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ABSTRACT 
This thesis at tempts to clurify the ccu-eer of one of the mm,t 
rem"i.rkablE-~ politicians in SCOt].illld's history, William Maitland of 
Lpthingion, Scotlond's MachiaVf~lll and Pr incJpal Secretary of State fr"om 
1558-73. His influence has lung oeen acknowledged but never adequately 
explained. This lhesi~; attempts Lo remedy that defect by investigating 
the source of MHHland's power, the Scottish Secretariat. The full 
extent of Maitland's respollsibiU ties are explained to show that he 
exemplifies the notion of thp sixteenth century not only as the age of 
the council and of the Secretary but also of the royal court. 
Maitland's consistent awareness of the wider Eur~opean dimension in 
which Scotland's affairs wen:' invariahly cast at. thjs timE - one of the 
major themes of this thesis - is Sf.:!€n to be due primarily to his 
control of foreign pOlicy through his position as Secretary. Maitland 
was the only Scottish representative present at the closlng stages of 
the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. It was Httle wonder that he was ablP 
to view Scotland's affairs in a wider context than most of hjs 
countrymen. 
The renaissance background of the Maitland family is traced in detail 
and is acknowledged as a major contributing factor to Maitlano's 
success in the government of Mary Stewar't, r'enaissance QUf~en of Scots. 
New light is shed on Maitland's involvement in all the major episodes 
thai so conspicuously colour his fifteen-year Secre1.arllit. Hjs role in 
the Reformat.lon cr"isis is critically eXtlmined and his articulation of 
the most radical unionism ever voiced by a pre-Union Scottish offtcial 
explained. Maitland's vol te-faC(~ foliowing his i.mm[~diatp realization of 
Mary's likely return in January 1561 is noted and thp. traditional notion 
of the amity from 1561-65 challenged. Maitland's leading role in the 
aUP-mpted coup d'etat of 1566, his major part in Mary's downfall in 1 ~67 
and his suhsequent leadership of the Queen's party is cr-Hically re-
appraised. 
Maitland's religious, political and cultural leanings are exam·lnp.d and 
the popular- notion of Maitland as an anglophile politique rejected in 
favour of an image more in keeping wHh the new evidence uncovered 
during the course of this research. The image of Maitland as Scotland's 
Machiavellj is refined. The crude image of Maitland as li Machiavelian 
BthtA.st and chameleon is rejected. Instead, the notion of Mflitland as a 
sophisticated political scientist, thoroughly acquainted with the 
principles of the Discourses and The Prin\.f~ and much else besides and 
drivf-~n by an over-riding regard for the commonweal is promoted. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MAITLAND AND THE GOVERNMENT 
Maitland's appointment as 'oure souverane lord and ladies secret are and 
keipar of all thair signets all the dayis of his life' on 4 December 
1558, following the death of David Paniter, bishop of Ross, was the 
single, most important development in his remarkable career.1 It was 
the solid and prominent base of the secretariat, one of the chief 
executive offices of state, that enabled him to play such a major role 
in almost all the dramatic domestic issues and intrigues which so 
conspicuously coloured his years of office. To a large extent, it was 
also responsible for Maitland's keen awareness of the wider, European 
dimension in which Scotland's affairs were conSistently cast during his 
fifteen-year tenure of office. The management of foreign policy -
traditionally the main aspect of the Secretary's craft ensured 
Maitland always kept a watchful eye over events outwith Scotland's 
borders and provided his entree to the turbulent stage of European 
politics. Maitland's Secretariat holds the key to an accurate 
understanding of his career and it is remarkable that earlier works on 
Maitland have made only passing mention to it, making no attempt to 
define the office or to assess the extent of its responsibilities. 2 This 
chapter will attempt to re-dress that deficiency by tracing the 
development and importance of the office and assessing Maitland's role 
in the government of Scotland. It is a quest that necessarily involves 
a discussion of the provenance and standing of the Maitland family in 
Scottish society, which, it is hoped, will provide a useful introduction 
to this study of Maitland's career. 
The significance of the office of Secretary in Sixteenth-century 
government has long since been acknowledged by historians. The century 
has been characterised as the 'age of the council and of the secretary' 
whilst ProfesscrElton refers to the Secretary as simply the keystone of 
the government at this time. 3 Certainly in Tudor England, the spectre if 
not the actual impact of men of the calibre of Stephen Gardiner, Thomas 
Cromwell, William and Robert Cecil and Francis Walsingham give a 
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spectacular and glamorous notion of the importance of the office. 
Similarly, the careers of the Perez brothers in Spain and the de 
l'Aubespine family in France test ify to the wider European significance 
of the office. Given this acknowledged importance it is is regrettable 
that so little has been written concerning the nature and history of 
the Scottish Secretariat. It is, however, generally reckoned that it is 
closely analogous to its English counterpart. 4 This comparison, while 
not being completely accurate is nonetheless worth pursuing and 
provides a good starting point for a brief investigation into the 
nature of the Scottish Secretariat at the time of Maitland's 
appointment. 
The Development of the Scottish Secretariat 
In both countries the office developed gradually out of the royal 
household and, from being virtually synonymous with the office of the 
keeper of the privy seal, grew into a much more important and 
independent office in its own right,S The earliest mention of the office 
occurs in 1360 when Robert of Dumbarton, elsewhere termed King's clerk, 
is termed Secretary. 6 The very close associat ion with and the gradual 
move away from the office is well charted in R K Hannay's Early History 
of the Scottish Signet. 7 It appears that the Scots were some fifty 
years behind the English in this development and it is in the early 
fifteenth-century that it becomes more common to find the Scots 
Secretary and Keeper of the Privy Seal listed separately in sederunts 
and exchequer rolls. From 8 June 1444, following the temporary 
recombination of the offices in the illustrious personage of William 
Turnbull, the offices were never held joint ly again. 8 That a very close 
association between the offices continued has been emphasised by the 
most recent study on Cardinal Beaton. This study also highlighted the 
need for a good working relationship between the royal administrators, 
when much 'business arrived in the privy seal office from that of the 
secretary and that a good deal of it passed on to that of the 
chancellor', 9 
While Beaton as Keeper of the Privy Seal took official precedence 
over the Secretary, who was keeper of the signet - the Secretary was 
actually put in possession of his office by the symbolic delivery of 
l1ai tJand ind the Government 3 
the signet to him - in practice, the importance of the office of Keeper 
waned as that of the Secretary and the signet grew. 1 0 By 1538, such 
was the growth of business in the council and the Court of Session 
that the signet was involved in, that quite apart from his actual 
deputies, the Secretary had a small legion of assistants including four 
chief clerks to the signet engaged under his direct supervision. 1 1 
During Maitland's tenure the office of keeper seemed to be in his gift. 
The appointments of Maitland's father, Sir Richard, as Keeper of the 
Privy Seal in 1562 and, on his resignat ion in 1567 of Maitland's 
younger brother, John, suggest this as well as underlining the close 
relationship between the two offices. 12 A further proof of the decline 
in importance of the privy seal was the relegation in 1596 of 
Maitland's nephew, Sir Richard Cockburn of Clerkington, from Secretary 
to Keeper of the Privy Seal as the Octavians' ascendancy was 
established. 13 This was a complete reversal of the earlier trend in the 
fifteenth-century when that same move represented a clear promotion in 
the royal administration. 14 
The Responsibilities of the Office 
The relatively advanced state of the English Secretariat is perhaps 
mirrored in Maitland's own time when the various responsiblilities, 
scope and nat ure of the respect ive offices are considered. The best 
evidence for this comes from the pen of Cecil himself, or Lord Burghley 
as he was, in September 1590. Writ ing to ~lait land's younger brother, 
John, Burghley recalled his: 
good understanding with Lethington your elder brother when we 
were both secretaries ... for memory's sake the old affection 
survives towards you his brother, a secretary as he was, though 
now also Chancellor which I take to be the office of Principall 
Secretary.1S 
To Burghley, his own responsibilities were greater than that of any 
previous Scottish Secretary and only the combined offices of the 
Secretaryship and Chancellorship matched the English office of 
Secretary. Yet perhaps the gulf was not so wide as he perceived it to 
be. At any rate, it was not so wide as to prevent contemporary 
comparisons between Secretaries in the two countries. 
In May 1569, the earl of Bothwell, languishing in captivity in 
Denmark, expressed the view that 'if the two secretaries in England and 
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Scotland were dead both realms would be better'.16 The common hatred 
of Bothwell was only one of the many things the English and Scot t ish 
Secretaries had in common. A more constructive comparison was offered 
in March 1565 by Paul de Foix, the French ambassador in London, to 
Guzman de Silva, his Spanish counterpart. He described Maitland as 'a 
sort of Scotch Cecil'.! 7 It is not difficult to see how easily the 
analogy could come to mind. Mait land later admitted to Cecil in 1565 
that 'sence the first begynning of our acqwentence I have ever set you 
before my eyes as a pat terne wyshing I myght con forme myself and all 
my act ions to the imitacion of yours'.l 8 Throughout his career Mait land 
referred to Cecil in deferential, filial terms, professing himself to be 
Cecil's obedient son and looking up to him as a father figure. 1 '1 Most 
probably, De Foix's analogy referred to the similar personal abilities 
and skills of Maitland and Cecil rather than to their duties and 
responsibilities as Secretaries per se. Yet, if this is the case, the 
comparison is st ill pert inent because of the at tent ion it draws to an 
issue which is fundamental to any discussiom concerning the nature of 
the Secretariat. This is the recognition of the essentially personal 
nature of the office. 
It is commonly accepted that it was the man who made the office, 
not the office the man. 20 This old axiom, however, must be qualified. It 
is impossible to believe that either Maitland or Cecil could have 
exerted the influence they did without their Secretarial office behind 
them and in this sense it was the office that made both Maitland and 
Cecil. It was, however, very much the case that the individual Secretary 
determined the nature, character and responsibilities of the office. 
There was not any fixed job description and there are good grounds for 
maintaining for Maitland as has been done for Cecil that his role as 
Secretary defied descript ion. 21 Secretaries appear to have enjoyed a 
certain amount of scope and initiative as far as direction of policy in 
a whole sphere of state affairs was concerned. As such, this lack of a 
precise job description tells as much by its absence as it could by its 
presence. There does, however, exist a most useful memo, writ ten by 
Robert Beale in late 1595 which is probably the most comprehensive 
survey of the English Secretary's duties. 22 
Beale, the brother-in-law of Francis Walsingham. cites an almost 
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exhaustive list of duties pertaining to the office and it is striking 
not only how many of these could be ascribed to Maitland but how many 
more could be added. For example, Maitland could have claimed, if not 
executive responsibility for, then at least a significant degree of 
involvement in border matters. A good deal of his correspondence 
throughout his career is taken up with disputes between English and 
Scot tish wardens and the borderers themselves. 2 3 As far as financial 
policy was concerned, Mait land in keeping with many of his predecessors 
in the post acted as an auditor of the royal accounts. 24 Various 
aspects of mercantile activity, particularly overseas trade also figure 
prominently in Maitland's correspondence. 2 S In ecclesiastical affairs, in 
both pre- and post- Reformation Scotland, the Secretary played an 
important role. Prior to the Reformation, the Secretary was closely 
involved with papal negotiations relating to such matters as the 
succession to benefices, while the key role Maitland played in ushering 
in the religious settlement of 1560 and then defending as Mary's 
minister, her right to worship as she wished, is well chronicled, 2 b 
Maitland played a prominent role in the evolution and administration of 
the thirds of benefices settlement whilst his prominence in the General 
Assembly - along with several other leading members of the privy 
council - was a striking feature of the developing Kirk.27 
It was, however, in his influence over foreign policy that Maitland 
had most in common with his English counterpart. He was employed by 
Mary of Guise on missions to the courts of Mary and Elizabeth Tudor 
and it was Maitland, present at the court of Henry II at the conclusion 
of the Cateau-Cambresis set t lement, who obtained Francis and Mary's 
ratification of the recently concluded Anglo-Scottish peace. 28 
Maitland's continued management of foreign policy under Mary Stewart is 
a major part of this thesis and it is perhaps sufficient to note here 
that it was a mark of his fall from Mary's favour in mid 1565-6 that 
control over foreign policy was taken out of his hands. 2 9 Mait land was 
no longer entrusted with missions to England as Mary followed an 
alternative foreign policy concentrating on the pursuit of a papal 
subsidy. 
There were of course many other responsibilit ies relat ing direct ly 
to the privy council, 'the supreme executive authority below the Crown, 
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with a general political competence that allowed it to intervene in 
almost any area of government'. 3 0 A royal decree of 1546 had made the 
Secretary's attendance at all meetings of the privy council mandatory. 
This seems to have been simply a confirmation of a long-established 
practice but it does give an indication of the growing importance of 
the office by the time of Maitland's tenure. Maitland's record of 
attendance at the council, which dealt with a host of business, public 
and private, administrative and judicial was exemplary. The rare 
occasions when he was not present in the council coincided with his 
employment elsewhere on other Secretarial business. 3 Z Unlike England it 
is not clear whether the Secretary prepared the agenda for the council 
but given that the council was known to meet in the Secretary's 
chambers it is possible that he did. 33 There may of course have been no 
established practice for this. The Scottish court and privy council 
appears, on the whole, to lack the rigidity of its English counterpart 
and because there were times when Maitland simply was not present in 
the council he cannot have monopolised the preparat ion of agendas. 3 4 
Yet during his tenure of the office, by a rough process of elimination, 
it is easier to imagine the industrious Maitland holding this 
responsibilty than anyone else. He is certainly a more plausible 
candidate than the noble Chancellor, who in the case of the fourth earl 
of Huntly was a very remote one as well. 3 S 
Similarly, the exact parliamentary responsibilities of the Secretary 
are not clear. It was not until 1567 that the Secretary, together with 
the other officers of state received membership of parliament as a 
distinct category.3 to Despite this uncertainty, it is clear that Maitland 
enjoyed a prominent parliamentary career. He seems to have taken over 
the Chancellor'S responsibilities in parliament, acting as Speaker or 
harangue-maker on three separate occasions, in 1560, 1564 and 1567. 37 
This in turn draws attention to a striking feature of Maitland's 
Secretariat - the lack of a dominant, ecclesia~Ucal Chancellor, which for 
centuries had been such a common feature of Scottish political life. 
Maitland took advantage of the lack of sympathy Chancellor Huntly felt, 
both for the Congregation and then for Mary on her return, to 
strengthen his influence. Morton, Hunt ly's successor I displayed a marked 
reluctance to perform in public at this time. His preference for being 
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the power behind the throne rather than in front of it arguably 
continued until 1572 when he finally became Regent; it was certainly 
evident in 1564 when Maitland delivered his parliamentary oration in 
favour of the Lennox restitution: 'having hir majesteis commandment to 
supply my lord chancellaris place being present lie as ye see 
diseasit'.38 The genuineness of Morton's indisposition was suspected, 
while in 1567, although Morton was again present it was the Secretary 
and not the Chancellor who addressed the parliament. 3 9 This informal 
extension of the Secretary's responsibilities provides an interesting 
precursor to John Maitland's later combination of the offices of 
Secretary and Chancellor under James VI. ... 0 As well as on occasion, 
helping to assemble the business of the parliament, Maitland was also 
part of several parliamentary commissions, as was his father, Sir 
Richard, the Keeper of the Privy Seal. ... 1 The most important of these 
was the committee to interpret the Law of Oblivion, on which Maitland 
sat five times .... 2 
Maitland's Predecessors In The Office 
Clearly, during Maitland's tenure the Scots' Secretariat was on a close 
par with its English counterpart. Yet the duties ascribed to Maitland 
could easily be ascribed, although not to the same extent, to many of 
his predecessors. Even in its embryonic stages, the position of 
Secretary commanded some status. Secretaries were not appOinted 
carelessly. It would appear that it was never given as a first 
appointment in the royal service .... 3 Even in the fourteenth century, one 
1s struck by the conSistently high calibre of the men associated with 
the office. Up until the mid-fifteenth century though, the office was 
clearly a useful stepping stone to positions of greater influence. The 
appointments of former Secretaries John Carrick, Duncan Petit, John 
Cameron and George Schoriswood to the position of Chancellor 
illustrates this point.... ... Similarly, the career of Bishop William 
Turnbull, humanist founder of Glasgow University bears the point out of 
earlier Secretaries exerting great influence in other spheres .... s 
Turnbull's career, draws attention to the strong tradition of 
humanist influence that has been held to be a hallmark of the 
developing Secretariat .... 6 This humanist influence has been dated from 
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Turnbull through to Archibald Whitelaw and Patrick Paniter but can be 
be strethed to include later secretaries such as Thomas Erskine, David 
Paniter and Maitland himself.47 Archibald Whitelaw personifies this 
humanist tradition: in 1437 a determinant of St Andrewsj he was awarded 
his MA in 1439 before moving on to Cologne University in the 1440's 
where William Elphinstone was a student under him.48 In 1454 he was on 
the St Andrews Faculty before being appointed tutor to James III. 4 9 His 
Oratio Scotorum ad Regem Ricardum Tertium at Nottingham in 1483 is 
generally reckoned to be the earliest extant piece of extended humanist 
prose to be composed by a Scot, mentioning as it does Cicero four 
times, Statius three, Virgil five, Seneca, Livy and Sallust once each.50 
Quite apart from these academic achievments, Whitelaw is significant 
among pre-Maitland Secretaries for the sheer length of his term of 
officej thirty-one years. It was in 1462 that he was appointed 
Secretary by Mary of Gueldres, a post he was to hold unt il 1493. 51 
Whitelaw has, however, been depicted as the most boring man in the 
fifteenth century and the Oratio as the only example of 'his emergence 
from the relative obscurity, routine and drudgery of his position.'52 
This may be true but as far as the Secretariat is concerned, Whitelaw's 
years unspectacular though they were count among the most 
significant for the office. The vast experience of Whitelaw, 'the 
perfect civil servant', established the Secretariat as an integral part 
of the royal administration. By the time he retired to his highly 
impressive library in 1493 he had laid the foundation which was to 
make possible the more spectacular achievements of his successors. 53 
Patrick Paniter, Secretary from 1506, was able to capitalise on 
Whitelaw's groundwork. 5 4 Far more ambitous than Whitelaw, Paniter 
successfully realised the potential which the post offered as a 
powerful influence on royal policy, during a tenure that could not, by 
any stretch of the imagination be described as drudge like or routine. 
Paniter provides a clear illustration of the influence of the Secretary 
and also of the benefits of loyal service to the crown. He received a 
great number of benefices through his favour with James IV, including 
Fet teresso, the vicarage of Kilmany, the chancellorship of Dunkeld, the 
archdeaconry of Moray, the rectory of Tannadice and the abbey of 
Cambuskenneth. 55 He also maintained the tradition of superbly erudite 
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Secretaries, having studied at Montaigu alongside Erasmus, John Major, 
George Dundas and Hector Boece. Paniter also followed in Whitelaw's 
footsteps as a royal tutor, being entrusted with the education of both 
Alexander and James Stewart. 56 
The Letters of James IV greatly illumine the extent of the 
Secretary's sphere of influence. 57 It is obvious from this vast 
collection of royal correspondence and actually at tested to by Nicholas 
West, Henry VIII's ambassador to Scotland, that 'the secretary doothe all 
with his maister'.s a Paniter has been termed a 'master of the 
secretary's craft '. He could: 
with equal facility, with an equal air of conviction turn a 
graceful compliment to a foreign princess, put off the demands of 
an importunate ally with expressions of deep affection which 
seeming to promise everything promised nothing, throw the cloak 
of piety over a peculiarly twisted simoniacal transaction or 
recite the grievances of merchant or mariner unaccountably 
thrown into some foreign prison or port. 59 
The same could be said for many other Scottish Secretaries. 
The growth of the importance of the Secretary's position is well 
test Hied by a number of incidents. In 1511, a let ter of James IV urged 
Pope Julius II not to give credence to any requests for ecclesiast ical 
preferment that did not bear Paniter's signature as well as his own.60 
His major role in foreign policy is perhaps best illustrated by his part 
in the Treaty of Rouen in 1517. 61 His efforts at Rouen also show that 
rumours of his death at the battle of Flodden in 1513 have been 
greatly exaggerated. 62 Paniter did direct the Scots artillery at the 
battle but escaped unharmed. After Flodden he vacillated between the 
Queen Mother and Albany with the result that both parties sought to 
depose him.63 Clearly by 1513 and particularly during a regency it had 
become a polit ical liability to have a Secretary who did not lend full-
hearted support to the regime. That Paniter was fully restored to 
Albany's confidence is clear from his role in the Treaty of Rouen but 
later political casualties of the Secretariat, such as Thomas Erskine 
and Henry Balnaves were not to be so fortunate. 
One further aspect of the Secretariat that comes to the fore during 
Paniter's tenure is the role played by assistant secretaries. Paniter's 
heavy involvement in foreign affairs necessitated long absences from 
Scotland. He was ably assisted by Laurence Telfer, who signed the royal 
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correspondence during his absence abroad and continued to do so after 
his death. b 4 Telfer held the right sort of credentials for the post, 
being later described as 'a man distinguished in Scotland for erudition, 
experience of affairs and outstanding ability' and by Buchanan as 'an 
honest and learned man'. b S The employment of assistants to the 
Secretary would appear to have been such a well-established practice, 
that from Thomas Erskine's appointment in 1524, the capacity of the 
Secretary to appoint his own deputies formed an inte gral part of his 
commission. The commissions of Erskine, Paniter and Maitland all made 
the provision for the Secretary 'to mak deputis ane or maa under him in 
the said office for exercing of the samyn in his absence'. b b It is not 
always clear who these assistants were but that they were at various 
times employed seems certain. 
Sir Thomas Erskine's tenure is the next - in chronological terms at 
least - which provides useful information concerning the nature of the 
office. He followed the rather brief tenures of Patrick Hepburn and 
Thomas Hay and is significant as the first lay Secretary for over a 
century.b 7 In this respect, coupled with his similar social status as a 
laird, Erskine makes an interesting forerunner to Maitland. He 
undoubtedly possessed the sound intellectual provenance that had come 
to be associated with the office. He was educated at Pavia and was 
later described by the Imperial ambassador as 'a wise man reported to 
have a great share in the affairs of Scotland'.b 8 Erskine survived the 
turbulent years of James' minority, being originally commissioned by 
Margaret and Arran and confirmed as Secretary by Angus to emerge as 
one of the key figures of James' personal reign. b 9 Erskine personified 
James V's reliance on minor lairds in his administration, which was 
further demonstrated by the appointments of Adam Otterburn as Lord 
Advocate, Robert Barton as Treasurer and Comptroller, and Sir James 
Colville of East Wemyss and David Wood of Craig. 70 
Just as The Letters of James IV shed light on the intense activity 
of Patrick Paniter as Secretary, The letters of James V and the Acts of 
the Lords in Council give valuable testament to the continued 
development of the post under Erskine. 7 1 He was very much involved in 
this impressively diverse correspondence which reveals that foreign 
policy, papal negotiations, overseas trade and the more mundane matters 
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of law and order all came under his auspices. Along with Cardinal 
Beaton, Erskine was heavily involved in James' attempts to secure a 
foreign bride whilst Erskine's Italian experiences have been held to be 
vital in the establishment of the College of Justice in 1532, arguably 
the most outstanding achievement of James V's reign. 7 2 It was certainly 
the single most important development, responsible both for the growth 
in importance of the office of Secretary and and the amount of 
business performed by the Secretariat. For the College was serviced by 
the writers and clerks to the signet who were all in turn responsible 
to the Secretary.73 These appointments were in the gift of the 
Secretary, the numbers of which had become so great, as to necessitate 
the foundation of the Society of Writers to the Signet in 1594.74 With 
this greatly increased responsibility it is hardly surprising that the 
Secretary superseded the Keeper of the Privy Seal in importance. 
Although at its inception in 1532, the Secretary was not a senator of 
the College of Justice, his free access to their deliberations was soon 
found to be essential and Erskine was duly appointed a Lord of Session 
in 1533. 75 All the future sixteenth-century Secretaries, Henry Balnaves, 
Maitland, Robert Pitcairn, John Maitland, Richard Clerkington, Balcarres 
and Balmerino with the exception of David Paniter were Lords of 
Session. 7 b While Maitland's own attendance at the Court of Session was 
not particularly impressive it was not uncommon for him to attend 
meetings of the privy council and the Court of Session on the same 
day.77 
Erskine's tenure sheds further light on the role of assistant 
secretaries and also the possible rewards of faithful service to the 
Crown. It was Erskine who was entrusted to secure for Laurence Telfer 
the benefice of St. Ninians in the parish kirk of Musselburgh in 1533. 
According to Erskine, Telfer was a 'faithful servant of James IV as he 
has been of James V' as well as a very good personal friend of his 
own.78 Erskine appears to have been served by several assistants, 
including James Strachan, who was styled 'a canon of Aberdeen and one 
of the royal secretaries'.7 9 Strachan was employed in such a capacity 
for a number of years and it was he who was styled Secretary at the 
first recorded meet ing of Mary's privy council in 1561 when Maitland 
was in embassy at the court of Elizabeth. 8 0 In 1537, Strachan was sent 
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to Rome to gain the Priory of St Andrews for the seven-year old, 
bastard James Stewart, the future Regent. It was in a way not envisaged 
by James V that his son fulfilled his promise 'some day to be should 
need arise a defender of the Christian faith'.6 1 The infant prior's 
fut ure conduct cannot have pleased Strachan, one of the few Catholic 
clergymen to make a positive stand for their faith during the 
Reformation crisis. Along with John LeSlie, Patrick Myreton and 
Alexander Anderson, Strachan gave a bold testimony of his faith before 
Knox, Willock and Goodman in January 1561. 62 
Erskine himself gained so spectacularly from his favour with James, 
in terms of influence and lands in Angus that the local balance of 
power was transformed at the expense of the traditional arbiters of 
power Crawford, Gray and Glamis. 63 It was hardly surprising that 
Erskine was one of the earliest casualties of the new regime following 
the death of James V. A let ter from the Governor Arran dated 10 
January 1543 addressed Erskine as Secretary but some ten days later 
David Paniter had received his commission to act as Secretary.84 Henry 
Balnaves briefly held the office in tandem with Paniter before becoming 
another political casualty of Arran, although not before he had helped 
introduce the parliamentary legislation permitting the reading of the 
Bible in the vernacular. On recovering from his so called 'godly fit' 
Balnaves was decisively dropped by Arran.8s 
David Paniter's career as Secretary would be of interest if only 
because he is Maitland's direct predecessor in the post. As it is, his 
Secretariat provided a continuation of the consistent development of 
the post discernible throughout the reigns of James III, IV and V. 
Paniter's origins are not precisely clear but the strongest evidence 
points to him being an illegitimate son of the former Secretary Patrick 
Paniter. Patrick apparently received papers of legitimation for David in 
1513. 86 This relationship provides the first, albeit indirect 
associations of nepotism with the office, which was very much a feature 
of the Secretariat in France, Spain, England and Scotland in Maitland's 
time. 
What is not in any doubt is that Paniter possessed the impressive 
intellectual provenance that had come to be associated with the office. 
Educated at Paris in 1526, he was a humanist companion of Buchanan, 
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with whom he remained friends for many years. 87 In 1545, he invited 
Buchanan to dinner in Paris and was keen to hear him in lecture in 
Greek but in later years, Buchanan - as he did to so many of his 
erstwhile friends - denounced Paniter.88 His abilities, however, are 
very much in evidence in the Epistolae Regum Scotorum, the second 
volume of which is reckoned to be almost entirely his own work and has 
won great praise. Ruddiman claimed that they could only have been 
written by 'a man imbued with elegant learning and also trained in the 
maxims of political wisdom. '89 
Like Maitland, who also fell foul of Buchanan after an earlier 
friendship, Paniter belongs to that less than exclusive band who fell 
foul of the pen of John Knox. Knox, gives a good insight to Paniter's 
service to the Governor and later to Mary of Guise. He recalled the 
high hopes of the godly on Paniter's arrival back in Scotland along with 
the then Abbot of Paisley in April 1543: 
For it was constantly affirmed of some that without delay the 
one and the other would occupy the pulpit and truly preach 
Christ Jesus. But few days disclosed their hypocrisy, for what 
terrors, what promises or what enchanting boxes they brought 
from France the common people knew not. 90 
Knox was to be bitterly disappointed and he later blamed Paniter as one 
of those responSible for Arran's speedy recovery from his Godly fit and 
for the fall from influence of such godly men as Henry Balnaves, Thomas 
Ballantyne, Sir David Lyndsay and Kirkcaldy of Grange. 91 By the time of 
his death Paniter had degenerated from a man of great promise into a 
'belly God' and 'Caiaphas' figure who died 'eating and drinking which 
along with the rest that there upon depends was the pastime of his 
life'.92 
There was, however, more to the life of David Paniter than eating 
and drinking. He was employed in the service of James V, being styled 
in 1534 'our daly servitour' and enjoyed royal support in gaining 
several benefices. 93 At various times he was the vicar of Carstairs, the 
rector of Kynell, the commendator of St Mary's Isle and Abbot of 
Cambuskenneth before finally being appointed to the Bishopric of 
ROSS.9~ While it was in foreign affairs that Paniter was chiefly 
employed, it was during his tenure that it was ordained in 1546 that 
the Secretary should always be present at meetings of the privy 
council. His involvement in foreign affairs was, however. immense. He 
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was sent to France in 1542 and 1543; in May 1545 he was sent to 
France, Germany and Hungary to renew the Burgundian alliance and was 
later sent as an envoy to both England and France during the Castilian 
crisis. In 1550 he was Scotland's representative at the Treaty of 
Boulogne.9 S 
His career as both ambassador overseas and Secretary provides an 
interesting barometrical guide to the fortunes both international and 
domestic of the House of Hamilton. Paniter probably owed his 
appointment to his 
career he seems to 
strong Hamilton connections and 
have been a loyal supporter 
throughout his 
of the Hamilton 
interest. 96 He was described as the 'governor's creature' when passing 
in embassy to London and France during the Castilian crisis but Paniter 
was no blind follower of the Hamilton interest and coped admirably with 
the changes of fortune wrought by the death of Francis I and the 
resultant Guisard ascendancy in France and Scotland. 9 7 He was able to 
play a vital role in the relatively smooth transition of power from 
Arran . to the Dowager for which the Abbey l'Abyse in Poitou was 
apparently his reward. 9 8 Paniter's continued commitment to the Hamilton 
cause is, however, demonstrated by his continued efforts to find a 
suitable marriage for the Earl of Arran after 1554, whilst reciprocally, 
Paniter's French interests seem to have been well served by Rassateau, 
the Lieutenant General of Chatelherault. 99 His continuation as Secretary 
to the Dowager, despite considering himself 'too old, heavy in mind and 
body, ill suited for the work he once did' was a measure of her 
political acumen. 1 00 She clearly perceived the need for a measure of 
continuity and experience in her government which provides further 
evidence, if it were needed, of the inaccuracy of Knox's memorable 
bovine analogy of a crown on Mary of Guise's head being, 'as seemly a 
sight as to put a saddle on the back of an unrewly COW'.1 01 
Maitland's Standing in Scottish Society 
The impressive careers of Maitland's predecessors, bear witness to the 
established significance of the post by the time of his appointment. An 
individual appointed Secretary in Scotland as in most European 
countries at this time - had the potential, given the almost constant 
association with high matters of state, to exert great influence in the 
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government of the day. The power vested in the Secretariat draws 
attention to the pertinent issue of Maitland's status in society. How 
did the son of the laird of Lethington come to occupy such a position 
of power? This is a question that has aroused much debate and one that 
raises important issues concerning the nature of Scottish society and 
the degree of social mobility available at this time. 
Much has been made of the notion of Maitland as one of the species 
of 'new men', the type who seem to proliferate in Tudor England and are 
at the heart of the 'new men for old' debate in Scottish history.l 02 
Maitland has been held to be representative of 'the new highly political 
class of lairds surrounding the capital' and in certain respects he 
exemplifies the rise of the lairds and the 'middling sort' generally. 1 03 
There can be no question that the Maitland family were a new, rising 
force and were yet to achieve their greatest days. The poetic advice 
Maitland was given by his father in The Laird of Lethingtounes Counsell 
To His Son Beand In The Court endorses this view, with its cautionary 
reminder that 'To governe all and reull be nocht our bent '.1 04 Those 
words were, however, a more accurate appraisal of the Maitlands' 
station in life in the mid-sixteenth century than by the end of it. By 
then both William and his younger brother John had shown that their 
'bent' was precisely to 'governe all and reull', John Maitland had been 
elevated to the peerage in 1590 and in 1624 his son John was created 
the first earl of Lauderdale. 1 0 S By this time too the Maitland family 
had established itself as one of the great legal dynasties that so 
dominate seventeenth-century Scottish society.106 In this sense the 
Maitland family in the sixteenth-century are antecedents not only of 
the rise of the lairds but also of the legal profession. 
This ennoblement of the Maitland family enables yet another parallel 
to be drawn between the English Secretariat and the Scottish, in 
particular to the elevation of William Cecil to the peerage. Both were 
classic examples of the development of a noblesse de robe. It should, 
however, be pointed out that Cecil's origins were a good deal more 
obscure than Maitland's.1 07 Although it is right to see Maitland as 
representative of the rise of 'new men' it would be wrong to get 
carried away with this notion. 1 08 Maitland was not low-born. 
Disparaging references to his social status are sparse. Despite Huntly 
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and Argyll's memorable challenge to meet Maitland in armed combat, 
'albeit Lethington be neither of quality nor blude equal unto us' and 
the image of John Maitland as a 'start-up', the Maitland family origins 
were not ignominious. 109 They can be traced back to the twelfth century 
and the Anglo-Norman era of settlement in Scotland. llo The name 
Maitland, or, in its earlier forms Mautalent or Maltalent has been 
identified as typically Norman and translates as evil genius. ll1 This is 
rather ironic when it is recalled that many of Maitland's contemporaries 
vituperatively held him to be just that: he is Bannatyne's and many 
other propagandists Michel Wylie and, Buchanan's Chameleon, capable of 
everything bar bravery and loyalty - virtues symbolised by the only 
colours the chameleon is incapable of camouflauging itself in, red and 
white. 1 1 2 To these and to many others, William Maitland of Lethington 
was truly a Maitland by nature as well as by name. 
The founder of the Maitland family of Lethington was the thirteenth 
century knight, Sir Richard Maitland, whose heroic exploits - mythical 
or not against the invading English armies in the Wars of 
Independence earned him a place in Gavin Douglas' Palice of Honour.1 1 3 
The Palice of Honour was itself a product of the sixteenth-century 
revival of the cult of chivalry. 1 1... From the early fourteenth century 
the Maitlands were allied in marriage to a number of impressive noble 
families including the Dunbars earls of March, the Keiths, earls 
Marischal of Scotland, the Scrym'8~ours, Constables of Dundee and 
perhaps of greatest significance for Maitland's own time, the lords of 
Seton. 1 1 5 Mait land's father proudly proclaimed himself a 'docteris son' 
of the House of Seton and the closeness of this connect ion was shown 
by his History of the House of Seton. 11 b The involvement of Maitland's 
ancestors in events of major national importance can also be shown. In 
1346, Sir Robert Maitland of Lethington was killed at the battle of 
Neville's Cross whilst in 1424, Robert Maitland was ransomed for 400 
merks as a hostage for James 1.117 The respective values placed on the 
hostages in 1424 gives a good indication of the status of the Maitland 
family. While clearly some way behind great nobles such as Athol who 
was ransomed at 1200 merks, Robert Maitland was on a par with Lords 
Ruthven, Livingston and Calder who were all rated at 400 merks.1 1 8 The 
military traditions of the family were upheld by Maitland's grandfather 
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who was one of the many to fall at the bat t Ie of Flodden in 1513,1 1 9 
While not going so far as the anonymous sixteenth cent ury poem In 
Prayse of Lethington when it asks: 
Quha dois not knaw the Maitland Bluid 
The best in all this land 
In quilk sumtyme the honour stuid 
And worship of Scotland? 
The Maitland family, were, by the sixteenth century clearly a well 
established force in East Lothian and Scottish society,120 
It must also be stated that Maitland's appointment as Secretary 
represented no great break with tradition, As well as the argument that 
'there was nothing less new than new and lesser men in royal 
government', the careers of Mait land's predecessors, Thomas Erskine, the 
son of the fourth laird of Dun, and the rather more short-lived 
Secretariat of Henry Balnaves of Halhill show that Maitland was an 
example of a trend of employment that was at the very least some 
thirty-years old,l 21 The dangers, however, of over-excessive use of 
lesser men in government had been shown in 1488, whilst Erskine's 
untimely fall from power in 1543 and the difficulties John Maitland 
later encountered show that the 'new man' tag was still a dangerous 
one. 1 22 It was perhaps a tribute to Maitland's skill that he 
successfully avoided being depicted as a parvenu or 'start-up', It was 
pOSSibly because he was aware of the dangers of such an image in what 
was essentially a conservative society that Maitland so frequently 
emphasised and appealed to traditional notions of the role of the 
nobility and the commonweal. His insistence on the importance of rank, 
tradition, quality, degree and blood were particularly evident during 
the post 1570 period of the civil war.1 23 Maitland's ultimate allegiance 
in the civil war adds a rather paradoxical perspective to Sir Henry 
Killigrew's analysis of Scottish society and the reason for the King's 
party's victory in 1573: 'Methinks I see the nobleman's great credit 
decay in this country and the barons, boroughS and such like take more 
upon them ',1 24 It is ironic that Killigrew was not, in this instance, 
referring to Maitland, who is sometimes held to be the 'new man' 
personified, and who had definitely taken 'more upon' himself than most. 
l1aitland and the Government 18 
The Circumstances of Maitland's Appointment 
Although it was December 1558 when Maitland was appointed Secretary it 
was some years before this that he was appointed assistant to David 
Paniter. This assistantship was his major breakthrough into high 
political circles and his successful acqui~l of the task virtually 
assured him of the post on Paniter's death. The circumstances of 
Maitland's appointment as assistant to Paniter, and particularly the 
fact that the nobility appear to have lobbied Mary of Guise on his 
behalf, show that both in terms of his status and ability Maitland was 
held to be fit to hold the post. 1 2 S In this sense Maitland's appOintment 
belonged to the ordinary rather than extraordinary scheme of things. 
Most of the information regarding Maitland's assistantship stems from 
the not impartial pen of his son by Mary Fleming, James. Although his 
Narrative needs to be treated cautiously, most of its leading 
propositions concerning this incident can be corroborated by Buchanan 
and Paniter's own correspondence. 12b 
The Narrative relates how David Paniter, when Maitland was aged 
twenty-six, became 'extreme corpulent and unable of bodie and extreme 
seikle'. It goes on to detail the Dowager's regret at the loss of such 
an able servant and her decision, because of the lack of a suitable 
Scots candidate, to appoint a Frenchman to the post. It was at this 
juncture that her council reminded her that there were Scots, 'some of 
qualitie and birth fit and capable of that or a better place and able 
if thai were imployit to discharge that place no less than anie that 
had injoyit it before' ,1 27 Buchanan relates that it was the part icular 
efforts of his former pupil, Gilbert, third earl of Cassillis and then 
Treasurer and Lord James his future patron, that secured Maitland's 
appointment.128 The Narrative emphasises more the part played by 
Paniter along with Cassillis in persuading the Regent to consider 
Mait land, being 'of ane ancient and verye well deserving familie and of 
great expectacioun everye waye', The same authority also states that 
Mait land magnanimously refused the post 'be reason it was ane uther 
man his place and office' but 'being earnestly desyrit als weI by the 
Regent, nobles and Panter' he accepted. In the best hagiographical 
traditions, however, the Narrative claims that Maitland did not take any 
of the fees or profits from the office unt il after Paniter's death.l 2 9 
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Undoubtedly, the movements of Maitland's father, Sir Richard, in 
influential circles in and around the court greatly enhanced his son's 
prospects of preferment and enabled him to be so strongly recommended 
for the post as Paniter's assistant. By the 1550s, Sir Richard, the 
celebrated poet and lawyer, could boast useful connections. While it is 
true that Sir Richard benefited enormously from his son's future 
prominence - his appointment as Keeper of the Privy Seal can be put 
down to this - the esteem in which he was held, ensured that the 
traditional pattern of the father paving the way for the son and easing 
his passage to court was not entirely lost. James VI spoke in 1584 of 
Sir Richard's loyal sevice to 'his grandsir, goodsir, goodame, mother and 
himself' although it is not precisely clear what favour he enjoyed with 
James V.l 30 The claim that he was appointed a Lord of Session as early 
as 1533 is to be doubted. 1 31 The strongest authority states that he 
was admit ted as an extraordinary Lord in 1551 and an ordinary Lord in 
1561. 132 He had, however, acted as an assize judge as early as 1525 and 
this 'docteris son' of the house of Seton was certainly heavily employed 
by Mary of Guise and the Governor Arran. 133 In 1552 he had been 
employed along with the Earl of Cassillis and Drumlanrig as a 
commissioner for the Division of the Debatable Land and, along with 
Cassillis and Paniter was an auditor of the royal accounts for the 
period October 1554 to October 1555. 1 3 ~ In 1559 he signed the Treaty 
of Upsettlington and was regarded by Sir Ralph Sadler as the 'wisest 
man' amongst the Scots commissioners. 13s 
Maitland's Academic Background 
Not only was William Maitland's social status not inappropriate for the 
post, he was also able to maintain the tradition of academic excellence 
associated with the office. Probably educated at Haddington Grammar 
school, it is known for certain that he was educated at St Leonard's 
College in 1540 - where he may have been one of the many to imbibe of 
the Protestant 'well' - and Paris in 1542 respectively.1 3 b 1542 was a 
bumper year for Scots in Paris with over fifty Scots entering the 
uni versit y along with Mait land on 16 December 1542 including: Quint in 
Kennedy, the Catholic apologist; Kirkcaldy of Grange's younger brother, 
Thomas; Maitland's cousin, George, the future fifth lord of Seton; James 
Naitland and the Government 20 
Hamilton, probably the future Bishop-elect of Argyll and half-brother of 
Chatelherault; Robert Pitcairn, Maitland's successor as Secretary and 
William Roberton, the future schoolmaster of Edinburgh who was to cause 
the reformers so much trouble. 1 37 Maitland was no doubt helped by the 
fact that his kinsman William Cranstoun, the staunchly Catholic, future 
Principal of St. Salvator's College was elected 'Scotus Rector' in 
1542. 136 Given the acknowledged strength of the 'auld Parisiane 
kyndnes'l 3 ~ between the students which later often transcended 
theological differences, the importance of Maitland's years in Paris 
from a personal as well as an academic point of view should not be 
underest imated. 
The recognition of Maitland's attendance at St. Andrews and Paris, 
however, gives only a minimal notion of the breadth and depth of his 
learning. It seems likely, although not certain, that he was educated 
elsewhere in Europe but his movements from 1542 until 1550 are 
unknown. Maitland was almost certainly familiar with Italian literature 
whilst the classical allusions which garnish his correspondence display 
his knowledge of Greek. 140 Less remarkable but essential for the 
acquittal of his Secretarial duties was his ability to 'commune weill' 
in Latin and French. Similarly, his ability to communicate perfectly in 
both English and Scots must have been a useful asset in the acquittal 
of both domestic and foreign policy. 1 41 Quite apart from his linguistic 
abilities, Maitland, for a layman, was exceptionally well-equipped 
theologically. He was to prove a more than able opponent in debate with 
Knox on solid theological grounds, able to quote scriptural chapter and 
verse as well as the opinions of reformers such as Musculus, 
Melancthon, Bucer, Calvin and Luther.1 4 2 Philosophically, Maitland 
rejected the 'untractable discipline in the Stoickes' prefering instead 
to be 'a student in that schole where it is taught that wyse mens 
myndes must be ledde by probable reasons which doctrine the disciples 
of Plato and Aristotle have embraced'.1 43 This same preference for 
flexible reasoning is evident in Maitland's regard for the practicality 
of the Roman 'jurisconsults' and their awareness that 'the cawses, 
tymes, places, persons, occasions, and other circumstances where the 
variacion of the leaste of all the circumstances wolde vary the whole 
decision '.1 44 As well as being well acquainted with the classics, 
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Maitland was also familiar and comfortable with the 'new learning', as 
his friendship with the Italian Protestant and humanist client of the 
earl of Bedford, Pietro Bizarri shows. 14s 
Regrettably, no record of Maitland's library survives but it must 
have been an impressive collection. The absence of this information is 
made more frustrating by the frequent allusions to his genius by 
contemporaries and later commentators alike. Even Maitland's staunchest 
critics testify to his academic brilliance. To Elizabeth he was 'the 
flower of the wits of Scotland'.1 4 II To Buchanan, his most savage critic 
he was nonetheless a man 'of consummate ability',l 47 Calderwood refers 
to him as 'a man of rare witt',l 48 whilst Spottiswoode relates that he 
was 'a man of deep wit, great experience and one whose counsels were 
held in that time for oracles',l 49 Robert Sempill, a bitter critic of 
Buchanan-like proportions seemed grudgingly to respect this 'scurvie 
scholar of Machiavelli's lair' and his ability to 'both quissil and cloik 
and his mouth full of meil'.1 so 
Maitland's ASSistantship, 1554-58 
The exact date of Maitland's appointment as Paniter's assistant is 
difficult to date precisely. It was, it is likely, sometime during 
December 1554, or early 1555 shortly after Paniter's return form France 
but Maitland's uncertain date of birth hinders exactitude on this 
point,1 51 The generally accepted date for Maitland's birth is 1528 and 
given that Maitland is found regularly receiving a royal pension from 
1555-6 in the Treasurer's Accounts - being awarded £150 in September 
1555 - and the Narrative claims Maitland was appointed when he was 
aged 26, it does seems that it took place sometime in late 1554. 1 S 2 
While this may have been the case, to accept Maitland's birth as 1528, 
means that he was only twelve years old when a student at St. Leonards, 
and only fourteen when he studied abroad in Paris. Even allowing for 
the fact that sixteenth-century university students were much younger 
than their modern counterparts, fourteen does seem to be a lit t le too 
young for a boy to be embarking on the second phase of his university 
education. 1 53 Perhaps Maitland's date of birth should be put back a 
couple of years to 1526 but again this is supposition rather than fact. 
More precise details of Maitland's assistantship have been 
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forthcoming from a most obscure source. An entry for 1597, in the 
'Genealogies of the Families of Fife' reveals that on his appointment as 
assistant, Maitland became the first ever clerk to the council and 
gained immediate access to the privy council. 1 S 4 The brief entry is 
quoted in full below: 
The Secretary of state has two deputes, the one is the clerk of 
the council of which the first w~s William Maitland, afterward 
Secretary, then John Johnston then Alexander Hay and now John 
Androw. They got 12 livres 10 shillings monethly from the 
Treasurer. The other depute to the chief Secretary was properly 
such and received from the secretary, 40 livres a year and from 
the Treasurer 60 livres, which furnished him paper, ink and waxe 
and he had the profit of the signet worth 50 livres. Both of 
them attend the court and have bouche en courte. 
It is not clear whether Maitland ever became Paniter's chief deputy or 
remained clerk of the council until 1558, but it is obvious that his 
assistantship enabled him to gain vital experience of the royal 
administration and the opportunity to establish himself firmly in the 
Dowager's credit. Maitland did not waste the opportunity. By November 
1557 it was reported that Maitland 'was great with the dowager'15S and 
by 1559, Count de Feria reported to Philip II, that the 'common talk' in 
London was that Maitland ruled the Dowager 'body and soul',l S I> 
The Treasurer's Accounts of February 1555 reveal Maitland's 
involvement with the financial administration of the Crown, An entry 
details how two messengers were: 
to pas throucht the haile northe with the Quenis grace misivis 
to evir ilk lord laird bischope baron and broucht is with let ters 
to charge thame to bring thair taxt as William Maitland gaif 
information at the Quenis grace command. 1S7 
Given Paniter's alleged involvement in the controversial tax proposal to 
raise a standing army this entry may have concerned that episode. This 
however is only speculation. A further entry in the June of the 
following year relates that Maitland was 'directed to pas to the 
warden is of the eist marches of Ingland in ambastrie', which was 
possibly the first of many such missions throughout his career. 1S8 
Several other episodes show Maitland's proximity to the heart of the 
Dowager's government. In 1557 he was involved with Mary of Guise's 
at tempts to support the French war against Spain. According to the 
Narrative Maitland was sent by the Regent from Kelso to persuade the 
nobles to support the attempt of her Lieutenant, D'Oysel to besiege 
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Wark Castle. The mission was a complete failure and Maitland was 
apparently in some danger of his life from the anger of the nobility 
headed by Chatelherault, Huntly and Argyll who refused to obey their 
orders.l 5 </ Maitland's continued credit with the Dowager was revealed by 
a letter of Lord Wharton dated 14 November 1557. 160 This letter 
detailed her anger at the refusal of Chatelherault, Huntly and Argyll to 
support the military offensive against England and her intention to be 
avenged by promoting the restitution of the Lennox family to Scotland. 
Interestingly and in some cases rather ironically, the letter records 
the support of Lord James, Glencairn, Kirkcaldy of Grange, the Bishop of 
Caithness, Seton, Craigmillar and Maitland for the scheme. This provides 
an early reminder that attitudes towards Lennox - as with so much else 
in Scotland - seldom remained constant. 
Wharton's letter shows the disparate state of the Scottish nobility 
and it is striking to see so many later principal supporters of the 
Congeregation at odds with each other at the time of the First Bond. 
Maitland's triumph in his later work for the Congregation was not only 
his securing of English aid but his ability to harness the damaging 
factionalism that was such a feature of Scottish political life in this 
period. Randolph's comment of April 1560 that 'I never saw in any 
country so many private quarells causing men that mortally hate the 
Frenche to keepe off' bears witness to the magnitude of Maitland's 
achievement in this respect. 16t Incidentally, Wharton's letter also 
draws attention to some of the men with whom Maitland was to be 
associated for the rest of his life. Although not always in agreement 
with him, Maitland was often closely involved with his kinsman Seton, 
while Simon Preston of Craigmillar, who was related by marriage to 
Maitland, was to prove a most useful ally in the years ahead. 1 62 It is 
also striking to see Maitland acting in concert with Lord James at this 
early date. This thesis will chart the development of their dynamic 
partnership and its collapse into bit ter enmity. Perhaps most striking 
of all, however, is the sight of Maitland, at the onset of his political 
career acting in unison with Kirkcaldy of Grange, the man with whom he 
was to end his life in 1573. 
One last episode which illustrates Maitland's favour with Mary of 
Guise was the attempted embassy to England and France in February 1558 
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with Yves de Rubay, another of the Dowager's chief advisers, in an 
effort to mediate a peace. This mission, however, was doomed to failure 
given Mary Tudor's festering anger over the loss of Calais and Maitland 
reached no further than London. 1 03 Maitland was later to allude to this 
mission when he recalled how he had worked for the unity of the realms 
in 'Queen Mary's time though frustrated'.1 04 In view of his rising 
credit and diplomatic experience, it is surprising that Maitland was not 
chosen for the ill-fated commission which was sent to witness the 
marriage celebrations of Mary and Francis in April 1558, although the 
failure of his negotiations in London just two months earlier may have 
had something to do with this.1 6 S Maitland, however, was no doubt happy 
to keep the most conspicuous absentee from the wedding celebrations -
the mother of the bride - company in Scotland and even more so when 
four of the commissioners failed to ret urn alive. 1 60 Through all this 
employment in the Dowager's service Maitland gained not only valuable 
experience but also, as the Narrative pointed out many 'private friends' 
in influential places. It can have occasioned little surprise when he 
was appointed Paniter's successor.1 0 7 
The Importance of the Court 
The fact that Maitland's assistantship to Paniter not only gave him 
access to the council but also bouche en courte is a reminder that if 
the sixteenth century was the age of the council and the Secretary, it 
was also the age of the court. This has been emphasised in much recent 
research on the English court and many of the lessons learned from 
this hold true for Scotland. 108 This is particularly so given the 
recognition of the glittering renaissance court of Mary Stewart which 
developed the progress made by her forebears, and the acknowledged 
importance and size of the Queen's household. 1 69 One of the main 
consequences of this new research has been the blurring of previously 
clear-cut distinctions between the court and the council, and courtier 
and councillor. 1 70 It is not difficult to see why. In the early modern 
period, power and influence was vested in the monarchy and the most 
important fact of political life was access to the monarch 'who alone 
could fulfil or frustrate ambition'.1 71 That access was chiefly gained 
by presence at the court.1 72 In this sense the Secretary by virtue of 
l1al tJand and the Government 25 
his bouche en courte held a clear geographical advantage over many of 
his contemporaries; he had access to the monarch in abundance. The 
business of the council in Scotland, as in England was conducted chiefly 
in chambers which were an integral part of the court.1 73 It even 
appears that the council met in Maitland's own chamber, for in August 
1565, Knox relates that he: 
was commanded to come to the Council, where in the Secretary's 
chamber, were convened the earl of Atholl, the Lord Ruthven, the 
Secretary, the Justice-Clerk, with the Advocate. There passed 
along with the Minister a great number of the most apparent men 
of the Town. 1 74 
As Secretary, Mait land, in common with the rest of the privy council, 
had to be able to operate in the twin spheres of court and council. 
Like any other subject seeking influence, a privy councillor had to be 
able to acquit himself well at court. Part of the reason for Maitland's 
success as Secretary in advising, formulating and executing policy was 
his easy familiarity with the renaissance ambience of the court. 
Mait land was a highly skilled court ier, equally at home in the 
stimulating, intellectual climate of the court and the more energetic, 
equine pursuits of hawking, hunting and running at the ring. Throughout 
his career Maitland took a full part in the masques and celebrations of 
the court and was also a card-playing companion of the Dowager. 1 7 S 
That the dist inct ion bet ween court ier and councillor was obviously a 
fine one was emphasised by the contemporary denunciation of Maitland's 
brother John, as 'that great courtier'.1 76 While there is no evidence 
that Maitland shared Robert Cecil's extremely courtly view of the 
relationship between the Secretary and the monarch as 'the mutual 
affection of two lovers undiscovered to their friends',1 7 7 his constant 
access to the Queen must have necessitated a certain degree of 
intimacy. This personal, intimate nature of the office is perhaps 
highlighted by Maitland's almost constant presence on Mary's progresses 
throughout the realm. Wherever Mary went, more often than not Maitland 
went too. This was hardly surprising given Maitland's basic 
responsibility for drafting the royal correspondence. 178 
Maitland was able to acquit himself so well at court because of the 
impressive cultural background of his family. The Maitlands of 
Lethington in the sixteenth century can unreservedly be described as a 
renaissance family. The credit for this lies chiefly through the 
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influence of his father, Sir Richard the respected judge, privy 
councillor, poet and family historian. It is only in recent times that 
Sir Richard's poetry has been rescued from the savage treatment of 
historians and literary critics alike and received the critical acclaim 
it deserves. 179 His poetry has long since been 'more quoted than 
appreciated' but has begun to be recognised for the skilful, subtle and 
artistic work that it is. Sir Richard Maitland was one of the greatest 
collectors of poetry, both English and Scots and was clearly influenced 
by the poets whose work he collected. The influences of Chaucer, Dunbar 
and Lyndsay are clearly discernible and it was probably from his father 
that Maitland inherited his own appreciation of Chaucer. 1 a 0 Sir Richard 
was as well able to follow the example of the classics such as Horace 
as he was to adapt to contemporary trends in literature. lal His 
religious lyric Pastyme With Godlie Cumpane was in keeping with the 
fashion best exemplified in the Gude and God lie Ballat is of 
transforming secular works into a more sacred form. It has been argued 
however that 'none of the God lie Ballatis' succeeds in this 
transformation as well as Sir Richard. 182 
All Sir Richard's sons inherited his literary skills. Although 
Maitland, unlike his brothers John and Thomas did not - so far as it is 
known - publish any poetry or satirical pasquinades, his voluminous 
diplomat ic correspondence is amongst the most skilful and brilliant of 
his day. Sir Richard has been acknowledged as a master of rhetoric and 
of the art of ironic understatement and those same traits are clearly 
identifiable in his son's correspondence from 1558 to 1573. 163 The 
literary efforts of Maitland's brothers are considered in a later 
chapter dealing with the propaganda of the civil war but perhaps at 
this point it is interesting to note that Thomas addressed his Latin 
justification of war against the Turks to his elder brother William. 184 
The Erasmian-like religious tolerance of Sir Richard which 
Maitland cannot but have been exposed to - was a useful preparation 
for life in the court of Mary Stewart, which provided a paradoxical 
Catholic focus for a Protestant country. In 1546, after accommodating 
George Wishart at Lethington shortly before his martyrdom, Knox 
described Sir Richard as 'ever civil albeit unpersuaded in religion' and 
it is clear that his sympathies were not with the reformers. l 8 S Sir 
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Richard, like his Catholic kinsmen the Setons had close connections with 
the constantly devout and virtuous Convent of St Catherine of Siena at 
Sciennes, outside Edinburgh. He did not join the Congregation and was 
strongly critical of the post-Reformation Church in his poetry.186 
Unlike his father, Maitland was no Catholic but despite the initial 
success Knox enjoyed in converting Maitland to Protestantism his 
religious convictions were hardly Knoxian either. It is not known 
whether Maitland was present when Wishart stayed at Lethington in 1546 
but in 1555, at what could be termed a meeting of the privy kirk in the 
house of Erskine of Dun, in the company of John Willock, David Forrest 
and Robert Lockhart, Knox appr~ntly persuaded Maitland of the 
sinfulness of his continued attendance at the Mass. 1 87 This thesis will 
show that the harmony of the privy kirk in 1555 was not an accurate 
portent for the future of the Knox-Maitland relationship. While the 
level of Maitland's religious tolerance was closely related to political 
circumstances, he did however, share his father's civility to those of 
different religious views. His relationship with Mary arguably shows 
this, as does his friendship with the many Catholics within his 
immediate family circle - such as the Somervilles and Setons as well as 
William Cranstoun, Principal of St Salvator's College - and those 
outside it such as Archbishop Beaton and Nicholas Sanders.1 88 In these 
and in so many other intangible ways, the renaissance environment in 
which the Maitlands were raised must have greatly assisted the rise of 
the family in the court and government of Mary Stewart, renaissance 
Queen of Scots. It was also true of others in Mary's government in the 
1560s. Sir John Bellenden of Auchnoule, her Justice-Clerk, belonged to a 
family which had strong links with the renaissance patronage of the 
court of James V.189 
Maitland, by virtue of his position as Secretary and as a Lord of 
Session, had access to and exerted great influence over the chief 
organs of government in Scotland: the pdvy council, parliament and the 
College of Justice. If the watchful eye Maitland kept over the General 
Assembly of the Kirk - it is known for certain that he attended six 
Assemblies - is added to the unquantifiable importance of his ready 
access to the Queen by virtue of his almost constant presence at the 
court, then the scope of Maitland's influence begins to emerge. 1 90 This 
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thesis will attempt to chart the development and use of that influence. 
The next chapter will show how during the Reformation crisis, Secretary 
Maitland was perfectly placed to play the role of double-agent at the 
expense of the Dowager and to the great benefit of the Congregation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MAITLAND AND THE REFORMATION CRISIS 
1558-1560 
I cannot sing for the vexatioune 
Of Frenche men and the Congregatioune 
That hes made trouble in this natioune 
And monie bair bigging 
In this new yeir I sie bot weir 
Na caus thair is to sing. 1 
35 
In the light of much recent historical research the traditional picture 
of the Scottish Reformation crisis has been transformed. In the words 
of one scholar, 'facile assumptions concerning the irretrievable decay 
of Catholicism and the irresistible rise of Protestantism' have been 
'consigned to oblivion'.2 A thorough appraisal of Maitland's role in 
these years adds considerably to the further delineation of a realistic 
picture of the Scottish Reformation crisis and it is striking how many 
of the issues raised by this recent research are encapsulated in 
Maitland's own political thought and conduct at this time. 
Maitland for example personifies the complex dichotomy between . 
religion and politics which has been largely ignored by the more 
confessional school of historians. He was also critically aware of the 
crucial internat ional dimension of the Scot t ish crisis: cognisant that 
the Scots' struggle was inevitably bound up with the wider diplomatic 
complex involving England, Spain and France which itself was 
conSistently sharpened by SWift-moving events in international 
relat ions from mid-1558 onwards. Perhaps more than any other 
part icipant in the crisis, Mait land appreciated that while the Lords of 
the Congregat ion could benefit from Scot land becoming the cockpit of 
European diplomacy it also made it far less likely that they would be 
able to control their own dest iny. Mait land was also the most 
consistent and efficient Scottish advocate of the amity with England, 
working tirelessly to procure the union of the realms and proving 
himself to be closely in tune with the 'British' dimension of William 
Cecil's early foreign policy.s These brief examples provide a glimpse of 
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Maitland's grasp of a whole series of political nettles which this 
chapter will seek to highlight. In so doing, it is hoped to contribute 
to a better understanding of Maitland's personal political development, 
providing evidence for how he viewed in these early years, issues which 
were to remain firmly on the Scot t ish polit ical agenda for the next 
decade. 
Maitland's Undercover Support For The Congregation 
Maitland had been appointed successor to David Paniter on 4 December 
1558 and it was in the last days of October 1559, almost two years 
since the First Bond of the Lords of Congregation that Maitland was to 
finally defect openly to the Congregation's side, deserting the Regent 
at Leith.4 Yet it was long before October 1559 that Maitland had begun 
to serve the Congregation's interests as well as those of Mary of 
Guise. It may even have been prior to his appointment as Secretary that 
Mait land embarked upon this duplicitous course, although to try and 
date this precisely is to enter into inconclusive speculation. 
Interestingly, Spottiswoode refers to Maitland, along with Sandilands of 
Calder and the famous five signatories to the First Bond, as being one 
of the principal advocates of religious reform in 1558. s If 
Spot t iswoode is correct it provides not only further evidence of the 
Dowager's reputation for employing a degree of religious tolerance at 
this stage but also of the irony with which so much of the 
Congregation's history is riddled. For it is striking that two of the 
Congregation's earliest and eventually most influential supporters, 
namely Morton and Maitland, saw fit to remain in the Dowager's service 
longer than most - in the case of Morton, markedly longer than most. 6 
The coincidence of Maitland's appointment as Secretary with the 
Elizabethan accession in England should be noted. The significance of 
the death of Mary Tudor is often ignored by historians in accounts of 
the Reformation crisis in Scotland yet the death of the militantly, 
Catholic Mary had many repercussions north of the border. It 
jeopardised the poliCY of toleration that the Dowager had been able to 
employ. While Elizabeth's Protestantism may always have been a 
disappointment to her more zealous subjects this did not prevent the 
London mob in Fleet Street welcoming the daughter of Anne Boleyn as 
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the Deborah of the North, a theme which permeated her coronation 
pageants. 7 Elizabeth was not unequivocally Protestant but she did 
represent the unequivocal hopes of Protestantism. To the Dowager, the 
growth of Scottish Protestantism was much less threatening with a 
Catholic 'auld enemy' than it was after November 1558. Is it just chance 
that the rising of the religious temperature in Scotland and the first 
clear signs of Maitland's involvement with the Congregation coincides 
with the collapse of the Marian regime in England? 
There can be little doubt that Maitland played some part in the 
remarkable Border conference of January 1559 between Chatelherault and 
Sir Henry Percy.8 This is generally accepted as being the first 
tentative step towards the renewing of an Anglo-Scottish alliance that 
was to culminate in the Treaty of Edinburgh of July 1560. It is clear 
that from this point Maitland acted as an undercover agent for the 
Congregation whilst in the pay and service of the Regent. 9 Maitland was 
to play the role of double-agent throughout his career with 
considerable finesse. Despite others falling under the increaSing 
suspicion of the Dowager and her French advisers, no evidence survives 
to show that Maitland was unable to cleanly cover his tracks before his 
eventual defection. 
Several aspects of Maitland's duplicitous conduct are worthy of 
comment. It should be of no surprise that a realist like Maitland did 
not openly defect earlier to the Congregation. Throughout his career 
Maitland was motivated by a very strong self-preservatory instinct and 
was not the sort to commit himself prematurely to a hazardous course 
while other opt ions remained open. This can clearly be seen in his 
absence from the ranks of the Chaseabout lords in 1565 and again in 
his very late departure from Mary in 1567. 1 0 In 1559 he was acutely 
aware of the Congregation's inherent weakness and their poor prospects 
of success without English aid. The Congregation themselves, confessed 
as late as July 1559, their inability independent of English assistance 
to achieve their objectives, lamenting, 'How we be able to accomplish 
these premisses is to us unknown'. 1 1 It is perfect ly tenable to maintain 
that it was only when Maitland's life was in danger in October 1559 
that he finally committed himself to the Congregation's cause. Certainly 
at any time prior to this Mait land could have abandoned his covert 
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support for the Congregation without even needing to seek a 
rapprochement with Mary of Guise. 
It must, however, be acknowledged that Maitland was a lot more use 
to the Congregation in this underground capacity than he would have 
been as an open advocate of their cause. Maitland was no great noble 
like the earl of Argyll, who could promise thousands of men in the 
field, but a skilled diplomat ist whose value and kudos to the 
Congregation lay in his position as Secretary. Maitland was the only 
favourer of the Congregation's cause in a Scottish executive dominated 
by the French. D'Oysel, De Rubay and Villemore occupied the other chief 
executive offices of state, whilst the positions of Treasurer and 
Chamberlain were left deliberately vacant. 12 By virtue of his access to 
the highest political circles of the Scottish, English and French courts, 
Maitland was able to add respectability and credibility to the 
Congreg a t ion's cause. It was this, that was Maitland's major 
contribution to the Congregation, both before and after his open 
defection to their cause. Knox was for once guilty of an understatement 
when he referred to Maitland, his replacement as manager of the civil 
affairs of the Congregation in 1559, as 'a man of better judgement and 
greater experience'.13 There could have been few who were better 
qualified than Maitland to front the Congregation's cause. 
The cautious realism evident in Maitland's long delay in joining the 
Congregation's ranks is also manifest in England's own hesitant 
acceptance of the Congregation's invitation to intervene in Scotland. 
Cecil was in no doubt of the marvellous opportunity the Congregation's 
rising offered England to improve dramatically their own desperate 
situation. He was acutely aware of the awesome plight of England as 
set out in the Distresses of the Commonwealth: 
The Queen poor the realm exhausted. Division amongst 
ourselves ... The French King bestriding the realm having one foot 
in Calais and the other in Scotland. Steadfast enmity abroad but 
no steadfast friendship.14 
Cecil regarded the Congregation'S rebellion as a heaven-sent opportunity 
to remove the threat from France. He advised English agents to 'Anywise 
kindle the fire, for if quenched the opportunity will not come in our 
lives'15 yet remained realistic of the Congregation'S prospects for 
success, judging their progress in pessimist ic terms as 'cold, slow, and 
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negligent'.16 His pessimism was to prove well founded and was to be 
exacerbated further by Elizabeth's parsimony, which severely threatened 
the prospect of effective English aid to the Congregation. 
The Border Conference Of January 1559 
Yet before turning to events subsequent to October 1559 it is 
necessary to scrutinise more closely Maitland's conduct prior to his 
open defection. As mentioned earlier, it is possible to see Maitland's 
hand discreetly at work in the momentous Border Conference between 
Chatelherault and Percy, a conference which abounds with the language 
of and desire for 'Christian amity ... unity, peace and quietness betwixt 
these realms'.17 These are themes which dominate a substantial part of 
Maitland's diplomatic career and his part in the introduction of this 
agenda once more into Anglo-Scottish relations can be detected both 
from Chatelherault's speech and Percy's later conduct. 'Sir Henry Percy', 
spoke the Duke, 
this is the first time I have spoken to you but it is not the 
first conference that hath been betwixt us by message 
Therefore as I know it hath been moved unto you the taking of an 
abstinence, I would wish the same might take effect.18 
If this is taken in conjuntion with Percy's letter two days after the 
conference, warmly recommending Maitland, then it seems likely that 
Maitland was the medium by which Chatelherault and Percy had been able 
to commune so candidly. Percy commended Maitland to Cecil: 
as being chief secretary to the Dowager and one in great 
estimation with her desireth that there were an abstinence of one 
month to the end that he might but once talk with you Sir William 
Cecil. This man is as much my lawful friend as can be and a man 
both godly true in his doings and of good religion. 19 
Percy's commendation is significant in a number of ways. It provides an 
early example of Maitland's oft repeated ability to play a timely, godly 
card and also of his immense political acumen. He knew it was vitally 
important that he gained access to Cecil and discussed closely with him 
his plans for the Congregation if they were even to get off the ground. 
It was more than a coincidence and serves as a reminder of the central 
importance of the office of Secretary in sixteenth-century government 
that the best hopes for an Anglo-Scottish alliance at this point lay in 
the hands of Secretaries Mait land and Cecil. 
The abstinence referred to is a reference to the Anglo-Scottish 
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conflict at this time in which both countries had become embroiled as a 
consequence of the Franco-Spanish conflict, which was drawing 
inexorably to a close at this time. The abstinence and sUbsequent peace 
were facilitated more by the Franco-Spanish determination to draw the 
peace of Cateau-Cambr~sis to a close rather than the mutual desire of 
the Scots and English for peace. This serves as an excellent reminder 
of the wider internat ional dimension in which Scot t ish affairs were 
invariably cast at this time and also of Mait land's capacit y to exploit 
this situation to the Congregation's advantage. The negotiations for 
peace presented Maitland with a golden opportunity to inform Cecil and 
Elizabeth of the Congregation's desire for an English alliance. 
Maitland's skilful diplomacy ensured it was not lost. He adrOitly 
handled the negotiations leading up to the abstinence to ensure he was 
sent to London and Paris to conclude the peace. 
Maitland's Mission To London and Paris In March 1559 
On 4 March 1559 the Regent sent Mait land with full commission and 750 
crowns to treat with Elizabeth 'on matters tending to the quietness, 
commodi t y and wealth of both the realms'.2 0 To Mary of Guise it was 
money well spent. Maitland returned in May from London and Paris with 
reputation and credit enhanced together with the ratifications of the 
concluded peace between Francis and Mary and Elizabeth.21 Yet the 
hidden agenda of Maitland's mission was to cost the Regent more than 
750 crowns. For it was this mission that laid the foundation for the 
eventual English intervention that was to lead to the destruction of 
the French position in Scotland. 
It is more than a little ironic to note that Mary of Guise who was 
so strongly charged by the Congregation over the lack of 'government by 
born men of the realme' should have been so completely duped by one of 
the few well-born men whom she trusted implicitly. Maitland ruthlessly 
capitalised on his great credit with her. On 5 February 1559 the 
Dowager was given £10 to 'play at the cartis with the Erle of Huntlie 
and young Lethingtoun'22 but the stakes were clearly a good deal higher 
than the Dowager realised. It was during this mission to London that 
the Spanish ambassador reported that Maitland ruled the Regent 'body 
and soul'23 and thus it appears how well Maitland was able to play the 
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role of double-agent. Maitland had not only fooled the Dowager but her 
advisers as well including D'Oysel, Bothwell and Captain Sarlabous, the 
Gascon captain who was also to serve Mary, who were all involved in 
the negotiations for the abstinence. It was perhaps Bothwell's anger at 
Maitland's deception on this occasion that laid the basis for their 
bitter personal rivalry that was to be such a feature of Mary's 
personal reign. The Dowager and her advisers were, however, in good 
company in being duped by Maitland. Buchanan draws attention to 
Maitland's ability to avoid detection while in France in particular his 
capacity to outwit even the Cardinal of Lorraine, 'then esteemed the 
first diplomatist in Europe'.24 
Glimpses of Maitland's hidden agenda can be seen in his private 
conversations with English officials prior to his departure to London. 
Curiously, it was the English officials, in particular Sir James Croft 
rather than the Regent's advisers who were more concerned over 
Maitland's true intent. Croft voiced concern that Maitland was playing 
the role of double-agent too well and remonstrated with him over his 
refusal to accept a safe-conduct from the earl of Northumberland. 
Maitland insisted on a full conduct from Elizabeth, which caused further 
delay in his embassy. Clearly, Maitland was determined not to fall under 
any suspicion from the Regent and the anger of Croft at his 
proceedings who complained that Maitland, 'put the whole nation in peril 
by standing upon ceremonies' must have helped in this respect. 2 S Yet 
Croft's conversations with Maitland do tend to highlight his role as an 
undercover agent for the Congregation rather than as the dutiful 
Secretary of the Regent. 
The spectre of the marriage of the earl of Arran to Elizabeth, 
anathema to the Regent, was raised by Croft's allusion to Mait land that 
'princes that are desirous by marriage or otherwise to knit amity with 
the Queen lose no time'.26 Similarly, Maitland's dismissal of Mary Queen 
of Scots' claim to the English throne 'which never entered into any wise 
man's head', was hardly likely to endear him to the Regent.z 7 If this is 
added to Croft's assertion that Maitland had 'spoken frankly many ways 
all of which were very much and not easy to put in writ ing' and 
Maitland's own determination to make 'large offers', then it becomes 
clear that Maitland went to London fully intending to plead the 
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Congregation's cause. 28 Regrettably, the details of Maitland's embassy 
and his meet ings with both Cecil and Elizabeth are not extant, and it 
is during this embassy that the whole chronology of the granting of 
English aid to the Scots becomes very confused. 
The difficulty surrounds a letter of Cecil to Maitland dated 16 
April 1559. The Calendar of State Papers Scotland takes this to mean 
April 1560, but Conyers Read in his authoritative Mr Secretary Cecil 
places it in April 1559. However, examination of the actual letter, in 
BL Additional Manuscripts, shows the date to have been written in a 
completely different hand to the rest of the letter, which is in Cecil's 
own distinctive hand. 29 Close reading of the letter shows it to be 
much more likely to belong to April 1560 than to 1559. To accept it as 
belonging to April 1559 greatly advances the attainment of a positive, 
interventionist English attitude to the Scottish problem which other 
evidence hardly supports. If written in 1559, it would mean a full 
three months elapsed before Cecil advised Croft to assay the Scots with 
'first fair promises, then with money and last with arms'. 30 
Alternatively, it shows him as concerned with the practicalities of the 
situation which had emerged after the dispatch of an English force: the 
removal of French troops, the demolition of fortifications at Leith and 
the delicate issues of sovereignty rather than with the matter of 
actual intervention. The whole letter reads more comfortably in the 
context of 1560, with the panic-stricken Scots anxious over being 
forced into a compromise settlement, and none more so than Maitland 
himself. Maitland's description of his dilemma at this stage as being 
forced 'to sail be' twixt Scylla and Caribidis'31 was not the best 
example of his classical background. That particular analogy was 
destined to become something of a sixteenth century cliche but it does 
seem a good deal more likely that it was to Maitland's perplexity of 
1560 that Cecil was addressing himself to when he wrote to Maitland: 
Sir, I am sorry of the perplexitie wherein you and others have 
been brought of late with doubt of any conclusion that might 
prejudice your liberty and therefore in any wise collect your 
stomach ageyne and make an assured accompt that ye shall ether 
make the bergayne yourselves or els ye shalbe to unreasonable. 
Indede I see no such surety as to have the governance in the 
naturall borne and the men of warre utterly put out and yet this 
now seemeth at the first sight both to many here and to other 
princes abroade so straynge as it is thoght unreasonable. And 
indede I see herein grete difficulte for it is thought by some 
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that it might lye in you there to moderate the matter and thus 
to parte the state - to gyve the Frenche interest of soverayntee 
as to have a general remission and that for the maytenance 
thereof there might be others taken amongst yourselfes for one 
to mayntene the other that the chancellorship might be 
exercised by one of your countrey - that the men of warre might 
all depart saving some to remayne in Dunbarr for a collor of 
soveraynte - that Lyth might be demolished - that for the 
governance iii or iv might be joyned to the Queen until a date 
assigned for a parlement that for all other perticuler 
differences vi might be chosen to report the same to the French 
kyng. And so many devises might be thought of. But when all is 
mitigyued it shall best lye in your selfes to judge of the truest 
- and if ye can also devise some titular honors for the Frenche 
reputation it shall satisfye the world and putt over this heat 
that king Phillip conceaveth agaynst this realme which ye must 
think is of no small moment here and yet surely not by us of 
counsell so wayed but we prefer your weale before his power. 
Take this my writ ing in good part I beseech you and if mot ions 
of offers offend you, let them offend no moo for they were never 
spoken in tongue by me. Fare ye well and increase your 
st rength. 3 2 
Read refers to the letter as clear in parts and obscure in others.33 
The whole letter, however, becomes much clearer if read in the context 
of April 1560. The letter raises the significant matter of possible 
Spanish involvement in the Scottish crisis and while the threat of 
Spanish intervention was to play a large part in the great efforts 
Elizabeth made to achieve a peace by negotiation, this was an issue 
much more pressing in 1560 rather than 1559. It is true that the let ter 
may be referring to some negotiations Maitland may have conceivably 
had with the Spanish while in France during the last days of Cateau-
Cambresis. However, it is much more plaUSible that it refers to April 
1560, when almost every letter to or from Scotland made some anxious 
reference to the threat of Spanish intervention. 3 ~ Perhaps the 
strongest evidence that suggests a 1560 reading of the letter is 
Cecil's proposal that remissions should be granted to the Scots. In 
April 1559 there could only have been a tiny minority of Scots who had 
commit t ed themselves so far forward as to be in need of a remission. 
However, even Read's misdating of the document does not invalidate the 
basic conclusion he draws from it: that it shows Maitland and Cecil 
negotiating ways of weakening the French position at least a month 
before Knox returned to Scotland to 'throw fat in the fire'.3s This 
conclusion is probably the safest one that can be drawn from Maitland's 
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mission that kept him out of Scotland for over two months. 
If Maitland felt out of touch with the situation in Scotland on his 
ret urn - he had missed the riotous uprising in Perth and the last 
Catholic provincial council to be held in Scotland - this was more than 
compensated by the benefits his passage through the courts of England 
and France had imbued him with. The letters of Henry II and Francis and 
Mary from Fontainebleau on 21 April 1559 testify to his prominence 
whilst Henry II's let ter writ ten by the French Secretary Claud 
del'Aubespine is interesting as being the first contact between these 
two Secretaries. 3 6 It was a contact that was to later develop into an 
intriguing relationship much to the annoyance of the English, who, in 
1563 accused dtl'Aubespine of providing Maitland with a royal pension 
from Charles IX.37 Maitland's French embassy was thus of long-term as 
well as short-term significance but it is the immediate concerns that 
are of interest here. 
The mission cannot but have enhanced Maitland's European perspective 
of the Scottish crisis, a pers pective which was unmatched by any other 
Scottish participant with the possible exception of Knox. However, 
Knox's vision was at once widened and narrowed by his obsession with a 
pan-European crusade against popery. It was Maitland rather than Knox 
who was able to pose effectively as the Congregation's man in the know 
- aware that their struggle mirrored that between the French Crown and 
its Huguenot inclined provinces - and in possession of the darkest 
French secrets and intent towards England and Scotland. The French, 
however, refuted Maitland's claim that 'in the Quene there was nothing 
but craft and deceit '38 by insisting that his time in France should 
have shown him the honest and upright intentions of the French. Jacques 
de la Brosse went so far as to allege that: 
Maitland had brought back from France in the month of May last 
an order from the King to that very effect that that the French 
troops would have been sent back had it not been for the great 
disobedience of the subjects which followed shortly afterwards. 39 
Maitland, however, continued to draw on his inside information of the 
French to 'reveal all the Queen Regent 's projects'~ 0 as part of the 
Congregation's recruiting campaign. 
In the same way as Maitland's French mission was of subsequent 
advantage to the Congregation, so too was his time in England. Although 
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it is difficult to discern what Maitland discussed with Cecil it does 
seem likely that the desirability of having the earl of Arran back on 
Scottish soil, if not the actual prospects of a marriage between Arran 
and Elizabeth was discussed. More certain is the fact that by the time 
of his departure from London in May 1559, Maitland had established the 
influential contacts that were to make him the ideal ambassador for the 
Congregation some six months later. He was most likely known to the 
majority of the English privy council, undoubtedly to the English 
commissioners at Cateau-Cambresis and, most crucially of all, he had 
established a working relationship with the two most influential people 
in England, Elizabeth and Cecil. If this is added to the already high 
regard he was held in 
abundantly clear what 
Lethington. 
by the English Border officials, it becomes 
a useful ally England had in Maitland of 
The Progress Of The Congregation Before Maitland's Defection 
Following his return to Scotland in May 1559, Maitland adopted a low 
profile and it is difficult to piece together his movements before his 
open defection to the Congregation in October. Perhaps his mission had 
imbued him still further with Cecil-like caution. At any rate it is 
somewhat ironic that at the very time that the Congregation began to 
assert itself as a potent, dynamic and overtly Protestant force - the 
friaries of Dundee, St Andrews, Perth, Linlithgow and Stirling were 
among those the worse for wear after a visit from the Congregation -
Maitland was conspicuous by his absence. Despite Maitland's reluctance 
to declare openly for the Congregation, intense diplomatic efforts by 
the Congregation to secure English aid continued apace. These were 
conducted chiefly by Kirkcaldy of Grange, John Knox and latterly by Lord 
James and the earls of Glencairn and Argyll. Maitland assisted 
Kirkcaldy's efforts although, according to Percy, 'he would not thereof 
be acknowen'.4 1 The continued importance that Cecil attached to Maitland 
is shown by his firm remonstrance to Percy for his failure to give 
precise details of a message which Maitland had sent to Percy via a 
servant.42 
The diplomatic correspondence carried out by the Congregation in 
these months prior to Maitland's defection highlights many of the 
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reasons for their difficult progress and the problems hindering direct 
English intervention. In July 1559 Cecil hit upon perhaps the largest 
single obstacle hindering the Congregation's progress and in turn the 
granting of English military aid. This was the lack of legitimate 
authority and repectability in the Congregation's cause and ranks. While 
Cecil was glad of the opportunity offered by Kirkcaldyis diplomacy, he 
bemoaned the fact that 'Kirkcaldy is but known as a private man'43 and 
one with whom England could hardly enter into full-scale negotiations 
or respond to as positively as they would wish. This lack of legitimate 
status was something the Congregation themselves were acutely aware of 
and of the adverse effect it was having on their progress. They 
reminded Cecil that Scottish Protestantism, unlike that in England or 
Denmark, was not a state-sponsored activity and that this exacerbated 
the major difficulty of persuading, 'a multitude to the revolt of an 
Authorite established'.44 
The Congregation's illegitimate status was something not lost on 
Mary of Guise either. She was consistently able to exploit and 
capitalise upon the Congregation'S dilemma, scornfully attacking them as 
violent political subversives masking behind spiritual beliefs who 
'meantt not religion but a plane rebellion'. 4 S The Congregation faced 
the insuperable dilemma that they could not comfortably gain political 
authority and thus legitimise their status without being seen to 
vindicate the Regent's accusations that they were treasonable rebels, 
intent on 'the subversion of authority and the usurpation of our 
Crown'.4 t. In the final analysis this is exactly what happened. The 
Congregation deposed the Regent and were able to pose as the the true 
government acting in the best interests of Francis and Mary, defending 
the commonweal by insis ting upon 'government by born men of the 
realm '47 but arguably even more vulnerable to the Regent's accusat ions 
which remained her most effective propaganda weapon. 
Maitland's Defection 
It was in the last days of October, shortly after the deposition of the 
Regent, that Maitland finally joined the Congregation. There is general 
agreement in the sources of Knox, Buchanan and Calderwoood that 
Maitland had at last come under suspicion as a favourer of the 
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Congregation and fled from the Regent at Leith in some danger of his 
life. 48 The Regent's bitterness at being so thoroughly duped by one of 
the few 'well-born men of the realm', whom she trusted implicitly, 
probably accounts for her subsequent offer of reconciliation to the 
Congregation, 'if they would put away Balnaves, young Lydington and 
Ormeston '.49 Mait land could surely have expected no other react ion. 
One aspect of Maitland's betrayal of the Regent is particularly 
pertinent. In the same letter of Randolph's that details Maitland's offer 
of service to Elizabeth, mention is also made of his father, Sir Richard, 
continuing to act on behalf of Mary of Guise. so This serves to 
highlight not only the complex and divisive nature of the Reformation 
crisis in Scotland but also the need to exercise caution when 
evaluating the role of kinship as a determining and motivating force in 
the allegiance of those involved. Sir Richard disagreed with his son's 
active espousal of the Congregation's cause. As the opening quotation 
of this chapter shows, Sir Richard was equally crit ical of both the 
French and the Congregation for the conflict. The more peaceful 
solution he favoured is detailed below: 
The Queens grace gif that scho has offendit 
In hir office lat it reformit be 
And ye all legis let your saill be mendit 
And withtrew hart serve the authoritie 
And ye Kirkmen do your dewtie 
And all estatis syn and vyce foirbeir 
The quhilk to do I pray to the trinitie 
To send yow grace now in to this new yeirS1 
Sir Richard could later boast to Mary in 1561 with an easier conscience 
than the vast majority who did, that he had been, a Itrew servand to 
thy mother and in hir favour st uid ay thankfullie ' . S 2 
Maitland could not have joined the Congregation at a time when their 
fortunes were lower. Within a week of his defection they had reached a 
new nadir. They had been forced by the Regent into ignominious retreat 
from Edinburgh to Stirling, causing a subsequent dispersal of their 
troops and £1,000 of English aid had been snatched from Ormiston by 
the earl of Bothwell. s 3 If the Guisard ascendancy in France following 
the death of Henry II and the arrival of almost 2,000 French troops in 
Scotland by late summer 1559 is recalled, then the Congregation's 
incapacity - independent of English military intervention - to achieve 
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lasting success becomes obvious. It was towards securing that 
assistance that Maitland immediately addressed himself. 
Maitland's Mission To London, December To February 1560 
It is striking that the Congregation made immediate use of the 
increased respectability that Maitland offered their cause. In his 
commission to solicit aid from Elizabeth they styled him 'secretary of 
the realm', s, an obvious improvement on the private diplomacy hitherto 
conducted. It was in this latest diplomatic mission that the Maitland-
Cecil relationship developed into a firm alliance. The two secretaries 
worked inexhaustibly to persuade a reluctant Elizabeth and privy 
council to intervene direct ly in Scot land. If Mait land had any lingering 
doubts, he was soon to discover for certain that the granting of 
English military aid was no foregone conclusion. His role in the 
subsequent granting of military assistance as sanctioned by the Treaty 
of Berwick in February 1560 should not be underestimated. Close 
examination of Maitland's mission to London reveals the vital role which 
he played. 
Maitland arrived in London in early December 1559, equipped with 
instructions drawn up by Cecil as to how best to plead the 
Congregation's cause. 5S Yet Maitland was to be more than a mere 
mouthpiece for Cecil in this mission. Cecil's earlier fears of the lack 
of a suitable ambassador for the Congregation, 'Of all other Knox's name 
if it be not Goodman's is most odious here',s 6 must have been greatly 
allayed by Maitland's handling of their affairs with considerable 
finesse. This fact was reflected in the make-up of Maitland's embassy. 
He was accompanied by Sir Robert Melville, later first Lord of Monimail, 
an able and long-standing diplomatic associate of Maitland's.s7 The 
credibility of the embassy was further enhanced by the inclusion of the 
Master of the Mint, David Forrest. Forrest, another member of the royal 
household, would have been able to provide an accurate indication of 
the Congregation's finances as well as those of the crown itself.s 8 
Maitland also ensured the careful management of the potentially 
explosive Protestant element in the negotiations by selecting the most 
acceptable face of the Scottish Protestant ministry, John Willock.59 
Maitland obviously chose well, for Willock was later appointed rector of 
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Loughborough through the influence of Robert Dudley, earl of 
Leicester.o 0 Maitland's contribution towards ensuring effective English 
intervent ion during this embassy can best be found in a let ter of his 
dated 20 January 1560. 61 Maitland admitted this resembled more a 
political tract than a letter, and it was probably intended for 
circulat ion amongst the English privy council. This let ter encapsulates 
the entire argument surrounding English military intervention and 
illustrates vividly the great asset Maitland was to the Congregation. It 
not only shows his perfect grasp of the means and arguments to be 
employed to woo the English into the fray, but his unparalleled ability 
to present them in a lucid, detailed and convincing manner. 
At the beginning of his letter, Maitland set out to dispel English 
suspicion both of the Scots constancy and the sincerity of their 
professed desire for perpetual amity. He knew that the English 
distrusted the Scots and feared that 'after being delivered' they would 
'becom enemies as of before'. 02 Mait land sought to allay these fears by 
placing the 'auld alliance' and the traditional Anglo-Scottish enmity in 
its historical context before going on to explain the complete role 
reversal of England and France in this crisis. Maitland explained: 
God's providence has so altered the case yea changed it to the 
plat contrary that now has the Frenche taken your place and we 
of very judgement becom desyrous to have you in their rowme 
Our eyes are opened, we see them manifestly attempt the thing we 
suspected of you. 
Maitland knew that something more substantial than circumstantial 
change which rendered English friendship more desirable to the Scots 
had to be offered if English cynicism that the rapprochement was any 
more promising than the amity offered during the reigns of Henry VIII 
and Edward VI was to be overcome. Consequently Maitland played his 
godly card. 'Was not all times the difference of religion the only stay 
that they were not embraced? Did not the craft of our clergy and the 
power of theyr adherents subvert the devices of the better sort?' God 
had now so blessed Scotland, Maitland was happy to report, that they 
now professed, 'the same religion with you quilk I take to be the 
strongest knot of amitye can be devised'.o3 
This illustrates quite clearly what a vital ingredient the religious 
element was in this crisis. Recent research has tended to play down the 
religious element in the Reformation crisis. Yet rather than undermining 
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this element, Maitland's arguments tend to show the complex interaction 
between religion and politics at this time. Undoubtedly the appearance 
of a clear commitment on the part of the Scots to Protestantism played 
an major role in bringing Anglo-Scottish relations so far forward as to 
make the Treaty of Berwick possible. It certainly helped to allay the 
English suspicions of their ancient enemies, as Cecil himself observed: 
so many slights and finesses have been used before time by that 
nation that were it not in this common case of religion there is 
no respect of nation I would be loathe to commit trust to any 
word or promise. 64 
It is true that the Treaty of Berwick made no mention of matters of 
religion but this is hardly surprising. It was simply not politically 
expedient for Elizabeth to be seen to be intervening in Scotland on 
religious grounds. Support for religiously motivated rebels in Scotland 
ran the risk of fuelling the religious debate at home, offering a 
dangerous example to her own Catholic subjects as well as inviting 
international hostility. 
Similarly excluded from the Treaty of Berwick on the grounds of its 
political explosiveness was the other great enticement Maitland offered 
the English to intervene in Scotland - the prospect of the union of the 
two realms. The notion of Anglo-Scottish union was however an 
important aspect of the diplomatic efforts to secure English aid. 65 Yet 
it was an argument more likely to appeal to Cecil and his colleagues 
than the ultra-conservative Elizabeth. 6 6 Cecil was reported as being 
'possessed with the chimerical not ion of unit ing Scot land and Eng land 
under one creed and government '67 and despite his best efforts to keep 
Maitland's mission in London a secret - even going to the length of 
hiding him in the Palace of Westminster - Gilles de Noailles was able 
to report to Francis II that Maitland was in London treating with 
Elizabeth for the union of the realms under the style of Great 
Britain. 68 Cecil was on record as saying 'that the best wotldly felicity 
that Scotland can have is to either continue in a perpetual peace with 
the kingdom of England or to be made one monarchy with England as they 
make but one isle, divided from the rest of the world'69 and he could 
not have hoped for a better ally than Maitland for what has been 
termed the 'British context' of his foreign policy. 7 0 Mait land professed 
himself to be consecrated to the idea of the union of the realms, and 
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the two men at this point clearly shared a vision of a godly union of 
England and Scotland. 71 
From talk of a godly union. Maitland increased the force of his 
arguments by making a direct appeal to that most powerful of motives, 
English self-interest. Maitland skilfully exploited English xenophobic 
fears of French aggreSSion by playing up to England's deep-rooted 
hankering after their lost medieval dynastic possessions in France, so 
as to highlight the French threat. Maitland reminded them 'how covertly 
your places about Boulogne were assaizeit and carried away ye being in 
peace as now. How the enterprise of Calais was fynely dissembled I 
think ye have not so sone forgotten'.72 In plain terms, Maitland warned 
the English that the French sought to use Scotland as but a 'futstole' 
from which to attack England: lYe are the marke they shote at. they 
seke our realme but for an entery to yours.... Giff ye se not the lyke 
disposition presently in them ye se na thing'. Maitland also sought to 
create confidence amongst the English that they could take on the 
French and win. 
In a manner that could only have come from a deep knowledge of 
French affairs, Maitland stated, at once prophetically and accurately, 
that 'theyr estate is not always so calm at home as everyman thinketh'. 
Mait land pointed to the French domest ic problems to show that the 
French were not capable of waging a successful war against the English 
and the Scots. France, rather, had a 'vain expectation' of not meet ing 
any resistance and it was this that had prompted them to move so far 
forward in the matter. Now was the time, Maitland urged, for the 
English to strike back at the French, 'the less fit they be presently 
for weyr, the mare opportune esteeme ye the time for you'. He reminded 
the English, 'Giff the like occasion were offered to the Frenche against 
yow, wey how gladly would they embrace it '. The accuracy of Maitland's 
view of the European situation is confirmed by the modern European 
historians Lecostoquoy and Braudel, who explain France's ready 
acceptance of the unfavourable terms of the peace at Cateau-Cambresis, 
which gave Spain considerable advantages in Italy, because they saw the 
prospect of such rich pickings in England and Scotland. 73 
Maitland went on to confront the most basic issue that was 
hindering English intervention: finance. By January 1560, Maitland 
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already knew Elizabeth well and was acutely aware of the threat her 
parsimony posed to the successful outcome of the Congregation's cause. 
Maitland's tack was to concentrate on the money to be saved by 
Elizabeth through timely military intervention. It would certainly cost 
her more, he added, to fight the French on English soil, the logical 
consequence of the Congregation's defeat, to say nothing of the damage 
to national prestige. Maitland also pointed to the long-term savings to 
be made by Elizabeth in the fortifications at Berwick, which would be 
rendered superflous if England and Scot land were bound together in 
amity. It would have been a substantial saving: the defensive walls 
built around Berwick from 1558-70 cost £128,000; the single most 
expensive item built in Elizabeth's reign. 7 4 
Maitland also dealt thoroughly with the major problem of the 
Congregation's image as rebels against a divinely sanctioned authority 
- which continued to be exploited by their opponents. He made effective 
use of the language of the commonweal, one of the Congregation's most 
successful propaganda weapons, to argue that the Congregation were in 
fact loyal subjects acting in the best interests of their sovereign and 
country. According to Maitland the Congregation meant: 
na wyse to subtrak our obedience from our souverane to defraud 
hir hyeness off her dew reverence, rents and revenues off hir 
crown. We seke nathing but that Scotland may remane as of before, 
a fre realme rewlt by hir hienes and hir ministeris borne men of 
the same, and that the succession of the crown may remane with 
the lawful blode. 
Penultimately, Maitland turned to the important positive advantages to 
be accrued by England through their intervent ion. In so doing Mait land 
revealed his close sympathy with Cecil's unionist outlook, not only of 
England and Scotland but of the whole British isles, by raising the 
significant issue of Ireland. It also affords conclusive proof of the 
importance of the unionist factor in the accomplishment of English 
intervention. Maitland like Cecil was acutely aware of the integral 
relationship of the three kingdoms within Britain. He gently reminded 
the English of their Irish problem and their inability to benefit from 
such a great asset by virtue of its 'continual unquietnes'. Maitland 
knew that Ireland was to England a 'burt hen unto you than great 
advantage' and that the Congregation had within their ranks one with 
the power to advance the English cause in Ireland, namely the earl of 
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Argyll. 'It is not unknown to you what service we are abill to do' for 
the pacification of Ireland, tempted Maitland. The Irish angle was the 
Congregation's strongest bargaining counter and it was one that clearly 
counted for much. The sUbsequent Treaty of Berwick made detailed 
provision that Argyll would assist with his force as and where 
necessary to 'reduce the north partis of Iryland to the perfyt 
obedience of England'. 7 S 
Maitland's letter amounted to a comprehensive treatise on the whole 
matter of English intervention. Even those readers not learned enough 
to follow his closing advice that they should consult Demosthene s· 
orations to the Athenians, could be left in no doubt as to what course 
of action Maitland believed they should follow, when, as he pithily put 
it, 'your neighbours house is on fyre'. 
Maitland's embassy undoubtedly helped Cecil to convince his 'backward 
advisers' on the privy council that intervention was essential. The 
subsequent Treaty of Berwick was agreed upon only after an intensely 
long and hard fought diplomatic battle in the privy council. Cecil even 
had to threaten his resignation in order to win the day.7 b The myriad 
of arguments that Maitland provided for Cecil, covering the whole 
political spectrum from progressive unionist or religious zealot to 
conservative patriot, must have been especially welcome assistance. 
Maitland's contribution to the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of 
Berwick is perhaps the prime example of the close co-operation between 
the two secretaries during the Reformation crisis and it certainly 
helped foster the 'father and son' understanding that was to develop 
between the two men. 
From The Treaty Of Berwick To The Treaty of Edinburgh 
It was no doubt a very relieved Maitland who signed the Treaty of 
Berwick in February 1560. 77 Yet any belief that the Treaty guaranteed 
the Congregation's ultimate success was soon shattered. The months 
between it and the Treaty of Edinburgh, concluded in July 1560, are 
amongst the most precarious in Maitland's entire political career. 
Maitland admitted in April 1560 that 'he never had greater care since 
he was borne' which made him almost wish that he 'had never been a 
meddler therein'.7 8 By the time English troops had arrived in Scotland 
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in March, Elizabeth's resolve had already weakened. She was determined 
to obtain a cheap, compromise settlement by negotiation rather than a 
costly military conquest and Maitland had to draw on all his powers of 
persuasion to offset the damage this was causing the Congregation's 
continuing recruitment drive. 79 Elizabeth's preference for a cheap 
compromise severely hampered the Congregation's cause and Maitland 
sharply remonstrated with English officials at the loss of support it 
was causing. He somehow managed to hold the Congregation together 
during this period of high uncertainty but lamented that many 
prospective supporters 'seeing a treaty so suddenly propounded they 
become cold, doubting what should follow a communication ' .80 
It was indicative of the difficulties the Congregation faced in 
capturing the support of the nation that recruitment remained such a 
pressing problem. On 28 May it was reported that Maitland, Lord James 
and Argyll were still busy 'soliciting other lords to join their 
faction'.81 Remarkably, it was not until May that the allegiance of 
Morton was finally secured by Chatelherault's wife's renunciation of any 
claims to the earldom of Angus held by Morton's nephew. Maitland was 
instrumental in securing that guarantee. a 2 This constant lobbying of 
support was to continue even after the Treaty of Edinburgh had been 
Signed. The four-line whip the Congregation exercised to ensure the 
success of the Reformation parliament was a distinctive feature of that 
significant assembly and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Maitland was relieved when the English finally turned their 
attention to a military conquest. This. however, soon turned to despair. 
The English military campaign was catastrophic in its impact and 
characterised by severe incompetence. 8 3 Poor leadership, exacerbated by 
clashes of personality between Lord Grey and the Duke of Norfolk 
resulted in the debacle of the siege of Leith. 8 4 The English troops 
were easily repulsed: not surprisingly, given that the English scaling 
ladders were yards short for the purpose. The haphazard nature of the 
English military operation leads to the inescapable conclusion that 
England had success thrust upon them in July 1560 rather than 
achieving it through their own efforts. Victory could not have been 
obtained without a series of fortuitous events, outwith England's power. 
that significantly strengthened their hand. The death of the regent, 
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Mary of GUise, was probably the most significant of these, which, added 
to the all-consuming French domestic strife triggered by the Tumult 
d'Amb,;tse in March 1560, seriously weakened French resolve and capacity 
to cope with the Scottish crisis. The Spanish distraction with the 
Turkish menace in the Mediterranean similarly helped to clear England's 
path towards a negotiated settlement in Scotland with terms far more 
advantageous than their campaign merited. 
It was left to Cecil to come to Scotland to conclude the settlement 
with the French representatives. On his arrival in Scotland he paid 
tribute to Maitland's and Lord James' sterling efforts in the most 
difficult of circumstances. Cecil recognised Mait land as 'of most credit 
here for his wit and almost sustains the whole burden of foresight 165 
and Lord James intriguingly as a man 'surely not unlike either in 
person or qualities to be a King soon'.66 In this period leading up to 
the Treaty of Edinburgh, Maitland and Lord James can be seen working 
particularly closely together, preparing to take possession of the 
centre-stage roles they were to occupy for the best part of the next 
decade. They both won praise for being prepared to work the Scottish 
nobility in such a way as to allow the English their complete 
sa t isfact ion. 6 7 This was no mean task with the contending egos of 
Hunt ly" ChAtelherault and Morton, to name but three, to contend with. 
Both men, however, were astute enough to realise that they had to meet 
the demands of the English before they could turn their attention to 
the management of their own affairs. It can thus clearly be seen that 
almost from the beginning to the end of the Scottish Reformation 
crisis, Maitland exerted a crucial influence over its course. 
The Treaty of Edinburgh, signed on 6 July, put the seal on the 
Congregation's victory and the successful English intervention. aa It was 
victory achieved despite Elizabeth's policy rather than because of it. 
Even at the very time that Cecil was exploit ing all his reserves of 
diplomacy to pull off the advantageous Treaty of Edinburgh, Elizabeth 
wrote him a most remarkable let ter. 89 She ordered him to break off the 
negotiations unless the French agreed to restore Calais and pay an 
indemnity of 500,000 crowns. It was a ridiculous demand. Fortunately 
for Cecil and the Congregat ion, the let ter did not arrive unt il 9 July, 
by which time the Treaty was already a fait accompli It is this crude, 
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ham-fisted approach of Elizabeth that tends to give the lie to the 
notion that English intervention in Scotland was 'almost a classic 
example of a short-lived military effort designed to set up an 
administration favourable to the ideology of the master-power'. 9 0 Such 
a rationalisation, flattering as it is to Elizabeth, cannot be seriously 
entertained. 
In conclusion, the victory of the Congregation was a personal 
triumph for Maitland. His contribution to the success was immense both 
before and after his open defection to the Congregation's ranks. While 
his Protestantism was not of the Knoxian ideological brand, it was 
nonetheless convinced and more radical than many historians have 
allowed for; it also re-expressed in far more cogent political terms 
Knox's notion of an imperial Britain. 9 1 A radical foreign policy was 
matched by a deeply conservative domestic policy. This paradox hits at 
the heart of the essential paradox of the Scottish Reformation crisis: 
the Congregation could only succeed with the help of English military 
aid but it could only gain acceptance if it were also a revolt of the 
provinces. 92 Once Maitland joined the Congregation in October 1559 this 
balancing act was performed with considerably more success and finesse. 
The levy of a tax in support of the Congregation by the largely 
Catholic and hitherto stubbornly loyal Aberdeen burgh council is one 
example of the Congregation's new found ability to find consensus. 9 3 
Maitland's diplomatic skills shone throughout the crisis, particularly 
during the panic-stricken post-Treaty of Berwick phase. Amidst a 
disastrous four-month military campaign, Maitland held the broadly 
based Congregat ion coalit ion together, at tract ing to it both the 'Pope 
of the north east' Huntly and the staunchly Protestant but hitherto 
politically neutral Morton. 9 4 He had established an impressive coterie 
of influential English contacts. Maitland could count Sadler, Killigrew, 
Percy, Throckmorton, Randolph, Norfolk, Winchester, Pembroke, Wotton, 
Howard, Cecil and Lady Cecil and Elizabeth firmly among his favourers. 
It was a widespread and concrete base of support, one that he was to 
exploit in the years ahead. Given Maitland's pre-eminent role throughout 
the Reformation crisis it seems only fitting that it was he, acting as 
Speaker or Harangue-maker in the Reformation parliament in August 
1560, who ushered in the religious settlement and the formal proposals 
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of a godly and permanent alliance with England. There was surely no one 
better suited for the task. 
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FROM THE REFORMATION PARLIAMENT 
TO THE RETURN OF MARY 
decade of the 1560s is frequently cited by 




turmoil and political instability. In the context of this 
not ion of prolonged crisis the opening year of the decade from the 
Treaty of Edinburgh to the return of Mary, is a striking portent of the 
next ten traumatic years in Scottish and European politics. In a sense 
it provides a microcosm of a decade which repeatedly witnessed the 
transformation of the existing political equilibrium by the occurrence of 
unpredictable events of cataclysmic proportions. The death of Francis II 
in December 1560 was one such event. It ensured that the bullish 
confidence displayed by the Scots in their Reformation parliament and 
manifest also in their adventurous proposal of Chatelherault's son, the 
future third earl of Arran in marriage to Elizabeth was immediately 
replaced by a sheepish, nervous realism which marked the Scots' 
attempts at a rapprochement with their home-coming Queen. Less than a 
year earlier such a scenario would have been unthinkable. Yet since the 
news of Francis' premature demise, the dilemma of coping with the 
problematical return of Mary, a daughter of Guise and Rome - the twin 
victims of the Congregation's triumph had dominated Scotland's 
political horizon. Maitland's own reaction was symptomatic of those who 
had played a prominent role in the Congregation's victory. He was 
acutely aware that his betrayal of the French interest was painfully 
fresh in memory and he lamented the fact that he had more to fear than 
most: 'Alwayes I am taken in France to be a better Englishman than 
other'l and 'though not in greatest place yet is my danger not least.'2 
Such concerns, however, could hardly be detected in the heady, buoyant 
atmosphere following the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh, when 
Maitland, acting in close concert with Lord James sought to consolidate 
and develop their recent triumph. 
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The carefully drafted Treaty of Edinburgh confirmed the 
Congregation's victory whilst studiously avoiding discussion of the two 
most controversial issues of the dispute; the religious question and 
the matter of the Scottish alliance with England. 3 This well considered 
discretion on England's behalf was not matched by the subsequent 
conduct of the Scots. In direct contravention of the terms of the 
Treaty they eagerly proceeded to hold a parliament and publicly 
proclaim their commitment to Protestantism and their aspirations for a 
permanent union with England. It is to a closer examination of this 
Reformation parliament that attention will now be focused upon. 
The Background To The Reformation Parliament 
Accurate and constructive comment on the Reformation parliament is 
impeded by the paucity of the sources available. The limitations of the 
helpful but incomplete sederunt found in Keith's History and the Acts of 
t)~ Parliaments are well known, in particular its failure to give any 
precise indication of the attendance throughout the parliament's entire 
sitting." The defective nature of the sederunt is emphasised by the 
conspicuous absence of Mait land from it, either in the guise of the 
laird of Lethington or as an officer of the Crown. As it is, perhaps one 
of the safest conclusions to be drawn from the Reformation parliament 
is its confirmation of Maitland's pre-eminent influence along with Lord 
James in the direction of Scottish policy. Their partnership which had 
been forged during the recent crisis continued to develop. Throughout 
1560-1, Maitland and Lord James were not only in the same Church but 
more often than not in the same pew as well. It was not always to be 
thus. 
In 1560, however, it was Maitland and Lord James who, to a large 
extent, orchestrated the parliamentary proceedings and their alliance 
was seemingly sealed by their united approach to the problematical 
return of Mary. Together the two men canvassed effective support for 
the oncoming parliament. On July 29 they travelled to Inverkeith to 
persuade such waverers as Crawford, Innermeath, Gray, Athol and 
Marischal to at tend. 5 There were many more whose at tendance at the 
parliament could be explained by Lord James' influence. 6 While it is 
possible that Maitland attended parliaments prior to 1560, it was his 
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selection as harangue-maker in the suspicious absence of Chancellor 
Huntly, on this occasion that marks the beginning of his prominent 
parliamentary career.7 It was one that undoubtedly owed a good deal 
more to his position as Secretary than to his status as a laird; a fact 
that is not without significance in the light of the striking attendance 
of lairds at the Reformation parliament. 
A parliamentary assembly had been mooted by Maitland as early as 25 
May 1560. 8 In a letter to Cecil of that date he informed his English 
counterpart that the estates would assemble on 10 July; an assembly 
that was subsequently sanctioned by the Treaty of Edinburgh. 9 Whether 
or not at this point Maitland enVisaged an assembly on the scale of 
August's is debatable. The political circumstances of May with victory 
uncertain and the Dowager still alive were hugely different from those 
of August. It is, however, in those anxious days of May that the roots 
of the remarkable attendance of so many lairds at the Reformation 
parliament are perhaps to be found. Maitland's letter of 25 May, written 
some five days after the completion of what later emerged as the First 
Book of Discipline, informed Cecil that parliament would see 'ane 
uniform ordour taken by a common agreement, when I am sure the council 
will desyr to have your advys',lO It is possible that Maitland planned 
this assembly as a massive, conclusive display of support for the 
Congregation in the face of the resilient opposition of the Dowager. 
Indeed it is as part of a manufactured and carefully orchestrated 
poli tical demonstrat ion that the at tendance of the lairds ought to be 
viewed, rather than as a spontaneous democratisation of the 
parliamentary-procedure in a spirit of revolutionary fervour sparked 
off by religious zeal. It is highly improbable that the lairds would 
have been granted a parliamentary voice if this had not been to the 
Congregation's advantage. If account is taken of the acknowledged levels 
of intimidation at work in this parliament, then it must be questioned 
whether the lairds were voicing their own support or were merely the 
tools of their more powerful patrons and sponsors. 11 Whatever the true 
explanat ion of the remarkable at tendance, the presence of over 100 
lairds did succeed in providing the Congregat ion with the appearance of 
a national seal of approval for their victory and a mandate for their 
legislat ion. 
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Much less speculatively, Maitland's letter of 25 May spelt out the 
guiding English tutelage of the Scots at this point. It has been 
observed that it was no accident that the only external authority, civil 
or ecclesiast ical, to whom the Scots Confession of Faith was submit ted 
for vetting was the English Secretary of State, Cecil.12 Maitland's 
close relationship with Cecil, along with his and Lord James' prominence 
and the dynastic ambitions of the Hamiltons combined to facilitate this 
tutelage which was very much to England's advantage. Maitland was 
undoubtedly a driving force behind the parliament and it is clear from 
his correspondence following the Treaty of Edinburgh's sanctioning of 
the assembly on July 10, that he had little intention of abiding by the 
Treaty's other stipulations that the parliament could not continue until 
Mary and Francis had ratified the peace. Another letter of his to Cecil 
illustrates this point. It shows that he was acutely aware of the risks 
involved of proceeding without Mary's authorisation and his desire to 
follow Cecil's advice in the matter: 
whearby it shall comme to our soveraynes knowledge that we go 
about the same before we send to them for establishing off our 
counsall ... I stand but only on the ordour of propounding wherin I 
desire your honour's advise. 13 
Cecil's influence over the parliament was apparently not limited to 
procedural advice. A further letter from Maitland to Cecil dated 29 
August gave Cecil 'double thankis' not only for his good advice but also 
for his efforts to ensure that the recent Treaty of Berwick was 
confirmed by the parliament. 1 4 Maitland was pleased to report that the 
Treaty had indeed been 'confirmed by the estates in a form nothing 
disagreeing with your advice differing very little in the very 
woordes'.l S Maitland's determination to follow Cecil's advice is a 
definite feature of this parliament and represents the peak of his much 
alleged anglophilia. This is particularly evident in the discussion of 
the Arran marriage proposal and in his panic-ridden reaction to rumours 
that he was to be the Scots envoy to France. Maitland replied 
incredulously to Cecil that: 
I marvel wot you ment to write that I was reserved for the voyage 
of France. I think it was not in earnest! For I speake it in the 
presens of God I had rather be banished Scotland for seven yeares 
than take that journey on hand. 1b 1 
Maitland had every reason to fear such a mission. It was, however, a 
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mark of the swift-changing nature of the triangular relationship 
between England, Scotland and France and, of lvlaitland's ability to keep 
pace with this fluid situation, that in much less than seven years time, 
he carried out a most successful diplomatic misssion to France, much to 
the chagrin of the English government. 17 
The Composition Of The Reformation Parliament 
Following the pro-forma assembly of the estates on 10 July, the stage 
was set for one of the most significant parliaments in Scotland's 
history. Yet before attention is focused upon the legislation of this 
parliament, some detailed comment ought to be made upon the legislators 
themselves; those who attended the Reformation parliament. The helpful 
parliamentary sederunt has been used by historians to provide a useful 
guide to the regional strengths and weaknesses of the Scotttish 
Reformation, and also as an illustration of the importance of kinship as 
a crucial factor in the determination of political and religious 
affiliation.18 A good many of those recorded as present are readily 
identifiable but it is not the least of the paradoxes of the Scottish 
Reformation that attendance at the Reformation parliament is hardly the 
most reliable litmus test of a commitment to Protestantism. When 
factors such as the intimidation of likely opponents to the legislation 
is taken into account, along with the political and kindred-based 
motivations of many of those present, a more complex yet perhaps more 
realistic picture of the constitutional birth of Protestantism in 
Scotland emerges. 
There was certainly a broad range of commitment to Protestantism 
amongst the fourteen earls present at the Parliament ranging from the 
exemplary, devout Glencairn to the downright opposition of Athol. It is, 
however, the ground in between, occupied by those such as 
ChAtelherault, Marischal, Caithness and Crawford that is more 
interesting. Consistency was not a term that sat comfortably with 
Chatelherault, a man capable of taking at least 'five purposes in three 
moments'19 yet no religious prevarication on his part was to mar what 
has been termed the 'triumph of the Hamiltons'.2o Similarly, the young 
and soon to be quite mad Arran, the prospective groom of Elizabeth and 
a far more genuine Protestant than his father, was only too glad on 
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this occasion to toe the family line. 21 Argyll had been exposed from an 
early age to paternal Protestant influences and as Lord Lorne signed 
the First Bond, an accurate portent of his and the clan Campbell's 
consistent attachment to the reformers cause. 22 The Earl of Rothes also 
bears testament to the at times hereditary nature of Protestant 
leanings while Menteith, a close friend of Maitland's has also been 
described as a strong Protestant. 23 
The positions adopted by the Earls Marischal, Crawford, Eglinton, 
Caithness and Cassillis are not so unequivocal. According to Knox, Athol 
was the only dissenter amongst the peerage to the Confession of Faith 
but this is contradicted by Randolph who mentions both Casillis and 
Caithness as opposing the reformers cause. 24 Archbishop Hamilton went 
still further and named Eglinton, Athol, Caithness, Cassillis and 
Crawford amongst those who opposed the Confession. 2 S The reliability of 
Hamilton's testimony is questionable but the conservatism if not 
Catholicism, of Caithness and Eglinton, together with the legendary 
religious inconstancy of Cassillis makes their opposition, at the very 
least, tenable. The maverick Bothwell was not present at the 
proceedings but a more significant absentee was the 'pope of the north-
east', Huntly. Huntly's 'sore leg' which prevented him attending the 
parliament remains one of the most notorious cry-offs of all time yet 
it did not altogether impede his influence at the assembly.26 Huntly's 
influence perhaps explains the luke-warm support given to the 
Confession by Sutherland and Crawford and for the surprising lack of 
fervour shown by Marischal. Sutherland, as Huntly's cousin had his star 
hitched very closely to the Gordon wagon and has been described as 
Ca tholic. 27 In view of his certain conservatism it is perhaps more 
surprising that he did not actually oppose the Confession. Crawford's 
reluctance to support the reformers' programme was again confirmed 
some months later when he refused to subscribe to the Book of 
Discipline. 28 Marischal's Protestant fervour was not of the consistent 
brand either. In the 1540s he had been an enthusiast ic Protestant, in 
the 1550s a supporter of Mary of Guise and in 1559-60 a somewhat 
cautious supporter of the Congregation. 29 Lord James - Marischal's 
future son-in-law - was compelled to exert his persuasive powers to 
gain Marischal's support for the Confession before he made a premature 
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exit from the parliament pleading sickness. 3 0 It has been argued that 
Marischal's lands of Dunnottar exposed him to Protestant winds blowing 
in from the continent but those same lands also exposed him to the 
influence of Huntly, from whom he held the lands. 31 Indeed Marischal 
has been described as one of Hunt ly's friends. 3 2 
The pre-Reformation Scottish episcopacy has been criticised for not 
providing better leadership and a more effect ive resistance to 
Protestantism. The unsatisfactory pastoral example that they provided 
is clearly reflected in the prodigious offspring of the primate, 
Archbishop Hamilton. 33 Yet whatever the personal failings of the 
bishops, those who remained loyal to Catholicism and were present at 
the parliament, put up, if not an effective opposition, then at least a 
sure disapproval of the reformers' programme in the face of definite 
intimidation. Archbishop Hamilton, Robert Crichton of Dunkeld and William 
Chisholm of Dunblane, as the chief representatives of the Catholic 
Church bore the brunt of the intimidatory tactics tacitly acknowledged 
by the reformers. Knox admit ted that for fear 'the bishops would nor 
durst say anything in the contrary'S 4 whilst Archbishop Hamilton wrote 
to his already safely escaped cOlleague Archbishop Beaton, 'all thir new 
preachers perswadis opinly the nobilite in the pulpit to putt violent 
handis and slay all kirkmen that will not concur and take thair opinion 
, .. ',35 Despite these threats Crichton voiced his contempt of Knox as 'an 
olde condemned heret icke'3 6 but undoubtedly it was Archbishop Hamilton 
who was in the most invidious position. In true Hamilton style, however, 
the Archbishop was able to cope with his dilemma. He opposed the 
Confession yet supported the Arran marriage proposal, which, if 
successful would have guaranteed not only the future of Scottish 
Protestant ism but also the triumph of the Hamiltons. 3 7 The reformers 
were assisted in the parliament by the conforming Bishop of Galloway, 
Alexander Gordon, the Bishops-elect of Argyll and the Isles, James 
Hamilton and John Campbell respectively, whilst the conforming Adam 
Bothwell of Orkney and Lennox's brother the Bishop of Caithness did not 
to attend the parliament. s 8 
Taken as a whole, the conduct of the episcopacy illustrates the 
competing forces at work in the parliament, ranging from the strong 
pull of kin-based loyalties and violent intimidatory action, through to 
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genuinely held religious-ideological convictions. Both Alexander Gordon 
and Archbishop Hamilton felt strongly enough to refuse to follow their 
chief kinsman's example, even if Hamilton did take out an insurance 
policy. It appears however that the unsatisfactory nature of the 
Scottish episcopacy remained a problem for the post-Reformation Church. 
The charges laid against the conforming bishops Bothwell and Gordon in 
the General Assembly of December 1567 illustrate their perhaps less 
than whole hearted conversion from their pre-Reformation practices.39 
The commendators and priors present at the Reformat ion parliament 
contained perhaps the most significant group of convinced Protestants. 
Certainly, many of those present could boast a healthy Protestant 
pedigree, whilst the number of experienced parliamentarians, Lords of 
Session and executive office holders amongst their ranks also lent an 
extra welcome air of respectability to the assembly.4 0 Undoubtedly the 
most significant of this group was Lord James. His influence over 
certain of the earls has already been noted and it was just as 
effectively exerted over the Stewart commendators of Holyrood, 
Coldingham, and Inchcolm and definitely over the commendator of Culross, 
William Colville of Cleish. Interestingly, both Lord James' fellow royal 
bastards of Holyrood and Coldingham again followed his cue on Mary's 
return, defending her right to the Mass. Although both these men seem 
to have supported the Reformation, neither of them acheived popularity 
with Knox, who was suspicious of their personal friendship with Mary 
and their adherence to the court.41 The commendators of Culross and 
Inchcolm were more straightforward supporters of Protestantism. 
Colville's family had long been clients of Lord James and Colville 
himself cut an impressive figure as a former Comptroller and Lord of 
Session.42 Political and dynastic influences probably had a lot to do 
with Gavin Hamilton's acquiescence, although his brother John, the 
commendator of Arbroath seems to have been a more genuine 
Protestant.43 While it has been alleged that Donald Campbell, the 
commendator of Coupar Angus, was in a hurry to 'put on secular weed', 
it has also been argued that his support for the Reformation had more 
to do with clan loyalties than with zeal for the religion.4~ The 
commendator of Deer, Robert Keith, kinsman of the earl Marischal, 
certainly facilitated the spread of the reformed ministry in his kirks 
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but seems to have followed his master's example in not supporting the 
Arran marriage proposal.· S The conduct of the Kerr commendators of 
Jedburgh and Newbattle and the Erskine commendators of Dryburgh, 
Inchmahome and Cambuskenneth has been described as being in keeping 
with the Protestant sympathies of their families .• 6 John Winram, the 
prior of Portmoak, the future superintendent of Fife and Strathearn, one 
of the famous 'six Johns', is an obvious supporter of the reformers 
ideals amongst this group.4 7 It is interesting to note that Winram 
along with Maitland was chosen to cast a modifying eye over the 
Confession of Faith.· a Robert Richardson, the commendator of St Mary's 
Isle was officially appointed Treasurer in 1561 but seems to have acted 
in that capacity some while before that date. He supported the 
reformers' proposals in the parliament but as Treasurer later incurred 
the wrath of Knox for supporting and assisting the implementat ion of 
the thirds of benefices scheme .• 9 John Philip, the abbot of Lindores, an 
experienced parliamentarian and Lord of Session, also supported the 
reformers at this parliament. s 0 It is somewhat ironic to recall that 
Philip along with several other prominent figures of the Reformation 
parliament including Chatelherault, Marischal, Colville of Culross and 
John Winram sanctioned the burning in effigy of Sir John Borthwick at 
St Andrews in 1540. 51 It is to be wondered what impression that ritual 
burning had on the young Maitland, then a student at St Leonards. 52 
Burghal representation at the parliament is difficult to evaluate. Of 
the twenty-two burghs recorded as present at the parliament, the 
conspicuous absence of Brechin and St Andrews - both of which it is 
thought had established 'privy kirks' before 1560 - has been noted by 
Professor Donaldson. 53 It does however seem likely that the Provosts of 
these two burghs were present at some point during the parliament, as 
they were certainly in Edinburgh in late August to sign the remarkable 
letter sent to Mary and Francis asking them to agree to the proposed 
marriage of Arran to Elizabeth.5 4 It is, though, difficult to identify 
with any certainty the parliamentary representatives of the burghs 
although the letter to Mary and Francis helps to identify such 
convinced Protestants as Archibald Douglas of Kilspindie, Provost of 
Edinburgh, James Haliburton, Provost of Dundee, Erskine of Dun, Provost 
of Montrose, and Lord Ruthven, Provost of Perth. Yet even with this 
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helpful identification it is still a quantum leap to equate burghal 
representation at the Reformation Parliament with burghal acceptance of 
and enthusiasm for Protestantism. The now more clearly delineated 
histories of the Reformation in Edinburgh and Aberdeen, show the 
dangers of such an approach and the need for caut ion in evaluat ing 
burghal embracement of the new faith.s5 
The same influences at work amongst the earls, bishops and 
commendators at times coalescent, at times divisive are also 
discernible amongst the many lords and lairds present at the 
parliament. There are those whose presence has been seen as 
predictable, as a sort of logical conclusion to their long held 
Protestant and anglophile convict ions. Balnaves, Torry, Tullibardine, 
Meadowflat, Loudoun and Morphie are amongst those who have been placed 
in this category.s 6 Yet while a good many lords and lairds were of a 
proven Protestant provenance, there were others who were not. Recent 
research into Angus and the Mearns, an area receptive to Protestantism, 
has shown that parliamentary representatives from Angus in contrast to 
those of the Mearns, were an ill-assorted group who at tended uneasily, 
'as clients of their sponsors or as mildly dissenting from the general 
ethos'. 57 Similarly, the definite family lines toed by the various 
Hamilton, Cunningham, Campbell and Douglas lairds who attended the 
parliament was motivated by varying degrees of attachment to 
Protestantism, with the Campbells proving to be outstandingly 
consistent in their support for the new faith. 
Equally significant is the regional distribution of the lairds who 
attended the parliament. Most representatives came from the Lothians, 
Perthshire, Fife, Kyle and Angus and the Mearns, with far fewer from 
Renfrew, Stirling, Peebles and the northern regions of Aberdeenshire, 
Banffshire and Invernesshire. 5 8 Mait land's own locality of East Lothian 
was particularly well represented at the parliament with Broun of 
Colstoun, Cockburn of Ormiston, Douglas of Whitt ingham, Hamilton of 
Fingaltoun, Hamilton of Innerwick, Heriot of Trabroun, Lauder of Haltoun 
and Wauchope of Niddrie-Marischal all present. 59 It would be convenient 
to ascribe this particularly high turnout to Maitland's own local 
influence but despite the fact that Douglas of Whittingham and Heriot 
of Trabroun were shortly to become Maitland's brothers-in-law,60 the 
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question of Maitland's influence over East Lothian society is a thorny 
one. 
East Lothian actually provides the awkward anomaly of a particularly 
high turnout at the Reformation parliament being followed by a 
particularly slow uptake of the reformed ministry in the area. 
Recusancy flourished in East Lothian when only Bolton, Oldhamstocks, 
Tynninghame, Haddington and Tranent enjoyed the establishment of an 
early reformed ministry.61 Not until 1567/68 did the ministry become 
more common in the region with no Reader evident at Athelstaneford 
until 1574, while the minister of Dunbar was still attending to the 
needs of a number of local kirks.6 2 As late as 1571 the minister of 
North Berwick was supervising four kirks 63 - a classic example of 'Four 
parische kirkis to ane preicher' - and in such a climate there may well 
have been some truth in the allegation of 1569 that the parishoners of 
Whitekirk had 'never heard the word twice preached, nor received the 
sacraments since the Reformation'.64 It is quite possible that the 
Catholic influences of Maitland's kinsman, Lord Seton and those of his 
father, Sir Richard, acted as a brake upon a speedy uptake of the 
reformed ministry in the area. Perhaps Maitland's own Catholic family 
ties also took the edge off his r'eforming zeal in his own locality. 
There is certainly no evidence of Mait land performing any equivalent 
missionary work in East Lothian to the forty days he and Lord James 
spent together in 'the north partis of Scotland advancing the 
religion and the common cause'.6 S 
Although an avowed Protestant himself, Maitland seems to have been 
continually stalked by the shadow of his family's Catholicism. Apart 
from his father and Seton, Malt land was related to the Catholic Lord 
Somerville,66 while after his second marriage to the Catholic Mary 
Fleming, Maitland also became a brother-in-law to the Catholic earl of 
Athol.67 The complexities of this period - allegedly an age of religious 
fundamentalism - are further illustrated by Maitland's relationship with 
the future Catholic Provost of Edinburgh, Sir Simon Preston of 
Craigmillar. Craigmillar was Maitland's brother-in-law and undoubtedly 
his presence and support at the Reformation Parliament would have been 
helpful, yet Maitland seems to have blessed his absence from the 
assembly due to some personal business in France. Maitland took 
Reform~tion to Return 73 
advantage of Craigmillar's journey and used him as a bearer of 
important letters to Cecil and Lady Cecil dated 29 July, recommending 
him warmly as 'bedfellow to my wifis sister'.b 3 Maitland's practical 
handling of Craigmillar was to prove fortuitous in the extreme. Several 
months later when Craigmillar returned to Scotland as one of Mary's 
four envoys after the death of Francis, Maitland was able to extract 
much reliable information from this source. 69 This particular episode is 
yet another reminder of Maitland's political astuteness and of his 
reluctance to close needlessly any open doors, as well as illustrating 
that personal ties and relationships could transcend ideological 
differences just as easily as vice versa. 70 
It was then a diverse body that constituted the Reformation 
parliament which proceeded to pass seventeen Acts of Parliament.7 I Not 
surprisingly attention has traditionally focused upon the specifically 
religious legislat ion, in part icular the adopt ion of the Confession of 
Faith and the Acts proscribing the Mass, papal authority and the old 
heresy laws. However, closer scrutiny of the parliament's extensive 
legislation and its implications offers a more thorough appraisal of 
the constitutional birth of the new kirk. It is on an examination of 
that legislation that attention will now be focused. 
The Legislation Of The Reformation Parliament 
Parliament met as appointed on 1 August, 
adjournment on 10 July. The formal opening 
9 August, following a week-long debate 
assembly in the absence of the royal 
following its three-week 
was, however, delayed unt 11 
over the legality of the 
commission and a royal 
representative. 72 It is surprising that a vote took place at all. It is 
evident that Maitland had little intention of waiting for Mary's 
authorisation. He seems to have realised that it was unlikely to be 
forthcoming and that it was important for the Congregation not to lose 
the impetus and momentum of victory. It was no surprise that the belief 
that the parliament was as valid 'as if it had been called and 
appointed by the express command of the King and Queen' prevailed 
against Archbishop Hamilton's opposition and that parliament was 
formally opened on 9 August. 7 3 
In the absence of Chancellor Huntly, Maitland opened the parliament 
as harangue-maker following the traditional procession from Holyrood to 
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parliament. with the Crown. Mace and Sword placed in the royal seat.7 4 
Maitland conducted himself with characteristic aplomb, setting the 
desired tone for the proceedings by appealing for unity in the face of 
the challenge facing the nation. In his opening speech he excused his 
own insufficiency for the task entrusted to him and proceeded to give a 
resume of their recent. necessary defence of their country and the 
great victory it had pleased God to give them. He sought to soothe 
those who were st ill unconvinced and suspicious, who st ill 'laye backe', 
and urged 'all estates to lay all particularities apart and bend 
themselves wholly to the true service of God and their country'. He 
reminded them of the long absence of good government and justice in 
the realm. In typical Maitland style he enforced his message with an 
apposite analogy. He reminded them that they were all members of the 
one body and of the fable 'where the mouth denied to receive 
sustenance to nourish the rest of the body so long that the whole 
perished', In closing he exhorted them as members of the one body to 
work together in 'hearty friendship' and prayed God to maintain their 
amity with all princes 'especially between England and Scotland, in the 
love and fear of God'.7s 
It is quite clear from Maitland's address, why. what later emerged 
as the First Book of Discipline - composed months before the parliament 
sat was not presented for discussion on this occasion. 76 The 
parliament was intended as a display of national unity, not as a 
demonstration of divisiveness; division would have come only too readily 
to the fore if the far-reaching proposals of the later Book of 
Discipline had been discussed. This was undoubtedly Maitland's opinion 
and, in this instance, the prevailing one. It was this marked political 
realism of Maitland that signalled the end of the most harmonious phase 
of his relationship with Knox and his fellow radicals and the beginning 
of what can only be described as a most volatile. often bitter, often 
amusing series of confrontations. It certainly helps to explain the 
friction between Knox and Maitland at this time and Maitland's alleged 
gibe that 'we must now forget ourselves and bear the barrow to build 
the house of God'.7 7 Already it was clear that there were fundamental 
structural differences between Knox's and Maitland's designs for the 
new ecclesiastical edifice. The prominence of the amity with England, so 
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often the bed- fellow of Scot t ish Protestant ism, is also obvious from 
Maitland's opening speech. On this occasion, however, Maitland was 
unable to promote a discreet discussion on this front, being powerless 
to restrain the Hamiltons' enthusiastic proposal for guaranteeing 
perpetual amity between the nations. 
The first business done in the parliament was the decision to ratify 
the recent Treaty of Berwick and to beseech Mary and Francis to do 
likewise. The next business was the largely unprecedented decision to 
listen favourably to the request of the lairds to attend the parliament. 
The parliament was able to turn to the precedent of James I's sanction 
of the right of the barons to have free voice in parliament in 1427 but 
hardly any lairds had attended the parliament for close on three 
quarters of a century. The chief exception to this was the 1491 
parliament of James IV when a large number of lairds attended. 78 If, 
however, it is borne in mind that in 1560 many of the lairds attended 
as clients or kindred of the leading members of the Congregation such 
as Chatelherault, Glencairn, Lord James, Argyll and Morton then it is 
difficult to resist the view that the lairds request was something of a 
put-up job. It was small wonder that it was positively responded to and 
that Maitland observed that he could not remember 'to have seen so 
frequent a parliament'. 7'1 There could have been few alive able to 
dispute the point. 
The Lords of the Articles were then selected and their ranks 
contained few surprises. Randolph was pleased to report the common 
opinion of the Lords of the Art icles that 'there was not a 
substancialer nor more sufficient number of all sorts chosen in 
Scot land many years nor in whom greater hope of good'.8 0 It was a 
predominantly Protestant selection which ignored the Catholic Bishops in 
its spiritual ranks but which did choose Athol as one of the temporal 
lords. The lairds new-found parliamentary voice was recognised by the 
selection of six of their zealously, Protestant number, including 
Tullibardine, Lundy, Cunninghamhead, Maxwell and Lochinvar, all of whom 
had been solid supporters of the Congregation. The elusive Provosts of 
Linlithgow, Jedburgh, Cupar, Glasgow and Stirling no doubt all 
supporters of Protestantism - joined the firmly Protestant Archibald 
Douglas of Edinburgh, Patrick Ruthven of Perth and James Haliburton of 
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Dundee as Lords of the Articles. The selection of the Catholic Thomas 
Menzies of Aberdeen was possibly a token gesture. 8 1 Perhaps the most 
notable absentee from the Lords of Articles was Maitland himself. He 
never acted in that capacity throughout his career which may possibly 
have been due to his position as Secretary. His absence from their 
ranks did not, however, diminish his influence in the parliament. 
Attention then came to focus on the religious question. According to 
Knox, dicussion arose in response to the petition of 'The Barons, 
Gentlemen, Burgesses and others' which called 'in the bowels of Jesus 
Christ' for the abolition of the papistical Church and its doctrines, the 
redistribution of its patrimony and the expulsion of the clergy of 'that 
Roman harlot' from parliament and the Church. 82 The response of 
parliament to this vehement petition was to request the petitioners to 
'draw in plain and several heads, the sum of the doctrine which they 
would maintain and would desire that present parliament to establish as 
wholesome, true and only necessary to be beli~ved and to be received in 
that Realm'.83 The request was taken up and in four days the Scots' 
Confession of Faith was presented and overwhelmingly accepted by the 
parliament. The fervour of the original petition coupled with Knox's 
narrative of these events suggests that Knox would have preferred the 
parliament to discuss the already existent 'Booke of Common 
Reformation' at this time. As earlier observed, the timing was hardly 
right for the parliament to consider those radical proposals. Knox put 
this reluctance to countenance a 'perfect Reformation'84 down to the 
worldly respects of the parliamentarians and no doubt Maitland was 
amongst those immensely relieved to have discussion confined the the 
Con f ess ion. 
One of the many Reformation myths that have been recently debunked 
has been the simple equation of Knox = Confession of Faith = 
Calvinism.s S Dr Hazlitt has shown that those who believe - as has 
traditionally been held - that the 'Confessio Scoticana represents pure 
Calvinism in a Caledonian accent '86 will search in vain for the clear-
cut principles of Calvinism amidst the theology of the Confession. There 
is no double pre-destination, no limited atonement along Calvin's lines 
and only a passing reference to the perseverance of the saints in the 
Scots Confession. 8 7 Knox, himself, acknowledged the work was not his 
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alone but the work of the 'six Johns" Willock, Row, Winram, Douglas, 
Spot t iswoode and Knox. 6 6 It was perhaps the diverse and cosmopolitan 
experiences of these six men that accounts in part for the discernible 
influences of other reformers such as Oeclampadius, Bucer, Bullinger, a 
Lasco, Luther and Beza. 69 Maitland's correspondence also attests to the 
significant element of English influence over the Confession. 9 0 It was 
earlier noted that the only external authority to which the Confession 
was submitted for vetting, was Cecil and it was not a fait accompli 
that he was presented with. On 13 September 1560, Maitland wrote to 
Cecil asking him if there was anything which he disliked in the 
Confession so that 'eyther it may be changed (if the mater will so 
permit) or at least in somethyng qualifeed to the contentation off 
those which otherwayes myght be offended'. 91 
Mait land's own modifying influence is also discernible if· it is 
recalled that the Confession passed to a sub-committee for preliminary 
examination before being presented to parliament. Maitland worked 
alongside Winram in this commit tee and according to Randolph 'thoughe 
theie coulde not reprove the doctrine, yet dyd theie mytigate the 
austeritie of maynie wordes and sentences which sounded to proceade 
rather of some evle concealed opinion, then of anie sounde judgement'. '12 
Randolph alleged that Maitland and Winram vetoed a chapter on the 
obedience or disobedience of the subject to the magistrate as 'an 
un feet matter to be intreated at thys tyme'.9 3 This was typical of 
Maitland's conduct throughout his career in which he conSistently 
sought to correlate the religious temperature to the wider political 
climate. A further example of this will be seen in his reaction to the 
death of Francis II. Despite this apparent veto, article 24 of the 
Confession is devoted to the question of obedience to the civil 
magistrate. This confusion draws attention to the great controversy 
surrounding the diverse interpretations of the Confession's teaching on 
this point. These have ranged from the view that obedience was to be 
virtually unqualified, to a more moderate view that the Confession 
recognised traditional limitations upon the obedience due, through to 
the radical view that it sanctioned a special resistance theory.9 4 It 
seems likely as Dr Hazlitt has argued that Maitland and Winram vetoed a 
chapter specifically devoted to civil disobedience rather than 
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obedience. 95 Indeed article 24 is, in itself, a very conservative 
statement and it is only through the informal allusions of other 
articles not specifically devoted to the question of obedience that the 
more radical interpretations gain any weight. In this sense it can be 
argued that the Reformation parliament in almost classic post-
revolutionary fashion, fostered reactionary rather than revolutionary 
legislat ion. 
Taken as a whole the Confession of Faith was both a manifesto and a 
proclamation not only to Scotland but to the world, of the Scots' 
breakaway from Satan and idolatry and their embracement of the true 
faith. It served its purpose well and was warmly welcomed in 
parliament, much to the amazement of Randolph. The parliamentary 
acceptance of the Confession was not however an accurate portent of a 
smooth and easy infancy for the new Kirk. Knox was to have good reason 
to lament the reluctance of many to countenance a 'perfect Reformation' 
in the months and years ahead during which time Maitland was to prove 
something of a bete noir to the reformer. 
The Confession was accompanied by the Acts abrogating papal 
authority and the old heresy laws as well as those forbidding the Mass 
and also by a host of other ecclesiast ical legislat ion. The consistonal 
courts' jurisdiction was to be transferred to a secular alternative, 
specified pensions were to be valid without papal confirmation, 
possessors of teinds were to retain them for the time being and feus 
of Church land carried out since 6th March 1559 were declared 
invalid. 96 Despite the fact that stiff penalties were attached to the 
saying or hearing of Mass, ranging from forfeiture to banishment and 
for a third offence death, it has long been held as an admirable 
feature of the Scottish Reformation that it was spared the barbarity 
and persecution of other European Reformations. This was not because 
the triumph of Protestant ism in 1560 so completely eradicated 
Catholicism to the extent that there were no dissenters attending the 
Mass to prosecute. 9 7 Knox's hatred of the Mass and his belief that 'one 
Mass is more fearful than ten thousand armed enemies' does not suggest 
that it was due to a willingness of the Protestant radicals to seek an 
accommodation with Catholicism either. 9 8 The reluctance of the coercive 
powers to enforce - in what was a largely kin-based society - the 
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extremity of the death penalty, suggests that there was a definite 
split between the hard-liners and those more secular minded politicians 
who were happy to place such extreme legislation on the statute book 
in 1560 and again in 1567, but not to enforce it. 99 Maitland on this 
occasion, and again in 1567 exemplified the secular concerns which were 
responsible for the moderation which has been held to be at the heart 
of the Scottish Reformation. 100 It should be noted that this most 
attractive feature was achieved in spite of. rather than because of. the 
leading clerical proponents of reform. 
Despite its epithet 'Reformation' a good amount of overtly political 
legislation was carried out in this parliament. 1 01 Very much to the 
fore of this essentially secular legislation was the alliance with 
England. In a strenuous effort to guarantee the perpetual amity of 
England, the Treaty of Berwick was confirmed and the positions of the 
Hamiltons as heirs to the throne was ratified as a prelude to the 
decision taken in parliament to propose Arran in marriage to Elizabeth. 
Other Acts showed the parliament's convenient regard for the 
concessions granted to the Scots by the Treaty of Edinburgh when it 
suited them. These included the passing of a Law of Oblivion and the 
drafting of 24 names to be delivered to Mary and Francis for the 
formation of a provisional government. A further Act approved the 
selection of a council of six to continue in government until their 
sovereign's approval had been obtained. Regrettably the names of this 
six are not known but it would seem likely that Mait land was one of 
this number, for his name along with Lord James, Chatelherault. Arran, 
Glencairn, Morton, Rothes, Boyd and Ochiltree is amongst those that 
figure most promiently in the official documentation of the period. l 02 
It was Lord st John, a Sandilands of Calder, who was the unlucky man 
chosen to convey the Parliamentary legistation to France. It was 
probably as a reward for this heroic service that Torphichen was made 
a heritable lordship by the remaining Act of this Parliament. lo3 
Summary Of The Parliament 
The parliament came to no definite end but was prorogued until 
occasion necessitated its resumption, the return of the embassies from 
England and France being the most likely grounds for that eventuality. 
80 
While Mait land could report to Cecil, sat isfied that many principal 
mat ters had been passed 'with more uniform agreement than was looked 
for' it remained true that its two chief concerns, the religious 
question and the amity with England, were still very far from 
settled. 104 Even without the benefit of hindsight the argument that the 
seeds of division that were to reap such a rich harvest in Scot land 
were actually sown in this Reformat ion parliament is a compelling one. 
The reluctance, or as Knox put it, the abhorrence of many for a 'perfect 
Reformation' was to cost the reformers dear. Equally, the rich profits 
to be gained from a successful conclusion to the Arran-Elizabeth match 
in terms of guaranteeing the union of the realms and the triumph of 
Protestantism were heavily countered by the long English odds which 
accurately reflected the likelihood of a successful prosecution of the 
marriage suit. Far from imbuing the nation with a Calvinist certainty in 
the future direction of Scotland's destiny, the Reformation parliament 
succeeded more in emphasising the highly uncertain, political and 
ecclesiastical future of the realm. 
The Arran Marriage Propos-al 
The Arran marriage proposal was the major immediate outcome of the 
parliament. It pre-occupied Maitland's energies for the following four 
months until Elizabeth's polite refusal in December. The whole question 
of this proposal has achieved - in the light of Arran's subsequent 
pathetic career - something akin to comic status. It is not hard to see 
why. Indeed, with all the benefits of hindsight the notion of a marriage 
between 'the mad earl and the virgin queen' is more plausible as a 
Barbara Cartland romance than as a basis for the union of the realms. 
Yet the later lamentable history of the third earl of Arran should not 
preclude a serious appraisal of this proposal. Even the comic status it 
has achieved is hardly incongruous with the whole mat ter of royal 
matrimony - there can be few areas of historical study so rich in 
humour, high in farce and sheer ludicrousness than that of monarchirM 
marriage. It is undeniable that royal marriages throughout history have 
had a great deal more to do with political, dynastic and economic 
considerations than with the personal compatibility of the couple 
involved. A brief, cursory glance through the marital history of 
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Europe's royal dynasties, past and present, reveals a remarkable 
propensity for marriages far more ridiculous and with less politically, 
mitigating circumstances than the Arran offer to compensate for the 
secondary concerns of personal happiness. As such, the Arran marriage 
proposal is worthy of serious consideration. It was certainly regarded 
very seriously by the Scots in 1560. To them it represented a genuine, 
even logical attempt after the recent English intervention, to unite the 
realms in indissoluble amity. It is with this in mind that Mait land's 
role in the matter will now be examined. 
It has been alleged that Maitland adopted a faute du mieux position 
over the Arran project. 1 0 S This, however, is perhaps not the most 
accurate appraisal of Maitland's complex involvement in the scheme. For 
the Arran proposal as well as emphasising the limitations and 
vulnerability of Maitland's position as Secretary, also provided the 
forum for Maitland to express in strident terms the most radical notion 
of an Imperial Britain ever voiced by a pre-union Scot t ish Of ficer of 
State. He was acutely aware that his position as Secretary despite its 
remit for life was effectively dependent upon his ability to 
successfully execute policy. His fear of being associated with an 
unsuccessful and failed policy is a recurrent theme of his career. In 
this case it was the Hamiltons he had to satisfYi more typically it was 
Mary, and Maitland often admitted the difficulty of this fundamental 
dilemma. 1 06 In a particular reference to his selection as one of the 
three ambassadors to London to propose the Arran match, Maitland 
admitted: 
I mon of force comme with them or els I see not how I can 
maynteyne amyty with the Duke's grace and my lord of Arane so 
earnestly have they pressed me and layd it to my charge that no 
excuse will serve and I neither may nor will lose theyr 
friendship.1 07 l 
Maitland's 'may nor will' clause hits at the very heart of the delicate 
balancing act he was able to perform so successfully for the vast 
majority of his career as Secretary. The times when Maitland offset 
this balance, when he could, but would not carry out the poliCY he had 
been entrusted with are notable both for their infrequency and for 
their dire consequences. The Arran match was not one of those 
instances. The more common scenario was for Maitland to be in close 
sympathy with a policy but highly concerned as to the most propitious 
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manner of proceeding and of the actual outcome. Examples of this are 
found in Maitland's handling of the succession issue, the interview 
between the two queens, Mary's marriage and the Arran project itself. 
Historians have been right to point to Maitland's unease at the public 
manner in which the Arran proposal was dealt with at the parliament 
but it must also be recognised that he was repeatedly at pains to 
declare his support for the project. 1 08 It was the presentation rather 
than the content and objectives of the proposal that concerned 
Maitland, together with his usual fear of the uncertainty of a 
favourable reception in London, 
In a letter to Cecil of 18 August 1560, Maitland pOinted out that he 
felt the matter: 
might as conveniently have bene entreated more secretly not that 
I mislike anything either in the matter or manner of doing for 
itself bot for a certane kynd of feare I have to medle in so 
weghty a cause not being fully assured how it shall be lyked with 
you bot in this caas I have bene driven to a farther point then 
on my goodwill for the present I wolde have pressed at. 10V 
A similar attitude was discerned by Randolph who stated that 'The Larde 
of Lidington rather consulted upon the maner of the doinge than that 
he thought it not verie good and expedient to be put in experiens',11 0 
Despite serious misgivings over the manner of proceeding, Maitland was 
an earnest advocate of the marriage, wishing that II may rather dye in 
the voyage then that it turne not to the union of the two realms',! 11 
It was Maitland who constructed the arguments to induce or rather 
seduce Elizabeth into acceptance of the proposal, 
Although Maitland expressed anxiety over the public deliberation of 
the marriage he drew comfort from the widespread support and 
enthusiasm with which the project was greeted. Support for the marriage 
is difficult to gauge precisely due to the defective list in the ActsQHh~ 
Parliaments which differs substantially from the one in the Calendar of 
State Papers, but it is clear that the marriage was popularly acclaimed 
even in the most unlikely quarters,llZ If the latter list is accepted as 
a minimum indicat ion of the proposalls appeal, then the consent of 
seven earls (excluding Chatelherault and Arran), six bishops (including 
bishops elect), eleven commendators, thirteen lords and nine provosts is 
still an impressive shOWing. By far the most remarkable aspect of this 
support was the welcome it received amongst those still professing an 
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adherence to Catholicism. Archbishop Hamilton, Bishop Crichton, Bishop 
Chisholm together with Athol and Lords Somerville and Borthwick all 
supported the proposal. Maitland himself seemed taken aback by this 
support but welcomed the: 
general consent and agreement amongst us in that propos that they 
to whom it apeareth we have done greatest injury do wishe it maye 
be broght to pas and the very papistes themselves can be content 
for the accomplyshment thereoff to renounce theyr God the 
Pope. 113 
In a revealing let ter to Lady Cecil - who appears to have been one of 
the few English advocates of the match - Maitland's close diplomatic 
associate, Robert Melville, offered a plausible explanation for this 
widespread support.11 4 In so dOing, Melville raised the spectre of the 
complex factors already noted as being at work in the Reformation 
parliament. He hinted specifically at the persuasive and intimidatory 
powers of the Hamiltons when he referred to the decision of parliament 
to 'seik that thyng that may be gretest comfort to your first friend'. 
The lack of opposition that this had aroused sprang from the desire of 
'sum for feare of your friendis comfort and sum for luif to haif it 
makis ane quietnes and ane rest '.1 1 5 
Opposition to the match was enunciated by Randolph in his usual 
lively style. 116 Eglinton, according to Randolph 'loves his wife so well 
he will do nothing for her father's sake', her father being 
ChAtelherault. Cassillis too was as 'obst inate as ever' whilst he put 
Marischal's opposition down to the somewhat surprising influence of the 
Clerk Register, James McGill. Randolph also doubted Lord Gray's support 
and believed Athol consented out of his contempt for Huntly.117 The 
overwhelming impression, however, is of widespread enthusiasm for the 
match and it is difficult to argue with Randolph's appraisal that the 
Scots were determined with 'tooth and nail' to set the mat ter 
forward.1 1 8 What else could account for the amazing gall the Scots 
showed in officially recommending the match to Francis and Mary, 
requesting their blessing on the project?119 
In England, however, the Scots could find no reciprocal enthusiasm 
for the match. Indeed, it is to be doubted whether the offer was ever 
seriously countenanced by Elizabeth and the English court. While 
Randolph acknowledged the Scots' enthusiasm for the match, he privately 
confessed that he felt the embassy to be 'as mad a journey as any that 
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ever was made'.l 20 In a sense, the whole episode illustrates the 
difference in the priority of England for Scotland and Scotland for 
England at this time. Whereas the Treaty of Edinburgh stimulated a mass 
of activity in Scotland as to how the Anglo-Scottish alliance might be 
strengthened, it failed to procure a similar effect in England. 
Elizabeth was reluctant to consolidate her recent success and refused 
such measures as the disbursal of pensions to the more influential and 
significant ScotS. l2l In so doing, she set the pattern for her reign in 
which she consistently declined to countenance a determined, animated 
policy towards Scotland except when necessity insisted upon it. 
Necessity was always the mother of Elizabeth's Scottish inventions and 
it was to insist within five months of the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Edinburgh that she turn her attention most urgently to her Scottish 
border.1 22 
At the time of the Arran marriage project, Elizabeth was far too 
busy flirting with Dudley to entertain serious matters of state 
concerning Scotand. Her pre-occupation with her horses' groom also 
seems to have temporarily jeopardised the position of Cecil, the English 
statesman with the most careful eye towards Scotland. l 23 Yet even 
allowing for Cecil's more immediate concerns for his own security, which 
may have diminished his enthusiasm for the Arran proposal there is no 
doubting Cecil's consistent opposition to the match. This is despite the 
fact that it would have fulfilled all of Cecil's own criteria for 'the 
best worldly felicity Scotland can enjoy'.! 24 Despite much resourceful 
and continual hectoring from Maitland and his COlleagues, even using 
the channel of his wife, Lady Mildred, Cecil never warmed to the 
proposal,1 2 S In fact it is hard to detect any development of Cecil's 
professed desire for the union of the realms in this period.1 2 b His 
only comment at this time concerning the future government of Scotland 
was confined to his tantalising allusion to Lord James as 'a man not 
unlyke ether in person or qualitees to be a Kyng soone'.1 27 In what was 
a clear contradiction of Cecil's assessment, Lord James himself was 
reported as being 'marvellous earnest' in his support of the match. 128 
It is, however, important to emphasise that it was the unionist 
cause rather than the Hamilton interest that Lord James in common with 
Maitland was primarily supporting in advocating the Arran match. 
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Confirmation of this is found in the hostility with which both men 
regarded Arran's subsequent marital offer to Mary in early 1561. 129 By 
that time of course the vital position of the Hamiltons in Scottish 
affairs and the political value of Arran in the inter-dynastic marriage 
stakes had been fundamentally altered. This, however is to ant icipate. 
In October 1560, when Maitland left for London in embassy with the 
earls of Glencairn and Morton and an impressive train of 74 horses, it 
is only with hindsight that the waning star of the Hamiltons can be 
detected.1 30 
The impressive composition of the embassy reflected the importance 
the Scots attached to the mission. It was only after much deliberation 
as to the 'personages and the manner of sending them' that a decision 
was made in this respect. Chatelherault felt that he ought to have the 
major say as 'the cheffeste poynte of their message touchethe hym and 
hys' but he was not to have it all his own way.131 Caution was 
apparently urged as it was felt that an indiscreet handling of the 
proposal, together with the Hamiltons' over-eagerness and the 
'imperfection of the partie whom they desire to prefer' would be the 
major obstacles to the success of the project. 13l Very probably 
Maitland felt that indiscretion had already shown itself to be the 
major part of this particular valiant attempt. Touching the embassy, 
Randolph observed that 'whatsoever order they take, some they think 
necessary to take'1 33 and Maitland was most certainly amongst this 
number. Randolph felt that Mait land's unifying presence could ill be 
spared from the centre of government but Chatelherault was not about 
to countenance an embassy 'touching hym and hys' being devoid of 
Maitland's unparallelled diplomatic skills, as Maitland himself was 
critically aware. The 'poor, honest, constant and wise' Glencairn 1 34 
along with Morton was an uncontroversial choice although Randolph did 
see fit to scotch rumours of Morton's alleged disloyalty to the English 
cause, 'he is the same to our nation that he would be esteemed for of 
US'.1 3 S Lord Maxwell was originally touted for the mission but his 
preoccuaption with a bitter and protracted border dispute with Lord 
Dacres prevented him from travelling. 1 36 Maxwell's indisposition 
perhaps provides a more accurate insight to the harsh, problemat ical 
realities of Anglo-Scotish relations at this time. 
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There was no shortage of volunteers for the journey to London. Lord 
Robert was keen to go and Argyll seemed especially enthusiastic. 137 The 
distinct impression is of an earnest desire amongst the leading Scots 
to ingratiate themselves with Elizabeth. This probably sprang from the 
selfish and somewhat optimistic desire to ensure they did not miss out 
on any largesse Elizabeth may have seen fit to bestow. Such desires if 
they did exist were to be disappointed. Elizabeth's Scottish patronage, 
perhaps wisely in the light of earlier unsuccessful at tempts to buy 
Scottish loyalty, never achieved gravy-train proportions. To a large 
extent this parsimonious policy was remarkably successful. Indeed it 
can be argued that the loyal service Elizabeth obtained from such as 
Lord James and Morton, was a far greater return than her minimal 
investment deserved. 138 
The financing of the Arran embassy is something of a mystery. It 
was undoubtedly a major expense and one not easily undertaken. 
Parliament had apparently sanctioned the levying of a tax for the 
purpose but no evidence exists of such a tax being collected. Randolph 
reported of the said tax that 'verye muche hath bene saide herein and 
as yet nothynge concluded'.1 39 Very likely the new regime was reluctant 
to risk immediate unpopularity by the raising of a tax so early in its 
life, especially in a period of post-war economic hardship. 
Unsurprisingly, Chatelherault was reluctant to foot the bill despite his 
earlier stated belief that he 'ought to have the strooke' in the 
selection of the ambassadors.1 40 As far as the financial aspect was 
concerned Chatelherault was 'lothe to have any parte therein'.! 4! It is 
equally hard to imagine the poor Glencairn, the greedy Morton and the 
crafty Secretary of State paying their own fare. A letter from the 
three ambassadors to Cecil dated October 15 suggests, however, that an 
appropriate source of funding was found. 142 Robert Melville was sent on 
ahead of the embassy 'to receive some money conforming to the 
Treasurers warrant which he brings'.1 43 It was after some delay (they 
originally expected to be in London by Michaelmas) probably due to the 
financial uncertainty of the mission that the ambassadors left Scotland. 
Maitland's Handling Of The Proposal 
Unsurprisingly it was Maitland who took the lead in the negotiations 
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for the marriage. It was an earlier drafted document of his that 
provided almost verbatim the official proposal of the Scots to 
Elizabeth. 1 44 Maitland's draft is a remarkable document covering every 
conceivable angle of the marriage, emphasising from every turn the 
advantages to be accrued by Elizabeth and England by acceptance of the 
proposal. It is this document which provides perhaps the most cogent 
expression and adoption of the notion of an Imperial Britain, 
encompassing England, Scotland and Ireland in godly unity ever 
articulated by a pre-union Scottish government. The apparent popularity 
of the proposal allied to the strident unionism that it embodied 
undoubtedly adds to the complexity inherent in Dr Durkan's dictum that 
'there is nothing more difficult in any age to pin down than the 
climate of thought and nothing more necessary to reckon with '.1 45 
Perhaps it was as a measure of the Scots' willingness or alternat ively 
despair of winning Elizabeth's hand that they were prepared to travel 
so far along the unionist road. However, never again, not even in the 
eventual Treaty of Union, was the Scots desire for union ever couched 
amidst such demeaning admissions of national inferiority and dependence 
upon England as it was in the Arran marriage proposal. Certainly, 
arguments alleging Scotland's legal system to have had an English 
provenance and references to England as the 'better part of the realm' 
have been conspicuous by their absence. 146 
It is in this sense that the Arran project represents the zenith of 
Maitland's anglophilia. He was a consistent unionist and indeed 
confessed himself consecrated to the union of the isle but 
significantly not always by the same sycophantic means. 1 47 Maitland's 
means were always closely governed by a sharp perception of the 
realities of the existent political situation. He used the analogy of 
the mariner who knew 'in ruling his shippe to applye his course as the 
stormie blasts of winde and weather shall dryve hym'1 48 to explain his 
political conduct and on another occasion compared himself to the 
gambler who shuffled his card anew but always kept the same ground. 149 
Maitland may not have been in tune with the climate of thought or the 
spirit of the age but he was invariably in tune with the spirit of the 
moment and acted accordingly. It is in this light that his espousal of 
the union in 1560 along stridently Protestant, godly lines ought to be 
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judged and so too his later conduct, when he aggressively negotiated 
Mary's claim to the English succession as a prelude to a union along 
not so godly lines. 1 50 
Wisely and in keeping with the traditional procedural pattern of 
royal marriage negotiations, Maitland sought to entice English 
acceptance by concentrating on the 'circumstances and dependents' 
beneficial to both countries, rather than dwelling upon 'the person that 
is propounded'.l S 1 This, however, did not prevent Maitland describing 
Arran as a virtuoso renaissance Prince but he did make it perfectly 
clear that it was not Arran's advancement they were seeking but rather 
'the prosperitie of this whole isle, which doth altogether depend upon 
the union of the two nations'. Maitland began by acknowledging the 
enormous debt the Scots owed Elizabeth as the divinely appointed 
'meanes instrument and only worker of our deliverance' and their 
incapacity to repay her before moving on to discuss how this 'good 
intelligence betwixt the realmes might be continued to our posterity'. 
According to Maitland the Arran marriage was 'the only meanes in our 
sight to make this friendship constant and indissoluble'. 
In his attempts to procure acceptance of the offer, Maitland 
utilised the already strong English lobby urging Elizabeth to 'resist 
this same solitary kind of life and desire which she seemeth to have to 
live alone' by presenting Scotland and Arran as the optimum partner for 
herself and England. Maitland knew that Scotland did not have the 
material advantages of other nations competing for Elizabeth's hand. In 
an earlier letter to Cecil he had spent much time comparing Scotland to 
Eric XIV's Sweden. He admitted 'Theyr ostentation maye be greater and I 
confess ar able to mak a greter shewe of richesse than we't 52 but was 
at pains to point out that this was not due to any nat ural Scot t ish 
poverty trap or 'sterility of the soil' but rather: 
being eightene yeares togeather destitute off constante 
government, the princesse a minor and furthe of hir realme so 
long in a continewall warre... oppressed by tyranny of strangears 
.. yow may imagyne if it have good cause to be very wealthy.l 53 
Despite this obvious handicap, Maitland argued that Scotland by divine 
geographical appointment offered England more advantages than 'they 
with all theyr richesse ar not able to purchase'.l S 4 Maitland, quite 
accurately reminded the English that Scotland although but a poor 
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nation itself 'hath bene the occasion to yow of spending more treasure 
than the richest of them all hath in sum' and that union offered the 
remedy for this great expense. 1 55 This unionist angle was also evident 
in Maitland's description of Arran as: 
no strangear but in a manner your own countryman seeing this isle 
is a common country to us both, one that speaketh your own 
language, of the same religion and one that hath a special good 
will to this realme'.l 5 b 
It was this forthrightly unionist introduction that provided the launch-
pad for the central thrust of Maitland's argument. A detailed extract is 
given below so that the full impact of the radically, imperial. godly 
unionism on offer to Elizabeth. couched in a European context can be 
fully comprehended: 
You need not to feare the marriage of a King of Scotland to a 
Queen of England that the pre-eminence of England might be 
defaced for that should alwayes remain st ill for the worthiness 
thairoff and the Kings of Scot land should ever desyre to make 
their reSlaence England as in the better part of the isle. 
Neither yet neade you to feare any alteration of lawes, seeing the 
lawes of Scotland were taken oyt of England and therefore both 
two realmes are ruled by the one fashion. It is worthily to be 
noted that the other great Princes of Europe as France and Spayne 
have of layte tyme so increased with theyr estates by joyning of 
new powers unto theyr old inheritance that now they be nothing 
lyke that they were wont to be and yet England remayneth always 
one without accession of any new force. Consider if therein there 
be peril or not. For avoyding thairoff the united strength by 
joyning these two kingdoms having also Ireland knit thereto by 
this means Ireland might be reformed and brought to perfection of 
obedience and if choice should be made for the weale of England, 
Scotland were more mete to be joynt to England. By this means the 
Queen of England would be the strongest prince of Christendom 
upon the seas and establish a certain monarchy itself in the 
oceans divided from the rest of the world. 
This explicit articulation of the crux of his argument left little to 
the imagination. Indeed the whole tenor of the Arran marriage proposal, 
countenancing as it does some of the physical and constitutional 
practicalities of the union, illustrates how low on the Scottish agenda 
-and remote a possibility- the return to effective rule under Mary and 
Francis was regarded by the Scots. Maitland's hypothesiSing of the 
marriage of a King of Scotland to a Queen of England and his apology 
that Arran was not yet a King, 'the more sorry we', shows that he 
believed Arran to be but a small and eminently achievable step away 
from such a title. It also adds weight to Elizabeth's later allegation 
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of 1583, written in defence of her own treatment of Mary, that in 1560 
she had vetoed Mait land's suggest ion of deposing Mary.l S 7 
Much less speculatively and quite typical of Maitland was the wider 
European perspective in which he couched his arguments for union. This 
broader outlook and awareness of Scotland's position in European 
affairs was, as noted in earlier chapters, a permanent feature of 
Maitland's career. He could admit that 'Scotland is here in a corner of 
the world separated from the society of men'l S 3 but was nevertheless 
fully aware of Scotland's tactical and strategic import. Similarly, 
despite his painfully obsequious and ingratiating reference to England 
as 'the better part of the isle' he had a shrewd and informed awareness 
of England's status in the European pecking order. As one of the few 
British politicians present at the closing stages of Cateau-Cambresis , 
he witnessed at first hand the dramatic realignment of post-Cambresis 
Europe. Spain had added an ascendancy over Italy to its ever growing 
empire, whilst France having conceded much Italian ground at least 
enjoyed the consolation of eradicating the last continental remnant of 
England's medieval expansionism, inflicting an incisive psychological and 
political blow to English morale. It was in response to the fact that 
'France and Spayne have of late tyme so increased theyr estates' whilst 
, England remayneth alwayes one without accession of any new force' 
that Maitland advocated the creation of what was effectively an 
Imperial Britain embracing England, Ireland and Scotland united under a 
common creed, language and crown. ls9 To Maitland this creation of a 
'monarchy set apart from the seas' provided the best possible defence 
against continental aggression, particularly against the threat of 
France, determined on revenge following the recent Anglo-Scottish 
triumph. 
Maitland's notion of a united Britain, of a monarchy set apart from 
the seas, illustrates the argument that in the early modern period the 
oceans united rather than divided countries. l 60 More significant, 
however, was his allusion to the prospect of a reformed Ireland 
'brought to perfection of obedience'. 1 61 Maitland's raising of the 
troublesome Irish question was a further reminder of the Scots' 
capacity to intervene effectively in Ireland through the offices of the 
earl of Argyll. Even if one allows for Elizabeth's judicious refusal of 
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the Arran match, which effectively ruled out a unionist settlement to 
the Irish question, her failure to entertain Argyll and his repeated 
offers of service more assiduously - which would have significantly 
increased her potential to influence Irish and Scottish affairs - is 
indicative of the alarming errors of political judgement Elizabeth was 
gUilty of in this decade. 16 ' 
Maitland concluded his arguments by lamenting the failure of the 
Scots to embrace the union of the realms through the proposed marriage 
of Mary to Edward VI. 'How we have bene plagued for it sence you can 
best beare us record whereby we have bene so deeply wrapped in misery 
that we are not as yet rid of it '. He advised the English to 'learn of 
our punishment' but to no avail. 163 Elizabeth politely but firmly 
rejected the offer advising the hapless earl not to 'forbeare to accept 
such marriage as may be made to him for his own weill and surety'.l 64 
Summary Of The Proposal 
Elizabeth's rejection of the proposal is not and should not be regarded 
as one of her political errors. The lack of warmth and enthusiasm that 
the match aroused in England, rendered it an eminently sensible 
decision and one that with hindsight appears positively inspired. This, 
however, ought not to deflect from the basic fact that this analYSis of 
the Arran marriage proposal has sought to highlight. The proposal was a 
serious and logical at tempt to guarantee the victory of Protestant ism 
and the future of the Anglo-Scottish alliance through the union of the 
realms. It was not a light-hearted escapade designed to provide an 
interval of light relief in the complex and difficult field of Anglo-
Scottish relations. If, with the retrospective knowledge of Francis' 
death and Arran's madness, Elizabeth's refusal appears inspired then how 
much more inspiring to Scotland and Protestant Europe would her 
acceptance of the invitation to create a godly 'monarchy set apart form 
the seas' have been in early December 15607 It would have been an 
audacious and adventurous resolution, one in keeping with the 
propagandists image of the 'Deborah of the North'1bS but one totally at 
odds with the cautious infecundity of the Elizabethan regime. Elizabeth 
knew that England for all its boastful rhetoric was in no position to 
throw down the gauntlet to France, Spain and the papacy and risk 
complete ruination by 
theoretically claimed to 
Hiberniae. et Scotorum. 1 I> I> 
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Elizabeth's caution was vindicated almost immediately by the news of 
the death of Francis II. There is no evidence to suggest that she 
regretted her decision in the light of the colossal changes this event 
wrought. Rather it confirmed her resolution and encouraged her to view 
with delight a most convenient solution to her Scottish problem: the 
marriage of Mary to the recently rejected Arran.1 67 It is ironic to 
view the complete role reversal that this scheme produced. To England 
and Elizabeth the marriage of Mary to Arran was as attractive and 
logical as the Arran-Elizabeth match had been to the Scots. In almost 
geometrically perfect correspondence, Elizabeth's proposal was as 
distasteful to the Scots (with the obvious exception of the Hamiltons 
and Knox) as the Scots' own project had been to Elizabeth.1 I> 8 In this 
particular instance it was the Scots who held the more realistic view. 
Maitland himself was critically aware of the utter impracticality of a 
marriage which would have completely destroyed the delicate balance of 
Scottish politics. He and Lord James responded angrily to Arran's own 
determined efforts to further the match with Mary but they need not 
have worried. 1 1>" Mary's own complete opposition to such a match ensured 
that Arran's hopes of marrying Mary were to remain as remote as his 
hopes of matrimony with Elizabeth. 1 7 0 To quite an accurate extent, the 
miserable marital fortunes of Arran provide a useful portent to the 
dwindling fortunes of the House of Hamilton in the forthcoming decade. 
Maitland's reaction to the death of Francis was totally different 
from Elizabeth's and did not only amount to a difference of opinion 
over Mary's next marriage. It was far more fundamental than that. 
Elizabeth's convenient, simplistic, and unrealistic solution to the 
problem posed by the death of Francis was in stark contrast to the 
realpolitik response of Maitland. Even before he had left London he had 
already espoused - in some detail to Cecil - his scheme that was for 
the best part of Mary's personal reign to provide the pretence, if not 
the actual basis for the preservation of the amity.171 It was a scheme 
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borne as much out of Maitland's own self-preservatory instincts as out 
of the desire for the weal of the two realms and Mary's own benefit. 
Maitland urgently advocated a rapprochement between Elizabeth and Mary 
as the only means of preserving the amity. This, according to Maitland 
could only be achieved by Elizabeth's recognition of Mary as her 
successor in exchange for Mary's ratification of the Treaty of 
Edinburgh. 1 72 Maitland's attitude towards the ratification of the Treaty 
was to alter considerably in the following months and years, but his 
insistence on the recognition of Mary as Elizabeth's successor as the 
sole means of guaranteeing perpetual amity and his own efforts to 
attain that recognition, was arguably the raison d'etre of his 
subsequent career.! 73 It was to prove a most elusive and frustrating 
goal. 
The swiftness and entirety of Maitland's complete change of policy 
as regards the future of the amity should not be underestimated. The 
ink of the Arran marriage proposal which, if accepted, would have 
created a state of affairs hugely prejudicial to the interests of Mary, 
can hardly have dried when Maitland promulgated his scheme to win her 
the English succession. This immediate reaction of arguably the most 
well-informed and alert Scottish politician is not without significance 
for the whole quest ion of Mary's ret urn to Scot land. 
It has recently been argued that after the death of Francis, Mary 
had no intention of returning to Scotland; that she did so only 
reluctantly, doing 'everything in her power' to prevent her return to 
Scotland. 174 The reaction and conduct of Maitland from his discovery of 
the death of Francis up to Mary's eventual return is not consistent 
with such a view. Perhaps more importantly neither is Mary's own 
conduct. Indeed it is hard to reconcile such a narrow, constricted view 
with the facts. If the reluctant ruler argument is accepted it says a 
lot for Mary's powers of political guile and statecraft that even before 
the official forty days mourning period had elapsed she had writ ten to 
Lord Gray signifying her firm intention 'to pas schortly in thair partis 
to leif amongst our subjectis in all concord and amity'.l 7 S This letter 
dated 8 January 1561, delivered by Robert Lesley can quite safely be 
taken as representative of the 300 or so letters Mary sent to Scotland 
with Lesley and her three other envoys, Preston of Craigmillar, Ogilvy 
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of Findlater and Lumsden of Blanerne. Mary commissioned these envoys as 
early as 12 January 1561.1 76 These letters were pithily described by a 
concerned Maitland as 'the sede of sedition' and despite his boast to 
Cecil that 'some of the new corn sede is ordained to be planted in my 
garden yet I change not',1 77 he was only too well aware of the 
invidious nature of his position and that change he must. 
Maitland provides perhaps the most penetrative analysis of the mood 
and realignment that took place in Scot land in the period of Mary's 
impending return. Through his brother-in-law, Preston of Craigmillar, 
Maitland had an acute understanding of Mary's professed intent to 
return. Maitland met with all four returning commissioners at 
Craigmillar cast Ie on 20 February but Craigmillar was the most useful 
so far as Mait land was concerned. Randolph shared the same opinion. 1 78 
On his outward journey to France, Craigmillar had delivered letters from 
Maitland to Cecil and his wife and on his return through England he 
also declared his mission to Cecil.179 The other three commissioners all 
had spurious records of at tachment to the Congregat ion. As late as 11 
May 1560, Ogilvy of Findlater had negotiated on behalf of the Dowager 
with Maitland, Maxwell, Lord James and Ruthven. Lumsden of Blanerne had 
been described by Randolph as 'a principal practiser of the French' and 
as 'crafty, false and subtle a man as any in Scotland'! 80 whilst Robert 
Lesley was described by the same source as 'a mortal enemy to their 
cause who pretends to the earldom of Rothes'.l 8 1 It was through careful 
liaison with Craigmillar and other recent arrivals from France such as 
Captain Forbes that Maitland was able to remain alert and well informed 
and provide the most lucid appraisal of his own and Scotland's delicate 
situation during these coming months. 182 
The Political Realignment In Scotland 
According to Maitland the death of Francis had caused a major polit ical 
realignment in Scotland. The bi-partite scenario of 1560 consisting 
essentially of earnest supporters of the Congregation and those who 
Maitland described as neutrals those who had opposed the 
congregation were in Maitland's mind too insignificant to be taken 
account of - had been supplanted by a tri-partite state of affairs.1 83 
In explaining this division to Cecil, Mait land could not resist telling 
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his English counterpart that this change had arisen directly out of 
Elizabeth's rejection of the Arran proposal. As a consequence of that 
refusal, the Scots 'must of necessity procure their sovereign's 
benevolence' and it was in the matter of how to procure Mary's 
benevolence that the split had occurred. 184 Significantly, it was not the 
neutrals who had altered their opinion. They remained 'as they were 
before, careless of the commonweil' and 'ready to receive whatsoever 
command of the Prince without examining from what counsel it proceeds 
or what end it tends to'. It was amongst the Congregation's supporters 
that the division had taken place. 
In characteristically selfish fashion - albeit arguably prophetically 
correct - the Hamiltons believed their only surety lay in the marriage 
of Mary to Arran, and that to be achieved before her return. Maitland's 
account of the other party is of more interest and significance. This 
group which was 'no small party neyther in nombre degree nor power' 
felt that Mary should be actively encouraged to return and be 
favourably received, provided that 'she neyther bring force, neyther yet 
counsall of strangers but only trust herself upon her nat ive subjects'. 
It was a measure of Mary's political acumen and the major reason for 
the early success of her personal reign that she chose to follow this 
route. This group also believed that there: 
wilbe wayes anew to induce her majesty to favour the religion not 
to disallow the proceedings past and put all things in good order 
that are amiss living in concord and unitie with all men and 
favourably to embrace her subjects. 
Finally and perhaps most significant ly this party believed 'it hard to 
propound any other conditions unto her of returning home and that it 
were not plausible in the world abroad' to do SO.1 6 S 
Maitland's exposition of the Scottish political scenario, particularly 
his recognition of a strong caucus of neutral opinion and the 
consistent tendency of this sizeable sector of society to follow the 
lead of established authority - so long as it had the power to exercise 
that authority - is not without significance for the entire Reformation 
period in Scotland. This body of conservative neutrality holds 
implications for the question of the Reformation as a popular movement 
and also for the whole question of power politics in sixteenth-century 
Scotland. This guarded neutrality added to the conservatism inherent in 
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the welcoming wing of the former Congregation party provides further 
evidence of the difficult birth of State Protestantism in Scotland. As 
such it strengthens the dictum that holds true for many local 
manifestations of the Reformation, that it 'succeeded most where it 
changed least'.l 8 6 
In depicting the political lie of the land, Maitland was also 
articulating his own acute dilemma. There is little reason to doubt 
Randolph's view that Maitland and Lord James would have been only too 
happy never to set eyes on Mary's face, but it is equally true that the 
earnestness of those desires were closely matched by the increasing 
improbability of their fulfilment.l 8 7 Maitland had already realised that 
his very livelihood depended upon his ability to serve Mary and was 
acting accordingly. Any lingering doubts he may have had on this score 
were unceremoniously despatched by Mary's letter to him of 29 June 
1561.188 This spelt out in clear terms the conditions of her clemency 
towards him: 'Nothing passes amongst my nobility without your knowledge 
and advice. I will not conceal from you that if anything goes wrong 
after I have trusted you, you are the first one I will blame'. This 
aggressive ultimatum is the antithesis of the image of the reluctant 
ruler. mindlessly inheriting her most capable counsellors. 189 
Maitland's situation was not, however, as clear cut as the above 
account would suggest. The English government were Maitland's insurance 
brokers and if Mary's return transpired to be the calamitous event he 
feared, then England would be his likely refuge. As he so laconically 
admitted 'it will be hard for me to dwell in Rome and strive with the 
Pope'.1 90 Maitland could hardly guarantee himself sanctuary in England, 
if, in the anxious months prior to Mary's return he had been perceived 
as facilitat ing her ret urn by carrying out her direct ives. At the same 
time he could not afford to incur the wrath of Mary by defying her 
commands. Once again it was a difficult. duplicitous role Maitland was 
compelled to play and one that as usual he was able to play with 
consummate skill. His solution to this dilemma was to convince Elizabeth 
of the necessity of a rapprochement with Mary by emphasising the 
precarious future for England and Scotland if she failed to do so. The 
collapse of the amity, the destruction of Protestantism and the 
resumption of the auld alliance was the harvest of failure waiting to 
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be reaped. 191 In so doing Maitland could claim to be serving both Mary 
and Elizabeth's best interests. 
Maitland was certainly able to convince the English of his loyalty 
to their cause. It was during this difficult period that Randolph 
praised him to Cecil as 'displaying the excellence of his wit, his love 
to his country and his goodwill towards the English... more than could 
be thought in any man'.! 92 Almost all Maitland's English correspondence 
at this time affirms his ardent efforts to limit the damage of Mary's 
return by a combination of religious and political pre-emptive 
strikes. 193 However, while Maitland's actions could be interpreted 
favourably by England they were hardly incapable of a palatable 
interpretation by Mary either. Even the rejection of the auld alliance -
which Maitland engineered in the convention of January 1561- was 'so 
tempered... that their men are not put out of hope' and Maitland 
admitted it was a postponement rather than an outright rejection. l 94 
His argument that Scottish friendship was to be granted rather than 
requested also smacked of sensible advice rather than disobedience to 
Mary.1 9 S Similarly, the question of Maitland's promotion of religious 
measures 'something more radical than at another time I would have 
allowed' requires clarification. 19b 
It is difficult to identify what measures Maitland was referring to. 
The January convention is traditionally noted for its refusal to 
implement the radical proposals of the First Book of Discipline rather 
than for the adoption of an extreme and coercive religious policy.1 9 7 
Certainly a debate was held between Knox, Willock and Goodman with the 
Aberdonian, Catholic contingent of Alexander Anderson, James Strachan 
and John Lesley, but this was little more than a show trial. 198 
Unsurprisingly the debate was was won by the reformers but it was a 
hollow Victory. Anderson continued to act as Principal of Aberdeen 
University until 1569, Strachan continued to serve in the royal 
Secretariat on Mary's return, whilst Lesley was to rise to great 
personal favour with Mary.1 99 Also at this convention a 'very strait 
law for eating of meat in Lent and other days of old forbidden' was 
passed but this was piecemeal compared with the far-reaching proposals 
of the First Book of Discipline, which. if implemented would have gone a 
long way towards ensuring the victory of Protestantism remained secure 
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beyond the grasp of their Catholic Queen. It appears that Mait land was 
instrumental in this rejection, quite possibly delivering the dismissive 
gibe of it as a 'devout imagination'.2 0 0 Such action was hardly 
consistent with the alleged adoption of vehement religious measures. 
It is possible to argue, however, that Maitland was protecting the 
best interests of Protestant ism. The hard-hit t ing financial proposals 
the Book demanded for the endowment of the Kirk, had the power to 
transform the crucial acquiescence of many influential neutrals into 
open opposition. Needless to say, Knox, did not share this generous 
interpretation of Maitland's conduct. 2 0 1 He was no doubt suspiciously 
aware that at this point, Maitland, could easily justify his conduct to 
Mary. The rejection of the First Book of Discipline as Knox well knew 
was not unwelcome news for Mary. 
Maitland was clearly managing to play his bifarious game 
successfully. In this he was undoubtedly helped by Lord James. During 
this period their partnership developed into a stronger bond. Jvlaitland 
secured his support for the policy of alluring Mary into acceptance of 
the amity and the domestic status quo, via Elizabeth's recognition of 
her claim to the English succession. 20 2 It was greatly to Maitland's 
advantage that Lord James was chosen as the envoy of the Estates to 
invite Mary to return. Maitland could certainly endorse Lord James 
subsequent advice to Mary: 'Above all things madam, for the love of God 
press not matters of religion, not for any man's advice on the 
earth'.2 0 3 It was a further reminder of Mary and the Guises' political 
judgement that she chose to accept Lord James' prudent invitation 
rather than the alternative Catholic crusade offered by Huntly via John 
Lesley.2 0 ~ Perhaps one should not be too surprised at Mary's decision, 
which was entirely in keeping with the conciliatory climate of pre-
Poissy France. 2os 
The united front that Maitland and Lord James were able to hold 
together succeeded in isolating Huntly and minimising the domestic 
disruption caused by an unhappy 'Cock of the North' and a nervous 
Chatelherault. 206 This can certainly be detected in the forty days 
IvIai t land and Lord James 'spent in the north parts of Scot land .. , 
advancing the religion and the common cause',207 This is one of the 
most obscure episodes of this interim period. It was apparently 
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sanctioned - along with the visitations of Argyll, Glencairn and Arran 
to the west, and of certain unnamed lords to the 'inparts' of the realm 
- by the May convention in response to the petition from the kirks to 
suppress idolatry throughout the realm.2 0 4 According to Spot t iswoode 
these visitations were carried out amidst an orgy of violence, pillage 
and fire. 
The buildings of the church defaced, the timber, lead, bells put 
out to sale... the very sepulchres of the dead were not spared 
but digged, ript up and sacreligiously violated. Bibliothecks 
destroyed, the volumes of the Fathers, councells, and other books 
of humane learning with the Registers of the Church cast into 
the streets and consumed with fire. 209 
This is certainly evidence of the more vehement religious policy 
Maitland had spoken of in January and there must have been strong 
political overtones in the visitation which kept Maitland and Lord James 
away from the seat of government for almost six weeks. It certainly 
provides an interesting precursor to their next journey northward, to 
Corrichie the following year. 
The State Of The Nation Immediately Prior To Mary's Arrival 
Immediately after his return from the north, Maitland composed within 
one week, three letters of major significance to Cecil. 2 1 0 These let ters 
provide a clear insight into Maitland's mind at this critical juncture 
as well as a comprehensive report on the state of the nation, just days 
before Mary's return. They give a synoptic appraisal of Maitland's 
attitude, with his emphasis on his own perilous situation, the 
vulnerability of Protestantism and England and the efficacious necessity 
of Elizabeth establishing an entente cordiBle with Mary. What is most 
evident in this correspondence is Maitland's absolute uncertainty as to 
the outcome of Mary's return. He simply did not know what to expect. He 
feared the worst and predicted 'wonderful tragedies'21 1 if Mary 
ret urned an enemy to Eng land and the religion. It is not hard to see 
why. 
His letter of 10 August makes it particularly clear that despite the 
vandalism of the recent visitations, the victory of Protestantism was 
far from secure. 21 2 This letter is almost Knoxian in its temper with 
allusions to the 'hollow hearts of the faithful' and the 'butchery of 
Bonner'. Maitland lamented that it was only in 'outward appearance' that 
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the religion had 'the upper hand' and that the Protestants were not a 
united body but rather 'be not all alike' and diverse in their 
commitment to the faith. In a marvellous analysis of the heterogeneous 
composition of the body of the new Kirk, Maitland depicted several 
troublesome elements, 'So many protestants as be either addicted to the 
French fact ion, covetous, inconstant, uneasy, ignorant or careless'. 21 l 
While it must be borne in mind that Maitland was writing with the 
specific purpose of persuading the English to accept his conciliatory 
policy as the best solut ion to Mary's ret urn, his portrayal of the 
complex nature of Scottish Protestantism is nonetheless pertinent. 
InCidentally, it is striking that Maitland had a suffiCiently high 
opinion of Mary's state-craft to believe that she would not be so 
impetuous as to wage open war against the religion, but feared 'the 
same would be pressed at by indirect meanes'. Maitland in common with 
Throckmorton was very much aware of the quality of her political 
tutelage under the Guises, and from a very early stage was respectfully 
fearful of Mary's political guile. 2 1. 
The domestic division that Maitland described in these letters is a 
jolt to those who take the simplistic view of 1560 as the annus 
mirabilis of Anglo-Scottish relations, which once and for all rooted out 
the influences of France and Catholicism in favour of England and 
Protestantism. 21 S Maitland's belief that 'some have been so accustomed 
to feed upon the French fare that their delicate stomachs cannot well 
digest any other'21 6 allied to his fears of the papists, illustrates the 
danger of over-emphasising the consequences of 1560, major milestone 
though it was. As well as identifying the French and papist influences 
preying on the disparate Protestants, Maitland also drew at tent ion to 
another explosive element in the equation; the personal tension between 
Chatelherault and Lord James. If the smouldering discontent of Huntly is 
added to this cauldron of confusion, it is not difficult to appreciate 
why Maitland was alarmed at rumours that Mary was seeking to effect a 
Lennox restitution.217 
Maitland admitted that he was amazed that the situation was not 
worse considering that: 
it is now more than two years past that we have lived in a manner 
without any regiment ... I marvel from whence doth proceed the 
quietness which we presently enjoy, the like whereof was never 
seen in any Realm. 218 
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Maitland was, however, critically aware of the limitations of the make-
shift government. The emphasis he placed on Mary's greater powers as 
the legitimate Prince is striking. Maitland spelt out in basic terms how 
Mary would be able to establish her ascendancy: 
Every man once in a year has to do with his Prince's benevolence: 
If at that time when his particular business occureth, her 
countenance shall be but strange to him, in sight of the peril, in 
what case shal the subject then be? Every man hath in his private 
causes some enemy or unfriend: what boldness shall they not take, 
seeking an advantage and knowing their adversary to be out of the 
Prince's good grace?21 9 
This analysis of the monarch-subject relationship, so closely related as 
it was to the practicalities of life in sixteenth-century Scottish 
society, provides perhaps the best notion of Maitland's own fears at 
the return of his sovereign, with whom he stood in such ticklish terms. 
The letter of 10 August also contained an interesting contingency 
plan in the event of Mary returning hostile to England and the 
religion. 2 2 0 Maitland admitted that it was implausible to renew the 
Treaty of Berwick on the grounds of its offensiveness to Mary and also 
because of 'the faint-hearted amongst ourselves' with whom he had to 
contend. As an alternative, he advocated the creation of a European 
Protestant League made up of England, Scotland, Denmark, Sweden and the 
German Protestant Princes as well as those of France. It is difficult to 
see how this would have been any more palatable to Mary than a renewal 
of the Treaty of Berwick. The scheme does, however, show Maitland's 
consistent eye to the continent and his conversance with the type of 
sectarian alliance that was to come to dominate Europe. It was though a 
suggestion more worthy of Knox than Maitland and as such it is perhaps 
no surprise that it shared the ill-fated destiny of so many of that 
reformer's proposals. 
Maitland's letter of 15 August contained a definite change of tone. 
It was writ ten a Her he had discovered Elizabeth's refusal of lvlary's 
safe-conduct. While Maitland had endorsed Cecil's earlier prevention of 
D'Oysel's journey northward and the general opinion that it would be 
best if Mary's ret urn could be somehow delayed, he could scarcely 
credit the insulting refusal of the safe-conduct. 22 1 It represented the 
rejection of the conciliatory approach he had advised in favour of the 
politics of confrontation. He was ut terly dumbstruck both at Elizabeth's 
impolicy, 'To what purpose should you open your pack and sell none of 
your wares or declare yourselves enemies to those you canot punish?' 
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but also at Mary's audacious determinat ion to carryon regardless. 2 2 2 
More than ever Maitland lamented his own dilemma, 'who am taken to be 
a chief meddlar of all the practices within that realm' and confessed 
that 'it passeth my dull capacity what this sudden enterprise should 
mean'.2 2 3 While he felt that 'my wit is not sufficient to give advice in 
such a dangerous case', at this late stage he appears to have felt his 
best surety still lay with Elizabeth rather than Mary. He advised 
Elizabeth to ensure Berwick remained well fort Hied and begged Cecil 
for advice as to, 'What is best to be done as well in the common cause 
as my part icular'. 224 It must have been a shocked Elizabeth, who, in 
barely three weeks time was greeted by Maitland and his newly acquired 
Marian stance as Mary's personal envoy.2 2 S 
I f a week is a long time in polit ics, then the year from August 
1560 to August 1561 was a veritable aeon. The complete change in the 
international balance of power wrought by the death of Francis II 
demanded an equally thorough change in policy. Maitland working in 
close concert with Lord James personified the Scots firm grasp of this 
uncomfortable political nettle, which Elizabeth and England struggled to 
come to terms with, clinging to the irrelevancy of the terms of the 
Treaty of Edinburgh. The year witnessed the desertion of the good 
fortune England had enjoyed in Scottish affairs and the year ahead was 
to expose the true worth of the Scots' recent promises of eternal love, 
gratitude and devotion to England. In Scotland, the inner contradictions 
within the Congregation and the compromise settlement of the 
Reformation parliament were realised once the capacious, motivating and 
unifying force of the commonweal had been superseded by the obedient 
response demanded by Scotland's first adult monarch for eighteen years. 
The vivid picture of domestic discord painted by Maitland which 
highlighted the competing forces of the Hamilton party, Lord James 
party, Huntly, the neutrals, the papists, and the spectre of Lennox is 
at once an impressive retrospective tribute to the triumph of the 
Congregation and an accurate appraisal of the enormity of the task 
facing Mary Stewart on her arrival. Maitland had good reason to fear 
Mary's return but his father, Sir Richard, probably spoke for the 
majority when he welcomed Mary in poetic verse, concluding: 
'Viva Mairie, trenobill royne de escois'.2' 6 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FIRST YEAR OF MARY'S RULE 
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For in the memory of man that day of the year was never seen a more 
dolorous face of the heaven than was at her arrival .... for besides the 
surface wet and corruption of the air, the mist was so thick and dark 
that scarce might any man espy the length of two pair of boots. The 
sun was not seen to shine two days before nor two days after.l 
john Knox's description of the apocalyptical weather conditions of 19 
August 1561 may not be very reliable as metearological data but it 
certainly draws at tent ion to one of the major landmarks of Scotland's 
history, Mary Stewart's return to Scotland and the commencement of the 
nation's first experience of the personal government of a female 
sovereign. That the Scots warmed to the prospect is perhaps reflected 
in the fact that the early years of Mary's reign are commonly regarded 
even by her sternest critics as something of a success. As this chapter 
dealing with the establishment of Mary's government and Maitland's 
leading role in that process will try to show, it is difficult to see 
how they can be regarded otherwise. For Mait land, as for so many 
others, Mary's return marked the beginning of a distinct new phase in 
his political career. Immediately confirmed in his position as Principal 
Secretary, for the first but certainly not the last time, he could be 
properly regarded as the minister of Mary Stewart. 
The Problems Facing Mary On Her Return 
The successful resumption of adult personal rule by a Stewart monarch 
following a long minority was not a new feature in the political life 
of the nation. Indeed, in this respect Mary's successful return after 
nineteen years of minority rule can be seen as a mere continuation of 
the well established traditions of her Stewart forebears. There was, 
however, much that was unique in her position and it is difficult to 
accept the view that the years of Mary's minorit y like those of her 
father and grandfather before, had acted as some sort of beneficial 
safety valve. 2 The consequences of Mary's minority were far more 
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serious than anything her ancestors had faced. The diplomatic and 
religious Reformation of 1560 had er·oded two of the supporting pillars 
of the Stewart monarchy. the Catholic Church and the French alliance. It 
was not possible for lvlary in the way that her predecessors had so 
conspicuously done for generations to encourage actively the twin 
nat ional promot ion of Catholicism and a host ile suspicion of England. 
Added to this were the more typical problems facing a Stewart monarch 
after a long minority. The personal reigns of her father and 
grandfather had both begun with a crisis in the Crown's relations with 
the nobility while it has been acknowledged that 'the key to the 
stability of any Stewart reign lay in finance'. It is hard to believe 
that the success Mary enjoyed in managing this clearly difficult 
situation - in particular avoiding the need to levy unpopular taxes -
can be put down as has recently been suggested to a combination of 
'luck and gun barre 1 v is ion 1.3 
Mary's Successful Management 
Almost from the start of her reign Mary displayed a skilful adroitness 
in establishing herself in her realm. Within six days she had addressed 
the religious problem in possibly the best way imaginable, proclaiming 
her recognition of the status quo whilst reserving her own right to 
worship as she herself wished. 4 Within two weeks by sending Maitland in 
embassy to London she had turned her attention to what had been the 
most significant aspect of Scottish forelgn policy over the last two 
years, the relationship with England. s Within three weeks she had 
embarked on her first royal progress through her realm, travelling to 
Linlithgow, Stirling, Kincardine, Perth, Dundee and St Andrews, a feature 
that was to become the trade mark of her personal reign. 6 More so than 
any other Stewart monarch, Mary displayed a willingness to act upon the 
parliamentary advice given to both James III and IV to travel 
throughout the realm and to give access to their subjects. Mary's clear 
enthusiasm for this particular method of government was perhaps one of 
the most beneficial of the many French influences that can be discerned 
at work during her reign. 7 All these measures are far more in keeping 
with the image of a diligent monarch, gathering the advice of her 
counsellors and prudently addressing matters of state, rather than that 
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of the conspicuously reluctant ruler, displaying a marked indifference 
to the problems of her native land. 
It has been alleged, however, that Mary's personal reign was marked 
by both these detrimental features and that in an era characterised as 
the age of the council and of the Secretary, her selection of both her 
council and Secretary thoroughly vindicates such a view. a It has 
further been argued by the same author that Mary was blandly and 
blindly indifferent to the choice of her key personnel; making no choice 
at all but simply inheriting the existent office bearers and, as far as 
it is possible to judge in the absence of the privy council records of 
Mary of Guise's regency, the existing privy councillors as well. This 
allegation is especially pertinent to this thesis on the career of the 
Scotttish Secretary of State and must be dealt with. 
The evidence suggests an altogether different picture. The intense 
diplomatic activity that took place between Mary and her subjects 
during the interim of Francis II's death and her ret urn to Scot land 
eight months later, emphasised Mary's grasp of the central importance 
of the council and of the Secretary." Maitland, after having received a 
stinging rebuke and ultimatum from Mary in June 1561, which clearly 
spelt out the conditional terms of his continued employment as 
Secretary, certainly did not view Mary as indifferent.lo Neither did 
Morton or Argyll, two of the original signatories to the First Band of 
the Congregation in 1557 and subsequently two of Mary's principal privy 
councillors. It would appear from the obsequious grovelling so evident 
in the letters these earls sent to Mary in February and March 1561 
that she had also made the terms of their continued prosperity 
abundant ly clear to them. 1 1 Other let ters sent by men with much less 
to fear, such as the earl of Cassillis who had voiced his opposition to 
the proceedings of the Reformation parliament, also show an earnest 
desire to win Mary's favour. 12 It is not being too adventurous to 
suggest that the response of these three earls was perhaps typical of 
the reaction to the 300 or so letters Mary had sent into Scotland with 
her four commissioners as early as January 1561 signalling her firm 
intention to return. lS It would appear that well before her return in 
August, the 'reluctant ruler' had long since begun considering the 
matter of her future government. 
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It is actually difficult to see how Mary could have handled the 
matter of her return any better. She had made it clear to her subjects 
that she was prepared to forgive past misdemeanours and to start 
afresh.14 In response to this she had received many written and 
personal assurances of loyal support from her subjects. Perhaps the 
most striking feature of Mary's return in 1561 was the marked 
willingness on the part of herself and the nobility to take each other 
at their word. In 1564, Mait land loudly praised Mary's 'beningt ie thir 
thrie yeiris with the mair that scho hes lived in governament over yow' 
and her success in obtaining, 
sik dew obedience as a just prince can luk for at the hand is of 
faithfull and obedient subjectis, I meane na forceid nor 
unwilling obedience, quilk I knaw hir nature dois detest. bot sic 
as proceidis fra the contemplatioun of hir moderat kynd of 
regiment will for luff and dewties saik produce the fructis 
thairof.1 5 
This delicate balance based on the traditional, mutual relationship 
between monarch and subject was far more preferential than any other 
alternative open to Mary in 1561. 
It has been suggested that Mary should have conducted a wholesale 
clear out of councillors and office bearers. 16 If, however, Mary had 
favoured this aggressive approach and dismissed en masse the existing 
administration, she would then have been faced with the difficult 
problem of establishing new criteria upon which to base the selection 
of her council and ministers. If that criteria had included the 
rejection of all those who had shown some support for the Congregation 
then she would have barely been able to staff a plausible privy council 
at all. She may, just possibly, have been able to create a council which 
fulfilled the Congregation's earlier demand for 'government by born men 
of the realm' but it would have been one that out of necessity could 
not have avoided a parvenu image. which, in a societ y ever conscious of 
rank, tradition and privilege would have been a highly inflammatory 
gesture. As it was, the second chance that Mary made clear she was 
prepared to give her subjects was in effect, a vote of confidence in 
the political community and proof of an impressively incisive. political 
judgement which avoided many unnecessary pit falls. It was a decision 
that worked particularly well as far as Maitland was concerned. He 
voiced his approval to Cecil of Mary's decision to 'trust her person in 
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our hands' and his firm intention to respond dutifully to his 
sovereign.1 7 
The same prudence so evident in the selection of her council was 
shown also in her immediate response to the religious issue. This again 
was not a hasty decision but one taken after careful consideration of 
the alternat ives open to her. Mary had been given two clear 
alternatives from her subjects before her return. Lord James on behalf 
of the prOVisional government had offered her in June 1561 the 
emphatic advice that 'for the love of God madam press no matter of 
religion, not for any man's advice on the earth'.18 This was in stark 
contrast to the prospect of a Catholic crusade tendered to her from the 
earl of Huntly via the offices of John Lesley.19 Her royal proclamation 
of 1561 signalled her acceptance of Lord James' advice and in a sense 
was the epitome of her conciliatory and conciliar style of government 
in these opening months. Mary followed the policy favoured by the 
majorit y of her counsellors, a decision that was swift ly vindicated by 
the support of Lord James and Maitland in defence of her Mass. It is to 
be noted, however, that Mary very wisely did not ostracise or exclude 
Huntly from her council as a result of his desire for a Catholic 
restitution. He was immediately confirmed in his position as Chancellor 
and it is difficult to see how his total eclipse the following year at 
Corrichie could have been ant iCipated at this junct ure.2 0 It does not 
appear to have been a pre-determined policy on Mary's part. 
It must, however, be recognised that Mary's decision to follow Lord 
James advice was undoubtedly shaped by the conference convened at 
Joinville by the Cardinal of Lorraine and at tended by several 
experienced French campaigners in Scotland, Jacques de la Brosse, the 
vicomte de Martigues and the Bishop of Amiens, Nicholas de Pelleve. 21 
These men all favoured the adoption by Mary of a friendly stance 
towards Elizabeth. This Joinville conference is a timely reminder of a 
further vital aspect of Mary's personal reign, the continued influence 
exerted over her by her French kindred. This Guise factor was, however, 
something of a two-edged sword for ~lary. Undoubtedly it provided a 
source of family stability and solace but it also provided advice which 
often conflicted with that tendered by her Scottish counsellors. 
Maitland had to contend with this problem and he was undoubtedly 
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helped in this first year of Mary's reign by the degree of similarity in 
the aims of her French kindred and his own. In 1562 the Guises were 
even prepared to allow Mary to embrace Anglicanism, a line that was not 
at all unpalatable to Maitland. 22 
The religious problem was not settled by the Proclamation but it did 
provide a valuable modus vivendi which enabled government to go on. 
When Mary did confront the problemat ical quest ion of the new Kirk's 
endowment it was once more with the approval of the council. This 
suggests that the criticism of the allegedly limited business the 
council undertook is somewhat specious. 2 3 As well as providing the 
forum wherein the endowment of the Kirk was formulated, throughout 
Mary's reign decisive matters of national importance in both domestic 
and foreign pOlicy continued to be discussed in the council. It is 
noticeable, for example, that the chief issue of Mary's foreign policy 
in these early years, her desire for a meeting with Elizabeth, was 
approved by the council. 2 4 Similarly, the stringent measures Mary took 
to ensure regular attendance at the council whilst she was on progress 
also suggests an acute awareness rather than indifference to the 
importance of the privy council as the main organ of government. 2S 
Long before the patrimony of the Kirk had been resolved, the 
prominence of Maitland at the heart of Mary's goverment had been 
confirmed. Within fifteen days of Mary's arrival he had been dispatched 
to London to prove his worth in the field that had hitherto been his 
forte, Anglo-Scottish relations. It was the first of many diplomatic 
missions he was to undertake on Mary's behalf and for that reason alone 
is immensely significant. However, its significance extends far beyond 
any novelty factor. Most of Maitland's diplomatic forays had a major 
bearing on the development of the amity and this unusually brief 
embassy (he left Scotland on 2 September and had returned by 24 
September) was no exception. 2 /) It provided the English with a vivid 
realisation of the profound effect Mary's successful return had upon 
the future direction of Anglo-Scottish relations. Maitland had long 
since grasped that in the light of Mary's impending return the future 
of the amity was entirely dependent upon the construction of a new 
deal acceptable to Mary. He had already made it clear that the only way 
to achieve this was through Elizabeth's recognition of Mary as her heir. 
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His embassy in September 1561 was to see the emphatic restatement of 
this view. 2 7 
The Condition Of The Amity 
So profound was the impact of Mary's return that although the term 
amity continued to be bandied about by the ministers of both countries . , 
the appositeness of it to describe the condition of Anglo-Scottish 
relations during Mary's personal reign must be questioned. In the next 
chapter it will be seen how Mait land in November 1562 was able to 
expose the amity for what it was, nothing more than a precarious, 
private, personal friendship between the two queens unendorsed by any 
public contract. This first mission anticipates that disclosure and 
reveals that at this early stage of Mary's reign the halcyon days of 
the amity were already over. In truth they were over· in December 1560, 
when the rejection of the Arran match was swiftly followed by the news 
of Francis II's death. From that point, even Maitland, arguably the 
architect of the amity that had proved so successful in 1560 never 
displayed the same unqualified, subservient willingness to embrace the 
Eng lish alliance. 2 8 
It would of course be rather naive to suggest that the amity had 
ever been anything other than condit ional on the part of the Scots or 
the English. Even the prospects offered by the Arran marriage proposal 
- which can rightly be regarded as the zenith of the Scots' desire for 
perpetual amity with England - was conditional upon the acceptance by 
Elizabeth of Arran as her husband. The amity had never been an 
altruistic arrangement for either party and indeed had only progressed 
thus far because of the demonstrably mutual need of 1560. The English, 
with their perennial need for security on their northern frontier had 
responded positively to the request for military intervention and 
secured the victory of the overwhelmingly anti-French Congregation. As 
well as securing the removal of the pro-French government of Mary of 
Guise, the English were also to be rewarded by the perpetual friendship 
and undying gratitude of the Scots based on a common religious bono, 
which according to Maitland was 'the straitest knot of amity 
imaginable'.29 Mary's ret urn showed how hollow those assurances were, 
as well as proving how easily that tight religious knot could be 
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loosened. The uncomfortable political reality for England in 1561 was 
that the amity was now fundamentally conditional upon the recognition 
by Elizabeth of Mary as her successor. English friendship and sincerity 
had to be proved all over again if the Scottish alliance was to be 
retained. 
The colder, more strained phase of relations between England and 
Scot land that Mary's ret urn ushered in was more of a detente than an 
amity. At the time of the Arran match the Scots could not praise the 
selfless and godly support of Elizabeth enough. who, according to 
Maitland, 'God hath appointed to be the mayne instrument and only 
worker of our deliverance ' . This rendered the Scots perpetually indebted 
to her and ensured they would remain 'always thankfull and suffer not 
the remembrance of so great a benefit suddenly to perish'. 30 It is 
remarkable just how quickly this indebtedness was forgot ten. Mait land 
himself was spectacularly hypocritical in this respect. He had promised 
Elizabeth in December 1560 that 'hereafter if matters so fall out that 
by occasion the service of our nation may stand your majesty in good 
stead your highness may be well assured that which we now profess in 
words will be ut tered in effect.'3l Within weeks of Mary's return 
Maitland made it clear that this gratitude would not include the 
recognition of the Treaty of Edinburgh: 
I enter nocht in dispute how that trety was past nor be quhat 
authoritie but this far I am assurit the commissioun was very 
slender to transfer fra the quene my souerane the titill of a 
kingdome and debar hir frome it perpetwally.32 
Maitland as one of the Signatories to the concessions the Treaty 
granted to the Scots knew very well by whose authority it had been 
passed but now amnesia and a new patriotism were the order of the day. 
It is striking just how differently at various key points in his 
career Maitland viewed the English intervention of 1560. The Arran 
proposal marked the benevolent. altruistic end of Maitland's spectrum of 
appraisals whilst the view he expressed in 1567 'that we think the 
quenes majesty in the opinion of her owne counsell and all the worlde 
tooke as great benefit by that change as the realm of Scotland did or 
any particular person l marked the other extreme. 33 The line Maitland 
seems to have taken on Mary's return lay somewhere in between these 
two points but his convenient dismissal of the Treaty of Edinburgh 
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suggests that it was perhaps closer to the latter than the former. 
This hardly subt Ie change of emphasis is a warning of the dangers 
of accepting the traditional notion of the amicable nature of Anglo-
Scottish relations during the early years of Mary's reign. It is true 
that this period was to witness a proliferation of hyperbolic 
expressions of mutual good will, love and affection between the two 
queens and also that the vision of a united Protestant realm continued 
to be the incentive Maitland laid before the English.s 4 Maitland was no 
doubt in genuine sympathy with this aim and was prepared to 
countenance extremes of sycophancy in order to achieve it. These 
diplomatic devices were, however, constantly underpinned by an 
entrenched firmness not to compromise on the main issue, Mary's rights 
to the succession. This fact holds the key to the progress of the .amity 
from 1561 onwards. Its prospects were only propitious for as long as 
Mary perceived that the recognition of her claim was a distinct 
possibility. In this sense Maitland's embassy of 1561, with his firm 
insistence that the concession was the 'onelie moyan thairin quhairby 
the principall difference micht be honorablie compos it and takin away\ 
provides a very accurate portent for the future course of Anglo-
Scot t ish relat ions during Mary's personal reign. 3 5 It is on that mission 
that attention will now be focused. 
Maitland's Mission Of September 1561 
Maitland's own detailed account of the mission from which it is 
possible to deduce not only what he set out to achieve but what he 
actually accomplished compensates for the fact that his official 
instruct ions are incomplete.3 b Ostensibly it would appear that he was 
sent to announce Mary's safe arrival and to deliver her expressions of 
good-will to Elizabeth but it is incontrovert ible that he had far more 
substantial business to carry out. In a clever diplomatic manoeuvre, 
Maitland carried two sets of instructions and two letters for Elizabeth, 
one from Mary herself and the other from the noblity.37 The nobility's 
letter was far more strident than Mary's and Elizabeth confessed to 
being taken aback by the 'menacing' tone of their missive. 3a That 
Maitland was able to show Elizabeth that it was the same nobility who 
so recently had expressed their addiction to her and England's service 
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and not Mary who had persuaded him to prosecute his proposal for the 
future of the amity was further indicative of Mary's success in winning 
her subjects to her side. Mary's ability within two weeks of her arrival 
to get the nobility to act so aggressively on her behalf and thus avoid 
incurring the personal wrath of Elizabeth sits somewhat uneasily with 
the image of the inept queen. 
Unquestionably, the nub of Maitland's embassy revolved around his 
proposal, formulated months before, that Mary should be recognised as 
Elizabeth's successor in return for her ratification of a modified 
Treaty of Edinburgh. His three interviews with Elizabeth during the 
course of this embassy repeatedly returned to this same point. It was 
hardly surprising that Elizabeth later complained to Sir James Melville 
that Maitland 'did ring always her knell in her ears, talking of nothing 
but of her succession'. 3'1 Mait land's arguments provided a clear 
indication of the aggressive tone of the Scottish line at this time, He 
reminded Elizabeth of her own doubt ful stat us in the eyes of Europe 
and of how this contrasted with the opinion of the legitimacy of Mary's 
claim which 'in the jugment of forayne nations is without all 
controversy',40 Whether Maitland actually expressed himself as frankly 
as he said he did is open to question. It ought to be remembered that 
his account was intended for the consumpt ion of Mary and her Guise 
kindred and was probably tapered accordingly, a timely reminder both of 
the continued close links between Mary and her French family and of 
Maitland's deviousness. 
As well as being an excellent indicat ion of Mait land's insistent 
at tit ude towards the amity and the succession, his mission was no less 
accurate in depicting the sclerotic state of Elizabeth's mind on the 
subject. Elizabeth was at least as strident and determined in defining 
her own position as Maitland had been in his. Maitland can hardly have 
been aware of the services he was rendering to future generations of 
historians but it was during the course of this embassy that he 
provoked a startling procession of what have become perhaps the most 
quotable quotes of Elizabeth's just ificat ion of her policy towards the 
succession. 
While there were hints of the same deliberate ambigUity so inherent 
in Elizabeth's Church settlement and her avowed determination not to 
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make windows into men's souls, Elizabeth's statement that 'The 
succession of the crown of England is a mat ter I will not mell in bot 
as the sacrament of the altar sum thinks a thing sum other whose 
jugement is best God knows', was underpinned by a dogmatic insistence 
that 'For so long as I live there shall be no other Queen of England 
but I'. Elizabeth made it clear that Maitland's proposal was distinctly 
unpalatable, 'this desire is without ane example to set my winding 
sheet before my eye... think you that I could love my own winding 
sheet'. Having spent her formative years during what has been termed 
the 'Mid Tudor crisis' Elizabeth had good reason for such an attitude. 
She was critically aware of the 'inconstancy of the English people how 
they ever mislike the present government and have their eyes fixed 
upon that person that is next to succeed' and never seems to have 
altered her belief regarding Maitland's proposal that 'in assuring her 
(Mary) of the succession we might put our present state in doubt '. 41 
If Maitland could have discerned that in his negotiations with 
Elizabeth during these first weeks of Mary's reign he had achieved as 
much progress as he was going to make in the succession issue, then 
the story of Anglo-Scottish relations in the first half of the decade 
of the 1560s would have been very different. The reason why Maitland 
did not recognise that he had already arrived at the impasse which was 
ultimately to wreck the amity and remained sanguine of achieving the 
major concession is simple. Elizabeth, as she was to do for the best 
part of the next four years deliberately gave him the impression that 
some sort of compromise was possible. It was in her and Eng land's 
interests to promote such a policy. Cecil was particularly aware of the 
obvious benefits of keeping 'the Scottish Queen's affairs hanging in an 
uncertaint y'. 42 It would have been grossly impolitic at the 
commencement of Mary's reign to have immediately alienated her by 
rejecting out of hand her claim to the English succession. 
The English, if not in desperate need of Scottish support, could 
certainly well do without Scottish enmity. A discontented Ireland was 
perhaps an inevitable and uncomfortable fact of life but a hostile 
Scotland, barely a year after it had seemed that they had so 
expensively and successfully bolted the postern gate which for 
centuries had posed such a dangerous threat to their national security, 
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was not a palatable prospect. The English knew that Mary's return had 
unbolted that door but it was as yet unclear how wide it had been 
opened. England's chief concern was to ensure it remained closed; the 
problem was how. They could not employ the same tactics as in 1560. 
Action against a divinely sanct ioned and resident sovereign was never 
high on the Elizabethan agenda and Mai t land's mission had made it clear 
that there was little chance of the Scottish nobility doing it for them. 
The only way was to encourage Mary to close it herself and an 
immediate rejection of her overtures for the succession was not likely 
to achieve this. In response to this dilemma Elizabeth concocted what 
could later be identified as a classic Elizabethan cocktail of 
diplomatic finesse: a torpid combination of delay, prevarication and 
faint promises designed to give Mary the impression that a favourable 
response to her claim was negot iable. It was an excellent and 
inexpensive way of avoiding decisive action and prematurely rupturing 
relations between the two countries. 
Maitland's Optimism 
Maitland had not returned to Scotland in a despondent mood. He had 
received the first of a long series of tantalising encouragements that 
a compromise could be reached. He felt that Elizabeth preferred Mary's 
claim to all others and had reason to believe that she was prepared to 
modify the Treaty of Edinburgh. As a prelude to this Elizabeth had 
specifically sanctioned the further development of the special 
relationship between ~laitland and Cecil as the best means of achieving 
a workable compromise. The two Secretaries were to liaise closely 
together to work towards this goal. 4o 3 Cecil was a good deal less 
wHling than Maitland to play along with this scheme, but this is to 
anticipate. Maitland also later alleged that it was during the course of 
this embassy that he had been given encouragement by a meeting at 
Hertford Castle with Dudley and Cecil of the prospect of a meeting of 
the two queens and also tacit recognition of his proposal as the basis 
of the future of the amity.4-4o Whether this is true or not is debatable 
and it is unlikely that Cecil ever approved of Maitland's scheme. Dudley, 
however, seems to have been a much more earnest favourer of the 
proposal and indeed throughout his career seems to have been far more 
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warmly disposed towards the interests of Mary than Cecil ever was.4S 
Maitland's optimism can be said to have been justified by the 
generous and courteous treatment afforded to Mary's uncle the Grand 
Prior and the Constable's son Monsieur d'Amville by the English on their 
return journey to France through England in October 1561. This has been 
seen as the first fruits of the amity between Mary and Elizabeth and 
an indication of the propitious prospects for its future. 46 This 
interpretation however, must be qualified. It is difficult to see how 
Elizabeth could have avoided treating her French company with anything 
other than exceptional kindness. After her unhappy refusal of the safe 
conduct to Mary just three months earlier she had a good deal of 
diplomat ic ground to make up. The extension of the usual courtesies to 
her distinguished foreign guests in October was a painless enough way 
of repairing the self-inflicted damage of the previous August. This did 
not, however, prevent Maitland and Lord James congratulating Cecil and 
Dudley on their kindness and capitalising on it as a token of the amity 
between the realms.47 
This in itself provides a glimpse into one of the most striking and 
important features of Anglo-Scottish relations up until 1565i the 
emergence of the 'gang of four' of Maitland and Lord James on the one 
side and Cecil and Dudley on the other. The diplomatic activity of these 
men provides the main focus for the progress of the amity through the 
often stormy waters of 1561-5. It was they who provided the main 
channel of communication between the two nations. The two Scots were 
to be consistent in delivering their gently phrased but firmly 
entrenched insistence that recognition of Mary's claim was the only 
guarantee to the perpetual amity of the realms. As hinted at earlier, 
they seem to have found Dudley a far more willing partner than Cecil. 
It was through the effective use of this channel of communication that 
Maitland together with Lord James sought to build on the success of 
his first mission by exerting intense diplomatic pressure upon the 
English for a meeting of the two queens. The notion of the 'interview' 
as it came to be termed, possibly did originate from Elizabeth as early 
as the summer of 1561 but from the early autumn of 1561 Maitland was 
the main proponent of the project. 48 It provided the main thrust of his 
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diplomatic campaign and indeed dominated the Anglo-Scottish agenda for 
the best part of the following year. 
The Stop-Go Amity 
It would, however, be foolish to regard the prospects for the amity and 
the development of Anglo-Scottish relations as overly propitious in the 
winter of 1561. Although effective channels of communication had been 
established between the chief ministers of the two countries as a 
precursor to the opening of a personal correspondence between the two 
queens and the 'interview' had been placed firmly on the agenda, the 
progress of the amity was at best a stop-go affair with prospects of 
success punctuated by long periods of frustrating uncertainty and a 
lack of co-operation. The underlying tension of the situation was .often 
only too discernible amidst the fulsome expressions of love and 
affection between the two queens. Perhaps the best illustration of this 
more pessimist ic but arguably more realist ic appraisal is provided by 
the outcome of Sir Peter Mewtas' mission to Mary in October 1561.~9 
Mewtas had been sent to Mary from Elizabeth in response to 
Maitland's own journey to England, to congratulate Mary formally on her 
safe return to Scotland and to demand the ratification of the Treaty of 
Edinburgh as it stood. This was in clear contradiction to the more 
optimistic interpretation Maitland had put on the matter. Mary replied 
to Elizabeth with fulsome thanks for the sending of Mewtas. offering 
expressions of tender, love and amity towards England but she refused 
Elizabeth's request, suggesting instead that commissioners should meet 
to modify the treaty.s 0 Cecil, in characteristic fashion quite accurately 
perceived that Mary's intention in doing this was to be rid of the 
treaty altogether and to have it replaced by a new agreement along the 
lines suggested by Mait land. S 1 
The five weeks it took Elizabeth to reply to Mary's let ter of 5 
October to restate her opposition to Mary's proposal is a further 
indication of the slow tempo of Anglo-Scottish relations at this time. 
There was, though, a hint of compromise evident in Elizabeth's politely 
phrased reply of 23 November. S 2 She would not agree to Mary's proposal 
of appointing new commissioners but was prepared to listen to Mary's 
objections to the Treaty as it stood through the private offices of 
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Randolph. There was an even longer delay of seven weeks before Mary 
eventually replied to Elizabeth's message on 5 January 1562. 53 All the 
evidence suggests that this long delay was not of Maitland's or Mary's 
choosing. It was due entirely to Cecil's unwillingness to offer Maitland 
guidance as to how best phrase the letter to Elizabeth's liking despite 
incessant requests for the same. 54 It was to be a further twelve weeks 
before Mary was to receive a reply to her January missive. s5 
It was Maitland who drew up Mary's letter to Elizabeth of 5 January 
and sent one of his own to Cecil. The two carried complementary 
messages and have been acknowledged even by Maitland's bitterest 
detractors as testaments to his great skill and tact in presenting 
Mary's case, diplomatically and persuasively without any helpful English 
advice. s 6 Maitland eloquently restated Mary's stance on the Treaty of 
Edinburgh, her desire to live in perpetual amity with Elizabeth and his 
own aspirations for the day when the two queens would be brought 
together 'at which time I doubt not but the one of them shall so 
governe the other that therefter they shall neade no mediators and then 
I shall say nunc dimittis servum tuum domine'.57 The timing and 
provenance of this January correspondence is significant. It was sent 
from Seton Palace where Mary had spent the New year celebrations, an 
occasion which was - it is likely - marked by Alexander Scott's 
present at ion to Mary of his poem Ane New Year Gift. 5 a It is highly 
probable that Maitland's father Sir Richard, the proud 'docteris son' of 
Seton and their near-neighbour who shared his kinsman's Catholic 
sympathies and like Scott, a distinguished poet, was present at these 
festivities; which illustrate the Maitland family's great credit and 
presence not only in Mary's government but in her court as well. 5 q This 
combination of government, culture and leisure provides another 
reminder of the renaissance atmosphere that surrounds the personal 
reign of Mary Stewart. 
Maitland's Frustration With Cecil 
Cecil's reluctance to assist Maitland represents the first breach 
between Maitland and the man he continued to refer to in filial, almost 
reverent ial terms. lila it land sought to ent ice Cecil into providing some 
helpful advice by playing on their long-standing friendship, emphasising 
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that 'whatsoever advancement I may come to I take the beginning and 
root of it to spring from you' and urging him 'to finish the building 
that you have begun in me'.60 Just how unwilling Cecil was to fulfil 
that work together with the other predominant ly British aspirations 
that had played such a prominent part in his earlier thinking, was a 
marked feature of his conduct in the decade ahead. Cecil's British 
strategy had not incorporated or anticipated the return of Mary Stewart 
and he remained impervious to Maitland's incessant badgering for advice 
as to how Mary should proceed. It is possible to argue from this that 
to'Iait land's unionism was of a more determined brand than Cecil's as his 
own earlier vision of a united isle had not envisaged Mary's return 
either. However, it must also be acknowledged that Maitland - unlike 
Cecil - had the very pressing motive of satisfying Mary's desire for 
recognition in the English succession to fuel his unionist zeal. 
After months of continuous frustration with Cecil's manner of 
dealing, Maitland began to give vent to his feelings. He remonstrated 
sharply with Cecil for his apparent disregard for Elizabeth's wish that 
'for the more secret and better conveying of all matters to a good end 
and to put them in some suret y before they should be ut tered to the 
world that you and I should freely write to one another'.61 He had had 
enough of Cecil's obscure parables and his 'brief and dark sentences' 
and demanded some plain, open dealing and encouragement. 62 He reminded 
Cecil that 'We shoot both at one scope which is the union of this isle 
and therefore it is not convenient that we shall deale together as 
strangers one seeking advantage of the other'6 S and warned him that if 
he did not 'open yourself more to me at large than you have done 
heretofore in the principall matter' then he would make his complaint 
straight to Elizabeth.6 4 As ever, though, Mait land retained a realist ic 
view of what his protests were likely to achieve. He could not afford 
to alienate Cecil and indeed did not want to lose the closest channel 
of communicat ion to Elizabeth and admit ted as much to Cecil, saying 
that he 'would rather guess at dark letters than have none'.6 S 
Throughout his negotiations with Cecil at this time Maitland 
expressed his own continued commitment to the union of the realms but 
also his own extremely delicate position in Scot land, emphasising the 
dangerous situation he and Lord James were in. This was something 
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Randolph also emphasised in describing Maitland's dilemma to Cecil: 
The more peril to be thonely autour, counsellour and perswader in 
so waightie a matter. Whoe is ther also with whom he maye so 
dieplie wade in these matters as ether wyll tak equale parte of 
the burdayne or wyll not hastelye shyfte oute hymself yf anye 
disadventure arrive. 66 
Maitland perhaps exaggerated his discontent that Mary 'in these caases 
will employ none other but me althogh I have earnest ly pressed the 
contrary'.67 Confidently, if not arrogantly aware of his own abilities he 
seems to have preferred his unrivalled position of influence with Mary 
and to begrudge power sharing. 6 8 However, there is 11 t t Ie reason to 
doubt the sincerity of his plea to Cecil before his proposed visit to 
London in May 1562, 'I pray you let me tak no voyage on hand oneless 
the success may fallout according to my desire for I list not alwayes 
totravell in oncertayntees, he that will hasard must sometimes 10se'.69 
In his prosecution of Mary's claim to the succession Maitland almost 
always had to 'hasard' and he did lose. 
It was during this difficult period of early 1562 that Maitland 
produced one of the most memorable of all the letters amongst his 
voluminous correspondence with Cecil. It was as much an expression and 
defence of his own political philosophy as it was of his lifelong 
commitment to the union of the realms: 
I have in a manner consecrated myself to the commonwealth. The 
uniting of this isle in friendship hath in my concept bene a scope 
whereof I have long shot and wherunto all my actions have bene 
directed these five or six years. I preas sed at in Queen Mary's 
dayes although frustra. In the Quene your maistress tyme many and 
diverse wayes and as ever as one occasion doth fayle me I begyn 
to shuffle the cards off new alwayes keeping the same ground. I 
shall not weary so long as any hope remayneth. 70 
The complex quest ion of !vIai t land's poli tical philosophy will be 
discussed in greater detail in a later chapter but it is sufficient to 
note at this point that he viewed his capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances and ability to, 'shuffle the cards anew' as an essential 
poli tical virt ue. Knox, and later many more were not to view it in so 
favourable a light. In October 1561 Knox accused Maitland as one of 
those 'delighting to swim betwixt two waters' and had written to that 
effect to Cecil. 7 1 Whether !vlaitland's reaffirmation of his firm unionist 
zeal reassured Cecil of his constancy is not clear but it was certainly 
timely. Cecil had already begun to suspect Maitland, warning him of of 
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'doubleness' and 'paedogogy' and Lord James of 'leger-demain'.7 2 
This persis _tent hectoring of Cecil in part icular illustrates one 
further important aspect of Anglo-Scottish relations at this stage: it 
was the Scots, Mait land and Lord James in part icular who were forcing 
the pace with a reluctant England. It has already been noted that a 
successful alliance between the two countries could only be maintained 
if the benefits of such an am it y were seen to be clearly mut ual as in 
1560. The ultimate collapse of the amity was due to the failure of 
Maitland's ceaseless attempts to convince the English that the benefits 
were still mutual and that, if anything they would be the principal 
beneficiaries. He was unable to convince Cecil that in recognising Mary 
as her successor, Elizabeth was the real winner as Mary's gains were 
dependent on a 'futuru eventu' and highly unlikely. 7 3 Maitland used a 
similar tactic to promote the 'interview', laying great emphasis on the 
potential benefits to England of such a meeting. The best chance, 
according to Mait land and Randolph, of Mary embracing Protestant ism was 
through the personal influence of Elizabeth: 
And before God neither the L. of Lidington 
perswaded that she will give over her Mass till 
with the Q Majest ie that it might seem rather 
such reasons as the Q Majest ie will use unto 
forced thereunto by her people. 74 
nor I can be 
she have spoken 
she doth it on 
her than to be 
Cecil, with the same reluctance that characterised his disinclination 
throughout Mary's personal reign to do anything in favour of her claim 
to the succession, was not in favour of the interview. The decision to 
grant it was unquestionably Elizabeth's as Cecil himself admitted: 'This 
interview is hardly got out of this Council; only the authority of the 
crown had got consent thereto and it is strange to see the vehemency 
of Her Majesty here'.7 s It is important to note just how early in Ivlary's 
reign Maitland's distinct disenchantment with this lack of progress and 
cooperation from his English counterpart emerged. f.'laitland seemed to 
deduce very early on the English desire to leave mat ters hanging in 
suspense. 7 b This fraught, tense atmosphere must be acknowledged if an 
accurate appraisal of Anglo-Scottish relations at this time is to be 
gained. If such an interpretation is accepted, then the ultimate failure 
of the amity becomes a lot less surprising and a good deal less sudden. 
It also explains why Mary had so ready an alternative to pursue in 
1565. Quite simply she had been left waiting for too long. 
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Progress At Last 
At the turn of 1562 the prospects of the amity were hardly propitious 
but by the summer of 1562 they had improved to the extent that an 
interview between the two queens appeared an almost certainty. What 
had provoked this significant up-turn? The incessant Scottish pressure 
certainly played a vital part, as did the efforts of the resident 
English ambassador in Scotland, Thomas Randolph. Randolph, although 
critical of Maitland's insistence for some certain assurances in the 
matter of the succession was definitely very sympathetic towards 
Maitland and Lord James, providing Elizabeth, Cecil and Dudley with 
consistently favourable reports of Mary and her two principal advisers. 
Randolph confirmed the pre-eminence of Lord James and Maitland despite 
the internal opposition they were facing. Maitland. with his 'fell 
tongue' and 'crafty head' was regarded by many as being 'too politic' 
whilst Lord James was accused of 'growing cold', 'seeking too much his 
advancement'.77 Certainly, these two were at the helm of Mary's 
administration. 'Lord James does most Lethington is next in credit' and 
both men operated in characteristic style: Lord James 'rudely, homely 
and bluntly'; Maitland, 'more delicate and finely'. It was Randolph's firm 
conviction that 'take these two out of Scotland and their country will 
soon find the want of them'.7 8 Similarly, Cecil, for all his suspicions 
of Maitland and Lord James knew his task of managing the Scottish 
problem would be even harder without them and he was no doubt 
reassured by Randolph's assurances of their fidelity to the cause. It 
was also Randolph's firm opinion that Mary was sincere in her professed 
friendship for Elizabeth, a theme that runs through his correspondence 
at this time. In early January 1562 Randolph expressed the view of 
Mary's affection for Elizabeth that 'either it is so greate that never 
was any greater or it is the dieplieste dissembled and the best 
couverde that ever was'.79 By mid-1565 Randolph was convinced that it 
was the latter rather than the former. 
A far more pressing consideration was the simple fact that the 
English r·eally had flO other' option but to r·espond positively to Mary's 
overtures, or at least appear to do so. The English poliCY of keeping 
Mary's affairs 'hanging in an uncertainty' could not be sustained by 
inertia. Mary was hardly to be kept in suspense by a cold, dismissive 
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English attitude which promised nothing. Elizabeth had to always give 
the impression of a growth in momentum of the movement towards a 
satisfactory compromise. Without that appearance it would have been 
only too obvious to Mary what the English tactic was and England at 
this stage were not strong enough to run the risk of having their true 
intent exposed. It was essential for their own national security that 
the policy of suspense was prolonged and that Mary received some 
encouraging signs. It was with this in mind that the last of Mary's 
returning relatives to France in early 1562 were in the same manner as 
her first, treated with the utmost courtesy by Elizabeth during their 
passage through England. so 
By 1562 it had become clear to England that they would have to take 
Mary Stewart very seriously indeed. In September 1561 it had not been 
clear what impact she was going to have. By early 1562 with the 
ratification of the Treaty of Edinburgh more remote than ever and with 
Mary daily strengthening her position in Scotland it had emerged that 
she was living up to their worst fears. The warnings that Throckmorton 
had given from France of her political prowess were being seen to be 
vindicated and it was a combination of all these pressures that 
resulted in the highly significant development of March 1562. 61 With 
nothing decided on the Treaty of Edinburgh, Elizabeth wrote to Mary 
offering her sufficient encouragement to dispatch Maitland once more to 
the English court. With the full backing of the Scottish privy council, 
Maitland was to negotiate an interview between the two queens. It 
looked at last as if the pressure was finally beginning to payoff. 82 
Mary's Continued Domestic Success 
All the while, as Maitland was busy pressurising the English to accept 
the interview, Mary was strengthening her position in Scotland and 
Maitland was growing in her confidence. 'Maitland serves me right well' 
Mary was pleased to report to the Duke of Guise in January 1562. 63 He 
certainly was. In November 1561 her sat isfact ion with his performance 
of his first diplomatic task was revealed by his appointment as an 
extraordinary Lord of Session. Maitland's legal prowess was consistently 
recognised by Mary throughout her reign and along with his father he 
was to figure in several important legal commissions. This strengthens 
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the notion of the Maitland family as antecedents both of the great rise 
of legal families and the lairds in the seventeenth century.84 
Maitland was also involved in Mary's first confrontation with the 
Edinburgh town council. Knox went so far as to say that the whole 
blame for the fiasco 'lieth upon the necks' of Lord James and 
Maitland. 8s Knox was clearly dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
deliberate and provocative attempt in October 1561 by the newly elected 
council to challenge Mary's royal proclamation of 25 August 1561 in re-
issuing the ordinances of June 1560 and March 1561, which had declared 
the unfitness of 'monks, friars, priests, nuns, adulterers, fornicators 
and all such filthy persons' to remain in a godly society. Mary rose to 
the bait and the ensuing conflict has, in the most detailed analysis of 
Edinburgh politics been termed - despite Knox's dissatisfaction. - an 
honourable draw.Sb Mary successfully dismissed Kilspindie, the 
disobedient Provost, together with the four bailies responsible for the 
re-issue but only avoided repeating her mother's disastrous appointment 
of the hawkish Seton as Provost by a somewhat fortuitous error. Mary's 
alternative leet for the Provostship which had included Seton was not 
presented in time, with the result that Mary instead accepted Thomas 
MacCalzean as Provost. It was a far wiser choice. MacCalzean, was a 
more moderate Protestant with a good record of burgh service as had 
the four new bailies - John Adamson, James Thompson, John Majoribanks 
and Alexander Acheson - who can all be found along with f.'iacCalzean 
amongst the ranks of the 'faithful brethren of Edinburgh in 1562'.87 
It is undeniable that luck was certainly on Mary's side on this 
occasion and saved her from a serious and damaging misjudgement. Mary, 
however, seems to have learned much from this early experience of 
Edinburgh polit ics, as her fut ure dealings with the burgh, which can 
perhaps best be termed as conciliatory, show. This is certainly evident 
in her subsequent endorsement of Kilspindie as the candidiate in the 
next election for the Provostship.8 8 That Mary had learned a valuable 
lesson in 1561 was clear from her next decisive intervention in a burgh 
election in 1565. There was little fortuitous in her handling of that 
situation which has been described as 'well-timed, judicious and 
comprehensive' and went a long way towards achieving her aim of a 
moderate and non-partisan burgh administration. 89 
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The image of Lord James and Maitland as Mary's right-hand men is 
the traditional picture of this early phase of her reign and while it is 
accurate to a very large extent, it also tends to neglect the support 
of many others that Mary was soon able to attract and maintain. 
Maitland and Lord James were certainly prominent in their defence of 
Mary's right to her own Mass: if Maitland's credit was confirmed by his 
immediate embassy to London then Lord James' was clearly shown by his 
carte blanche commission from the privy council in November 1561 to 
administer justice to the Borders. 9 0 Lord James and Maitland had given 
Mary a sound basis of support which she was able to build upon 
succeSSfully. By the time of the convention of December 1561, which was 
to deal with the religious issue, Mary was able to draw upon the 
overwhelming support of the nobility and privy council in rejecting the 
First Book of Discipline and implementing the controversial thirds of 
benefices scheme. 9 1 
Part of the reason for Mary's success in at tract ing widespread 
support was her ability to merge so many of her influential subjects' 
interests with her own. This was particularly evident in the thirds of 
benefices settlement. Perhaps too much time has been spent examining 
this controversial scheme from a religious perspective. For while there 
were undoubtedly critical implications inherent in the settlement for 
the development of the Kirk and the survival of Catholicism, the thirds 
scheme was perhaps not so much a statement of Mary's ecclesiatical 
policy but rather of her perCipient economic policy.9 2 Randolph 
recognised this and claimed 'It is done neither from zeal for Christ's 
religion nor hatred to the viciusness of the lives that had it '. 93 The 
thirds of benefices set t lement was in short, a financial masterstroke. 
It was noted earlier that the key to the stability of any Stewart reign 
lay in finance. The thirds set t lement showed Mary's perfect grasp of 
that fact and went a long way to ensuring she was not going to be 
plagued in same way as her mother and father had before. Only once did 
Mary have to resort to taxation and even then it was clearly a special 
one off occasion to finance the dazzling baptismal triumph of her son 
and heir.94 Whilst the Hamiltons could complain how badly off they were 
after the thirds scheme they were a good deal better off than they 
would have been had Knox been able to achieve his 'perf ect 
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Reformation'.9s It was on the whole a measure that contented the 
established landed interest and helped ensure that the disappointment 
of the Protestant radicals was unlikely to be transformed into potent 
political action. It was a delicate balancing act Mary was attempting to 
perform but one she was managing well. 
Maitland's Prominence In Mary's Service 
Mait land was vital in helping her perform this act. In the pages of 
Knox's History, at this time he figures prominently. It is not difficult 
to see why or how he fell so foul of the reformer or how his 
reputation as a politique came into being. Maitland was a strong 
supporter of the thirds settlement and had the effrontery to argue 
with Knox that even after the settlement Mary had barely enough money 
to buy a pair of shoes. 9 6 Maitland admitted he was accused of being 
'too politic'97 and while it is difficult to argue with the notion of 
Maitland as a moderate Protestant it must also be recognised that his 
Protestantism, however moderate, had its own firm limits under which he 
would not go. He was instrumental in Mary's rejection of the ambassador 
of the Duke of Savoy, Bertino Salaro, Signor di Morette's efforts in 
January 1562 to persuade Mary to at tend the ant icipated resumpt ion of 
the Council of Trent. He was to do the same with De Gouda, the papal 
envoy, later on in the same year. 9 8 Maitland's religous convictions are 
a very complex issue. He was unquestionably a very sophisticated and 
well-informed Protestant, able to quote chapter and verse with Knox and 
conversant with the opinions of Luther, Calvin, Bucer, Melancthon and 
Musculus. Yet his Protestantism was not Knox's and in December 1561, he 
can be seen, much to Knox's chagrin anticipating the rights James VI 
was later to command over the General Assembly, questioning its 
legality to meet without the monarch's consent. 9 9 
A rather ironic illustration of how far Knox and Maitland had moved 
from each other was provided by a meeting of what in the pre-
Reformation period could well have been described as a meeting of the 
Edinburgh privy kirk. It ought to be remembered that it was at such a 
gathering in the house of Erskine of Dun in 1555 that Knox, had, if not 
converted Maitland to Protestantism} then at least convinced him of the 
sinfulness of his continued attendance at the ttlass. 1 00 In November 
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1561, in James McGill, the Clerk-Register's house, the question of 
whether 'the subjects might not lawfully take her (Mary's) Mass from 
her' was discussed. There was a complete split of opinion between the 
privy councillors who supported Mary's right to hear Mass - including 
Morton, Marischal, Lord James, John Bellenden and Maitland - and Knox 
and his colleagues John Rowand Robert Hamilton who did not. Times had 
clearly changed a great deal. 1 01 Knox insisted on writ ing to Calvin for 
advice on the matter but Maitland was quick to halt this development 
insisting that he should be the one to write, arguing that 'there stood 
mekle' in the way the question was phrased. It was of course a delaying 
tactic and Maitland much to Knox's disquiet never did write to 
Calvin. 1 02 
Mary's Skilful Handling Of Domestic Opposition 
It is not the intention of this chapter to suggest that this first year 
of Mary's reign was all plain sailing. Quite clearly it was not: as well 
as inheriting an extremely delicate situation, fresh hostility and 
opposition soon manifested themselves. What this chapter has sought to 
show was that Mary was able to manage an obviously difficult sit uat ion 
extremely well, due in no small part to her skilful maintenance of an 
effective consensus of support. It is perhaps indicative of Mary's 
success as the Catholic Queen of a Protestant country that in these 
early years her chief problem was not the religious issue but with a 
section of her nobility. An even more impressive testament to the 
success of her first year of rule was the skilful manner in which she 
was able to address this problem. 
The victory of the Congregation in 1560 is commonly and rightly 
regarded as a 'triumph of the Hamiltons' and indeed in the summer of 
1560 the prospects for their dynastic ambitions had appeared to be 
particularly bright. 103 However, the basic incompatibility of those 
ambitions with Mary's own ensured that the li¥J&ihood of the 
establishment of harmonious relations between herself and the Hamiltons 
were not high. Indeed it is difficult to resist the argument that the 
Hamiltons were perhaps the greatest losers of Mary's return. Yet for 
all that, Mary was remarkably successful in dictating the terms of her 
relationship with the Hamiltons in this early phase of her reign. She 
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successfully checked the discontented Chatelherault's drift towards 
France and even more significantly succeeded in detatching him from his 
similarly disaffected fellow earl, Huntly. Mary also displayed an astute 
political opportunism by taking maximum advantage of Arran's 
psychotically induced outburst which told of a coup involving himself 
and Bothwell, the object of which was allegedly to imprison Mary in 
Dumbarton and to kill Maitland and Lord James. t04 Mary shrewdly 
accepted ChAtelherault's denial and apology for his son's outburst but 
nevertheless took the precaution of repossessing the Hamilton's west 
coast fortress of Dumbarton. 1 0 S As a consequence of this Chatelherault 
seems to have decided to cut his losses and put away for the time 
being at least any rebellious thoughts. He did not support Huntly's 
rebellion and was to remain prominent in Mary's service, a fact 
confirmed by his carrying of the sword at the opening of Mary's first 
parliament in June 1563. 106 
It is interesting to note Randolph's opinion of ChAtelherault at this 
time. Randolph is often described as the apologist of the Hamiltons but 
his description of ChAtelherault as 'so unconstante and saving in 
covetousness and greedeness that in iii moments he will take v 
purposes' hardly bears this out. 1 07 Randolph was not too worried about 
his loss of Dumbarton and his appraisal of ChAtelherault's character 
was yet another mark of his favourable disposition towards Mary at 
this time. There was, however, a quite pressing reason for the timing 
of Randolph's change of horse at this time. There had been much talk 
since early 1561 amongst the English diplomatic agents of the French 
efforts to win back the Hamiltons and Hunt ly to the French cause. 1 08 
Throckmorton had been aware of this at tempt from an early stage yet 
despite his warnings, the Huguenot Paul De Foix, the French ambassador 
to Scotland in November 1561 seems to have stolen a march on Randolph. 
De Foix's Protestantism seems to have acted as the perfect cover for 
his anti-English activities and that Randolph did not suspect anything 
was shown by his warm recommendation of De Foix on his journey 
homeward as 'one who professethe Chryste for whose cawse your honour 
knoweth what he hath endured'. 1 09 It was perhaps Randolph's later 
realisat ion 
during his 
of the harmful seed De Fob 
brief stay in Scotland that 
had so industriously 




appraisal of Chatelherault and his son.110 
Randolph's criticism of the Hamiltolls also further strengthens the 
view that in the first year of Mary's reign the divisive issue was not 
so much the sectarian Catholic-Protestant one but rather the conflict 
between those who favoured the auld alliance and the new. His criticism 
of Arran~ whose 'mind is nothing but to be French' supports this 
view. 111 The internal divisions in France appear to have played a part 
in the development of this conflict in Scotland. There was clearly a 
divergence between the anti-English advice tendered to Mary from 
Catherine de Medici via Paul De Foix and that offered to her by her own 
Guise kindred. 1 1 2 It is not the least of the paradoxes of this complex 
period and a further warning against viewing the sixteenth century 
along narrow confessional lines that the policy adopted by the Catholic 
Guises, was, in this instance more attractive and favourable to 
Protestant England than De Foix's.113 
The Hamiltons were not the only discontented subjects Mary had to 
contend with. The maverick Bothwell had been involved in the proposed 
coup against Mary, Maitland and Lord James but at this stage he did not 
present as serious a threat as that posed by the 'pope of the north-
east' the fourth earl of Huntly. Huntly had declined the golden 
opportunity of his re-appointment as Chancellor to demonstrate his 
support for Mary's regime. His indiscreet repetition of the offer to set 
up the Mass in three shires in October 1561 if Mary would only give 
the word, was a direct challenge to the twin planks of Mary's 
administration; her recognition of the religious status quo and her 
pursuit of the English succession.114 It was also the complete 
antithesis of the cautious prudence with which Mary was trying to 
establish herself in her realm. Mary could not and did not have any 
truck with such outspoken reactionarism and in January 1562 gave a 
signal of both her opposition to Huntly and her determination to follow 
through her chosen policies by secretly conferring the earldom of Moray 
lying deep in the heartland of Huntly's traditional sphere of 
influence - upon his arch-rival Lord James. 1 1 S 
Mary's Combina tion Of Renaissance Splendour And Political Power 
The following February was to see the further delineation of ~lary's 
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political alignment in Scotland and once again Lord James was the 
principal beneficiary. It was a splendid month for Lord James who, in 
1562 was arguably at the peak of his credit with his half-sister. He 
could certainly have no complaints at the generosity of her wedding 
gifts to him on the occasion of his marriage to Agnes Keith. This 
marriage to the daughter of the Earl Marischal and a near-neighbour of 
Huntly, greatly increased Mary's capacity to control her troublesome 
northern province.!l6 On 7 February, Mary conferred the earldom of Mar 
upon Lord James and she ensured that the wedding itself was a 
spectacularly memorable affair. /..;.;lrd .l.ua~' wedding was perhaps the first 
of several major celebrations at Mary's court which combined the 
elements of renaissance magnificence which have now been 
acknowledged as an integral part of Mary's reign - with an overtly 
political message. It was not the last time Mary would make such a 
dramatic demonstration of her favour and her power. This was 
predictably to the annoyance of Knox 'and many of the godly' who were 
offended at the vanity and greatness of the banquet but the author of 
the Diurnal of Occurents was a more appreciative witness. 1l7 
The anonymous author described in detail the 'solemnitie as the lyk 
hes not bene sene beforej the haill nobilitie of this realme being thair 
present' and drew at tent ion to the masquing that was to be such a 
feature of the Marian renaissance. The culmination of the celebration 
after 'greit and diverse baling and casting of fyre ballis fyre speris 
and rynning with horsis' was a demonstration of Mary's political power 
with the clear message that favour lay in faithful service to the 
Crown. Mary created ten knights, the majority of whom can be clearly 
identified as members of Lord James' party. Wishart of Pitarrow, Stewart 
of Minto, Stewart of Traquair, Learmonth of D~~c. Murray of Balvaird 
were members of his household while Stewart of Traquair and Kirkcaldy 
of Grange can be safely numbered as his friends. l ! 8 The new knights 
can all be found amongst the ranks of those whom Professor Donaldson 
has identified as both friends of reform and England.!! 9 Mary was 
beginning to make it quite clear both what her policies and who her 
supporters were. 
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Maitland's Mission Of May 1562 
Maitland's mission to London in May 1562 provided another insight into 
the extent of the support Mary had established in Scotland. The embassy 
was in 'response to the encouragement she had received from Elizabeth 
but it was also significant that it took place with the full backing of 
the privy council, Huntly alone excepted. The council advised Mary not 
to consent to an interview with Elizabeth without the strong prospect 
of gaining recognition of her claim to the English succession. 1 20 Such 
a prospect was always the quid pro quo for Mary's compliance with any 
major request of Elizabeth's and in this sense it is possible to see 
Mary as the patriot queen, following the policy favoured by her 
subjects and not, as has been suggested, flying in the face of their 
wishes by an obsession with the English succession. 
Maitland's embassy to the English court was to prove to be yet 
another classic Elizabethan encounter. He left Edinburgh on 25 May and 
made good time on his journey, arriving in London on the last day of 
the month before returning to Edinburgh on 12 July.1 21 His account of 
the episode is rich in details of Elizabeth's exaggerated fervour, both 
for Mary and the interview. At one point Elizabeth made a typically 
melodramatic gesture. She rejected Maitland's general letter of credit 
and clasped Mary's handwritten letter to her bosom, exclaiming 'Take you 
that other let ter Cecil but by God you shall not be privy to this. I 
will here be my own secretary'.1 22 Mait land was now of course a very 
familiar face at the English court and Mary's cause could not have been 
in more capable hands. This was his sixth embassy to the court of 
Elizabeth in just over three years and, as ever, he seems to have taken 
the opportunity to strengthen his established contacts at the English 
court. He appears to have become part icularly at tached to Leicester at 
this time. The Spanish ambassador who was particularly nervous in June 
1562 at the improvement in Anglo-Scottish relations even suspected 
that Maitland and Leicester had already agreed on a Darnley match for 
Mary at this time in return for Maitland's support of Leicester's 
ambition to wed Elizabeth.1 2 3 
La Quadra's wild speculation reflected his fears of the outcome of 
Maitland's mission which appeared to have been a complete success. 
Maitland returned to Scotland with Du Croc. the French ambassador, a 
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portrait of Elizabeth and - most significant of all - with a set of 
conditions which he had agreed with Lord Howard, Elizabeth's 
Chamberlain, for an interview at Nottingham. 1 24 The interview looked so 
certain that Cecil had even gone to the length of procuring the 
services of an elephant tot ake part in the celebrat ions that would 
accompany the meeting of the royal princesses. 1 2 S However, Maitland's 
and Mary's joy was to be short lived. Within days of his return to 
Scotland, Elizabeth had dispatched Sir Henry Sidney to Mary to announce 
the postponement. The stop-go amity in a pattern that was to become so 
familiar had come to a halt again. 1 2 6 
It was a somewhat ironic mark of the fluid and highly unstable 
international situation that the French factor, which had been arguably 
the main influence which had first forced Elizabeth to contemplate the 
interview should be the decisive factor causing its postponement. For 
while the French efforts to create an anti-English party favourable to 
themselves in Scotland had acted as an impetus for the amity, the 
outbreak of religious strife in France following the massacre of Vassy, 
provided the ostensible excuse for the deferral of the interview until 
a more convenient date. 127 Mary was deeply disappointed by the decision 
but was heartened by the prospect of a meeting the following year. 
Meanwhile she took full advantage of the postponement to turn her 
attention once more to domestic affairs and in particular to her 
troublesome earl of Huntly. 
The Fall Of Huntly 
It seems undeniable, that there was a definite link between the timing 
of Mary's northern expedition and the postponement of the interview. 1 2 8 
A visit to the north had long been in Mary's mind but had itself been 
postponed because of the proposed meeting with Elizabeth. The revival 
of the northern progress seems to have taken both the burgh of 
Aberdeen and Huntly by surprise. It has already been noted how Mary 
had sought to stifle her domestic opposition. It was noticeable that 
Chatelherault had wisely distanced himself from Huntly and had 
however begrudgingly but nevertheless sensibly - been seen to support 
in the privy council Mary's desire for an interview with Elizabeth. This 
left Huntly isolated and with time on Mary's hands he was cast 
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perfectly in the unfortunate role so familiar in the brutal history of 
the Stewart monarchy of the great magnate destined to suffer 
humiliation at the hands of the Crown. In Huntly's case it was to be 
annihilat ion. 
Mary's slaughter of Huntly was one of the most barbaric display of 
the power of the Crown by any Stewart monarch. It was designed 
primarily pour encourager les autres who may have had rebellion on 
their minds and, on a certain level it would be right to argue that 
Huntly's downfall had very little to do with religion. He was a 
disobedient subject whose alienation from Mary had become increasingly 
apparent during the course of 1562. In a memorable recurrence of the 
ailment that had enabled him to conveniently absent himself from the 
Reformation Parliament, Huntly had declined Mary's invitation to come to 
the court because of a sore leg. 1 29 The irresponsible behaviour of his 
eldest son Sir John Gordon who had escaped from his imprisonment and 
fled homewards provided Mary with a further excuse to demonstrate the 
power of royal just ice against the Gordons. On another level, however, 
it is hard to disagree with the argument that it was not in spite of 
Huntly's Catholicism that Mary ruined him but precisely because of 
it.1lo Mary could not have given a more forceful example of her lack of 
religious partiality when it came to the administration of royal justice 
than she did on the battlefield of Corrichie. It was yet another example 
of her political guile that she made sure her campaign gained the 
maximum possible publicity. 
There is something to be said for viewing the rout of Hunt ly as a 
carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign designed for English 
consumpt ion. Randolph was not brought along just for the ride. There 
was sound political judgement behind his presence in the royal 
entourage. He was to provide Elizabeth with the graphic details of 
Mary's conquest of her Catholic earl.1 31 The parallels between Mary's 
successful treatment of her northern kingdom and Elizabeth's own 
troublesome and conservative north would not have been lost on either 
Elizabeth or Randolph. For Mait land, who was 
the trip, it provided another occasion to 
Randolph's bed-fellow on 
further strengthen his 
relationship with the English ambassador. Their shared adventures on 
this campaign, which included the narrow avoidance of a series of 
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assassination attempts, can only have had a positive effect in this 
respect. Randolph unsurprisingly does not seem to have relished his 
role as war correspondent and described with relief the failure of 
Huntly's attempt to burn the house in which Mary and her entourage 
were staying in Old Aberdeen. He was not exaggerating when he reported 
that 'it had been hot for me being there'.1 32 
Maitland and Lord James were in the vanguard of this expedition. The 
importance of Lord James in Mary's strategy against Huntly was shown 
by her public proclamation of him as earl of Moray at Darnaway Castle 
en route to her confrontation at Corrichie. Maitland was also prominent 
in the campaign. Unusually for him, he seems to have operated in a 
military capacity, leading a surprise raid on Strathbogie Castle and 
later, on the actual battlefield of Corrichie, rallying the troops with a 
prayer for divine assisitance against the rebellious earl. Corrichie was 
as much a victory for the Maitland-Moray axis as it was for Mary. 133 
Summary Of Mary's First Year 
The success at Corrichie crowned a spectacularly successful first year 
of rule for Mary. She had made it clear to her nobility in the best 
traditions of her ancestors that faithful service would be rewarded but 
disobedience would not be tolerated. It was a truly auspicious start 
which contrasts in almost every respect to her disastrous final year of 
personal rule in 1567. She had dealt with a number of delicate problems 
with a skilful prudence that belied her nineteen-years of age to emerge 
in a position of considerable strength. In religion Mary had 
successfully exploited the gap between the Protestant radicals and the 
conservative majority to gain widespread support for her recognition of 
the religious status quo as it stood on her arrival in 1561. For all 
Knox's fear of the holy water of the court, Mary had not achieved her 
support through following an overtly Catholic policy but by trumping 
Knox with his own godly card. The major Catholic noble had been 
slaughtered, there had been no Catholic crusade and invitations to 
Trent had been rejected. By such measures, more politique than 
protestant, Mary had been able to steal the radical Protestants own 
thunder from them. 
As far as finances were concerned, Maitland's wild exaggeration that 
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Mary did not have enough to buy a pair of shoes nevertheless draws 
attention to the vital question of the Crown's finances. The situation 
was not quite so desperate as Maitland claimed and measures such as 
the thirds of benefices and the repossession of lands from the Gordons 
and Hamiltons all helped put the Crown's finances on a more secure 
footing, providing an accurate portent for Mary's consistent success in 
this critical area. 1 3'" 
In foreign policy, it will be seen in the next chapter how Mary 
expressed her deep dissatisfaction and frustration at the stop-go 
nature of the amity. Elizabeth had proved herself more than capable by 
her postponement of the interview of manipulating the situation in 
France to Mary's disadvantage. Maitland and Mary, however, were to 
prove equally adept at manipulating the threat of the old alliance and 
a new Spanish alliance to counter that ploy and pressurise Elizabeth 
into conceding the recognition of Mary's claim. It was her successful 
domestic rule that enabled her to employ such tactics. In this sense 
perhaps too much can be made of Corrichie as an exercise to please 
Elizabeth. Undoubtedly it could be and was usefully manipulated for 
that end but Mary did not destroy Hunt ly for Elizabeth's benefit but 
her own. By ridding herself of her most powerful domestic opponent Mary 
was increasing her capacity to follow the policies she wanted with a 
greater degree of impunity at both home and abroad. 
It was a measure of Mary's satisfaction with Maitland and his 
fulfilment above and beyond the let ter of her earlier ult imat um to him 
that the Maitland family star was firmly in the ascendant in this phase 
of Mary's reign. It was a conventional pattern of royal patronage for 
the success of the father to reflect favourably on the son but it was 
a mark both of the novelty of Maitland's position and of Mary's favour 
for her Secretary that his father Sir Richard, already over sixty-five 
years old and blind was appOinted Keeper of the Privy Seal in 1562.1 35 
It was not to be the last mark of her favour for the Maitlands. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MAITLAND'S MISSION OF 1563 
149 
A1wais 1at this be your comfort, that God is your protector and their 
can not so gryte ane storme comen bot he vi11 send a port quhairin 
your shyp may be saved. I se experience of this monye wais and even at 
this same tyme. Maitland to Mary 9 March 1563. 1 
This extract from a let ter writ ten in London during the course of 
Maitland's four-month long diplomatic mission provides an intriguing 
perspective from which this embassy, long shrouded in mystery can be 
discussed. The tantalising entry in the Diurnal of Occurents for 13 
February 1563, stating that Maitland of Lethington 'departit furth of 
Edinburgh to France in ambassatorie, to quhat effect non knowis', is 
symptomatic of the uncertainty surrounding this mission which 
historians over the years have steadily sought to reduce. 2 Thankfully a 
good deal more information is available to the modern scholar than was 
to the anonymous authors of the Diurnal. Accurate and reliable comment 
on the mission is now greatly impededed not so much by a paucity of 
sources but by the contradictory nature of the available evidence. The 
Spanish, French, English and Scottish sources offer conflicting images 
of Maitland's mission with the result that any interpretation is open to 
challenge and debate. 3 While it is still difficult to be certain as to 
the true purpose of the embassy and to what it actually achieved, it is 
possible to piece together Maitland's movements, activities and 
correspondence from February until his return in June and come to a 
more informative conclusion about this mission. The picture that 
emerges is of a highly significant chapter in the history of the 'amity' 
and one that emphasises its precarious condition in 1563. Maitland was 
actively pursuing on Mary's behalf, if not a direct alternative to the 
amity, then certainly alternative means of exerting pressure on 
Elizabeth to ensure the recognition of her claim to the English 
succession. It is towards a bet ter understanding of this controversial 
mission and the effect of Mait land's search for 'a port quhairin your 
shyp may be saved' on the development of the amity that this chapter is 
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devoted. 
Elusive though specific details of this mission are, it is an episode 
which in certain respects is the very epitome of his career as 
Secretary. It is very much in the best traditions of the international 
diplomacy of his dist inguished predecessors in the Scot t ish Secretariat 
such as Patrick Paniter, Thomas Erskine and David Paniter that Maitland 
was to be seen at work in 1563, fencing with the premier statesmen of 
France, England and Spain and personally negotiating with Elizabeth and 
Catherine de Medici at Mary's behest. The mission affords an exciting 
glimpse into Maitland, the Principal Secretary of State, at work and 
reveals a fascinating picture of him, arguably at the peak of his 
personal credit with Mary, at his most brilliant, diplomatic and 
duplicitous (Sir Thomas Smith the English ambassador in France was to 
argue t riplicitous!) best.4 
The Controversy Surrounding Maitland's Mission 
It is perhaps surprising given the fact that Maitland's official 
instructions from Mary on his departure into England are readily 
available that this embassy should have aroused so much controversy.s 
These set out Mary's claim to the English succession and her desire to 
mediate a negotiated settlement to the escalating Anglo-French conflict. 
Whether his declared commission was a deliberate ruse on the part of 
Mary and Maitland or whether as he himself later argued, he had merely 
reacted spontaneously to offers put to him is debatable and lies at the 
heart of the controversy. For while Maitland was not remiss in the 
prosecution of his instructions it is not for either of those issues 
that his mission has traditionally been controversially regarded. Rather 
it is because of his diplomatiC intrigues on Mary's behalf with the 
Spanish and French over the question of her marriage. It was this 
troublesome issue that was arguably the chief business of the mission. 
John Knox suspected as much from the start and was to accuse 
Maitland of deliberately promoting a Spanish match. 6 Thomas Randolph 
was also equally suspicious of Maitland's conduct, swiftly changing his 
opinion of February that Maitland 'never took charge with worse will 
specially if he pass into France', lament ing the fact that he had made 
no effort to commune with Moray in his absence, a fact which he 
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believed was a pre-determined pOlicy on the part of both Mary and 
Maitland. Randolph bitterly observed as regards Maitland's letters to 
Mary at this time that 'what was of little import was told some, the 
rest in cipher was kept to themselves'.7 That Maitland had chosen to 
commune with Mary in this covert fashion exacerbated the suspicion that 
his mission had aroused. By the time of his ret urn in June, Randolph 
was still prepared to give Maitland the benefit of the doubt but he 
admitted that 'many had begun to conceive strangely of Lethington'.8 
The task of the historian in deducing the facts of Maitland's mission 
is not made any easier by the loss of much of Maitland's correspondence 
at this time and the fact that much of it was in cipher reduces the 
reliability of the information to be gained from contemporary reactions 
to his news. It was hardly surprising that suspicious interpretations 
were placed on his conduct and ·that Randolph feared Maitland 'should in 
any thing overshoot himself'.9 
The question of Mary's marriage was after all an issue of major 
European importance and one that England was particularly sensitive to. 
Immediately following Francis II's death, Throckmorton had articulated 
the deeply-felt English bitterness at losing out in the struggle for 
Mary's first marriage and the hope that the mistakes of English policy 
in the 1540s be avoided in her second. 1 0 As earlier chapters have 
shown, a good deal had changed since the 1540s. England's hand had been 
strengthened considerably yet not all the developments had been to 
England's advantage. While the Scot tish Reformation of i 560 had 
certainly been a triumph for England in supplant ing the French as the 
dominant external force in Scot t ish politics, it had far from ent irely 
eradicated French influence from Scottish affairs. It is often 
underestimated how much remained intact. Despite Maitland's sincere 
commitment to the union of the realms, his career nevertheless shows 
the retent ion of a strong at tachment to France throughout Scot land as 
a whole and also a strong personal affect ion for the same. His later 
acknowledgment of many personal honours and favours received from 
France, 'more than some of my country of greater degree - some will 
say more than any yet' and his seemingly strong friendship with 
Archbishop Beaton bear testament to this. 11 
Maitland's warm recept ion into France in 1563 further endorses this 
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view and contrasts sharply with the treatment meted out to Sir Thomas 
Smith, the English ambassador to France. Indeed, Smith in a delightful 
diatribe which shows English xenophobia at its dyspeptic best, seems to 
cut exactly the figure of the archetypal Englishman abroad: 
France ys enough to vex any man ... and to troyble his pacience 
though he were as pacient as Job, yt ys so unstable, uncertaigne, 
untrue, impudent, unfaithfull and ever enclining to the worst and 
lik the disease that hath the name of them grieving itself 
andeasely rubbing apeace of the same upon hir next neighbour to 
mak him share parte of hir mischiefs and to be within a while in 
the same torment. 1 2 
Smith would no doubt have echoed the view of the Spanish ambassador in 
London that 'when the Ethiopian is white, then will the Frenchman love 
the English '.1 3 This inbred, mut ual distrust of the English and French 
was a strong reminder to the English of the need to retain Scotland's 
friendship. Right up until the conclusion of the civil war in 1573, one 
of the most striking features of Anglo-Scottish relations was that the 
perpetual friendship supposedly achieved in 1560 was shown to be, if 
not ephemeral then certainly negotiable. 
It ought also be noted that the success England enjoyed in 
weakening the Franco-Scottish alliance was further tempered by a 
simultaneous dwindling of he!' own Spanish alliance. Indeed one of the 
major differences in the competition for Mary's second marriage, in 
comparison to the chiefly two-dimensional contest of the 1540s, was the 
active and independent participation of a highly significant third force 
Spain. It was Maitland's mission of 1563 that was to see the 
introduction of their hand and the development of a most significant 
diplomatic channel between Scotland and Spain. 1 ~ 
The Background To The Mission 
Before proceeding to a detailed examination of Maitland's mission it is 
important to place it in its context in relation not only to the 
domestic situation in Scotland and the state of Anglo-Scottish 
relations at this time but also to the broader political climate of 
Europe as well. As far as the domestic situation was concerned, Mary, 
by February 1563 could reflect on sixteen successful months of personal 
rule in Scotland. She had displayed a determination and ability to rule 
in vintage Stewart style. Her routing of Huntly at Corrichie provided a 
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clear illustration of her grasp of the mechanics of the relationship 
between the Stewart monarchy and the nobility. She had further 
developed her ~ncestors' successful methods of conciliar government, but 
more personally characteristic and unique was her tactful management of 
the delicate problem of religion. Mary had won over a vast majority of 
the nobility to her style of religious toleration much to the concern 
of Knox and his fellow radicals. It was this successful domestic 
government that provided the solid basis for her foreign policy, the 
main issue of which was her relationship with Elizabeth and the 
prosecution of her claim to the English succession. 1S 
By the spring of 1563 relations with England had reached a critical 
stage. Maitland the architect of the amity embarked upon since Mary's 
return was beginning to show distinct signs of unease that the policy 
of subservient friendship had not achieved a single concession as far 
as the recognition of Mary as Elizabeth's heir was concerned. There was 
more than one symptom of the failure to make anything other than 
cosmetic progress. Elizabeth's postponement of the proposed interview 
between the two queens for which Maitland had laboured long and hard 
was perhaps the most obvious, but equally alarming were the strong 
sentiments voiced against Mary in the English Parliament of 1563, when, 
much to the annoyance of Elizabeth the Commons had broached the 
question of the succession. 16 
It had been the English support of the Huguenots in the French Wars 
of Religion that had provided Elizabeth with the perfect pretext for 
postponing the interview. The outbreak of hostilities in France 
certainly placed Mary in an invidious position. Maitland was acutely 
aware of Mary's dilemma, which he shared. English intervention in France 
was yet another unwelcome complication and obstacle to his attempts to 
secure recognition of Mary's claim to the English succession. In a 
remarkable and wide-ranging letter to Cecil, written from Dundee on the 
way home from Corichie and dated 14 November 1562, Mait land spelt out 
the central difficulty of Mary's position and the perplexity that the 
war 'begun betwixt the two countries in the earth which next her own 
be most dear to her' had placed Mary and himself in. It is a let ter 
which anticipates the mediatory role he was to play in 1563. 17 
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Maitland's Frank Appraisal Of The Amity 
In a vivid restatement of Mary's impressive royal provenance which had 
entitled her just three years earlier to be proclaimed along with 
Francis II as 'Rex et Regina Fran corum, Scotorum, Ang. lorum et 
Hibernict, l 8 Mait land reminded Cecil that Mary, paternally descended of 
the blood of both England and France through James V, the son of 
Margaret Tudor and of France by her mother, Mary of Guise. and having 
'friends in both that be most tender to her' would find it particularly 
difficult in a time of Anglo-French conflict 'to hold the ballance just 
betwixt them'. Despite implying that Mary would require the wisdom of 
Solomon to determine her allegiance in such a conflict, the entire drift 
of Maitland's argument, however, was designed to show in stark terms 
how much stronger Mary's reasons for siding with France rather than 
Eng land were. 1 9 
Maitland was at pains to point out that quite apart from France 
being the home of 'the most part of all her kindred chiefly her uncles 
with whom she hath ben from her youth nourish'd and up-brought and who 
do honour and love her above all creatures' was the simple fact, often 
ignored by historians, that Mary was st ill Dowager Queen of France. 
Consequently. Maitland perceived that Mary would be: 
as well by her uncles in part icular as by the KIng and queen 
mother earnest ly requir'd by virt ue of the ancient league betwixt 
the two realms not to forsake the defence of the king her brother 
and that realm where she had all her education and in which her 
dowry is situate now being invaded by the forces of England. 
If Mary failed to respond positively to those requests for support, 
favouring instead amity with England, 'which amity I know the State of 
France will never well digest as a thing most prejudicial to their 
wealth'. Maitland argued that she stood to lose not only her dowry but 
also the loss of French friendship forever. Such a decision would 
certainly ensure that in any future quarrel of her own she could not 
expect support from France having first denied 'their friendship in 
their necessity'.20 
Although Maitland assured Cecil that he would do all in his power to 
refute these arguments he also made it abundantly clear what a 
difficult task this was. In contrast to the tangible kinship and 
permanently official connections with France, there were no such 
considerations tying Mary to England. In a brutally frank analysis which 
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cut through the adiaphorous expressions of mutual good will. that at 
once proliferate and obscure Anglo-Scottish relations at this time, 
Maitland submitted an incisive critique of what the amity actually was. 
The amity, Maitland lamented, 'not being an amity contracted with the 
Realm publickly or approved by open fact or certain demonstration but 
only a familiarity contracted privately betwixt themselves <ie Mary and 
Elizabeth)' was severely and inherently vulnerable. Elizabeth's private 
expressions of love, much appreciated though they were by Mary. 
remained unendorsed by any public contract and 'but inclosed in her own 
heart et non transgreditur personam'; they were worthless as a 
bargaining counter 'to lay in ballance fornent' the French. According to 
Maitland. Elizabeth's recent bout of small-pox had further highlighted 
the fragility and dangers of an amity based solely on a personal and 
private friendship. For if Mary chose to support England rather· than 
France and then, as Maitland so delicately put it, 'God should call your 
mistress then shall mine be left destitute of all friends when she 
shall have most need'.21 
In a challenging article Dr Adams has argued for the importance of 
seeing the amity for what it was but he he fails to provide a 
convincing answer to the problem he identifies. 22 There is surely no 
clearer analysis from a Scottish perspective than that given by 
Mait land in 1562-3. It was Cervantes who observed the ability of fear 
to induce sharp-sightedness and it was perhaps because Maitland was 
acutely aware that Mary would hold him personally responsible for the 
disastrous prospect 'of being destitute of all friends' through 
following his policy of friendship with England that explains the 
disarming candour of his appraisal. Mai t land as the man 'who most 
chiefly and specially hath travelled at all times to knit up friendship' 
between Mary and Elizabeth, had a powerful personal motive for not 
allowing such a hazardous state of affairs to continue. It is in the 
development of his proposals to deal with this dilemma that a good 
insight is given into the tactics and rationale he employed several 
months later when he embarked upon his mission. 23 
Maitland, ever the astute politiCian, was acutely aware of all the 
opportunities available to him. He seems to have grasped perfectly that 
the Anglo-French conflict. whilst exposing the precarious state of the 
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amity. also provided an excellent opportunity for it to be strengthened. 
This was certainly Maitland's, if not Mary's line of argument. and it is 
in advancing such a view that the worth of Maitland's appraisal of the 
amity is enhanced. If. as Maitland desired. the 'amity were so straitly 
knit up betwixt their majesties so solemnly confirmed and by publick 
demonstration uttered to the world' then Elizabeth could rest assured 
that Mary would gladly follow and be directed by her good advice alone 
rather 'than of all the uncles she hath'. Maitland was of course hinting 
at Elizabeth's public recognition of Mary as her heir to the throne, in 
the event - as had so recently seemed likely - that Elizabeth died 
unmarried and childless. It was a tortuous game Maitland was playing 
but the ultimatum implicit in his argument was obvious. For the 
continuing credibility of himself and the amity, recognition of Mary's 
claim was essential. If recognition was not forthcoming, it was clear 
that the amity would remain as Maitland had already depicted it, 
insecure. exposed and vulnerable. 
Maitland's Mission As A Watershed For The Amity 
In this sense, it is possible to view the crisis of 1563 and Maitland's 
mission as a watershed in the history of the amity. Although it was a 
further two years before a complete breach was effected by the failure 
of the Leicester match and Mary's subsequent marriage to Darnley, 
Maitland's mission affords a clear indication of the rift between 
Elizabeth and Mary that was to develop into chasmic proport ions. It is 
clear that Maitland himself was frustrated that the policy he had 
advocated even before Mary's return had not borne fruit. 24 It was not 
out of a fondness for sycophantic grovelling that he had spent almost 
two years attempting to create a climate conducive to the granting of 
the recognition by Elizabeth of Mary as her successor. It was Maitland's 
consistent conviction that recognit ion of Mary's claim was 'the 
readiest yea and only moyen' to ensure the realms were joined in godly, 
perpetual amity.2s It was becoming increasingly obvious to Maitland 
that the prospects in 1563 for his policy and the amity were not 
propitious. What his mission illustrates is the change of tack on the 
part of Mary and himself in their search for an alternative. In what 
was to be a remarkable four months of diplomatic activity which 
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contrasted sharply with the picture painted by Maitland in November 
1562. it was not to be France which presented the most desirable 
alternative but Spain. 
Such then was the lie of the land in November 1562 at the outbreak 
of Anglo-French hostilities. Mary very wisely waited to see how the 
situation developed before seeking to intervene. Her eventual decision 
made after careful consideration of the complexities of the problem was 
probably the best possible. She decided to offer mediation between 'oure 
dearest freindis', England and France. This, along with her determination 
to secure the recognition of her rights to the English succession 
formed the basis of Maitland's official instructions for his mission in 
February 1563. 20 He was to seek French and English approval of Scottish 
mediation in the crisis and, in an attempt to redress the parliamentary 
opposition so recently voiced against her and in favour of Catherine 
Grey, he was also to seek admission to the English parliament to 
present Mary's claim. 27 
The Religious Climate At The Time Of The Mission 
One further aspect of the broader political climate at the time of 
Maitland's mission ought to be taken into consideration and this is that 
it coincided with the final sitting of the Council of Trent in 1563. 
This as well as further emphasising the delicacy of the international 
situation at the time, also draws attention to the matter of Mary's own 
religious policy. By virtue of her position as the Catholic Queen of a 
Protestant country there was necessarily a certain amount of complexity 
inherent in that policy. It is in her considered handling of the 
invitation to Trent that her skilful management of the religious 
question during the early years of her personal reign is perhaps best 
shown.28 
Maitland had been at pains to assure Cecil that Protestantism was 
prospering under Mary. It was his opinion that 'the religion' was a 
'great deal more increased since she came home than it was before' due 
to Mary's helpful attitude 'towards these that be of the religion in her 
own Realm and the religion itself'.29 However, the difficulty of 
accepting Maitland's appraisal of the healthy state of Protestantism in 
Scotland under Mary is that at the same time he was praising the 
The /fission 158 
progress of 'the religion' there were many, including the minister of 
Edinburgh and some of his colleagues, doing the complete opposite.3 0 
Whose position was the more accurate? 
Both viewpoints must be treated cautiously. Maitland's was as 
carefully tailored in its optimism as Knox's was in its peSSimism. 
Maitland was determined to prevent any unnecessary hurdles being 
placed in the way of Mary's claim to the English succession and he knew 
that the religious issue could be used against her. Maitland sought to 
turn Mary's religious policy to her advantage; he was determined to 
show that the Scottish experience proved there was no reason why 
Englishmen 'that be zealous of religion should suspect her'.31 In so 
arguing, the delicate combination of the stick and the carrot by which 
he was he was trying to induce Elizabeth into granting the concession 
he so desperately sought is clearly revealed. If the revival of the auld 
alliance was the stick then the godly card playing on the mutual Anglo-
Scottish need for Protestant solidarity in the face of the forces of 
the Counter-Reformation gathered at Trent was the carrot. It was 
Mait land's belief that it lay in Elizabeth's hands to guarantee that 
security by recognising Mary as her successor.32 His task was not made 
any easier by the alarmist fears articulated by Knox, who did not share 
Maitland's conviction that Protestantism was secure under Mary. 
However, for all Knox's concern it can hardly be said that 
Catholicism was thriving in Scotland. The sorry story of De Gouda's 
mission, Mary's refusal to establish a new Catholic seminary, her 
rejection of the invitation to provide Scottish attendance at Trent, 
together with the slaughter of the greatest Catholic noble in the realm 
all add weight to Maitland's rather than Knox's appraisal of the state 
of religion in Scotland. 3 3 In all these measures it seems, however, that 
Mary was exercising astute political judgement rather than following an 
openly Protestant poliCY, and in this sense Knox was right to be 
worried. It would have been political madness to set up a seminary 
along the lines De Gouda suggested. Mary seems to have grasped that 
the short-term opposition such an inflammatory gesture would have 
provoked far outweighed the necessarily long-term fruits of such an 
initiative. Similarly, while the slaying of the 'Pope of the north east' 
Huntly, had far more to do with temporal rather than spiritual matters, 
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it was usefully manipulated by Maitland and Mary as illustrative of her 
support of the new faith. Equally, there were many sound temporal 
reasons for declining the invitation to Trent. 
Maitland was instrumental in the making of that decision. s 4 He no 
doubt advised her of how it could be used to dispel fears, both 
Scottish and English of the dangers of her Catholicism. It could also be 
usefully manipulated by Mary and Maitland as a gesture of solidarity 
with Elizabeth's own decision to decline an invitation to Trent. Less 
obvious but equally pertinent was the fact that Mary's non-attendance 
enabled her to avoid becoming unnecessarily embroiled in the inner 
politics of Trent. Mary would have been inevitably caught in the clash 
betweeen the Papacy and her Guise family, who led the opposition party 
at Trent. ss At the same time, the fulsome letter of apology she 
delivered to Pius IV explaining her non-at tendance seems to have· been 
successful in helping avoid the discontent of the Papacy, something she 
does not seem to have incurred until later in her reign under a 
different pope. 36 
Knox then was right to view with suspicion the apparent progress of 
the Kirk. His fear of the threat Mary's personal committment to 
Catholicism posed to the security of 'the religion' can also be said to 
have been vindicated by the successively Catholic Easters Mary 
celebrated from 1563, peaking with an alleged at tendance of 12,000 
communicants in 1567 at Holyrood. 3 7 Whether Maitland was unaware or 
indifferent to such a threat is a moot pOint. It is perhaps sufficient 
at this point to say that Maitland was not, despite many Catholic 
connections in any sense a crypto-Catholic. One of the reasons the 
Spanish marriage proposal ought to be taken seriously is the fact that 
Maitland made no attempt in his negotiations with La Quadra to disguise 
himself as a supporter of Catholicism. La Quadra was quite well aware 
that 'as regards religion he does not desire the restitution of 
Catholicism any more than Cecil does'.3a 
It must not be forgotten that Maitland's religious fervour was 
always strongly governed by the prevailing political winds. Before 
drawing any conclusions from Maitland's attitude towards the Scottish 
religious situation in 1563, it is perhaps prudent to bear in mind that 
1563 probably marks the peak of his personal credit with Mary and his 
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own devotion and commitment to the Queen. It was very much in his own 
interests to follow her lead and endorse her policy. Is it just chance 
that his later opposition to the more Catholic aspects of Mary's pOlicy 
coincided with the times when his own credit with her was low and he 
himself was not holding the reins of power? If, the conspiracy of March 
1566 is to be understood in terms of a Protestant backlash then 
Maitland was clearly capable of adopting a militant stance on the 
religious issue when it served his political ambitions to do SO,39 In 
1563, as Mary's most trusted adviser, sharing confidence at the highest 
level he had no such worries. While he was no doubt aware of the 
potential dangers of Mary's own Catholicism he probably felt confident 
enough in his own ability to ensure these were not realised. At any 
rate Mary's conduct so far had given him no reason to believe that 'the 
religion' was in danger. 
Maitland's Rising Influence 
A clear indication of Maitland's personal power and influence at this 
time was given by the granting of a commission of justice to Eglinton, 
'the veriest rankest and despytefulleste papist of a lord in Scot land' 
and the admission to the privy council of Ruthven, 'an unworthier there 
is not in Scotland than he' in 1563.~ 0 According to Randolph, the 
responsibility for both these developments was entirely Maitland's, who 
had unnecessarily alienated many, including Lord James who was bitterly 
opposed to both men. 4 1 There is very strong evidence to suggest that 
Randolph was correct in blaming Maitland for Ruthven's return to power. 
A charter of April 1563 from Ruthven to Maitland, granting him lands in 
East Lothian looks suspiciously like a pay-off for this particular good 
turn but their friendship was not restricted to that one favour. ~ 2 Up 
until Ruthven's death in 1566 Maitland and he were to remain staunch 
allies. It was Maitland's friendship with Ruthven that enabled him to 
intervene during the Chaseabout raid with Colin Campbell of Glenorchy, 
who was married to Ruthven's sister Katherine, with whom ~laitland 
appeared to be on particularly good terms. In 1565 Maitland was termed 
Ruthven's 'chief friend' and both were later principal conspirators in 
the attempted coup of March 1566. 43 
In 1563 Randolph was highly concerned at what he viewed as a most 
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dangerous and unwelcome development which he felt sprang from 
Maitland's dangerous tendency to do good to all men but which 
'succeedeth evil'....... Maitland's willingness to act against Lord James' 
wishes in this matter is a particularly significant precedent, for there 
is little evidence to show Maitland acting in concert with the Queen's 
half-brother during the course of his mission. On the contrary, the 
evidence suggests that it was an independent Maitland who was able to 
serve and promote Mary's best interests during his four month absence 
from Scotland. It was then a highly sensitive political and religious 
climate that provided the backdrop to Maitland's mission. It was a 
mission he was able to undertake at the peak of his personal credit 
with Mary but under a cloud of suspicion from many of his colleagues, a 
cloud that was to thicken substantially by the time of his return in 
June. 
Maitland's Arrival In London 
According to La Quadra, Maitland's offer of Scottish mediation to the 
Anglo-French conflict was welcomed by Elizabeth and she requested his 
immediate dispatch to France .... 5 The same source, however, imputed an 
ulterior motive to Elizabeth's favourable reception of the peace 
initiative and her desire to have Maitland in France. This was to 
prevent giving Maitland the opportunity to press Mary's claim to the 
succession. Maitland, however, was up to the ruse and after much 
persuasion managed to force Elizabeth, albeit reluctantly, to send a 
servant of his to France in advance of his own arrival to ascertain the 
French willingness for him to undertake the mission .... 6 There is no 
evidence, however, to suggest that as a result of this concession or at 
any other point in his mission he was able to advance Mary's claim to 
the English throne. There is certainly no evidence of him gaining 
admission to the English Parliament to argue his case .... 7 This 
frustrat ion on the matter of the succession was short ly followed by 
disappointing news of yet another unwelcome development. Almost 
immediately after Maitland's servant had been dispatched to Sir Thomas 
Smith in order to present the initiative to the French court, news 
gradually filtered through to London of the assassination of the Duke 
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of Guise. It was news which inevitably affected the whole prospect of 
Mait land's miss ion. 4 8 
Impact Of The Dea th Of The Duke Of Guise 
According to La Quadra, the death of Guise rendered Maitland's proposed 
intervention ' ridiculous and contemptible' to the English .• 9 This may 
well have been the case but events were to show that English joy at 
the death of Guise was premature. Despite their boastful expectations, 
England can hardly be said to have benefited from the death of Guise. 
The assassination actually proved to be the catalyst for one of the 
most humiliating episodes of English foreign policy in Elizabeth's reign. 
In a singular display of French national unity which shines out amidst 
the decades of bloody civil strife in their bitter religious wars, 
Catherine de Medici was able to seize the initiative of the Duke's death 
and momentarily convert the French conflict from a sectarian struggle 
to a patriotic war against the English. Much to the English chagrin, the 
Huguenots were to prove more than capable of taking the English money 
and running to the side of Catherine de Medici to force the English out 
of Le Havre. Yet if the effect of Guise's death on the English 
intervention in France was clearly catastrophic, it is not quite so easy 
to adjudge its effect on Maitland's mission. s 0 
A good deal depends on whether Maitland did in fact originally 
depart from Scotland with hidden instructions to pr'omote a Spanish 
marriage for Mary. If he did, Guise's death and its consequential blow 
to what might cautiously be called Mary's party in France, must have 
added a new and greater urgency to the project. If he did not, then, as 
La Quadra argued, Guise's death can be seen as directly responsible for 
the resuscitation of the Don Carlos marriage. Both these explanations 
are entirely plausible but not necessarily conclusive. However, it is 
possible to be certain of one aspect of the impact of the Duke's death, 
and that is that it was insufficient to cause the abandonment of 
Maitland's mission. There appears to have been no question of Maitland 
being recalled. As soon as Mary discovered the bad news, Pierre Raulet, 
her French secretary was sent on to Maitland with letters of condolence 
to deliver in France and perhaps also new instructions. Maitland was 
still to go to France. s 1 That Mary still felt confident enough in her 
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credit at the French court to intervene in the Anglo-French conflict as 
she had originally planned, suggests that contrary to La Quadra's 
opinion, the consequences of Guise's death were not so drastic as he 
believed. 
It does, however, seem likely that Maitland was both perplexed and 
disturbed by the assassination. Despite Mary's insistence that the 
mission should go ahead the death of the Duke was a grievous personal 
blow to her. The spring of 1563 must be recognised as a particularly 
difficult time for Mary. The death of her beloved uncle had been 
preceded by the Chatelhard affair and was to be swiftly followed by 
news of the death of another Guise uncle, Francis the Grandprior. S 2 
Randolph was able to report with evident glee the false mourning of 
the Scottish court with many insincere tears being shed and much 
laughter suppressed. s 3 It is clear that Maitland was very unwilling to 
be the bearer of the bad tidings to Mary and it is not at all clear by 
what means Mary discovered the news. Possibly it was indirectly via 
Maitland, for there is evidence to suggest he informed Lord James but 
it was not unt il 15 March that Mary was informed.:; 4 It was probably at 
that time that she received Maitland's letter dated 9 March informing 
her of his discussion of the Spanish marriage with La Quadra. It is 
quite possible that Maitland timed his letter to boost Mary's flagging 
morale, following the uncertainty of the English succession, the shock 
of the Chatelhard affair and the impending blow he knew was about to 
land of the Guise misfortunes. Such an interpretation certainly adds an 
extra, intriguing dimension to Maitland's words of comfort quoted at 
the opening of this chapter that 'thair can not so gryte ane storme 
comen bot he (God) vill send a port at hand quairhin your ship may be 
saved. I se experience of this mony wais and even at this same time'. S S 
If all this tends to lend weight to La Quadra's explanation of the 
revival of the Spanish match, the inescapable fact that it was after 
the death of the Duke of Guise that the discussions commenced adds 
even more. Such an explanation also tends to support the view that 
Mait land was not seeking to implement a secret agenda on this mission 
but merely, in characteristic style adapting with some elan to swiftly 
changing circumstances. La Quadra informed his master, Philip that he 
had espied Maitland's perplexity, saw his opportunity to intervene and 
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set about doing so by inviting Maitland to dinner. It was to be a long 
evening for after Paul de Foix, the French ambassador, had departed, 
Maitland and La Quadra discussed the question of the Spanish match for 
over five hours. s " It is to that controversial matter that attention 
will now be turned. 
The Question Of Maitland's Sincere Support Of the Spanish Match 
The contradictory reports of Maitland and La Quadra, which conflict on 
practically every major point impede accurate comment on the 1563 
revival of the Spanish marriage. S 7 Both men insisted that it was the 
other who initiated the discussion. Maitland argued that La Quadra 
proposed the match as an alternative to an Archducal one, whilst La 
Quadra argued that Maitland had been sent down in embassy to initiate 
the marriage. Yet while it would be helpful in a number of respects, 
not least in evaluating the extent of Maitland's sincere support for 
the match, to know which account is more accurate, perhaps the more 
important thing to be drawn from the confusion is that the marriage 
negotiations had been launched. If for a moment the conflict between 
Maitland's and La Quadra's accounts can be sidestepped there is other 
evidence upon which an assessment of Maitland's sincere support of the 
Spanish marriage can be based. 
Opinion as to the sincerity of Maitland's support for the Spanish 
match has been split over the years. S 3 Russell, arguably the most 
accurate authority on Maitland to date, argues strongly against 
accepting Maitland as an earnest favourer of the match. The main reason 
for this is that it sits uncomfortably with his image of Maitland as an 
anglophile proponent of the union. Consequently it has usually been 
argued that Maitland had a more tactical approach to the match, 
supporting it to exert pressure on the English to frighten them into 
concessions regarding the succession and the amity. As this thesis has 
tried to argue, the image of Maitland as an Anglophile has been 
somewhat overstated. Even if La Quadra's portrayal of t.'laitland 
desperate to achieve the marriage is rejected there are still good 
grounds for taking seriously the view that Maitland sincerely supported 
the match. 
It is, for example, difficult to believe that in countenancing the 
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match at all and in so warmly recommending it to Mary that Maitland 
was not alert to the possibility of it actually being accomplished. 
Maitland's later letter to Archbishop Beaton detailing Mary's 
determinat ion for a Spanish mat ch: 'I find her mind only applyit to 
Spain ... remarking always what she has been and yet is' and his request 
that Beaton should enter 'in frank communication with the King of 
Spain's ambassador in that court touching the said Kyng's sonne and his 
marriage' also suggests he was an earnest supporter of the project. 5 .. 
Interestingly, Maitland's comment on the importance Mary attached to 
her royal status echoed his own opinion expressed to Mary that 'no 
petit compagnone' would suffice for her by virtue of 'of quhat ye ar 
now presentlie quhar ye ar lyke and autht to be heirafter and how 
honourablye ye have bein maryet heirsofoir' suggests a bias towards 
Spain. 6 0 Much later, in April 1565, Maitland is to be found earnestly 
petitioning Guzman De Silva, La Quadra's successor to go through with 
the match, albeit once more it could be argued that he had ulterior 
motives for doing so, such as to stop the Darnley match at all costs 
and to buy himself some valuable time. 61 
The damaging religous implications of a marriage with Catholic Spain 
for Protestant Scotland is an argument that has often been used to 
prove that Maitland was not sincere in his support of the match. The 
different accounts that both men give of the discussion of the 
religious problem is used to support such a view. 6 2 Yet once again it 
is perhaps of greater significance that a compromise was at least being 
discussed in terms of limited religious toleration for Catholics. As 
mentioned earlier, La Quadra did not have a rosy-coloured view of 
Maitland's religious persuasion, and his recognition of Maitland's 
Protestantism lends a business-like air to the negotiations that is too 
often denied. 63 Of course wilder speculations of Lord James' ability to 
win the Kirk over to granting wider toleration to Catholics must be 
suspected and La Quadra's view of Philip as a 'wyse politique prince' 
similarly SO.64 Yet, despite Philip's formidable historical reputation as 
a Catholic ruler, La Quadra was arguably correct to insist that he was 
not a 'soldado del papa'. Philip may well have been prepared to permit 
limited religous tolerat ion. 65 Mait land himself was always able to do 
business with Catholics and in this sense the quest ion of religion, 
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while undoubtedly a major obstacle, should not be regarded as an 
insurmountable hurdle to the acceptance of Maitland as a sincere 
proponent of the match. 
It does, however, appear likely that in March 1563 Maitland was 
playing with his usual legerity the fraught game of international 
diplomacy very well indeed. His main priority in what was a very 
turbulent and constantly changing climate was to try to assess Mary's 
options accurately, particularly as regards the English succession. What 
he was determined not to do at this early stage was to cut down the 
options open to Mary. It may well be, that his discussions with La 
Quadra were designed merely to exert pressure on Elizabeth but the 
evidence certainly permits the view that Maitland was prepared to 
sincerely support a Spanish marriage for Mary. 
La Quadra also raised with Mait land the prospect of a marriage 
between Mary and the Archduke Charles, rumours of which were 
apparently rife in Europe. Maitland was right to say that he had heard 
more talk of this in England than in Scotland. 6 t. He was to hear even 
more of it in France. He seems to have left for France by 3 April but 
before focusing attention on his time in France some brief comment 
must be made on his diplomat ic act ivit y with the English. 6 7 
Maitland appears to have successfully maintained an amenable front 
with Elizabeth, obtaining her approval for his journey into France and 
discussing with her the quest ion of Mary's marriage. 6 3 There is also 
evidence that Maitland was involved with the English Privy Council's 
handling of the earl of Lennox's complaints. 69 It is difficult to 
discern Maitland's attitude to Lennox at this time although it does 
appear that on this occasion he merely re-stated the argument he 
presented during the Reformat ion crisis, designed to prevent a Lennox 
restitution at that time. There certainly appears to be a pro-Hamilton 
bias in his submission, defending Chatelherault from the Charge of 
bastardy, a bias which adds to the confusion surrounding Elizabeth's 
decision in June to promote Lennox's return to Scotland. 70 
What is clear however is that Maitland had not made any progress on 
the matter of the succession. Indeed according to La Quadra, Maitland 
had said that even mentioning the succession was the surest way to 
ensure Elizabeth 'shut her mouth directly'.7 1 According to the same 
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source, it was at this point that Elizabeth actually proposed Dudley as 
the most fit match for Mary, a suggestion which at the time Maitland 
refused to treat seriously and laughed off as a joke. It is hardly 
surprising that with the apparent choice of Don Carlos, the Archduke 
Charles, DUdley or even his brother, Warwick that Maitland made such 
strenuous efforts with Spain. 7 2 He appears to have been helped in this 
respect by the arrival of Raulet from Scotland. Raulet assisted Maitland 
by emphasising to La Quadra <somewhat spuriously) the enthusiasm in 
Scotland for the Spanish match and by warning La Quadra that if Mary 
could not marry Don Carlos then she would turn to France and Charles 
IX.73 However unrealistic this proposal may seem in hindsight, with 
Maitland about to go off to France the threat seems to have succeeded 
in prodding Philip into action.7" 
Before he left for France he gave La Quadra a packet of letters to 
be sent on to Cardinal Granvelle. This is an interesting precursor of 
the growth of importance of this channel of communication for Mary 
with foreign courts. Granvelle was to be heavily involved in the 
subsequent negotiations for the Spanish match. On this occasion though 
some of the let ters were appparent ly for the Cardinal of Lorraine, and 
some for Philip himself, the letter to Lorraine almost certainly 
contained Mary's apology to Pius IV for her non-attendance at Trent. is 
Maitland's Arrival In France 
Maitland's departure for France in early April was to signal yet 
another twist in his mission. He was certainly able to carry out the 
personal part of his business, successfully delivering the letters of 
condolence and dealing with several matters concerning Mary's own 
property.76 There are also grounds for believing that his attempts at 
mediation were a good deal more successful than he has been given 
credit for. Yet as had been the case in England it was once more the 
question of ft'lary's marriage that seems to have occupied most of his 
time. 
As far as Maitland's attempts at mediation were concerned he seems 
to have made a favourable impression with Sir Thomas Smith, who 
believed him to be Ian honest well meaning man'. Smith was not always 
to hold such a generous opinion of Maitland and was later one of his 
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sternest critics. He later described Adam Hume as 'altogether a 
Lethington whom he would find double or rather triple having pensions 
from all three princes'. 77 However, during the course of his mission 
both Smith and his colleague Henry Middlemore held Maitland in high 
regard. 78 They had, as Sir Henry Killigrew testified, good reason for 
doing so. It was through Maitland's credit alone that Killigrew was 
released from his nine-month imprisonment in France. Maitland had been 
able to use Mary's credit with D'Amville, the Constable Montmorency's 
son, to secure his release, an indication that Mary's credit was perhaps 
not entirely dependent upon the Guisard connection. 7 9 Killigrew had 
been an early casualty of the English campaign and his imprisonment had 
no doubt given him time to reflect on his gung ho attitude of 1562 
'that it lay in Elizabeth's hands to banish idolatry out of France'. 80 No 
doubt equally impressive to the English diplomats was Maitland's 
resistance of Catherine de Medici's intense efforts to formally renew 
the auld alliance. 
Maitland's resistance of Medici's overtures is yet another example of 
his skilful 'politic pliancy'. He knew exactly how to play to a 
particular audience. He could satisfy the French by insisting that the 
auld alliance needed no renewing. 8 1 It has already been shown how 
fragile Maitland felt the amity to be and he was probably able, in 
classic Maitland fashion, to comfort the French with the same view. At 
the same time he could be perceived by Smith and Middlemore as 
favouring the English alliance by not formally renewing the auld 
alliance. 82 He certainly seems to have been successful in his dealings 
with the French court and perhaps not unsurprisingly was far more 
successful than Smith. Smith was clearly jealous of Maitland's easy 
access to the French court and complained to Cecil that Maitland: 
has the Queen Mother so ready to grant the Queen of Scotland all 
his requests that he plieth his harvest and hath bein these four 
dayes at Paris about the dispatch of them and within three fair 
dayes he goeth home. Dmnes que sua sunt querunt!. 83 1 
Part of the reason for Maitland's success was no doubt his ablity to 
allay Catherine de Medici's suspicions of his negotiations with De 
Quadra over Mary's marriage, which he assured her were designed merely, 
'to caus England grant to our desyris'.84 
Although it took a long time, (Maitland was in France for almost six 
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weeks), he was able to make some progress in promoting a negotiated 
settlement to the Anglo-French conflict. In so doing Maitland made it 
clear to Elizabeth that she was in a hopelessly indefensible position, 
if not morally then certainly strategically and that the sooner she 
began to treat for peace the better.a 5 Arguably Elizabeth never did 
come round to accepting this sensible advice but there is evidence to 
suggest that Maitland was instrumental in promoting the unsuccessful 
peace negotiations in London in June 1563. The catholic D'Allouy, the 
French secretary of commandments and the Huguenot De la Haye who 
together with Paul de Foix made up the French negotiating team were 
dispatched into England shortly after Maitland's own departure. ab 
While in France Maitland seems to have been particularly well looked 
after by yet another of Mary's uncles in France, Cardinal Louis de 
Guise. a 7 It was Louis who informed Maitland of Lorraine's proposal, 
apparently made to the Emperor at Innsbruck in February 156~ that Mary 
should marry the Archduke Charles. a 8 If to be fore-warned is to be 
fore-armed then his negotiations with La Quadra were certainly useful 
in helping him prepare his response to this proposal. His letter to 
Mary, in which he informed her of the match and of Du Croc's mission to 
discuss the same with her, contrasted sharply to his own private view 
of the match. a 9 This is pOSSibly explained by the fact that the bearer 
of his letter was Du Croc himself. Mary's own diplomatic, public 
response also contrasted greatly with her own private opinion. She was 
furious that Lorraine should so far have exceeded himself to have 
proposed a marriage for her, especially one that never, for a number of 
sound, financial and political considerations attained a high place in 
Mary's plans. She was 'loth to have it thought that the Cardinal of 
Lorraine was a suitor for her in marriage to the Emperor's son.'9 () 
Similarly, in 1565, Maitland insisted to De Silva that in 1563 after 
discovering Lorraine's proposal he had immediately written off to the 
Cardinal, 'a toda furia' expressing his anger at the proposal even 
before he had left England. There is, however, no contemporary reference 
to that letter in 1563 and the picture that emerges of Maitland in 
France is of him maintaining a polite diplomatiC front, content within 
himself that the project would fail anyway.91 
The /fission 170 
Maitland's Let ter To Mary Of April 1563 
Lorraine's support for the Archducal match was undoubtedly yet another 
unwelcome complication for Mait land. In 1560 Lorraine had been one of 
the principal supporters of the Spanish match but if Maitland was 
banking on his support for it in 1563 he badly miscalculated. 9 2 That 
Maitland was anticipating being able to win Lorraine over to the 
Spanish match is evident from a fascinating letter of his to Mary 
writ ten from Chenonceaux and dated 16 April 1563. 93 In this let ter 
which is perhaps the most instructive of all his correspondence during 
the mission, he set out albeit in general terms the question of Mary's 
marriage and offered a wide ranging analysis of English. French and 
Scot t ish opinion on the subject. He also detailed the amount of co-
operation and opposition she could expect to encounter in making her 
choice. In so doing Maitland lamented that he was not able to talk 
directly with Mary as much of his message was too important to be 
committed to paper. That Maitland was not able to speak his mind fully 
must be taken into account. 
Maitland's basic premise was that of 'foraine nations your majesty 
has most to do with France and England'. He correctly observed, as far 
as France was concerned, that the: 
Quene mother and hail estate of the realme care not greatly of 
your marriage or with whom it be providing it bring with it no 
peril to this crown and that I judge they take onlye to be gyf ye 
join your self to Spain. 
Perhaps incorrectly in the light of Lorraine's support of the Archducal 
match, Maitland observed that 'your onkles kynfolk and special friends 
have no respect bot onlie your grandeur for therewith is joyned there 
advancement and surety.' Future events, particularly the progress of the 
Spanish match were to show that ~lary's kinfolk were perhaps more 
mindful of Catherine de Medici's ambitions than Mary's.9 4 
In England. Maitland defined 'three diverse factions', the Catholics, 
Protestants and Elizabeth herself. At this early stage Maitland was 
perhaps not too wide of the mark in believing that Elizabeth was not so 
much concerned about the religion of Mary's husband but of his military 
power. Darnley certainly filled this criterion and this was perhaps in 
Elizabeth's thinking when she originally approved his ret urn to 
Scotland. Unsurprisingly, Maitland reckoned that the English Catholics 
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favoured lane of thair religion of whome she (Elizabeth) might be in 
most doubt, that had the greatest forces and especially the Prince of 
Spaine'. Correspondingly the Protestants favoured lane of thair religion 
of quhome for all events thei neid not to feare any change of the 
estate of yair religion. '9 S 
Maitland then turned to Scotland and set out the way Mary would 
have to handle her own subjects. He was convinced there was not 'anye 
so unnatural subject that thei would your majesty should not marie' or 
at least none who would admit it but he did point to the fact that 
although 'the best part would accomode themselves and dispose their 
affections to your own contentment but I doubt not but their be ones 
inclining qUilk for diverse repects wishe diversely'. Somewhat 
ironically, in view of his own opposition to the Darnley and Bothwell 
marriages, Mait land himself felt that Mary's 'own contentment' was the 
chief consideration of the matter. To win her subjects round to her own 
choice, Maitland warned against making a hasty choice and advised Mary 
to 'feill the mynds of the nobilitie and by the labouring, credit and 
persuasion of them quhay are best affected induce the others to lyk of 
it '. As usual, he was able to offer an apposite analogy to illustrate 
the difficult dilemma her marriage presented; 'the nut will be hard to 
crak and yet your majesty have the kernel'. There were as Maitland 
rightly admitted, 'so many and different humours' she had to contend 
with that it seemed almost impossible to come to any satisfactory 
conclusion. 96 
It was here though that Maitland was able to offer Mary 
encouragement that the complexity of the problem could be used to her 
advantage. In so doing Maitland revealed his own remarkably open mind 
at this point as regardS Mary's choice of husband. Maitland argued that 
persuasion of some sort would inevitably have to be used and, working 
on the principle that 'for feare of greater inconvenience some tyme for 
avoyding thereof we can be prepared to admit the smaller' he maintained 
that 'they who would mislyk of a marriage being nakedlie proponed... for 
some respects may be driven to lyk of it '. For example, Maitland argued 
that some 'rather than to haif the prince of Spain will be persuadit to 
lyke the emperor's sonne and so perhaps rather than to admit the erle 
of Lennox sonne be content of ather of them bayth according to your 
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humours'.97 
His mention of Darnley is of especial significance. Darnley's parents 
had long been angling at his marriage with Mary but that Maitland was 
prepared to consider it at this stage along with Don Carlos and the 
Archduke is striking. In the light of Elizabeth's subsequent letter -
which Maitland carried home with him in June - stating that she was 
supporting Lennox's efforts to be restored in Scotland, it is even more 
so. It perhaps shows that Maitland had not argued against Lennox's 
restitution in the English privy council in March 1563 and certainly 
adds another interesting perspective from which to view Lennox's 
return. Equally significant is the absence of any mention of a match 
with Charles IX. As Maitland's depiction of Catherine de Medici's opinion 
showed, such a match was remote. This of course did not prevent 
Maitland on his return to England from continuing to frighten La Quadra 
into action with rumours of a marriage between Mary and Charles. 9 8 
That it did work, despite Philip's support of the the Archducal match 
showed that perhaps as La Quadra had admitted in March, Philip's 'sarke 
is narrer hyme nor his coit '. 99 Yet perhaps most significant of all, and 
again somewhat ironic given his later opposition to the Darnley match, 
was his advice that Mary should 'seme to requyre the Queen of England's 
counsell and advyse in it albeit ye will not stand to hir resolution in 
it'.l 00 
Maitland's Return 
Maitland appears to have left France on 22 May in the company of the 
released Henry Killigrew. 101 As mentioned earlier, he was followed 
shortly by D'Allouy and De la Haye. Maitland was certainly involved in 
the subsequent negotiations as Cecil's correspondence shows. 1 02 That 
the talks failed appears to have been due to a mixture of English 
intransigence and an apparent division between the French 
commisssioners. Maitland never seems to have veered from his view that 
an English withdrawal was essential and his later letters to Cecil 
after the English had been completely and ignominiously defeated have a 
definite 'told you so' ring about them.l 03 
Before he left for Scotland, Elizabeth not only informed Maitland of 
her decision to support Lennox's restitution in Scotland but also, if La 
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Quadra is to be believed, disclosed her discontent with his intrigues 
for a foreign match with Mary.l 04 More than this Elizabeth made clear 
that if Mary married Don Carlos or the Archduke or any member of the 
House of Austria she would become her mortal enemy. If, however, she 
followed her advice and married as Elizabeth saw fit 'she would not 
fail to be her good friend and sister to her and make her her heir'.1 os 
While being cautious as ever in accepting La Quadra's word, that his 
version bears a striking similarity to the official instructions given 
to Randolph some seven weeks later, suggests Maitland did take a verbal 
message back to Scotland to that effect.10~ Elizabeth herself, described 
Randolph's instructions as being 'in the same sort as we partly shewed 
our mind to the Secretary the L. of Lidington'.1 07 
Maitland arrived back in Edinburgh on 24 June. 1 0 a His return had 
been eagerly awaited by all. It was hardly surprising that he was 
warmly welcomed by Mary. They had much to discuss. His mission had 
done nothing but enhance his credit with her and this was to continue 
to rise in the year ahead. Perhaps the best illustration of this was 
her gift to him of the abbey of Haddington in December 1563. According 
to Randolph the abbey made him 'equal with any man that hath his whole 
lands lying in Lodian'l 09 and Professor Donaldson has confirmed that 
the abbey was a most lucrative reward probably worth £2,500 Scots 
annually.1 lO 
Even though he had missed the impressive opening of Mary's first 
Parliament with ChAtelherault carrying the Crown, Argyll the Sceptre and 
Moray the Sword, his interests had not been neglected. lll He was 
included on a commission to reform St Andrews University and more 
importantly named as one of the commissioners along with his father, 
Sir Richard to interpret the terms of the Law of Oblivion. Less 
important but further illustrative of his family's growing involvement 
in the government of Mary Stewart was the inclusion of his father on a 
parliamentary commission to promote standard weights and measures 
throughout the realm. ll2 
It was yet another indication of his skill that he was swiftly able 
to dispel Moray's hostile suspicion of him and his mission. Whether 
Mait land revealed his mind ent irely to him must be quest ioned and it 
does seems likely that Maitland gave him a carefully tailored account 
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of his mission. For although Moray was mentioned in some quarters as a 
favourer of the Spanish match, it is a good deal more difficult to 
regard him as an earnest supporter of the match than it is Maitland. It 
has been argued that Moray supported the Spanish match out of a 
desire to see Mary out of Scotland and safely housed in the Escorial, 
thereby ensuring a return to the good old days for himself, but this 
argument fails to convince. l1 3 Most likely, Maitland told him that in 
all his diplomatic adventures he had merely been trying to exert 
pressure on Elizabeth in order to strengthen the amity. Whatever he 
told him seems to have worked, for in the following two years they are 
to be seen working closely together seeking a marriage for Mary with 
the consent of Elizabeth in return for recognition of Mary's claim to 
the succession. 
Knox, however, believed Moray was Maitland and Mary's dupe for doing 
SO.114 He remained highly suspicious of Maitland, believing that not 
only had he been promoting a Spanish match but also hatching the 
downfall of Moray and Chatelherault by procuring the return of Lennox, 
favouring Athol and gaining the freedom of Bothwell, all the while 
ensuring he himself remained high in credit with Mary.1 1 S This is not 
one of Knox's more outrageous allegations and he was certainly correct 
to draw attention to Maitland's friendship with Athol but it is still a 
suspect picture, not least in the belief that Maitland positively 
supported the freedom of Bothwell. 1 1 6 
As argued in the previous chapter, it was perhaps a measure of 
Mary's successful personal rule, as evinced in the recent parliament. 
that her detachment of influential nobles from Knox and his like-minded 
radicals ensured that the discontent of Knox was of no great moment. 
As in the Reformation parliament, so in these early years of Mary's 
personal reign the secular considerations of the nobility. who had good 
enough mot ivat ion following the slaughter of Hunt ly and the recent Law 
of Oblivion for not falling on the wrong side of Mary, was a constant 
hurdle in Knox's continuous desire for a 'perfect Reformation'.ll 7 
Summary Of Maitland's Mission 
The tangible fruits of Maitland's mission are listed extensively in 
Robertson's Inventaires, which detail a rich cargo of silks. sat ins, furs 
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and taffettas together with a portrait of Mary's mother which Maitland 
had brought back from France. 118 This portrait was to remain among 
Mary's most treasured possessions and accompanied her on all her 
travels throughout her captivity being found amongst her belongings in 
Fotheringay.119 Less concrete but far more significant was the political 
impact of the mission. 
The fundamental difficulty in evaluating this is the uncertainty as 
to what Maitland set out to achieve. It is difficult to imagine ever 
being completely certain in this respect but perhaps this is no bad 
thing. It would certainly be convenient if there was a clear-cut 
explanation but any such account would be greatly at odds with the 
highly complex, uncertain political ambience that reigned over Europe in 
the early 1560s. As it is, his mission accurately reflects this 
uncertainty and his skilful diplomatic negotiations with France, England 
and Spain display Mary's determination to ensure amidst this confusion, 
that by whatever means necessary, her own interests, in particular her 
concern for the English succession were not neglected. Although 
Maitland did not achieve any formal recognition of Mary's claim, it does 
seem likely that it was his industrious diplomacy with France and Spain 
that provoked Elizabeth into offering Mary marital advice with the 
recognition of her claim as the carrot designed to secure her 
compliance. Whether it also provoked Lennox's restitution or was just 
coincidental to what was becoming an increasingly, inevitable 
development is impossible to say.120 
In this sense it would be wrong to give Maitland's mission of 1563 
a false importance. By no stretch of the imagination did it define the 
issues that were to dominate Anglo-Scottish relations in the coming 
years. These were in any case obvious from almost the minute Mary had 
decided to return to Scotland. Yet it did confirm them. It also exposed 
the amity for what it was: nothing but a precarious, private friendship 
unendorsed by any binding or public contract. Perhaps, though, in 
actively pursuing the alternatives open to Mary rather than meekly 
following the wishes of Elizabeth, Maitland set the scene for the 
eventual collapse of the amity in 1565. The essential difference, as far 
as Maitland was concerned, between 1563 and 1565 was his own control 
of the alternatives. Perhaps he had taught Mary too well for in 1565 he 
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was to be a casualty rather than perpetrator of the sort of diplomatic 
finesse of which in 1563 he had shown himself to be the master. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMITTY 
1563-66 
180 
As no man's hart I beleave is clear voyd of ambition so I am already 
entered with myself to imagyne what glory it shal be for us both not 
onely whi1est we ar onlyve but also after our death in the mouthes off 
the posterity to be named as med1ars and chere doars in so godly and 
honorable a werk as is the union off these two nations, which so long 
have continewed ennemyes to the greate decay of both.'1 Maitland to 
Cecil. 1 February 1565 
The course of the years covered by this chapter were to shatter 
Maitland's eloquent but misplaced confidence in his efforts to secure a 
perpetual amity between England and Scotland. This chapter will attempt 
to examine the reasons for that failure and analyse its many and far-
reaching consequences. For Maitland, those consequences were 
particularly dramatic as the stark contrast between his standing in the 
summer of 1563 as Mary's most intimate adviser and as a forfeited 
polit ical exile in 1566 shows. While difficult to pin down amidst the 
complicated intrigue that surrounds these years, the image that emerges 
of Maitland greatly enhances the further delineation of the man and his 
motives. Although; in 1565-6, Maitland actively opposed Mary for the 
first time in her personal reign, much of his behaviour was typically 
characteristic. His skilful diplomacy during Mary's marriage 
negotiations, his judicious decision not to join the Chaseabout raid and 
the classic fusion of religious, political and personal disaffection that 
marked his participation in the attempted coup d'etat of March 1566, so 
reminiscent of his betrayal of Mary's mother in 1559, all exemplify 
this. 
From the evidence presented in the preceding chapter it is perhaps 
more surprising not that the amity collapsed but, that as late as 1565, 
Maitland was so optimistic as to the prospects of success. His mission 
of 1563 had made it clear that the amity was becoming increasingly 
synonomous with a mutual suspiCion and distrust rather than lane 
mutual reciproque luif and benevolence betwixt the twa nations. '2 The 
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stern rebuke Cecil gave Maitland in August 1563, after he realised -
albeit hazily - the dangerous extent of Maitland's recent diplomacy, 
served notice on the downhill trend in relations between the two 
countries and the two Secretaries. Cecil urged Maitland to reject the 
'devisies and determinations of ye Cardinall of Lorrayn concevyed in a 
congregation of Antichristes soldyars' and to stay true to his 
professed zeal for the 'perpetuall reconciliation of these two realmes 
in unitie of hart'.3 Similarly, Maitland's avowal to Dudley in October 
1563 that 'I was once almost determined to forbear any further dealing 
considering with myself the less meddling the less danger especially 
where little hope was that matter would fall out aright' reflected the 
less than propitious outlook for the future of the amity .• 
There is a strong case for viewing the course of Anglo-Scottish 
relations in the years 1563 to 1565 as a straight forward continuance 
of the pat tern established since 1561. The manner in which the Lennox 
restitution and the Leicester marriage proposal were handled was 
certainly in keeping with the stop-go, yes-no pattern that had become 
so familiar in the first two years of Mary's personal reign. In the 
autumn of 1563, however, relations seemed to have taken a significant 
up-turn again. This was clearly Maitland's opinion, 'So now seeing some 
liklihood of the right trade I begin to take some comfort ... now I am 
content to return to my accustomed manner of doing.'s This revival was 
due principally to Elizabeth's offer of a marriage advisory service for 
Mary, with the prospect of the recognition of her claim to the English 
succession as the reward for her compliance. <> Mary's subsequent, 
positive response to Elizabeth's promotion of Lennox's restitution 
confirmed this revival and heralded yet another 'yes-go' phase of the 
amity. This mutual support of Lennox's return was the most positive 
proof of the amity since Mary's return. It was far more significant 
than any minor gestures of goodwill such as the courteous handling of 
Mary's homeward-bound French relatives, for now the two Queens were in 
complete agreement over a major item of policy. 7 
Dr Adams' clear depiction of the background surrounding Elizabeth's 
support of Lennox's restoration upholds such a view. In arguing against 
cynical, sinister mot ives lying behind Elizabeth's original decision, he 
has highlighted the irony of the damage that both the Lennox 
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restitution and the subsequent Leicester proposal eventually caused the 
amity.s Yet while Dr Adams' interpretation holds true for Elizabeth's 
original decisions in promoting both these matters, it collapses once 
her subsequent handling of them is considered. Sympathetic Anglo-
Scottish action as regards Lennox's return was particularly short-lived. 
Almost as soon as Scottish consent had been given to the restitution, 
an all too familiar pattern emerged and the amity once more lapsed into 
a 'no-stop' phase. Elizabeth, in typical fashion, was no longer sure. She 
changed her mind and the issue descended into a discordant conflict, 
the epitome of all that was wrong with the amity. From having been 
potentially the best proof of the amity, it developed into the greatest 
threat to it.9 
Maitland's Attitude Towards The Lennox Restitution 
Maitland and Moray were furious at this volte face. In stinging letters 
to Cecil they denounced it, delivering several home-truths to the 
English Secretary of his and Elizabeth's manner of dealing. 1 0 They made 
it clear how preposterous Elizabeth's demand for Mary to withdraw her 
permission for Lennox to return was, reminding Cecil that agreement had 
only been given in the first place because of Elizabeth's request. If 
she now thought otherwise, she could stop Lennox herself but they were 
not prepared to be her lackeys in the matter. They warned Cecil that 
'factions are not so easily to be suscitat in this country as some 
would believe'.1 1 Mait land went further and directed a cutting gibe at 
Elizabeth's irresolution by offering a direct comparison with Mary, who: 
having once given him liberty under her great seal to come, it 
will be hard to persuade her to revoke it and I dare not presume 
to enter on such with her majesty knowing how she respects her 
honour where promise is once passed and how unwilling she is to 
change her deliberations when once resolved which as she will 
not do her selff so doth she altogether mislike in all otherP2 
Maitland and Moray's stance on the Lennox restitution could not have 
been more vehement. Their dismissal of the claims that Lennox's return 
'shall breed troubles not only in religion but in civil causes' is, with 
hindsight, spectacularly ironic. 1 3 Maitland insisted that 'religion here 
does not depend upon my lord of Lennox coming nor do those off the 
religion hang upon the sleeves off anyone or two that may mislike his 
commyng', and claimed Lennox's homecoming 'to be no great mat ter up or 
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downe'.14 Time was to show the irony of Maitland's arrogant assertion 
that anyone who did not share the like opinion 'wilbe fayne to put 
water in his wyne'.1S In the summer of 1565 it was Maitland and Moray 
- and not those who had voiced disappproval, notably Knox, Kirkcaldy, 
Randolph and the Hamiltons - who were to be forced to cultivate a 
taste for de-alcoholised beverages. 1 6 This determined stance of Moray 
and Mait land is, with hindsight, scarcely credible. It is when an 
attempt is made to assess the political climate as it was at the time 
of the parliamentary restitution of Lennox in 1564 that their attitude 
becomes a good deal more explicable. 
Part of the answer surely lies in their confident belief in the 
security of their positions as Mary's chief advisers and their ability 
to guide and direct her policy. For it is inconceivable that they would 
knowingly seek to introduce legislation that would weaken their 
position. It has recently been convincingly argued that in restoring 
Lennox at a time when the Leicester match and the Spanish match were 
still very much alive that it is hard to believe Mary was already 
determined on marriage with Darnley and the wholesale restructuring of 
the court around the Lennox interest.17 It is even harder to believe 
that Maitland and Moray were in unanimous agreement with Mary that she 
should follow that course. Darnley's name was on many people's lips at 
this time and it has already been noted that Maitland certainly 
considered him a potential husband for Mary. It is difficult to argue 
with the view, however, that even as late as Darnley's arrival in 
Scot land in 1565, he was but one of several candidates, although their 
numbers were diminishing. 1 8 
Maitland and Moray's enthusiasm for the restitution does reveal a 
distinct disinterest in the only certain losers of Lennox's return, the 
Hamiltons. If the re-structuring of the court in 1565 was not a 
forseeable consequence of Lennox's restitution, then the adverse effect 
on the Hamilton's dynastic ambitions and local influence over 
territories which, during Lennox's twenty-year absence they had 
advantageously extended, surely was. ChAtelherault could not fail to 
lose by the return of his old rival and Maitland and Moray's stance is 
confirmation that the Hamiltons were of far less importance to their 
scheme of things since Mary's ret urn than they had been in 1560. 1 9 In 
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1564 that importance had never been lower. According to Knox, Maitland 
confessed that in promoting Lennox's return he was incurring 'the 
deadly haiterent of all the Hamiltons within Scotland, and have done 
unto them no less displeasure than that I had cut their throats. '20 
Nevertheless, Mary's reconciliation of Lennox and Chatelherault in 
October 1564 must have been useful in staving off some of the 
Hamiltons' immediate wrath. 21 
They were probably not so indifferent to Morton's fears over the 
loss of the earldom of Angus. Yet once again, their belief that the 
restitution would not cause civil dissension appeared to be vindicated 
by the surrender of the Countess of Lennox's claim to the earldom in 
November 1564.22 Similarly, the expectation, strong in the air of 
September 1564, of Moray's appointment as lieutenant general of the 
realm, was further proof that there was to be no surprise shift in the 
direction of Mary's policy or in her court circle. 23 Viewed in this 
light, their decision to support Lennox, while st ill ult imately mistaken 
becomes a good deal more credible. It was hardly surprising that 
Maitland could provide a vintage performance in the parliament of 
September 1564, when, acting once more in the place of the Chancellor, 
he introduced the Lennox restitution to the estates. Maitland praised 
the gracious, gentle and felicitous rule of Mary, whereby 'ye enjoy 
this present peax with all foryne nationes and quyetnes amangis your 
selffis in sik sort that I may think just lie it may be affirmid Scotland 
in na manis age that presentlie levis wes in greater tranquilitie'.24 
It was this confidence in their continued management of the 
direction of Mary's policy that probably made them so dismissive of the 
religious fears voiced by Kirkcaldy and Knox. 2 S Moray had long since 
ceased to be on speaking terms with Knox whilst Maitland's estrangement 
from the first minister of Edinburgh can be traced back even further.26 
While it is difficult in 1564 to detect signs of the more, overt ly 
Catholic policy that was to emerge in the following year after the 
Darnley wedding, is it just coincidence that the two men's subsequent 
opposition to that policy coincided with their own fall from power? 
Their reaction to Randolph's fears that Lennox's return would adversely 
affect the chances of Mary marrying Leicester and increase those of 
Darnley seems equally calculated. This is particularly so, if the 
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argument that it is difficult to imagine Mary, Moray and Maitland in 
agreement that she should marry Darnley is recalled. Their blithe 
insistence to Randolph that they were merely following Elizabeth's 
advice in restoring Lennox, which they well knew was no longer her 
desire, is indicative of their contentment at Randolph's alarm. It is 
entirely plausible that at this stage they were using the prospect of a 
Darnley match as a bargaining tool to induce some long overdue 
progress and detailed terms from Elizabeth in the Leicester 
negotiations. Maitland and Moray, happy in the knowledge that they were 
still the major gUiding influences over Mary, were not at all 
dissatisfied with this timely reminder to the English that Leicester's 
hat was not the only one in Mary's ring. Anything that would stir the 
English into action was welcome, for in 1564 an English match for Mary 
was Maitland's chief preference and most likely Moray's only one. 27 
Maitland's Continued Favour With Mary 
Taken as a whole, Maitland's conduct over the Lennox restitution 
strengthens the view that the years 1563 to 1565 were the golden years 
of his Secretariat under Mary. The picture is very much of him as her 
faithful servant, at the centre not only of her government but of her 
court too. He was virtually ever-present in the privy council, a 
constant companion on her progresses across the realm and constantly 
tied up with the increasingly heavy demands of his post. 28 An 
interesting insight into his influence at this time but not related 
directly to his post as Secretary was the lately deceased, earl of 
Menteith's choice of Maitland as the ward of his children. Menteith, who 
feared the encroachment of Colin Campbell of Glenorchy on his lands, 
could not have chosen more wisely. Maitland, chiefly through the 
friendship he had with Glenorchy's wife, was in an excellent position to 
ensure Menteith's wishes were respected. 29 Maitland's pre-eminence in 
the various spheres of the court was particularly evident during these 
years. The dedication by the Italian Protestant and humanist, Pietro 
Bizzari of his Pro L. Virginio contra Ap. Claudium, to Maitland, after 
his visit to Mary in 1564 is one example of this and adds weight to 
the belief that Mait land was familiar with Italian literat ure. It also 
exposes the inaccuracy of the statement expressed in the most recent 
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study of Maitland that he 'did not have very cordial relations with the 
Italians in Mary's court'.30 Maitland's romantic pursuit of Mary Fleming, 
traceable from 1564 provides further evidence of his strong presence at 
the court and adds an extra lively dimension to his character.s1 
Similarly, Randolph's record of the fortnight of spectacular pre-
Lenten feasting in 1564, 'with joy and mirth, marvellous sights and 
shows, singular devices nothing left undone to fill our bellies feed our 
eyes or content our minds' was a tribute to the splendour of Mary's 
court and to Maitland's own prestige. Randolph depicted a travelling 
court, with 'every nobleman his day abowte' hosting a banquet but noted 
the particular magnificence of Maitland's feast: 'Lethington's excelling 
all but the Queen's'.s 2 It was Randolph who also gave the most tangible 
indication of Maitland's established place in Mary's court, government 
and affection by drawing attention to his financial prosperity since 
Mary's return. He believed Maitland 'had augmented his living by the 
Queen's preferment almost 3,000 marks sterling in Lothian only. '33 The 
lion's share of this must have come from Haddington Abbey. 
Given Maitland's pre-eminence at court, it is hardly surprising that 
during 1563 to 1565 he was on such bad terms with John Knox. Judging 
by the latter's frequent denunciations of the court, he was not as 
appreciative as Maitland of its renaissance ambience.3~ The Knox-
Maitland relationship was, as ever, a reliable touch-stone for the more 
important state of the Mary-Maitland relationship. It was a measure of 
Maitland's credit with Mary at this time that he featured so 
prominently in her clashes with the reformer. This was clearly seen in 
the privy council in December 1563, when Maitland was Mary's mainstay 
in the attempt to dismiss Knox and in successive confrontations in the 
General Assemblies of 1563 and June 1564. 3 S The striking realignment 
of Knox and Maitland which can be traced from November 1565 to their 
part icipat ion in the at tempted coup of March 1566, corresponds direct ly 
to Maitland's loss of credit with Mary.36 
The Leicester Marriage Proposal 
If Elizabeth's handling of the Lennox restitution was symptomatic of 
the incompetence and indecision that characterised so much of her 
Scot t ish policy, a similar verdict needs to be ret urned on her handling 
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of the Leicester marriage proposal. Of all the puzzles that contribute 
so much to the enigmatic reign of Mary Stewart, the Leicester affair is 
amongst the hardest to crack. It has suffered diverse treatment at the 
hands of historians ranging from its memorable dismissal as 'worthy of 
a lending library romance' to a far more serious appraisal in recent 
times. 37 While there are undoubtedly elements of the proposal that 
would not be out of place in romantic fiction, the temptation to 
dismiss this controversial proposal out of hand should be resisted. For 
it was the Leicester match - or rather the prospect of the succession 
through that avenue - which, for almost two years was responsible for 
the continuation of the amity. 
In many respects the Leicester proposal serves as a microcosm of 
the amity. The stultifyingly, torpid pace at which the negotiations were 
conducted was symptomatic of the slow tempo that had characterised the 
progress of any proposal designed to address Mary's claim to the 
succession. 38 Even if it is discounted that it was first ment ioned to 
Maitland in June 1563 and the official announcement of Leicester by 
Randolph to Mary in March 1564 is taken as its commencement, it was 
still another year before the benefits Mary might expect from the 
match, in terms of her claim to the succession, were laid down. 3 9 While 
Randolph could talk with some just ificat ion of the need to proceed 
cautiously, 'in great matters good consultation ought to be had', to 
Maitland, Moray and most importantly to Mary herself, the same tactic 
smacked of deliberate time-wasting, indicative of the English reluctance 
to deal genuinely in Mary's favour. 4 0 Mait land put it neat ly: 
If tyme be alwayes dryven without further effect then hath 
followed upon any message hath past betuix them these thre 
yeares I am off opinion he shall in the end think him selff most 
happy who hath least meddled in the mater.4 1 
In June 1564, he was convinced that action was long overdue: 'Gentle 
letters, good wordes and pleasant messages be good meanes to begyn 
friendship amongst princes but I tak them to be slender bandes to hald 
it long fast'. 42 
The proposal also shared the irresolute vagueness necessarily 
inherent in Cecil's avowed determination to keep Mary's affairs 'hanging 
in an uncertainty'.4 3 The prospect of the succession was kept 
deliberately visible on the horizon to keep Mary out of the mischief of 
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a foreign match but always far enough away to ensure it remained 
elusively beyond her grasp. The Leicester proposal was, however, 
uncertainty on a grand scale - even by Elizabeth's standards. Amongst 
the English government there seems to have been a divergence of 
opinion, corresponding to that amongst historians in the present day, as 
to how genuine the offer was and what was to be gained from it. While 
the split between Elizabeth's two principal advisers, Leicester and Geci]" 
has been over-exaggerated, it must be acknowledged that they were 
seriously at odds over this issue. The accuracy of Sir James Melville's 
claim, that Leicester regarded the project as a plot devised by 'Mester 
Gicill his secret ennemy', is, like much else in his unreliable Memoirs, 
questionable but that Leicester was a most reluctant suitor is one of 
the few incontrovertible facts of this entire episode. 44 There was 
instant doubt as to whether Elizabeth was sincere in offering Mary her 
own favourite who was still mentioned as a likely candidate for her own 
hand in marriage. 4 S 
Further confusion is added by the split between Elizabeth's Scot tish 
policy formulated in London and the recommendations of her resident 
ambassador in Edinburgh, Thomas Randolph. The lot of Randolph - perhaps 
the most convinced supporter of the Leicester marriage - was not an 
easy one. This episode shows that he had only a very limited role in 
the formulation of English foreign policy. It could be argued that his 
consistent opposition to the Lennox restitution was responsible for 
Elizabeth's own change of heart in the mat ter but such an 
interpretation loses weight when the subsequent dispatch of Darnley 
into Scotland is recalled. This was directly against Randolph's advice. 
On hearing of the decision he admitted to Cecil that he was at an utter 
loss, 'howe to frame or fashion thys', confessing 'I knowne not yet what 
to thynke or howe to behave myself'.4 6 
Mary's own at t itude to the offer - which was at best diffident -
adds both to the complexity of the proposal and the element of farce 
inherent in it. In her handling of the Leicester offer, Mary revealed 
that she was at least as adept as Elizabeth in playing the courtship 
game. There were definite shades of Elizabethan prevarication in her 
judicious reaction of March 1564. Randolph's report that 'She hard it 
with patience but deferreth resolution', says a great deal about Mary's 
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prudent handling of the entire affair.4 7 Wisely, she did not reject the 
suit, nor demean herself by appearing over-eager for a man far below 
her royal status. Rather, she sought a water-tight guarantee of her 
reward for compliance with Elizabeth's wishes before commit ting herself 
to a decision. It was the prospect of this reward that explains why, 
despite the difficulties, delay, unwillingness and uncertainty 
surrounding the proposal, Maitland, as the opening quotation of this 
chapter implies, was so desperately enthusiastic for a successful 
outcome to the affair. The Leicester proposal had the potential to 
secure the amity between the two nations. Mary was led to believe that 
by marrying Elizabeth's nominee, her rights to the English succcession 
would be recognised. It was in pursuit of rM this bargain that Maitland 
and Moray devoted their energies until Elizabeth's fateful announcement 
of Mar ch 1565. 4 8 
The prospect of obtaining the recognition of her claim to the 
English succession provides the key to Mary's and Maitland's interest in 
the Leicester proposal but it would be misleading to view their 
attitude to the offer solely in such terms. A detailed analysis of the 
proposal from Maitland's perspective illustrates the shortcomings of 
such a view. Maitland provides fulsome material for the full range of 
theories on the Leicester match, from the 'lending library romance' 
school of thought, through to the various conspiracy theories in the 
light of Darnley's release at a time when negotiations for Leicester 
were at their height. It was noted earlier that Maitland laughed off 
Elizabeth's original suggestion of Dudley.49 Even if that allegation is 
rejected, there is more than enough evidence in Maitland's own 
correspondence to suggest that he was fully aware of the sheer 
ludicrousness of the notion of Elizabeth's horse-groom becoming Mary's 
bridegroom. so However, that Mait land was keenly aware of so many of 
the problems surrounding the match but actively sought to overcome 
them is perhaps an argument for taking the proposal seriously rather 
than lightly. As far as Maitland was concerned, Leicester was as 
feasible as any other suitor Elizabeth would care to name, if it 
resulted in the recognition of Mary's claim to the succession. This was 
why he was happy to be such an enthusiatic supporter, admitting 'that 
he wished it with two of his fingers yea his whole hande'.s 1 Moray. 
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shared this view, well aware that if they could make the succession the 
qUid pro quo of Mary's compliance, their own futures as well as that of 
the amity were secure forever. 
It was to prove a most difficult and ultimately hopeless task. The 
Berwick conference of November 1564 was to reveal how remote a 
sat isfactory conclusion to the proposal was and how wide the gulf 
between Maitland, Moray and Randolph had become. Even at the height of 
Randolph's regard for Mary, his support of her claim to the succession 
was never more than tacit. He was undoubtedly sincere in promoting the 
Leicester marriage but refused to accept the insistence by Maitland and 
Moray of the impossibility of persuading Mary to accept the offer 
without the guarantee of the succession. 5 2 As a result, relations 
between the ambassador and Mary's chief ministers became very strained 
at this time. 
Maitland's own conduct does provide strong evidence for rejecting 
the notion of the Scots as the innocent victims of English intrigue in 
this episode. The image of Mary and Maitland meekly awaiting 
Elizabeth's pleasure in the matter does not square with the evidence. 
Much of it suggests that they were still leading the English a merry 
dance of their own. The policy - so evident in his mission of 1563 - of 
casting around for alternatives to the English alliance seems to have 
continued. This is clear from Maitland's letter to Archbishop Beaton of 
November 1564, written shortly before the Berwick conference took 
place. S 3 It is a powerful reminder that although negotiations for a 
Spanish marriage had lapsed, they were not over. Maitland instructed 
Beaton, 'to enter of yourself in frank communication with the Kyng of 
Spaynes ambassador in that court touching the said Kyng's sonne', 
admitting, that if he failed to revive the project he was at a loss, 
'for we haiff no other thing in hand gif that fail quilk we may ryn 
another course'. His comment, 'I fynd her mynd only applyit to Spaine', 
together with his belief that 'it were tyme her majestie resolved ane 
way or other', adds to the atmosphere of intrigue from a Scot t ish 
perspective. This view is further endorsed by Maitland's reference to 
keeping both the earl of Bedford, who 'lies at Berwick', and the recent 
French envoy, Jean Baptista, in the dark as to the 'knowledge of our 
estate'.s, Mait land was not as honest in the pursuit of the Leicester 
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match as he professed. 
A letter from Throckmorton to Maitland dated 18 January 1565 
further illustrates the complexity of the Leicester proposal and of 
Maitland's attitude to the match. s S This letter suggests that he was a 
party to much of the inner English intriguing in the matter. 
Throckmorton is regarded as a guider of Leicester at this time and the 
two certainly had a similar attitude to Mary. Both were firmly 
Protestant but far more sympathet ic to Mary's claim than Cecil. S 6 In 
this letter, Throckmorton, however, appears to refer to the Leicester 
marriage as a farce: 'Let this suffice you howsoever the lord of 
Leicster's name is used in this farce he is not guilty'. Yet at the same 
time he says how well Mary's cause was progressing. S 7 This suggests 
that, to Throckmorton and Leicester, Mary's claim to the succession was 
not inextricably linked to her marriage with Leicester. Was Maitland 
part of a Leicester conspiracy, to support Mary's claim but not the 
Leicester match, with Darnley as Leicester's proxy? It is quite possible 
that he was. Maitland undoubtedly knew Leicester was an unwilling 
suitor for Mary and it is interesting to recall that in 1562 the 
Spanish ambassador felt Maitland and Leicester were campaigning 
together to have Darnley married to Mary and Leicester to Elizabeth. S 8 
The evidence, however, for depicting Maitland as party to a Leicester 
conspiracy is, like so much else in this episode, inconclusive. 
Maitland's Attitude To The Leicester Marriage Proposal 
It is possible, though, to discern two chief characteristics of 
Maitland's conduct throughout the Leicester proposal. One is his own 
adherence to Mary's service; the other is his preference for the English 
alliance. Randolph was struck by his determined support of Mary's 
interests during the negotiations, 'whatsoever she best liketh that he 
most alloweth'S 9 and he seems to have accurately deduced Maitland's 
tactics. Just prior to the Berwick conference, Randolph wrote to 
Elizabeth stating: 
I doubt not but his will is to press us to the furthest that we 
are able to say and I think not but his desire will be to rather 
to know what will be the ut termost of your majest ies will towards 
his sovereign than that we shall know assuredly what shall be her 
mind or wherunto she will incline60 
Randolph confessed his nervous trepidation at having to deal with 
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Maitland, fearing his 'wisdom to conceive and his wit to convey 
whatsoever his mind is bent unto to bring to pass'.61 He delivered what 
was to become a customary appraisal of Maitland's abilities: 
To meet with such a match your majesty knoweth what wit had been 
fit. How far he excedeth the compass of one or two heads that is 
to guide a queen and govern a whole realm alone your majesty may 
well think how unfit 1 am for my part and how far he is able to 
go beyond me. I would that it were not as I know it to be. 62 1 
Although this evidence suggests that Maitland was primarily serving 
Mary's interests, which involved continuous efforts to find an 
alternative to the English alliance, it is difficult to resist the view 
that an English match was Maitland's chief preference. The Leicester 
proposal occasioned Maitland's most impassioned and reasoned unionism. 
In September 1564 he explained to Cecil, 'I know how necessary England 
is for Scotland and even so Scotland for England. I preferre in my 
opinion the quene of Englandes sure amity to the frendship of any 
foreyn prince'. 63 There was, however, a very significant rider at tached 
to his insistence that: 
I trust my maistress will follow as moche of her frendly advise 
in her marriage and other wayghty affaires as off any frend she 
hath in the worlde besydes and so wold I advise her to do .... 
alwayes provided (which I have many tymes touched in my lettres) 
that respect be had to honour and surety.b4 
As Maitland insisted, this was not a new departure but the continuance 
of the policy he had adopted ever since the return of Mary. His 'honour 
and surety' clause hits at the heart of the dilemma the Leicester 
marriage proposal or indeed any at tempt to provide a husband for Mary 
from Elizabeth caused him. Mait land developed this further when he 
insisted: 
I must see eyther some shewe off contentacion and lyking in 
herselff or els an evident and assured grandeur to herself and 
commodity to her and her countrey to ensew infallibly by the 
mache before I enter into naming off any special person to her 
majesty for otherwise I myght perhaps soone speke that I shold 
not shortly amend and spill more in one half hour than I were 
able to repayre in all my lyfe. b5 
He was not prepared to jeopardise his own career by pursuing a 
demeaning English marriage for Mary yet his anxiety to avoid an 
unnecessary rupturing of the amity was also clear. He was determined 
that the opportunity to secure the amity should not be wasted. It was 
this concern that was behind his repeated at tempts to widen the field 
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of Elizabeth's approved nominees to give Mary a greater degree of 
choice. 
It were curteously and frendly done if the quenes majesty your 
maistres wold have myne for her plesur to forbear the maching 
with one two or thre greate howses whear moste apparent grandeur 
is to let her see evident ly that she shold be no loser by the 
bargayne and to remit the choyse off those few persons that 
remayne behind fit for her majesty to her owne option. 66 
This request was particularly pertinent given Maitland's belief, which 
he arguably maintained up until April 1565, that Mary had not yet 
decided whom to marry. There was certainly no lack of unionist fervour 
in his exhortat ion to Cecil of 1 February 1565, urging him not to pass 
up the opportunity afforded to them as Secretaries of the two realms, 
'to be named as medlars and chefe doars in so godly and honourable a 
werk as is the union off these two nations'. Maitland assured Cecil, 'if 
the mater now in hand . . be brought to pas', posterity would ensure 
their reward. Their reputations would exceed 'any whosoever thay were 
did most vailyeant ly serve Kyng Edward the first in his conquest or 
Kyng Robert the Bruce in the recovery of his countrey'. 67 
The Berwick Conference 
The Berwick conference of November 1564, between Randolph and Bedford 
as Elizabeth's representatives and Maitland and Moray as Mary's, 
revealed the lack of progress that had been made. Maitland put it 
bluntly, 'it is now two years since this advice was demanded, a year 
since my Lord Robert was offered and named to us' and he angrily 
Challenged the English to declare, 'what was there more spoken than was 
a year since'. 6 a The challenge was rhetorical, the answer obvious. Far 
from making progress, the conference revealed the fundamental impasse 
between the Scots' demand for the parliamentary declaration of Mary's 
claim and the English refusal to offer more than the vague assurance 
that, with marriage to Leicester, 'great good would ensew to both the 
realms'.69 
It has been suggested that the stalemate of Berwick should really 
have brought the negotiations to an end. 70 For a while it appeared that 
it had. Its immediate effect was to spark off an explosive clash 
between Cecil, Maitland and Moray with both sides angrily attacking 
what they saw as the other's intransigence. The heated exchange of 
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letters in December 1564 showed the two sides locked in complete 
disagreement. 71 Mait land and Moray reminded Cecil that unlike him, they 
did not have the comfort of their sovereign's sanction for their 
negotiations. They were anxiously aware of their perilous position, 'In 
princes affairs it will not be allowed when they call ministers to 
account to say we ment well' and insisted that 'before we enter in it 
we must forsee the issue lest in the end we should repent to have 
ut tered our selffs without doing good to the cause'. 72 What they 
needed was frank, open and honest dealing and they ridiculed Cecil's 
claim that he had given them just that: 
Now say yow, yow have spoken very playnly and yet in that same 
playn speache ther be many obscure word is and dark sentences and 
pardoun us that we may say so in a manner so many wordis as ther 
be so many ambiguities do result thereof!73 
It was, as ever, the succession that was the stumbling block. While 
refuting Cecil's claim that they had demanded an annual subsidy for 
Mary from Elizabeth, they did not deny that parliamentary recognition 
of Mary's claim to the succession was the guarantee they sought.7'-
Their at tempts to convince Cecil that such a declarat ion was not the 
great difficulty that he and Elizabeth perceived it to be were doomed 
to failure. Arguments that Elizabeth would be gaining far more from 
such a declaration were no more lkely to succeed now than they had 
been in 1561. The argument that 'the declarat ion of a t yt Ie to the 
second place is neyther kingdome nor crowne. Ye! skantlie in potentia 
propinqua to a kingdome',7 S had never really washed with Elizabeth and 
neither did Maitland's conviction that such a declaration was nothing 
more substantial than 'a toy' to 'conciliate these two queens and 
countries by perpetul amity'.7 6 
The Arrival Of Darnley 
This bitter Yuletide correspondence appeared to signal the final 'no-
stop' phase of the amity. Yet a now missing letter of Cecil's to 
Maitland seems to have had a miraculous, restorative effect and in 
January 1565, for the final time, the amity entered a 'yes- go' phase. 
This renewed optimism is evident in Maitland's letter to Cecil of 1 
February, already extensively quoted from, which represents the peak of 
Maitland's confidence of a successful conclusion to the negotiations. 7 7 
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This renewed optimism was to be particularly short-lived. Within two 
weeks Darnley had arrived in Scot land and Mait land's next let ter to 
Cecil, dated 28 February 1565, could not have been in sharper contrast 
to that of four weeks earlier. 73 Gone were the great hopes and 
aspirations for perpetual amity and union. Instead, Maitland 
deliberately forbore from discussing such mat ters, 'not knowing how to 
touch it and avoid offence' and restricted himself to recommending that 
the recently ill Cecil revitalised his love life. Love, according to 
Maitland, who was in the midst of his romance with Mary Fleming, was 
the 'rnoste singular remedy for all diseases in all persones'. While it 
is not hard to imagine Maitland and Mary Fleming 'set upon amery pyn' 
it Is almost impossible to imagine the dour Cecil and his puritan wife 
Mildred, engaging in such frivolity.7 9 
This remarkable letter of Maitland's was a measure of his reaction 
to the unexpected arrival of Darnley in Scotland when he and Moray 
were finally expecting Elizabeth's resolution in the Leicester match. 
They were both taken aback by this development but Maitland appears to 
have been bemused rather than panic-stricken. His light-hearted advice 
to Cecil reflects an air of indifference rather than alarm. There were, 
in any case, grounds for suspect ing that Elizabeth, in sanct 10ning 
Darnley's return, was not unfavourably disposed to the possibility of a 
Darnley-Mary marriage. While Maitland may have felt, as Randolph did, 
that his arrival killed off the Leicester match there is little evidence 
to suggest he feared the amity would necessarily perish with it.80 
Maitland was actually suspected of having long favoured a Darnley 
marriage and of being quite pleased at his arrival. He certainly had 
established friendly relations with both Lennox and Darnley but the 
claim that Darnley spent one of his first nights in Scotland at 
Lethington should be rejected. 8 1 He had been handsomely rewarded by 
both Lennox and Darnley with jewels and seems to have been particularly 
friendly with Lennox, lending him 500 crowns. 8 2 This friendliness was 
imputed by some at the time to 'the love he bears to Mary Fleming' 
although the importance of this connection has been over-emphasised. 83 
Moray was a good deal more alarmed than Maitland and for the first 
time voiced his fears of the possibility of a Darnley match. 8 4 However, 
that at this stage matters were not perceived to be desperate is 
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further shown by the intervention of Maitland and Moray in the 
Elizabethan Vestiarian controversy. In a letter to Cecil and Leicester 
dated 13 March, they voiced concern at the dangerous example 
Elizabeth's insistence on the uniform dress of her clergymen was 
providing: 'quhat sall the multitude and mony ma think of it bot as in 
outward habit thay wear the papists apparell sa in thair hartes thay 
approve of it '. Maitland, with characteristic moderation, toned down his 
concern in a postscript which requested that a degree of liberty of 
conscience was respected in the matter: 'I wisshe men were not to far 
preassed in matters which do anyways prick them in conscience'.8 S 
Within days, Randolph's disclosure of the contents of Elizabeth's letter 
dated 5 March ensured that such concerns paled into insignificance. 86 
The Impact Of Elizabeth's Let ter Of 5 March 
It was this letter, which could not be faulted for its 'plain and open 
speache'. and not Darnley's arrival that killed off any remote chance of 
a Leicester match. In so doing it sounded the death-knell for the amity. 
It can also be held responsible for provoking the Darnley match and the 
accompanying restructuring of the court around Lennox and his son. It 
was after the arrival of this letter and Elizabeth's frank disclosure 
that, as regards Mary's claim to the English succession, 'nothing shall 
be doone unt il hir majesty (Elizabeth) shall be married or shall not ify 
hir determination never to marry'87 that panic began to spread 
throughout the Scottish court and beyond. Moray was 'the sorrow fullest 
man that can be' but Maitland was 'more angry than sad'. He was 
certainly not surprised. His immediate reaction to the letter was to 
tell Randolph: 'that he found it nothing strange for that he knoweth so 
moche of the Queen's majesty nature that she will never resolve in that 
point nor never believed that it was possible to persuade her to it '. 88 
Randolph rightly felt Maitland's claim smacked of 'choler rather than 
judgement';89 Maitland had spent much of the last four years attempting 
to persuade Elizabeth. Maitland's reaction, however, does emphasise that 
at this point, he was still very much Mary's man. His anger was 
directed squarely at Elizabeth's intransigence. His continued high 
favour with Mary was reflected in his immediate commission to deliver 
Mary's response to Elizabeth. It was, however, to be almost three weeks 
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before Maitland left Scotland and as late as 18 April that he finally 
arrived in London. 90 
Maitland's Final Mission 
This was Maitland's last mission to England during Mary's personal 
reign. Like those before, it proved to be an accurate barometer for the 
condition of the amity. This particular mission, however, was to be a 
completely different experience for Maitland. The traditional pattern of 
Mary anxiously awaiting her Secretary's return before actively pursuing 
her policy was shattered. Maitland realized with acute discomfort that 
his diplomatic efforts in London had been outstripped by domestic 
developments back home. He had been supplanted as Mary's chief counsel. 
As historians have declared for generat ions, Mary had become 'her own 
minister'.91 This, in turn, rapidly changed Maitland from her most 
trusted confidant and servant into a highly dangerous but subtle 
opponent. The next part of this chapter will chart the course of that 
transformat ion. 
As ever, it is not possible to be certain as to Maitland's precise 
instructions for his mission. This, as much as any other embassy 
Maitland undertook was shrouded in mystery and intrigue. The fullest 
account of his instructions are to be found in the addenda volume of 
the privy council records. <12 Issued at Stirling, these gave him 
permission to obtain Elizabeth's approval of her marriage to Darnley and 
to attempt once more to gain parliamentary recognition of Mary's claim 
to the succession. Mary's generous commission to Maitland that 
'whatever he may do agree upon and transact with the Queen of England 
she will consider as valid as if it had been done agreed upon and 
transacted by herself' was a measure of her high regard for him. <13 
Randolph believed that if Maitland was able to persuade Elizabeth 'to 
fynde yt goode and to yelde as much with hym as ever she was with any 
other I muste nee des commend hys wyt forever'.9 4 Yet this was only a 
part of his mission. There was much talk of Maitland being sent into 
France and John Beaton had already been dispatched to London to gain a 
safe conduct for the mission. 9 5 This added further fuel to Randolph's 
rumours of 'some great conference between the cardinals of Lorraine and 
Grandveile'96 who greatly desired Maitland's presence. Despite Maitland's 
admission to Randolph that talk of his journey into France was 'only a 
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colour of a voyage into England', it is remarkable that at this late 
stage he was still not being completely honest with Randolph. 9 7 For 
what he did not tell Randolph was that, as well as negotiating for 
Darnley, he was to attempt to clarify the pOSSibility of a marriage 
with Don Carlos for Mary. That was the real reason behind John Beaton's 
journey. Guzman de Silva confirmed this, reporting to Philip II that talk 
of the safe conduct 'was only a pretext for the coming of Lethington 
here to confer with me'.9 8 
It would appear that part of the reason for Maitland's delayed 
departure from Scotland was Mary's desire to await news from Beaton of 
the outcome of his task. The wily De Silva, masking his astonishment 
that negotiations for Don Carlos were still alive, gave Beaton the 
necessary encouragement to ensure Maitland travelled. 99 De Silva's 
letter to Philip dated 26 April showed how remote a marriage between 
Don Carlos and Mary was, given Philip's cont inued preference for the 
Archduke Charles. 1 00 De Silva was not only uninterested in a Mary-Don 
Carlos match but also highly enthusiastic for a Darnley marriage. Like 
many others in April 1565, he was convinced it had already taken place. 
He informed Maitland that Philip regarded Darnley as at least as 
satisfactory a marriage for Mary as the Archduke Charles and he firmly 
but politely made it clear that Mary's marriage to Don Carlos was no 
longer on the agenda. lOI Randolph seems to have been blissfully 
unaware of Maitland's attempt to re-open the Spanish match, which 
Maitland also appears to have successfully kept from English officials 
in London. 1 02 Given Maitland's intermittent pursuit of the Spanish match 
from 1563, it is remarkable that he later gained credit from 
Throckmorton along with Moray for the prevention of a Spanish marriage 
for Mary.1 03 It is difficult to see how any Scot could claim 
responsibility for this, least of all Maitland. However, attention must 
now be concentrated on events shortly before Maitland's departure to 
London. 
Matters were moving quickly. The rise of Lennox and Darnley ever 
higher into Mary's credit caused Randolph to write in both nervous and 
bitter terms to Throckmorton on 31 March. Randolph clearly suspected 
Throckmorton had deliberately promoted Darnley's return so as to 
provoke his marriage with Mary. He warned his colleague, 'for yf you 
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were as innocent as our lord Jesus Chryste yf anye evil comme to me, I 
wyll mayke you partaker'. In what could only be a clear reference to 
Darnley he told him that 'thys darlinge of yours is so dandeled among 
us I fear we shall show our folly'.1 04 Within three days Randolph's 
fears were heightened by Moray's withdrawal from the court to his 
priory of St Andrews which Randolph intriguingly attributed to a 'false 
alarm' from Maitland. 1 0 s It may have been a false alarm but rumours 
were rife. that Moray had fallen into Mary's 'dysfavour' because of his 
opposition to her celebration of a Catholic Easter and his refusal to 
grace 'those ungodlye ceremonies used these two weeks to come' with his 
presence. 1 0 b He had not been so precise in 1563, when Randolph had 
reported that Mary 'at thys tyme of easter hath left not one jote of 
her solemnities unobserved'. 1 07 Moray's waning political influence 
clearly had a direct effect on the level of his religious tolerance. By 
15 April, Randolph informed Cecil that Mary's regard for Darnley was 
already so high 'that she can be content to forsake all other 
offers',1 08 and three days later he reported that 'the godly cry out 
that they are undone'. 1 0 9 
By this time Maitland had arrived in London. Although Randolph had 
admit ted, 'if at any time I have seen him (Mait land) perplexed it has 
been since these matters came to light',110 he was not without 
suspicion of Maitland's loyalty. His comment to Leicester of 20 March, 
'when you have Lethington in your hands use him as you like for I have 
already told him the Tower is too good a place for him', shows this.1 1 1 
Maitland's conduct, particularly his negotiations with De Silva, 
justified Randolph's concern. For the evidence suggests that on this 
last diplomatic foray he was still obediently serving Mary. He sought -
albeit to no avail - to revive her prospects of marriage with Don 
Carlos, to win Elizabeth's approval for the Darnley match, to procure an 
alternative for Mary more acceptable to Elizabeth by enticing Norfolk 
into the fray and actively pursued the anti-Marian succession 
propaganda, gaining possession of John Hales' infamous publication. 1 I 2 
In the same manner he had done for years he reported his progress to 
Mary. He sent her a six-page letter in cipher via Thomas Fowler, a 
servant of Lennox. 1 1 3 From Mary's disappointed reaction it appears that 
he informed her fully of his unsuccessful English and Spanish 
lS6J-1S66 200 
negotiations. 114 Maitland probably expected that, in time-honoured 
fashion, Mary's next move would depend upon his return. 
Elizabeth's opposition to the Darnley match was such that she now 
disowned her frank avowal of 5 March and returned to the policy of 
offering Mary vague assurances of her rights to the English succession. 
Elizabeth was insistent that it was only by marriage to Leicester 'that 
we can be content to yeld herunto and with non els'.1 1 S Throckmorton 
was sent ahead of Maitland, equipped with a determination from the 
English privy council to ensure Mary was left in no doubt of 
Elizabeth's opposition to a Darnley match. llb Maitland, anxious to 
prevent Mary acting decisively in his absence, wrote to Moray urging 
him 'to perswade the Quene to mayke no haste in the matter but keape 
yt in the staye yt was when he lefte yt'.1 1 7 He probably had no idea 
how low Moray's credit had sank since his departure to London. 
Domestic Developments 
Maitland had missed much in his absence. The Catholic Easter at 
Stirling, the religious riot in Edinburgh on Palm Sunday and Bothwell's 
Day of Law had all accentuated the fundamental realignment of political 
allegiances that was taking place in Scotland. ll a Moray, Argyll, 
ChAtelherault and Glencairn were consistently on the wrong side of Mary 
in all these events which tended to highlight the rise of the Catholic 
trio of Lennox, Darnley and Athol in Mary's favour. Although absent, 
Randolph held Maitland responsible for the continued allegiance of 
Morton and Ruthven to Mary; the latter being now regarded as 
'Lethington's chief friend',1l9 In a sense, Maitland's letter to Mary, 
which arrived on 30 April appears to have acted unwittingly as a last 
straw. l 20 It achieved everything Maitland hoped it would not. It 
stiffened Mary's defiant resolve to choose her own husband and 
establish a new power base to support a new, vibrant policy in exchange 
for the stagnant and moribund amity of the past four years. 
Ignorant of the developments that had happened in his absence it 
was a concerned but not desperate Maitland who began his journey back 
to Scotland on 7 May. By the time he had reached Newark on 8 May, a 
watershed had been reached in his relationship with Mary. He was met 
by John Beaton, whom Mary had sent with new instructions for 
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Maitland. 1 21 From these Mait land was able to deduce the full extent of 
developments in his short absence from the court. Not only did he 
discover how lit t le credit Moray now had with Mary but also how much 
his own position had been radically altered. He was completely stunned 
by Beaton's message, which, judging by his hysterical reaction was 
highly unexpected. Mary had ordered Maitland to return to London and 
announce her decision to marry Darnley, regardless of Elizabeth's 
objections and to pass into France to announce the news there. She also 
sent him a bill of credit authorising the receivers of her dowry to 
disburse whatever sums he needed and 'to spare no cost '122. Maitland's 
shock at Mary's determination after being, 'so longe trayned with fayre 
speche and in the ende begyled of her expectacion she dyd mynd with 
the advyce of the estates of her owne realme to use hyr owne choyse in 
marryage'1 23 supports the view, that on his arrival in London on 18 
April, Mary's marital destiny was not yet certain. 
Maitland deliberately disobeyed his new orders and made haste back 
to Scotland. It was not the behaviour Mary expected and it was not 
what Randolph expected either. The English ambassador professed himself 
pleasantly surprised by Maitland's response, which in every sense was 
the antithesis of his entire conduct, correspondence and policy since 
August 1561. 124 
Maitland's Volte-Face 
Mary went to great lengths to assure Maitland that it was the amity -
or more precisely, the attempts to achieve the recognition of her claim 
to the succession by respecting Elizabeth's wishes in her marriage -
that had been ditched and not him. Throckmorton, whom Maitland had 
caught up with at Alnwick, testified to this, informing Cecil that 
together with his instructions Mary had sent Maitland, 'the mooste 
favorable and gentle lettre with her owne hande that ever quene did 
wryte to her servaunte not leavynge behynde large promysses enowe of 
hys benefyte and greatness in tyme to come'.1 25 Despite the sweeteners, 
Maitland remained defiant. Throckmorton reported that he had never seen 
Maitland 'in so great perplexity, nor passion and would have little 
believed that for any matter he could have been so moved',1 2 II and even 
he was taken aback by Maitland's wish that he (Throckmorton) 'had 
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commissyon to threatten thys quene (Mary) with denuncyacion of warre 
... as the last refuge to staye her from this unadvysed acte ' .1 2 7 This 
desire for English military intervention hardly squared with Maitland's 
earlier advice to Mary regarding her marriage, that she should 'seme to 
requyre the Q of England's counsall and advyse in it albeit ye will not 
stand to hir resolution' and that her 'owne contentment' was the prime 
consideration in the matter.1 28 Mary was now carrying out that advice 
to the letter but Maitland had performed a complete volte-face. Why, 
when he had unquestionable proof of his suspicions of England's 
insincere dealing with Mary and he had the opportunity to fulfil his 
threats of following an alternative policy, did Maitland buckle? 
Many commentators have taken this to be proof that Maitland was 
driven all along by an over-riding unionist desire which transcended 
any notion of personal loyalty to Mary.1 29 Such a view is not out of 
step with Maitland's oft-repeated professions of commitment to that 
goal but does not in itself fully convince. The inadequacy of the notion 
of Mait land as, above all else, a unionist anglophile has been one of 
the central arguments of this thesis. The flaws of such a view are 
clearly exposed when his role in the civil war years are examined and 
it is hoped that the chapters relating to Maitland's career from 1561 
to 1565 have a similar effect. It is certainly tenable to argue that 
Maitland's earlier diplomatic activities on Mary's behalf may have been 
nothing more than a feint, to exert pressure on Elizabeth. Maitland 
knew that if the threat of an alternative amity was to be effective, it 
had to appear that he was completely prepared to countenance a foreign 
marriage for Mary. To borrow the parlance of the nuclear deterrence 
debate, he had to make Elizabeth believe that he really was ready to go 
into his bunker and press the button. 1 30 Yet is it possible to be 
certain that Maitland was bluffing? 
The possibility that prior to May 1565 he had an open mind on Mary's 
marriage and that a fundamental change in his attitude occured must be 
acknowledged. A dogmatic, unionist view of Maitland presumes that he 
was confident that his efforts to find an overseas husband for Mary 
would fail or that he could ensure their failure. This was not, even at 
the height of his credit with Mary within Maitland's power. The Spanish 
match, for example, failed because of Phillip's unwillingness and 
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Maitland's letter to Archbishop Beaton of November 1564 shows that he 
was aware of this basic fact.l 3 1 Even if the possibility that Maitland 
genuinely pursued a Spanish match is discounted, it is hard to reject 
the view that, prior to May 1565, he had an open mind on the prospect 
of a Darnley marriage. It is perhaps futile to speculate as to what 
Maitland's counsel to Mary would have been if, en route, he had not 
been so disturbed by her shift in pOlicy but it is possible that he may 
have recommended a Darnley match. He had earlier been suspected 
offavouring Darnley and his recent interviews with De Silva showed that 
he was aware of the diminishing number of candidates available to 
Mary.1 32 However, his support of a Darnley marriage while he continued 
to hold the reins of power, was a completely different scenario fromthe 
one with which he had just been presented. 
Undoubtedly his concern for the amity had a good deal to do with 
his subsequent change of heart but another important factor must be 
taken into consideration. This is his outrage at his loss of personal 
control over the direction of Mary's policy. It had been alleged by an 
English report of Febuary 1565 that part of the reason for Mait land 
and Moray's original support of Lennox, who 'in their hearts haith 
mislyked Levenax other tymes' was an attempt to 'continew there rule in 
that realme'.l 33 If this had been their tactic, it badly misfired. By May 
1565, it was obvious that Lennox and Darnley presented the clearest 
threat to their power, the amity, and, according to Moray, the religion 
as well. 1 34 Despite Mary's assurances, it was clear to Maitland that his 
position had been radically altered. He had previously lamented that he 
was Mary's chief and sole adviser but he lamented even more his 
exclusion from the decision-making process at the time of her most 
significant policy change since her arrival in Scotland. 1 3 S Mary had 
presented Maitland with a fait accompli and the Darnley marriage, 
without himself firmly in control of the direction of her policy, was 
nothing short of a personal catastrophe for Maitland. 
One further observation of Maitland's reaction to Mary's orders is 
that, not only was it out of step with his earlier policy but also with 
his subsequent conduct. The logical progression of Maitland's desire to 
see Elizabeth declare war on Mary, would be to find him amongst the 
ranks of the Chaseabout rebels. Yet Maitland was one of the many 
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significant absentees from the rebellion, a feature that was indicative 
of Moray's failure to recreate the political coalition of 1560.136 
Maitland's outburst to Throckmorton was made very much in the heat of 
the moment. His actual conduct in the face of Mary's determination to 
marry Darnley was altogether more characterist ic. His rage subsided and, 
acting on his strong self-preservatory instincts, in the way he had 
deceived Mary of Guise and later Moray himself. he accommodated himself 
to Mary's new regime, operating as an enemy from within. It was 
typically devious, insidious, behaviour from the Secretary: playing his 
usual, cautious game and waiting for the opportune moment to strike. 
Maitland finally reached Edinburgh on 13 May and received further 
orders from Mary to prevent Throckmorton reaching the court in 
Stirling. Once more he disobeyed. He left Throckmorton to his own 
devices and made haste to Stirling.1 3 1 No record of his reception from 
Mary survives but it must have been an intriguing encounter. Maitland 
had a lot of explaining to do and he seems to have done it well enough. 
Despite his patent disobedience. he was not dismissed. It is hardly to 
be thought that he expressed the same enthusiasm for an English 
declaration of war to Mary as he had done to Throckmorton. There is 
little evidence, however, to suggest that Mary was completely convinced 
by his performance. Her decision to allow him to cont inue as Secretary 
was at least as calculated as his decision not to join Moray's 
rebellion. Just as it is difficult to resist Randolph's belief that 
Maitland, in remaining within the Marian regime together with Morton 
and Ruthven, did 'only espy their tymes and mayke fayr wether untyll yt 
come to the pinche', 1 38 it is equally hard to resist the view that Mary 
was also exploiting Maitland. During the Chaseabout affair. Mary was 
able to disguise her true feelings at least as well as Maitland was 
able to control his undoubted sympathy for the rebels. 
Mary's awareness of the political restraints she was working under 
is clear from William Chisholm'S mission to the Pope in the summer of 
June 1565. 139 Chisholm informed Pius IV of Mary's desire to be rid of 
her heretic. Secretary Maitland but her inability to do so because of 
the political backlash such a move would provoke. 1 4 0 Maitland's 
cont inuance as Secretary in 1565 was a marriage of convenience from 
the point of view of both parties. Both were aware of the dangers of 
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outright opposition to each other. Maitland feared ruin, Mary a more 
serious rebellion. For that reason, while Maitland's credit was greatly 
reduced, he was not removed from office. Instead of a provocative 
dismissal, Mary contented herself with a subtle but effective pruning 
of Maitland's powers. In an alert pre-emptive strike, which reduced his 
capacity to use the Secretariat to weaken her position, foreign policy, 
for the past four years his jealously guarded preserve was taken out 
of his hands. 1 • 1 It was a prudent move which was hardly surprising in 
view of his recent performance in England. Mary, however, took 
advantage of Maitland's services when it suited her to do so. He 
remained a consistent attender of her privy council and it was 
apparently on his advice that the proposed convention in Perth on 10 
June was delayed to clash with the forthcoming General Assembly; Also 
significant was Mary's use of his credit with both Argyll and Athol in 
July 1565 to prevent an immediate outbreak of hostilities in 
Perthshire.1 42 
Lennox Ascendancy And Chaseabout 
By the time Maitland had reached Stirling in May, he no doubt realised 
how futile protests were. The court was in readiness for the elevation 
of Darnley to the earldom of Ross, his oath of allegiance to Mary and 
also for the creation of fourteen knights, selected by Lennox. 1 4 3 The 
new Lennox ascendancy and the restructuring of the court away from 
Moray was being confirmed in magnificent fashion. The significance of 
the ceremonials would not have been lost on anyone, least of all Moray. 
Just three years earlier his own pre-eminence had been confirmed by a 
similar multiple decoration of honour on himself and many of his 
clients. 1 4 4 It was yet another illustration of Mary's consistent use of 
chivalric honour and ceremony to provide visual reminders of the 
splendour and power of her royal court and per se of herself. Eighteen 
months later at the same Stirling venue, the renaissance bapt ismal 
triumph of her son was to offer the culminat ion of Mary's grasp of a 
court as, 'a magical combination of power, visual splendour, outward 
deference and a personal household staffed by members of the elite'.l 4 S 
In 1566 it is possible to argue that Mary had grasped the significance 
of that final ingredient, for both the Chase about rebellion and the 
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conspiracy of March 1566 fed Of} allegat ions that the Queen gave too 
much favour to men of 'base degrie' rather than to the elite of 'auld 
blood'.1 46 
Moray realised that the wheel had turned full circle against him and 
was not slow in reacting. He had already refused to sign the marriage 
bond of Mary and Darnley. insisting on guarantees for the establishment 
of the religion and, after attending the privy council for the last time 
on 19 May, he again left the court without giving his consent. 147 From 
that date, Randolph tells us 'Murray lyethe where he lyste' and that 
Maitland, too, had 'leave and leisure to court his mistress',1 48 The two 
erstwhile colleagues were to make very different use of their new 
found leisure time. 
Precise information as to the progress of events from the Stirling 
celebrat ions up to the marriage in late July and the p ... ~t.ing of Moray 
and his associates to the horn in August is scarce. Many of the usual 
sources of information dry up at this time. The records of the privy 
council do not yield up a great deal, Randolph's reports become so 
partisan as to be somewhat unreliable whilst Knox's History must 
necessarily be treated with its usual caution. Yet for all the confusion 
surrounding delayed conventions and of rumours - of Mary's marriage 
having been completed already, of conspiracies of Moray to kidnap Mary 
and Darnley, of Mary to take the life of Moray, of the restoration of 
Catholicism and of foreign intervent ion once more in Scot t ish affairs -
the basic outline is clear. 149 
By May 1565, Mary's determination to marry Darnley had provoked a 
distinct party of opposition centred ~ Moray, Chatelherault and 
Argyll. In March 1565, in anticipation of the Darnley marriage those 
earls had pledged their mutual support for each other.l so In their 
attempts to widen the basis of their support, however, they were 
consistently thwarted by Mary. They did gain the support of Boyd, the 
seemingly inseparable partner of Argyll, together with the staunchly 
Protestant Glencairn and Ochiltree and a smattering of Protestant 
lairds, but it is difficult to regard the Chaseabout raid as anything 
other than a stunning Marian success. 1SI It does not sit very 
comfortably with the image of the inept Queen but, in the context of 
post-Bayonne Europe, Mary's transformation of a major coup against 
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herself and her government into an impressive victory, tends not to 
emphasise the perilous position of herself but of her English cousin. 
Even Moray's most ardent admirers have admitted that on this 
occasion, he was completely 'out generaled' by his half- sister.1 52 Mary 
swiftly re-gained control of the godly ground that Moray at tempted to 
pitch his protest on, trumping his cry of 'religion in danger' through a 
series of effective measures. In August 1565 she re-issued her original 
proclamat ion of 1561, in July and September she gave fresh assurances 
that none of her subjects, Catholic or Protestant, would be 'molestit in 
the quiet using of thair religioun and conscience' and even declared 
herself ready to entertain scriptural debate and Protestant 
preaching. 1 53 Mary also made the most of her greatest natural 
advantage: her automatic possession of the moral high ground by virtue 
of her position as the divinely, sanctioned monarch. Just as Mary of 
Guise had done in 1559-60, Mary vigorously attacked the rebels' 
intentions, 'for quhat uther is this but to dissolve the haill policie 
and in a manner to invert the verie ordor of nature to mak the prince 
obeyand and the subjects to command'.1 s. She warned her subjects 'not 
to be deceaved undir pretence of religion to follow them' whose real 
intention was to 'be king is thameselfis'.1 55 In August, after two 
notable Edinburgh Protestants, John Johnstone and James Nicholson had 
been caught red-handed passing on English money from Randolph to 
Moray, Mary was even able to pose as the patriot Queen, legitimately 
defending Scotland's sovereign .ty against rebels in the pay of the auld 
enemy.l 56 
Mary's timely distribution of honours during 1565 showed that she 
was astutely aware that the distinction between skilful management of 
royal patronage and bribery was essentially semantic. Her detachment of 
potentially key supporters from Moray through this avenue was 
particularly impressive. Moray's long-time ally, Lindsay of the Byres, 
'shamfullye lefte him', swayed by Mary's continued support for him 
against Rothes over the sher 'ijfdom of Fife and was appointed one of 
Mary's lieutenants. 1 S 7 Even more significant was the conclusion of the 
deal between Lennox and Morton concerning the former's claims to the 
earldom of Angus, which ensured that Moray was bereft of the 
overwhelming support of the Douglases; only three Douglas lairds rallied 
IS6J-1S66 208 
to Moray's cause in 1565. 1 S 8 The creation of Lennox's fourteen knights, 
the peerages for Home, Fleming and Erskine and the rehabilitation of 
Huntly and Bothwell, cut across sectarian lines and emphasised the non-
partisan support Mary had enjoyed since her return to Scotland. 1s9 This 
played a crucial part in her successful reduction of the volume of the 
Protestant cries made by the rebels. 
Moray and his supporters, denied the political and spiritual high 
ground of the debate and depicted as greedy, unpatriotic rebels, were 
left with only a bitter resentment of Lennox to hold their rebellion 
together. Whilst the force of this motive should not be lightly 
underestimated - it must have been of some weight to reconcile Moray 
and ChAtelherault after their steady drift apart since 1561 -it was 
insufficient in the face of Mary's superior arguments and force to 
threaten success. That Moray's rebellion was reduced to an essentially 
anti-Lennox demonstration is reflected in the fact that the Hamiltons 
provided the backbone of the rebellion. This other half of Scotland's 
'old firm' provided some 300 men including thirty-seven Hamilton lairds, 
a contribution far beyond that of any other single interest group.160 
Indicative of the unhappy progress of the Chaseabout rebellion was 
its failure, reminiscent of the Congregation's failure in 1559 to arouse 
the support of the capital in their cause. By no stretch of the 
imagination could Moray's rebellion be said to have much to do with the 
privileges of the burgh. As a result, the burgh, never a hot-bed of 
radicalism, had little to do with it. 161 The contrast between 
Edinburgh's determined and successful resistance of the at tempt to 
depose Knox as their minister in August 1565 and the fiasco of the 
attempted muster on Salisbury Crags, together with the cold reception 
the lords received when they entered Edinburgh in late August 1565, 
illustrates the narrow, conservative concerns of the majority of the 
burgh's inhabitants. 1 to 2 The at tempt to depose Knox was a direct threat 
to the established and bitterly cherished burgh privileges, Mary's 
marriage to Darnley was not. Ironically, the at tempt by a minority of 
Protestant activists in the capital to ape the Chaseabout coup actually 
helped Mary exert more control over the burgh. On 25 August, the local 
Catholic laird, Simon Preston of Craigmillar was 'electit and chosin 
provest of Edinburgh' in place of the Protestant Archibald Douglas, 
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paving the way for even more decisive intervention in the next round of 
burgh elections. 1 6 3 
By the time Moray had been put to the horn in August, it was 
obvious that his only chance of success was the speedy arrival of 
substant ial English aid. It was not forthcoming. In another parallel to 
1560, what little aid that was sent was intercepted. Elizabeth, hemmed 
in by international considerations, concluded a miserable chapter in her 
handling of Scottish affairs by abandoning the rebels to their fate. She 
did provide a safe haven for the exiled lords but this does not 
disguise what has been termed the 'paralysis' of English policy in 
Scotland. 1 64 Bedford said it all when he admitted that, out of fear of 
France and Spain, England w~ 'neither permitted to fight nor 
conciliate'. 1 6 S Elizabeth's handling of the Chaseabout crisis can be 
regarded as the consummation of her inability to manage Anglo-Scottish 
relations successfully. Far more important than the blow to her 
prestige north of the border which her impolicy caused, was the loss of 
her most tactically significant supporter, Argyll. This was possibly the 
greatest political own goal Elizabeth ever scored. The gravity of 
Argyll's defection back into Mary's service was to be a two-fold blow 
for Elizabeth, reducing not only her party in Scotland but also greatly 
strengthening the rebellious Shane O'Neill's hand in Ulster.1 66 
What of Maitland's conduct during these months? Playing his 
characteristically devious game, he survived the Chaseabout affair along 
with the vast majority of Mary's administration, with his position 
intact. Wishart of Pit arrow, Moray's loyal henchman, was the only 
casualtYi he was replaced as Comptroller by Murray of Tullibardine, one 
of Lennox's fourteen knights. From May to October 1565, Maitland was a 
consistent member of the very mobile privy council which exerted 
'chasing' pressure on the rebel lords. The only breach in Maitland's 
record of attendance in the council was in its two meetings in Glasgow 
on 5 and 6 September. Previous to that, he had attended in Perth in 
Junei had followed the council back to Edinburgh in JulYi at tended its 
meetings there throughout Augusti caught up with it in September after 
it had moved from Glasgow to St Andrews; followed it back through 
Dundee to Edinburgh before the journey westward to Dumfries and the 
victorious return to Edinburgh in October.167 A good insight into 
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Maitland's attitude after his realization that the Darnley marriage was 
inevitable is given by a letter of his to Cecil dated 12 June. In this, 
he espoused the most practical opinion on the future of Anglo-Scottish 
relations by simply arguing, 'howsoever the princes matters fall out .... 
the best off every thing must be made'.1 b 8 Maitland was keen to limit 
the damage caused by the forthcoming marriage, a view that was shared 
by the Howard faction on the English privy council which favoured a 
rapprochement with Mary.1 69 Maitland's own efforts to this end, however, 
were not helped by the reduction of his influence over the management 
of foreign affairs. 
Yet if Maitland's influence had been reduced he was not totally 
bereft of means of intriguing with England. In this respect Mary's 
choice of John Hay, her Master of Requests and Commendator of 
Balmerino, as her ambassador to London was perhaps not as safe as she 
thought. Hay, a close friend of Moray's, was described by Randolph in 
June 1565 as 'godly, learned and wise' and as no more a favourer of the 
Darnley marriage than Mait land. 1 70 Hay did not join Moray's rebellion 
but like so many who supported Mary in 1565 later opposed her, earning 
the stinging denunciation as, 'a dowbill flattering tray tour ... quhome 
we promoveit fra ane puir simple clerk to ane abot and pryor'.l 71 The 
selection of Archibald Graham, the unfortunate Edinburgh merchant 
engaged in prolonged litigation in England as Hay's guide through what 
would be unfamiliar country for him, ensured Maitland was kept well 
informed of the developing English reaction to Scottish affairs. Graham, 
a client of Maitland's and fellow conspirator in March 1566, probably 
helped confirm Maitland's decision to remain within Mary's 
administration 'espying his moment'.1 72 The distinct lack of English 
assistance was surely the most decisive factor influencing Maitland's 
allegiance. As late as 4 October, just before the final dispersal of the 
rebels in Dumfries, Randolph reported that Maitland was 'ready to 
respond to the first call of English intervention'.1 73 There is little 
reason to doubt Randolph's claim, but it would have needed to have been 
a more reliable call than that of August, when John Johnstone -another 
of Maitland's clients, whom he had appointed as clerk to the privy 
council was caught handling the little English aid that was 
forthcoming. Maitland prudently distanced himself from such 
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activities.1 74 
October 1565 -March 1566 
Mary's rout of her rebels into exile in October 1565 represented a 
complete victory for her. Yet within five months, she was faced with a 
more serious threat to her government. Many who had refused Moray's 
call of 1565 act ively opposed Mary in March 1566. The obvious quest ion 
is why? Is this a case of Mary winning the war but losing the peace? 
The answer to this is not at all straightforward as a cursory glance at 
the composition of the March conspiracy reveals. This remarkable 
alliance of 'chasers' and 'chased' of the recent rebellion should caution 
against accept ing any simplist ic explanat ions of this coup. For this 
reason, the temptation to explain away the events of March 1566 solely 
in terms of a Protestant backlash against Mary's stridently Catholic 
policy should be resisted. After all, Darnley and Lennox had been 
amongst those to respond positively to Mary's invitation to the Mass at 
Candlemas in 1566. 1 7 S It is also striking that the two main apologies 
for the conspiracy Ruthven's well known account and Maitland's 
lesser-known justification make no mention of religious 
grievances. 1 76 It would, however, be wrong to argue that Protestant 
dissatisfaction had nothing to do with the March coup. Actions in this 
case may well have spoken louder than words. Rather, it is more in 
keeping with the evidence to argue that Protestant discontent was a 
potent element in the classic fusion of political, personal and 
religious grievances that rendered the conspiracy of March 1566 the 
most serious threat Mary had faced in her personal reign. 
What had Mary done to provoke such a dangerous coalescence? In 
October, having crushed Moray's rebellion, it seemed that she was about 
to lead Scotland into a new era of political stability but all was not 
what it seemed. Pyrrhic Mary's victory was not, but ironic it 
undoubtedly was. By the time that she had defeated the rebellion, 
provoked to a large extent by her choice of husband, she herself had 
come to doubt the wisdom of that marriage. She was to discover to her 
cost that the collapse of her marriage was to prove just as politically 
explosive as its inception. The political fall-out produced by the 
steady disintegration of the royal marriage, exacerbated what was 
already a volat ile and fluid political climate in Scot land. For in 1565-
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6, the Scottish political agenda, in common with that of post-Bayonne 
Europe was been redrawn. The new Franco-Spanish entente which had been 
agreed at Bayonne in July 1565 and their expressions of determination 
not to compromise with heresy, created panic amongst Protestant Europe. 
It is not surprising that so much has been written of a decisive change 
in Mary's policy at this period. The time was not only ripe for changej 
it demanded Change. The Chaseabout raid had helped fill the void left 
by the collapse of the amity. It presented Mary with an immediate 
threat that had to be met and seemed to offer the clear alternative of 
a new prosperity under Mary and Henry.1 77 That challenge had been met 
but the decline of the royal marriage impeded the prospects for a new, 
independent monarchy as a permanent alternative to the amity. Indeed, 
perhaps the most clear aspect of Mary's post-Chaseabout policy was the 
decisive change in her attitude towards her in-laws. 
The Lennox family fortunes had suffered a head-long plunge since 
the heady wedding triumph of July. In October, Randolph gave the first 
of many reports of a marriage, which was firmly on the rocks long 
before February 1566, when he reported that Mary 'hateth him and his 
whole kin'.! 78 Her preference of Bothwell over her father-in-law as 
lieutenant-general of the Marches in October 1565 provoked the first of 
many 'jarres' between the royal couple. 1 7 9 It was symptomatic of the 
thwarted ambitions of Lennox in the months ahead, during which the 
biggest grievance was Mary's refusal to grant Darnley the Crown 
Matrimonial. Long before his investiture in the order of St Michel, when 
Mary publicly denied her husband the use of the royal arms, her 
determination to 'gyve him only his due' was evident.! 80 The 
simultaneous softening of Mary's anger against their old dynastiC 
rivals, the Hamiltons, put the seal on the declining fortunes of Lennox. 
In December 1565, even though Chatelherault's pardon was accompanied 
with a five-year exile, that his brother the Archbishop, 'was well made 
of', ensured the Hamilton family firm was once more a force in Scottish 
politics. 181 
If the opposition of Lennox and Darnley to Mary in March 1566 is 
not difficult to appreciate, it is not, like so much else in this 
conspiracy clear-cut. As mentioned earlier, both had been conspiCUOUS 
in their support of Mary's Catholic risorgimento and Darnley's Catholic 
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fervour was reportedly greater than Mary's.1 82 However, from the number 
of folk ready, as in 1565..1 to jump on a Lennox bandwagon and manipulate 
it for their own ends, it is clear that the Lennox family were not the 
only casualties of Mary's post-Chaseabout policy. In fact the 
composition of the March conspiracy helps to identify the winners and 
losers of Mary's policy, which in turn, helps to depict more precisely 
Mary's strategy at this time. 
The involvement of some twenty-one disaffected Edinburgh burgesses, 
amongst whose ranks were the core of the Edinburgh Protestant party, 
of whom only one was currently on the town council, certainly bears 
testament to this. It illustrates the progress Mary had made in 
establishing 'a moderate and non-part isan administrat ion I in 
Edinburgh. 1 83 If the losers in local politics were much in evidence, so 
too were the losers in central government. They, though, cannot be 
distinguished by any loss of office. For one of the most striking 
aspects of the conspiracy is the number of Mary's office-bearers whose 
active participation can be proved. Her Chancellor, Secretary, Justice-
Clerk, and Clerk-Register were all clearly involved with the plot, whilst 
her Comptroller and Advocate found it necessary to take a discreet 
leave of absence in the aftermath of the COUp.18. This stunning vote of 
no-confidence from a sizeable section of her own administration draws 
attention to the major issue of Mary's methods of government at this 
time. It suggests there may well have been much truth in Ruthven's 
accusation that, while the structures of government remained intact, 
power was exercised elsewhere, 'by yourself (Mary) and your privy 
persons'.1 8 S Ruthven's claim adds an extra dimension to the dramatic 
shift within Mary's council which took place during 1565-6 and suggests 
that what happened in the council chamber was perhaps not as 
significant as what happened outside it. 
Mary's Methods Of Go vernm en t 
Dr Goodayre has pointed to a certain retreat into the household by Mary 
during this period but has also argued that the council remained 
important: hence the trouble Mary took to appoint new councillors such 
as Tullibardine, a Lennox knight, Craigmillar the Provost of Edinburgh, 
Balfour of Pittendriech, John Lesley the newly appointed Bishop of Ross, 
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Alexander Gordon the reforming Bishop of Galloway, and Maxwell of 
Terregles. 1 a 6 These selections stirred a good deal of criticism from 
both the Chaseabout rebels and the conspirators of March 1566, with 
howls of self-righteous indignat ion from an offended 'ancient' 
nObility. 1 87 It is interesting to note that in the aftermath of the 
March conspiracy, Mary continued to develop this pattern of 
appointments, as the sUbsequent prominence of David Chalmers of Ormond 
shows. 1 88 This suggests that this issue was not the real bone of 
contention. That Tullibardine, one of Mary's recent appointees, appears 
to have acquiesced in the March conspiracy further strengthens this 
view. 
How outlandish were these appointments? There was certainly no lack 
of precedent for ecclesiatical dignitaries holding office but her 
selection of lairds was more controversial. Men of their standing were 
usually appointed to specific offices, rather than accepted as 
councillors and, in this sense, Tullibardine's appointment as Comptroller 
and Balfour's later appointment as Clerk-Register were hardly 
departures from the norm. As for the appointments of Craigmillar and 
Maxwell, there is some mileage in viewing this as further evidence of 
the continuing rise of the middling sort in Scottish society. At any 
rate, it is difficult to see how Maitland, closely related by marriage 
to Craigmillar and his close friend, could raise hackles at the 
preferment of men of his own social class.1 89 In contrast to the 
conspiracy's clear failure to arrest Mary's appointment of privy 
councillors from the ranks of the middling sort, it is difficult to 
detect the effect it had on Mary's government through the household. It 
is easier to agree with Dr Goodayre's assertion that there were 'no 
more low born favourites' than it is with his claim that there was 'no 
more government through the household'.1 90 Mary's appointment of David 
Riccio's brother, Joseph, as his successor, ten days after the murder 
smacks of a most defiant snoot been cocked at the conspirators, 
suggesting that government through the household was not entirely 
extinguished by the events of 9 March. 1 91 Exactitude in this matter is, 
however, hindered by a lack of evidence and the difficulty in assessing 
the extent to which Mary had relied on her household prior to 1565-6 
denies the issue a proper perspective. 
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The major difference at this time may have been, as Ruthven argued, 
in the change of her 'privy persons'. Maitland was no longer one of this 
number. The most familiarly cited, offending names are tho,s\! of Riccio, 
Danelourt, De Busso, the master of Mary's household, and Lennox's 
servant, Thomas Fowler, although Balfour, another frequently mentioned 
name, was one of the council. 1 92 Yet it is difficult to believe that 
power was suddenly and excluSively vested in these household officials. 
The strongest argument against accepting such a view is that, in March 
1566, Mary was able to hold on to the vast majority of her support 
amongst the nobility. The support of Bothwell, Huntly, Fleming, Athol, 
Mar, Crawford, Cassillis, Marischal and Caithness weakens the view that 
the traditional role of nobility was at stake and shows that her 'privy 
persons' did not exclude the nobility.193 Huntly and Bothwell in 
part icular seem to have presented a powerful alliance at this time, 
especially after the marriage of Bothwell to Huntly's sister in February 
1566. 194 
The Conspirator's Motives 
This strong support for Mary amongst her nobility exposes the 
conspirators' conservative appeals for a defence of the commonweal and 
the quiet of the realm as a desperate attempt to obtain the credibility 
and respectability which their real (less honourable) motives did not 
allow. 1 9 S This desire to create a dignified front of respectablity also 
helps to explain why the murder of David Riccio provided the focus for 
the coup. Historians have moved towards a far more rational appraisal 
of Riccio, away from the notion of him as Mary's paramour and a secret 
papal agent towards the political scapegoat he undoubtedly was. Riccio's 
exact influence over Mary, is, despite the reports of 'Davie ruling all', 
difficult to quantify.1 96 There is no hard evidence to support the 
claim that Riccio was to replace Morton as Chancellor at the 
forthcoming parliament but in any case the question of his pre-eminence 
is something of a red herring. 1 97 The real issue at stake in this coup 
d'etat was not the extent of Riccio's influence but the conspirators own 
declining influence. In what was a largely conservative society, Riccio 
provided the desperate and disaffected men with the perfect symbol of 
their exclusion from the corridors of power. He could be ident ified -
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and subsequently was by both Maitland and Ruthven - as a legitimate 
target, an enemy of the commonweal. 1 98 
Maitland's own apology for the events of 9 March, a circular 
addressed to the nobility, written after the conspiracy had failed and 
he, like so many others was on the run, made much of this.1 99 It is a 
classic example of radical action being justified by appeals to 
traditional, conservative values. Maitland emphasised, in the very best 
traditions of so many sixteenth-century rebellions, that they were loyal 
subjects, meaning 'no 
majest ies' but merely 
wise to subtract their obedience form their 
defending the comonweal, by restoring the 
management of affairs out of the hands of strangers into the 
traditional custody of the nobility.2 0 0 It was the same tactic he had 
used on the Congregation's behalf in 1560 and represents a heavily 
censored version of the conspirators motives. 20 1 Sir James Melville was 
a good deal nearer to the mark when he described them as being 
concerned not with religion, nor with the defence of the realm, the 
exiled lords or with Lennox's ambitions but their own 'particulaires'.2 0 2 
Maitland was definitely not a beneficiary of Mary's post-Chaseabout 
policy. His credit with Mary appears to have sunk to an all-time low 
and, together with Morton and Ruthven he was a ringleader of the plot 
on Scot t ish soil. Morton's influence, despite his cont inuance as 
Chancellor was clearly on the wane. The strategically significant 
stronghold of Tantallon was delivered up to Athol in October 1565, 
much to his chagrin and that of Maitland, Bellenden, and Ruthven, all 
fellow-conspirators. 2 0 3 This heightened his fears of further losses 
with Mary's twenty-fifth birthday looming and the pOSSibility of a 
widescale reversion of lands granted during her minority. Ruthven was a 
slightly different case. He had been an early supporter of Lennox and 
an uncle of his was one of Lennox's knights, but further hopes of 
preferment seem to have sunk with Lennox's own decline. Ruthven's 
decision of 1565 not to support Moray's rebellion was not a difficult 
one, having been at odds with him ever since the early days of 1560. 
However, the reward Ruthven wanted for his loyalty, the office of 
Treasurer, was not forthcoming and he, along with his close friend 
Maitland seems to have been smouldering with discontent from October 
1565. 204 
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In November 1565, Randolph reported that Maitland and Morton could 
not rid themselves of the suspicion held by Mary 'that their counsels 
and deviss have byne with the other howe conning lye soever they have 
convoide matters and withdrawne themselves to leave others in the 
bryars'.2o S This suspicion perhaps explains the failure of their 
repeated attempts in the privy council to persuade Mary to extend the 
benevolence she was displaying towards the Hamiltons and Argyll 
towards Moray and Grange. 206 That Elizabeth also failed in her attempts 
to intercede on Moray's behalf is an indication that whatever the 
precise direction of Mary's policy at this time, it was not returning to 
a pro-English orientation. It was not until January 1566 that Randolph 
could report a softening of Mary's anger towards Moray but even this 
optimism was, in the following month, to prove badly misplaced. 2 0 7 . 
Maitland's Reconciliation With Knox 
November 1565 also witnessed a remarkable indication of how low 
Maitland's credit with Mary had sunk. In a striking role reversal, 
Maitland, for the first time, defended Knox in a confrontation with 
Mary. This is further evidence for regarding the Mai t land- Knox 
relationship as a touch-stone for his relationship with Mary.2 0 8 The 
period from October 1565 to March 1566 marks the most precise 
Protestantism of Maitland's career. As well as defending Knox, he also, 
along with Morton at tended the nervous General Assembly of December 
1565. Letters of despair were sent out to their European brethren from 
this assembly, proclaiming, 'that now to the great grief of many 
iniquitie command is tyrannie ringis and the cause of the ryghteous is 
utterlie suppressed amang US'.2 0 9 Protests were also made at the 
pollution of the realm with the Mass, whilst Mary's claim that 'she will 
mainteane and defend ... the religion in which she hath bene nourished' 
was denounced.21 0 In February 1566, the earl of Bedford reported 
Maitland's exemplary Protestantism to Cecil. Maitland was, according to 
Bedford, 'but in meane credit nowe and never did better in religion than 
at this present nor never so constant'.211 
Mary's Religious Policy 
If the political climate in Scotland was fluid, the same was no less 
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true of the religious one. In the continuing absence of official 
recognition of the reformed Church and ratification of the acts of the 
Reformation parliament it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. 
Mary's proclamat ion of 1561, whilst recognising the status quo, always 
left the door open for a change of policy.212 It was perhaps inevitable 
that this time of political flux would also be one of religious change 
and so it proved to be. It is not so much a question of whether Mary's 
religious pOlicy underwent a change at this time. It seems beyond 
reasonable doubt that from 1565, by a variety of means, Mary was 
act ively encouraging a Catholic revival. It is more a quest ion of that 
seemingly eternal Catholic dilemma, 'how far would she go?' Maitland's 
precise Protestantism, the panic of the General Assembly, the raVings of 
Randolph, the involvement of the Edinburgh ministry and Protestant 
radicals in the March conspiracy and the bonds made to protect the 
religion between Darnley and the exiled lords all reflected the 
widespread Protestant fears that Mary intended to go very far 
indeed. 213 
There was much evidence on which these fears were grounded. In 1565 
Mary had appointed three Catholic bishops, John Lesley, William Chisholm 
and Henry Sinclair, whose capacity to exercise the full powers of their 
episcopate was rumoured to be on the agenda of the forthcoming 
parliament. 2 14 In seeming accordance with the decrees of Trent, Mary 
had also appointed four public preachers, much to the alarm of Knox. 2lS 
Mary's court had always provided a Catholic focus but these measures 
were going beyond that and were illustrative of a determination to take 
the Mass out of her chapel. So too was the quest for a papal subsidy, 
which Chisholm was actively engaged in from June 1565. 216 However, it 
is not clear how public Chisholm's mission was. Evidence exists to 
suggest that Mary was able to disgUise the true intent of his mission. 
For example, although Maitland drew up Chis~';Ilm's request for a safe 
conduct through England, the latter's subsequent relation to Pius· IV of 
Mary's desire to be rid of her Secretary, suggests Maitland was not 
entirely conversant with Chisholm's mission. 217 This is a further 
reminder that Maitland was not controlling foreign policy at this time. 
Mary's more pronounced Catholicism became clearly evident in 
February 1566, with her attempt to persuade her nobility to attend 
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Candlemas and the suggestion of restoring the Mass at St Giles'. 2 1 8 A 
list of the nobles who accepted and refused the invitation to the Mass 
is, however, of little help in identifying her opponents of the 
following month. Huntly, Bothwell, Fleming, Livingston and Lindsay all 
refused but only the last-named opposed her in March. Conversely, 
Lennox and Darnley were at the heart of the conspiracy despite 
accompanying Mary to the Mass along with Athol, Seton, Eglinton and 
Caithness who all remained loyal to Mary.21 9 This has been depicted as 
the beginning of a 'Catholic interlude' for Mary, possibly inspired by 
the recent arrival of messengers from Archbishop Beaton, Cardinal 
Lorraine and the Pope and coinciding with the hard line they advised 
her to take against her rebels. 220 What is clear is that this diplomatic 
activity increased the fears of the legislation to be carried out at the 
forthcoming parliament. 
These fears were heightened by the constant stream of rumour and 
speculation which, throughout the Reformation period, arguably played as 
important a role as hard fact in the formulation of policy and opinion. 
This was particularly so in this post-Trent, post-Bayonne period when 
rumours of a Catholic League ready to wipe out Protestantism were 
rife. 221 It was already strongly rumoured that Mary would extend the 
liberty of conscience she enjoyed to her Catholic subjects. Randolph 
reckoned as much in Christmas 1565 and it was a sentiment which was in 
keeping with Mary's consistent attachment throughout her reign to a 
degree of liberty of conscience. In 1567 it was actually reported that 
Mary would grant freedom of conscience to all except the Calvinists22 2 
but by far the best evidence for Mary's religious toleration is her 
'death-bed' speech at Jedburgh in October 1566. On this dramatic 
occasion Mary begged her nobility to continue her policy of toleration: 
'I have pressed none of you that professes religion by your conscience 
I pray you, brother earl of Moray trouble none'.2 2 3 Professor Lee, 
however, has argued that 'only extreme mariolaters have ever contended 
that Mary favoured toleration as a long run solution to the religious 
question', maintaining that toleration was an alien concept in 
sixteenth-century thought.224 The accuracy of this view must be 
challenged. 
Toleration was perhaps unsuccessful in the sixteenth-century and it 
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was definitely unpopular with religious hardliners, Catholic and 
Protestant alike. Mary was acutely aware of this and had to work hard 
to justify her policy to the Papacy and to many of her own subjects.22s 
Yet, with France and Poland providing examples of state-sanctioned 
toleration, was it really such an alien concept?2 2 6 It is impossible to 
know for certain whether Mary did favour toleration as a final solution 
to the religious issue but it is in the face of the evidence and not 
just extreme mariolatry that the not ion is so blandly dismissed. It is 
perhaps well to remember, and certainly of more relevance for the March 
conspiracy, that it was the threat of Mary's desire 'to have all men 
live as they list' and not a Catholic restitution that was enough to 
excite the fears of Knox and Randolph. 227 
Fear of the forthcoming parliament also draws attention to the 
actual timing of the coup. If rumours were rife as to the impending 
religious legislation, the same was true of the temporal. The summoning 
of Moray, Glencairn, Argyll, Rothes, Ochiltree, Boyd and Kirkcaldy of 
Grange to 'compeir in the parliament to heir and sie the dome of 
forfaltour ordourlie laid aganis them' was not interpreted as 
conciliatory gesture. 223 It was also strongly rumoured that this 
parliament would not see the grant ing of the Crown Matrimonial to 
Darnley and the bonds made between the exiled lords and Darnley 
reflected those fears.2 2 9 The volte face of the previous summer could 
not have been more complete. The prevention of the parliament, the 
rehabilitation of the rebels, the Crown Matrimonial for Darnley and the 
protection of the religion was the outcome to be looked for if the 
conspirators were successful in their attempt to wrest control out of 
Mary's hands. The murder of Riccio, was the means by which they sought 
to gain that control. 
Relations with England 
Some attention ought to be given to the state of Mary's relations with 
England at this time. That England w~ also a loser of Mary's post-
Chaseabout policy is confirmed by her detailed inside knowledge and 
encouragement of the intended COUp.230 Randolph eagerly antiCipated 
Mary's humiliat ion. His reports increase in their rancour at this time 
and he expressed disbelief that he could ever have thought favourably 
of Mary.2!11 The long-awaited Border conference, which had at one point 
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offered hope of an Anglo-Scottish rapprochment, was symptomatic of the 
strained relations between the two realms. 232 Instead, it did not 
attempt any wider conciliatory overtures but was narrowly restricted to 
Border matters only. The choice of commissioners also reflected the 
colder climate that characterised relations between the two nations.The 
hard-liners Bedford and Forster headed the English commission, whilst 
the Scottish team led by Bothwell rather than Maitland, hardly had an 
anglophile ring to it. 233 Mary had been too suspicious of Maitland's 
enthusiasm to meet the earl of Bedford to entrust the task to him.2 3 4 
Randolph's expulsion from the Scot t ish court in February 1566 
consummated the 'paralysis' of English pOlicy in Scotland. 2 3 5 For 
England, it was a time for desperate measures and the March conspiracy 
provided a welcome opportunity to recapture their influence over 
Scottish affairs. 
Maitland's Motives For His Participation In The Coup 
If it was a time of desperation for England, it was no less so for 
Maitland. It is difficult not to believe that if Maitland had not been 
so low in credit with Mary then he would have supported her proposals 
for liberty of conscience. As recently as March 1565, Maitland had 
expressed the view concerning the Elizabethan Vestiarian controversy: 
Althogh I do not prayse the preciseness off soche as do mak every 
thing a mater off conscience <off which nombre ther ar to many in 
both realmes) yet wold I not wisshe that men were far preassed in 
maters which do anyways prick them in conscience. 236 
Political and personal motivations were more at the heart of Maitland's 
protest. He was anxious to regain power and along with the majority of 
the conspirators was much more interested in the return of Moray and 
the other exiled lords than with securing Darnley's ambit ions. At this 
stage, however, any help in the battle to wrest control from Mary's 
hands was welcome and the Lennox interest was invaluable in this 
respect. Again, like most of his fellow conspirators, Maitland was not 
short of particular personal grievances. The rise of his greatest, local 
rival, Bothwell, was of immense concern to him. Perhaps of all the 
conspirators bar Darnley he had the greatest interest in the dispatch 
of Riccio. 2 3 7 This was certainly the view of the anonymous author of 
the History of Jamie the Sext, who argued that Maitland 'being a man of 
subtile brayne' fed Darnley tales of Riccio's 'carnall copulatioun with 
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the queyne' because the Italian had superseded him as the major 
Secretarial influence over Mary. While such allegations cannot be 
proven, the notion of Maitland as the chief casualty of Mary's 
favouritism for Riccio is certainly a credible one.238 
While the extent of Riccio's influence is hard to quantify, it was 
probably along the same informal but powerful lines that Maitland 
himself had previously enjoyed. Melville paints a vivid picture of 
Riccio controlling access to Mary; and the reports of his prominence are 
not too far removed from the earlier reports that were so rife of 
Maitland and Moray's influence over Mary 'doing all about her' and 
earning no small measure of hostile enmity in the process.23 9 
Maitland's participation in the coup shows that he had given up hope of 
winning back that favour. Despite the moral rectitude inherent in his 
justification and its emphasis on not 'subtracting obedience' from Mary, 
the March conspiracy was precisely about the subjection of Mary to the 
discipline and obedience of her subjects. 24o 
Up until the night of 9 March Maitland had continued on an uneasy 
footing in Mary's administration, 'espying his moment' but doing enough 
to ensure he remained beyond Mary's suspicion. In December 1565, he 
advised his friend Campbell of Glenorchy to take the opportunity of 
seeking Mary's pardon, an indication that Mary's anger towards Argyll 
was softening.241 It would be misleading to regard Maitland's 
appointment in January 1566 as an Ordinary lord of Session in place of 
the recently deceased Sir Robert Carnegy of Kinnaird as a mark of 
Mary's favour for him as it is not clear whether Ordinary lordships 
were in the gift of the Crown. 2 4 2 Incidentally, Carnegy sheds further 
light on the question of Mary's methods of government at this time, 
tending to support the view that the composition of Mary's council was 
not as outrageous as her opponents tried to portray. Carnegy's 
attendance at the privy council enjoyed something of a renaissance in 
the post-Chaseabout period but his record of attendance could be traced 
back to Chatelherault's regency in the 15 40s. 24 3 
Randolph's dismissal from the Scottish court in February 1566 
provides the best indicat ion of Mait land's duplicity at this time. It 
was a poker-faced Maitland, with knowledge aforethought of the 'bait 
laid for seigneur Davie' who charged Randolph with delivering 3,000 
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crowns to Moray through the offices of his client John Johnstone. 
Johnstone was there in the presence of the council and Mary herself to 
admit the crime. 2 4 4 Also in February 1566, he interceded with Cecil on 
Mary's orders, for Thomas Fowler; earlier criticised as one of Mary's 
household advisers but who had now fallen into English hands. 24 S That 
letter to Cecil dated 9 February gives an excellent insight into 
Maitland's mind at this stage. It was his first for a long time to his 
opposite English number, written in reply to an encouraging letter he 
had received from Cecil and intended 'as a gage' to see how things 
stood between the old allies. 2 4 6 It is hardly surprising that a sinister 
interpretation has been put on this letter given Maitland's opinion that 
the amity could be salvaged if the right course of action was taken. 
This course was to 'chop at the veray root yow no where it lyeeth and 
so far as my judgement can reache the soonar all things be packed up 
the less danger ther is off any inconvenientis'.2 4 7 There is little 
reason to doubt that this pOints to anything other than the forthcoming 
coup d'etat. Two days later Maitland wrote to Cecil in recommendation 
of Mary's ambassador and his own long-standing colleague, Robert 
Melville, as 'privy to most off my conceptions', Perhaps at this stage, 
as in 1560, this member of the 'loyal Melvilles' was not so true to 
Mary's interests as his brother Sir James portrayed. 24e 
It is remarkable that Maitland is not generally reckoned to be at 
the heart of the conspiracy. Ruthven's account does not inculpate him in 
the crime but their staunch friendship may well have influenced this. 
He needed Maitland in power, not out of it and had nothing to gain by 
losing his closest friend at court.24 9 Maitland is also a conspicuous 
absentee from the extensive lists denouncing the suspects in the 
Register of the Privy Council and was far too prudent to sign any of 
the bonds between the conspirators.25 0 Even Buchanan's Chameleon 
admitted that while Maitland was 'chef enemy to Riccio after the King 
he was not advertsit by the Lords of thair enterprise',2 S 1 There is, 
though, an abundance of evidence that points to Maitland's clear 
involvement. 
Calderwood draws attention to Maitland's crafty behaviour on the 
night of 9 March, distancing himself from the scene of the crime. 2 S 2 
The conclusion of yet another very timely business deal with Ruthven 
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over the lands of Marvingstone in Haddington on 8 March 1566 also 
points to Maitland's active support of the COUp.2 S 3 Randolph regarded 
him as one of the chief conspirators and the clear involvement of a 
number of Maitland's own clients supports this view. 2s4 Thomas Cowy and 
Richard Cranston, two of his servants were called before the privy 
council for the crime. 2SS Archibald Graham, Maitland's client, was 
pledged on a surety of £1,000 for his part in the conspiracy, while his 
brother-in-law Douglas of Whittingham, and his kinsman Menteith of 
Kerse were also charged by the privy council for the crime. 2S6 
Maitland's own six-month political exile following the coup hardly 
points to his innocence. Although he was not officially dismissed as 
Secretary, he was heavily forfeited for his crimes. Bothwell, his arch-
enemy was the principal beneficiary, regaining control of Haddington 
Abbey and Maitland was fortunate that Mary's kind regard for the 
loyalty of his father, allowed several of his forfeited lands to pass 
into Sir Richard's hands. 2 S 7 
The Consequences Of Mary's Victory 
There is little need to go into descriptive detail of the events of the 
night of 9 March. The consequences of the botched putsch are of far 
greater Significance. It is perhaps hardly surprising, given the number 
of diverse interest groups inherent in the loosely based alliance, that 
Mary was able to split it so effectively and witness its' dissolution in 
time-honoured sauve qUi peut fashion. The conspiracy, however, was not 
an unqualified disaster. It did succeed in preventing the parliament 
carrying out its agenda, whatever that may have been. Similarly, the 
rehabilitition of the exiled lords was also accomplished but hardly in 
the way they had enVisaged. Instead of sealing the success of the 
rebellion, their ret urn emphasised its failure. Mary stole the 
conspirators' own thunder by voluntarily pardoning the exiles rather 
than forfeiting them.2sa This up-turn in the fortune of the exiles 
contrasted sharply with the fate of their fellow conspirators. 
For the Lennox interest, the conspiracy was a disaster. Darnley had 
been further exposed as a political embarrassment, the Crown 
Matrimonial was further away than ever and Lennox himself. who had 
been integrally involved in the plot, now felt the wrath of his 
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daughter-in-law. He did not appear in the privy council again during 
Mary's personal reign. 2 S 9 It has already been noted that the extent to 
which government through the household ceased needs to be quest ioned. 
Perhaps though, the reduction in the extent of government through the 
household can be explained not so much by the fact that Mary had 
learned a salutary lesson but because she had less need of it. After 
the coup, Mary was able to cleanse her administration of her internal 
enemies. Morton was replaced as Chancellor by Huntly, James McGill as 
Clerk Register by Balfour, whilst Mait land, Bellenden, Tullibardine, 
Ruthven and Lindsay were amongst those privy councillors forced to take 
a prolonged leave of absence from the council chamber. 2 6 0 Although in 
pardoning the exiles Mary had arguably exchanged one set of fifth 
columnists for another, she had enough established support of a wide 
section of her nobilty to hold these men in check. She was able to win 
Argyll completely over to her cause, whilst the influence of Chancellor 
Huntly and the maverick Bothwell ensured Moray's influence was as yet 
limited.2 6 1 
For England, the failure of the coup was as unwelcome as its 
success would have been welcomed. 1566 was to prove to be a most 
critical year for England. The prospect of a pan-Celtic alliance, 
manufactured by Elizabeth's bungling of Scottish and Irish relations 
posed a potent threat to English ambitions. Shane O'Neill's capacity to 
cause havoc in Ireland was greatly enhanced by the Scottish support he 
received from Elizabeth's disaffected ex-client, Argyll. 2 6 2 Mary was not 
slow to reap where Elizabeth had not sown. The support of Argyll was a 
vital element which enabled her to enter the final trimester of her 
pregnancy in a stronger position than ever before. The subsequent birth 
of her healthy son and heir, Charles James, was to strengthen that 
position even further. 263 
It has been argued that the coup signalled the end of Mary's 
'Catholic Interlude'.2 6 4 It certainly prevented any pro-Catholic 
legislation at the March parliament but the extent to which it acted as 
a brake on Mary's Catholic risorgiInento must be questioned. The 
Protestant Lent proclaimed by the Kirk's call for a public fast in 
February 1566 gave way to a Catholic Easter, with the capital 
witnessing a popular demonstration of the survival of the old faith.2 6 S 
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9,000 Catholics apparently received communion at Holyrood, although 
Mary celebrated the solemnities in private in Edinburgh Castle. 2bb Knox, 
well used by now to the sauve qUi peut routine, accused his erstwhile 
conspirators from the safety of the west coast of once more 'shaking 
hands with the devil' in bowing to Mary's authority.267 His 
disappointment at the renewed support Protestants gave their Catholic 
Queen was shared by the Papacy, dismayed by her refusal to 'spill the 
blood of her subjects' for a Catholic restitution. 26 a This unusual unity 
between Knox and the Papacy, allied to the conciliatory domestic 
overtures so evident in her subsequent baptismal triumph, further 
suggests that the notion of Mary genuinely promoting toleration as a 
long term solution should not be completely dismissed. 269 
For Maitland, Mary's victory of March heralds the most obscure 
period of his career. Only too well aware of his guilt he was forced, 
like so many of his colleagues, to watch Mary's rise to greater power 
from the seclusion of political exile. 270 His exact movements are 
difficult to trace. Randolph expected him to seek asylum in England but 
he was given permission to travel into Flanders by Mary in April. 271 
However, fearing Bothwell's pirates, he was instead ordered to be warded 
in Caithness. 2 7 2 Whether he actually did so is uncertain and he appears 
to have passed into Argyll. 2 7 3 Maitland's friends did not desert him in 
his hour of need. Athol, his future brother-in-law, provided him with 
immediate sanctuary in March and acc~~ni~'~dated him in Dunkeld and 
Callendar during the coming weeks and months.27 4 Livingston also proved 
his worth as a friend to Maitland at this time. 2 7 5 It was, however, as 
a recipient of another good friend's hospitality, Colin Campbell of 
Glenorchy, in his strong hold of 'the Balloch' that Maitland was to be 
found in July before his rehabilatation was effected through the 
strenuous efforts of Moray, Argyll and Athol - against the opposit ion 
of Bothwell and the ineffect ual Darnley. 27 b Mary's reconciliat ion of 
Maitland and Hothwell at Craigmillar, in September 1566 was 
con firma t ion 0 f the concilia tory domest ic policy she was now 
pursuing. 2 7 7 It was a measure of the revival in Maitland's fortunes 
that Haddington Abbey was restored to him.273 
Maitland was soon once more at the fore of Mary's administration, 
attempting to cope with the major domestic problem of Darnley and 
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actively involved in the management of foreign policy and the new 
at tempts to revive Mary's claim to the English throne through 
diplomatic channels. 279 His behaviour during the seeming crisis of 
Mary's impending death at Jedburgh in the second half of October 1566 
is perhaps the best proof of this. Maitland had accompanied Mary to 
Jedburgh and it was he who informed Cecil 'that for the space off half 
an hour we wer all desperate off her life.'2 8 0 Maitland offered a more 
detailed diagnosis to Archbishop Beaton, explaining that it was 
Darnley's intolerable behaviour that was responsible for Mary's illness: 
She has done him so great honour ... contrary to the advice of her 
subjects, and he... has recompensed her with such ingratitude ... 
that it is a heartbreak for her to think he should be her husband, 
and how to be free of him she sees no outgait. 281 
1566 appeared to herald a new golden age for Mary and Scotland. The 
effervescent fluidity of the political climate was beginning to settle, 
leaving Mary as the dominant force in British politics. The political 
embarrassment of her estranged husband's behaviour was more than 
compensated by the heal thy progress of her son and heir. Darnley had 
seriously jeopardised the very foundation of the new independent 
Scotland his marriage had appeared to promise but his son, Charles 
James, provided a far more impressive proof and focus of that new age. 
He was the powerful symbol of the transformation Mary had wrought in 
the balance of power in Anglo-Scottish relations in the years between 
1563 and 1566. This was dramatically emphasised by the baptismal 
triumph at St irling in December 1566. Many courses of act ion seemed 
open for the year ahead. It is something of an understatement to say 
that the course 1567 did take can only with hindsight be seen as one 
of those. For Maitland, too, the years 1563 to 1566 had been traumatic 
years of fluctuating fortunes. His star was however once again in the 
ascendant and in the course of the next six years he provides a 
characteristically useful focus for the origins and development of the 
Scottish civil war. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
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The year 1567, regardless of the nocturnal detonation of 9 February at 
the Kirk 0 Field, can quite fairly be adjudged amongst the most 
explosive years in Scotland's history. Quite apart from the 
assassinat ion of the Queen IS husband, for the first time in Scot land a 
reigning adult monarch had been forced to abdicate by her own subjects 
and sanction the coronation of an infant heir, who, in the process 
became the only Scot tish monarch to be crowned in the parish kirk at 
Stirling and only the second not to be crowned by his baptismal name. 1 
These facts provide an early and appropriate illustration of the lack 
of tradition, dignity and precedent that continually hampered the 
progress of the King's Party in the following six years of civil war. 
That these basic facts have tended to be ignored is symptomatic of the 
misdirection of attention in the more sensational speculation that 
hinders helpful historical comment on the civil war years in Scotland. 
The recent seminal research into the renaissance triumph of Stirling 
has helped to redress this imbalance by providing a wholly different 
perspective from which the drama of 1567 and beyond can be viewed. 2 It 
is from such a perspective, of a Mary triumphant, that this chapter will 
attempt to analyse the origins and development of the Scottish civil 
war with Maitland's tortuous conduct from January 1567 up until the 
assassination of Moray in January 1570 commanding particular attention. 
These years witnessed the visible demonstration of the full extent of 
Maitland's capacious political adaptability, subsequently and bitterly 
denounced by his erstwhile colleagues in the King's party only when he 
had transferred his devious abilities and allegiance to the Queen's 
party. As Maitland bitterly reflected in 1571, 'yea to be schort with 
you so long as I was a pillar to meanteane thair unjust authoritie, 
they would never put at me as they doe!I3 
From the opening of the year 1567, heralded by the renaissance 
magnificence of the Stirling baptism through to Moray's assassination 
in 1570, Maitland was characteristically prominent. He had taken a full 
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part in the ceremonial splendour of Stirling but more significant was 
his role in the realization of the policy inherent, in much of the 
renaissance imagery of the baptismal triumph: the renegotiation of the 
amity with England. Symbolic allusions to a Britain united under a 
Stewart monarchy had abounded in the Triumph and in January 1567 
Maitland was instrumental in the transposition of this imagery into 
effective diplomatic action. Coinciding with Mary's own letter to 
Elizabeth of 3 January was a letter of Maitland's to Cecil dated 4 
January, both of which were stark in their contrast to the earlier 
diplomacy of the reign. 4 However, before examining this new policy in 
detail it would be remiss not to recognise that the St irling 
celebrations were also of especial personal importance to Maitland. 
Maitland's Marriage To Mary Fleming 
On the twelfth night of Christmas, 6 January, in the Chapel Royal he 
finally married his elusive bride Mary Fleming. 5 It was a controversial 
if not sensational match. Kirkcaldy believed Fleming to be as fit a wife 
for Maitland as he was to be Pope. There was an age difference of at 
least ten years between the couple but much of the controversy seems 
to have been sparked off by jealousy.6 Mary Fleming was certainly a 
most desirable catch and Randolph in particular seems to have been 
particularly envious of Maitland's success in this respect. The noted 
Elizabethan diplomat, Sir Henry Sydney, was a former suitor and even 
Buchanan had been sufficiently stimulated by her grace and beauty on 
an earlier twelfth night to wax lyrical about her, whilst Randolph 
stretched his own powers of hyperbole to compare her favourably to 
Venus, Minerva and Juno. 7 Actual details of the wedding are scarce and 
the occasion was perhaps bereft of the splendour of the twelfth night 
of 1564 when Mary Fleming as 'queen of the bean' and personally 
attended and dressed by Mary was the object of Buchanan's and 
Randolph's voluminous praise and admiration. It is almost certain that 
Mary, who had recently returned to Stirling after celebrating Christmas 
at Drummond Castle, was present at the wedding of her Secretary to her 
intimate Marie, who, after the Chatelard incident had been her bed-
fellow. 8 
Far more significant than the romant ic and sent imental aspect of 
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this, Maitland's second marriage, was its creation of a new and intimate 
link between Mary and himself, whereby he was 'further entwined in 
Mary's inner court circle'. It also secured for Maitland a new and 
extensive kinship base, which in the course of the civil war he was 
fully able to exploit. 9 It would be helpful to know whether the 
marriage was performed by Catholic or Protestant rites but this 
information is elusive. Yet even without this desirable information it 
is clear that Maitland's wedding brought the curtain down on a 
remarkable chapter in the history of the court at Stirling and one that 
marked his complete rehabilitat ion following his part in the conspiracy 
of March 1566. 
The Re-NegotiBtion Of The Amity 
In January 1567 a personally secure and confident Mary was able to call 
upon Maitland to support the more aggressive amity with England. This 
was the main feature of Mary's pOlicy in the early weeks of 1567 and 
not as many commentaries on the period suggest, the construction of a 
conspiracy to murder her husband. It was a policy that had been evident 
in the preceding autumn, chiefly through the diplomacy of Maitland's 
close associate, Robert Melville, who had become Mary's first, permanent 
resident ambassador to the English court. In this post-triumph period 
it was emphat ically re-stated. 1 0 It has been argued throughout this 
thesis that the notion of the amity based exclusively along godly, 
Protestant lines is somewhat suspect. After Mary's return in 1561 it 
was essentially lip-service that had been paid to those ideals, designed 
to win Elizabeth's recognition of Mary's claim to the succession. What 
was striking about this new amity was the absence of even lip-service 
to this godly element. There is evidence to suggest that Maitland, while 
in unquestionable sympathy with the aim of union and Mary's claim to 
the succession, was not entirely comfortable with the means adopted by 
Mary at this stage. 11 However, in January 1567 when he had only 
recently been restored to Mary's favour, he was in no position to argue 
with her. 
Maitland's aforementioned let ter to Cecil probably arrived at the 
same time as Mary's to Elizabeth and they certainly carried 
complementary messages. If read together they illustrate with 
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translucent clarity the new agenda in Anglo-Scottish politics. January 
1567 is arguably the high water mark of the personal reign of Mary 
Stewart. Her prospects in contrast to Elizabeth Tudor's must have 
seemed so much brighter. At the age of 25, Mary was already in 
possession of that most rare Tudor commodity, a male heir. She seemed 
destined, with her realm apparently united behind her, to lead Scotland 
into a new and prosperous age of religious and civil stability. Mary 
had engineered this dramatic shift of power through an astute 
combination of domestic and foreign policy and was now in a stronger 
position than ever before to exercise pressure on Elizabeth in the 
question of the English succession. 
The Irish question was often a consideration of critical importance 
in Anglo-Scottish relations; the unique capacity of Argyll to intervene 
effectively on Irish soil was of especial relevance at this time. 
Ironically, it was Elizabeth's inept neglect of Argyll that allowed Mary 
to exploit the possibilities produced by Shane O'Neill's rebellion. 
Argyll's future behaviour in Ireland was now a major bargaining counter 
for Mary in her negotiations with Elizabeth for the succession. The 
prospect of a pan-Celt ic alliance arraigned against her, together with 
the new-found domestic stability of Scotland so recently demonstrated 
in renaissance style, was enough to force Elizabeth to consider once 
more the vexatious question of the succession. The very fact that she 
had to countenance the question of Mary's claim and the prospect of an 
amity based no longer exclusively on English and Protestant lines is in 
itself a striking testament to the new balance of power. 12 
Mary's confidence in her ability to dictate the terms of the amity 
to Elizabeth is outrageously clear in her instructions to the earl of 
Bedford which accompanied her letter to Elizabeth. 1 3 In a reversal of 
the roles played in 1561-65, Mary delighted in a deliberate mimicry of 
Elizabeth's earlier specifications as to her choice of husband. In thinly 
veiled facetiousness, so reminiscent of Elizabeth's earlier attitude to 
Mary's marriage, Mary expressed her hope that Elizabeth would marry 
soon and that: 'For oure part the personage quhome with scho sould 
joyne, nixt hir awin contentment sould be inclynit to the utilitie of 
bayth the countreis and intertening of oure amyt ie and intelligence'. 
Mary went on to specify, 'gif the Archduke Charles the Emperouris 
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brother sould be that persoun thair is none quhome we wald lyke bettir 
of ... knawing the gude affectioun he as the Princes freindis beris to 
us'.Similarly tit for tat was Mary's insistence in response to Bedford's 
complaints of Patrick Adamson's Latin verses in praise of Charles James, 
Prince of Scotland, England and Ireland that those guilty of circulating 
anti-Marian propaganda in England should be suitably punished.! 4 It is 
difficult to imagine a clearer illustration of the positively, bullish, 
post-natal bargaining stance Mary was able to adopt in her relat ions 
with England. 
Maitland's accompanying letter was not quite so irreverent but was 
nonetheless forceful in tone. It is a remarkable document, not least 
because in support ing this more aggressive prosecut ion of Mary's claim 
to the English throne, he did not have to produce a single argument 
that he had not used at some point from 1561 to 1565. 1 S Maitland 
admit ted this when he said, 'I have forborne so long to deal with this 
matter that I have almost forgotten many thinges which may be sayd for 
corroboration of her right which I can shortly reduce to my remembrance 
being at Edinburgh where my notes are'. What was new, however, was the 
absence of any godly overtones and his bold emphasis that Mary's claim, 
in the absence of Elizabeth's own offspring, was no favour to be 
granted but Mary's birthright, sanct ioned by every conceivable principle 
of English civil, canon and common law. 
Maitland's admission regarding the succession, that, 'I cannot be 
altogether ignorant of this matter considering that I serve my 
sovereign in the rowme that you serve yours' further emphasises the 
significance of the office of Secretary in both countries and the 
intriguing relationship between the two men. Of far greater import was 
Maitland's forceful prosecution of Mary's claim and his skilful 
repudiat ion of the pretended const it ut ional hurdles that 'sum wald lay 
as a bar in oure way'. The construction of Maitland's argument bears 
witness to his own distinguished legal provenance and is striking in 
its detailed knowledge not only of English law but also of English 
history. 
An amusing proof of this and also of the contrast between Maitland's 
unionist position on this occasion and the s)f..ophantic ground he 
occupied when he promoted the union of the realms through the Arran 
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match, was his dismissal of the foreign birth of Mary as a bar to her 
claim. 1 b Maitland manipulated the English claim to sovereignity over 
Scot land to remind Cecil: 
heretofore you have in sundry proclamations preceding your warres 
making and in sundry books at several times laboured much to 
procure the homage and fealty of Scotland. Your stories be not 
voyd of this intent ... what the judgement of the Fathers of your 
Lawe is and what commonly is thought in this matter you know 
bet ter than I. 
His drift was clear. By England's own claims to sovereignity over 
Scotland, which, as Maitland confessed, he 'being a Scott will not 
affirme the same' Mary could hardly be regarded as a foreigner. It is 
ironic to note Cecil's own convenient manipulation of this claim to 
sovereignty over Scotland. While happy to ignore that such a claim 
overcame the problem of Mary's foreign birth, in the different 
circumstances of May 1568, Cecil was quite happy for Elizabeth like 
Edward I, 'to hear and decide any controversy for the crown of Scotland' 
on the grounds that, 'of ancient right it apparteneth to the crown of 
England as by multitude of recordes, examples and presidentes may be 
proved'. 
Maitland dealt with other implications of the foreign birth argument 
providing proof that, 'it was alwaies the comon lawe of your realme 
that in the case of the crowne forraine birth was no barre'.He offered 
several historical and legal illustrat ions to prove his case as well 
delivering a gibe at England's delusions of grandeur. He reminded Cecil 
that although England was a, 'noble and puissant countrie the respect 
of the alliance only and the dowry hath not moved the great princes to 
matche soe often in marriage but the possibility of the Crowne in 
succession'. He drew upon the chronicles of Polydore Virgilius, 'written 
when it was little thought that this matter should come to question 'as 
proof 'to the world' of Henry VII's intent in marrying his daughter 
Margaret to James IV, 'by whose person the title is devolved upon my 
sovereign' . 
Maitland then turned his attention to the problem of Henry VIII's 
will. Here he did alter his approach to that of 1561 by challenging 
directly the authenticity of Henry's will. He again used England's own 
'histories and chronicles of that age' which 'do comtaminate and despair 
greatly the raygne of that Kyng' to strengthen his case, before naming 
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an illustrious list of Tudor nobles and court iers who could aver that 
the will was not even signed by Henry but was a forgery perpetrated by 
corrupt officials. Before closing, Maitland re-echoed Mary's wish for 
speedy and 'effectual reparacon' of anti-Marian propaganda such as John 
Hales' book, the publishing and exemplifications of Henry VIII's will, 
the disputes at Lincoln's Inn that had ruled against Mary's claim and 
the recent derisory speeches made against Mary in Parliament. 
Maitland concluded his assert ive missive by chiding Cecil's hesitant 
unwillingness to deal with the succession question over the years. 
Cecil, was too 'willing to forbeare alltogether to deale therein unless 
you were express lie commanded thereunto by the Queen's Majestie' and 
pretended 'more ignorance than is convenient for a counsellour' and he 
urged him to rectify this failing. Maitland's insistence that Cecil ought 
to make the most of this opportunity to oblige Mary after the discovery 
of Christopher Rookeby's spurious activities was a final reminder that 
the need to satisfy her was once again a consideration for England and 
Cecil to take into account. 17 
Maitland's letter resembled more of a tract and in the detailed 
ananlysis of the Early Elizabethan Succession Question it has been 
treated as such. 13 It was a revitalised expression of Mary's claim to 
be recognised as Elizabeth's successor and a clear statement that Mary 
was not prepared to tolerate Elizabeth's inflexible approach, which the 
failure of the Leicester marriage proposal and her sUbsequent marriage 
to Darnley had stiffened. Emboldened by a domestic and international 
political scenario which rendered Mary's prospects far more propitious 
than Elizabeth's, it represented her most forceful diplomacy to date in 
her dealings with Elizabeth. While with hindsight, the Stirling Triumph 
can be regarded as the most singularly inapt portent of Mary's 
fortunes, it would be erroneous to ignore the strength of Mary's 
position at the opening of 1567. This is not to suggest that the 
momentum of Mary's new-found strength would have proven irresistible 
in the quest for the English succession. It is improbable that Elizabeth 
would ever have conceded any substantial ground in the matter. However, 
the pressure Mary was able to exert, particularly through her 
manipulation of the Irish question, was certainly enough to cause 
Elizabeth and her councillours several major headaches. There can be 
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little doubt that the principal beneficiaries of Mary's fall from power 
were England and Elizabeth. By June 1567, the scenario had changed 
completely. Mary had been defeated at Carberry, O'Neill was dead and 
Elizabeth could once again rest easy in her position of superiority 
over the British Isles. As this thesis has strived to show it was not 
ever thus. 
The Problem of Darnley 
The Darnley murder was the first of a chain of events that signal the 
end of Mary's personal reign but most modern historians have been right 
to point out that this had very lit t Ie to do with her downfall. Genuine 
grief at the passing of Darnley was a commodity in short supply and in 
any case an irrelevance. What was not so scarce nor irrelevant was the 
widespread expressions, both internat ional and domest iCJ of outrage at 
the murder but even these were insufficient to bring Mary down. 19 What 
was at the root of Mary's downfall was her own disastrous conduct in 
the four-month period after Darnley's death. which ended in the fiasco 
of Carberry Hill. It is to those events that attention will now be 
turned. 
If this appears to be a contrived minimalising of the Darnley murder 
it is perhaps no bad thing. It is tempting to dismiss it altogether in 
those few sentences but further comment is essential on several counts. 
It is not the intention here to become embroiled in the most 
inconclusive unsolved murder in Scottish history but rather to try and 
pin down with some degree of accuracy the prevailing political climate 
at the time of the murder and to discuss its impact. In January 1567 
there was one major blot on Mary's otherwise auspicious political 
landscape; her disaffected husband Darnley. Historians have not been 
slow to argue that it is doubtful whether he could have caused Mary as 
much harm alive as he did by his death. Despite the accuracy of this 
view, the inconvenience and hindrance that the man who had been 
proclaimed King of Scotland in July 1565 had become to Mary should not 
be underestimated. For once, almost the entire nation could agree with 
Knox when he said of Darnley that 'none was like unto him within this 
island'.20 Fatherhood had done nothing to mature Darnley's character and 
his behaviour was becoming increasingly intolerable. Affairs seem to 
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have reached a head in October 1566 with his hare-brained scheme to 
flee the country.21 Mary was acutely aware of the personal and 
political embarrassment of such a move and, along with her nobility, 
actively pursued measures to counteract and limit the damage. Her 
response to Darnley's wanderlust was a sensible and alert pre-emptive 
diplomatic strike. With the full backing of her council, letters were 
sent to Archbishop Beaton and Catherine de Medici, warning them of 
Darnley's behaviour. 2 2 
Mary's handling of the Darnley problem, prior to his murder, was the 
epitome of the consensual politics that lay at the heart of the success 
of her personal reign. Mary's desire for conciliar consensus as to the 
problem of Darnley is perhaps the safest conclusion to be drawn from 
the much fabled Craigmillar conference, which, as evidence of Mary's, or 
anyone else's complicity in a plot to murder Darnley is highly 
spurious. 23 Given the widespread contempt for Darnley within Scotland 
it is hardly surprising that there is such a mult iplicity of possible 
assassins. As with virtually every candidate there is certainly no 
shortage of speculation to suggest Maitland's collusion in the affair. 
He was certainly suspected by contemporaries and there are several 
main counts which can be used to show Maitland was guilty of more than 
fore-knowledge. 
Evidence For Maitland's Involvement In The Darnley Murder 
Perhaps the most obvious is the Craigmillar Conference itself, 
particularly the version of this gathering given in Huntly and Argyll's 
Protestation of 1568. 24 This highly partisan account concocted by 
Lesley with the specific intention of proving Moray and Maitland's guilt 
in the crime is, as hard evidence, valueless. Yet the words Lesley put 
into Maitland's mouth that some action would be taken and that Moray 
would 'look through his fingers thereto' are nonetheless pertinent. 2 S 
The ability of the Scottish nobility to look through their fingers is 
the perfect indictment not only of Moray and Maitland but of a good 
many, who were only too happy to see Darnley disposed of but not to 
get their own hands dirty. 
Maitland's complicity in the murder is often seen to be proved by 
his journey to Whittingham along with Bothwell to meet the recently 
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returned Morton on 10 January 1567. 26 Not surprisingly a sinister 
interpretation has been placed on this event but once again evidence to 
this effect is unreliable. The only records of the act ual conversat ion 
came almost a decade and a half later from the not impartial sources 
of Archie Douglas and Morton. According to them the murder was 
discussed with Morton refusing to join Mary and Bothwell's scheme. It 
is possible, however, to put a less sinister interpretation on the visit. 
It was not unusual for a returning noble to be visited by two of the 
leading figures in the government, particularly when all three shared 
such common local interests. It is worth-while remembering that 
Maitland's sister Elizabeth, was married to William Douglas of 
Whitttingham. 27 It does, however, seem very likely that the elimination 
of Darnley was the prime business of this visit. 
The passing of the Priory of Coldingham out of the hands of 
Bothwell's infant and orphaned nephew, Francis Stewart, into the 
Maitland's family hands on 7 February, just two days before Darnley's 
murder is not above suspicion. This may well have been a pay-off for 
acquiescence in the crime with Maitland's brothers, John and Thomas, 
sharing 1000 merks a year but again it is impossible to be certain of 
this interpretation. 23 There are many other suspicious circumstances 
which point towards Maitland's complicity in the murder. His refusal to 
undertake a diplomatic mission to London on the unconvincing grounds of 
his recent marriage is striking. 2 9 It was uncharacterist ic of Mait land 
not to take advantage of a mission to England when he was in sympathy 
with the policy being pursued. This suggests two things: the first 
being perhaps Maitland's disquiet over the way the amity was being 
handled and the second, his foreknowledge of a more important mat ter 
and his determination to ensure he was well placed to cash in on the 
political scramble that he knew must follow Darnley's death. 
Despite Claude Nau's insistence that Maitland had signed the Darnley 
murder bond, it is impossible to identify with any certainty Maitland's 
position. 3 0 There is after all not so much an abundance of conflicting 
evidence as conflicting speculation. This confusing state of affairs is 
epitomised by the fact that it was alleged in some quarters that 
Maitland was not present at the wedding of Bastien and indeed out of 
Edinburgh, whilst elsewhere it is argued that Maitland together with 
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Bastien was responsible for saving Mary's life on the night of the 
murder. 31 That Maitland, within hours of the murder, penned the official 
explanation sent to Catherine de Medici and signed by the privy council 
including Bothwell, Huntly, Argyll, and Archbishop Hamilton telling of 
Mary's fortuitous escape from death is significant in a number of 
respects. 3 Z Firstly, it shows that Maitland cannot have been far away 
on the previous night and secondly, that he was happy not to ask too 
many searching questions about the murder. It seems highly unlikely 
that Maitland was unaware of the plot to kill Darnley and that, in 
common with the majority of the Scottish nobility he was more than 
happy to look through his fingers and take advantage of the political 
opportunities this would create. For there can be no doubt that the 
murder of Darnley created a wholly new political scenario in Scotland. , 
The Impact Of The Darnley Murder 
Mary was devastated by the murder and plunged into a severe and 
debilitating depression from which it is doubtful if she fully recovered 
d ur ing 1567. Her morose behaviour in the pos t - Darnley era bears no 
resemblance, and contrasts sharply, to the dynamic vitality of her 
earlier years. Not for the first time medical experts feared her life 
was in danger. 33 A perhaps not unsurprising accompaniment to this 
physical breakdown was its alarming effect on her political judgement 
as well. It was this that facilitated Bothwell's ascendancy and her own 
downfall. Yet it was perhaps a mark of the success of her personal 
reign and her well-established administration that, despite her own 
breakdown, there was every appearance of business in the post Darnley-
era being conducted as usual. The evidence of governmental records 
provide every indication that the usual organs of government continued 
to function. There is no breach in the Treasurer's or Comptroller's 
accounts although it is true that following Mary's deposition the 
Comptroller's accounts were presented for examination somewhat later 
than normal. Similarly, during the four months from February to June 
1567 there is no noticeable slackening in the number of charters 
granted under the Great Seal. 3 4 Even more significant is the clear and 
determined efforts to ensure regular and efficient conciliar government. 
While this was almost certainly an admission of weakness, this does not 
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detract from the eminently sensible provision of such a step. An 
ordinance of the privy council of May 1567 made detailed provision 
along the lines adopted in 1562 to split her nobles into carefully 
selected groups 'so that for the whole year thai saIl remane and await 
bot the monthes of council at twa times a year'. As in 1562, a ticket 
monitoring system was also to be used to ensure regular attendance. 3s 
The make-up of these four groups reveals an interesting balance. 
One section was made up of a predominantly Catholic group of John 
Lesley, Cassillis, Errol, Crawford and Oliphant; another had a distinctly 
Protestant flavour, headed by Morton, Rothes, Fleming and Alexander 
Gordon, the reforming Bishop of Galloway. There was much more of a 
religious balance in the next group of Archbishop Hamilton, Argyll, 
Caithness and Herries. Those four were all to distinguish themselves as 
loyal Marian supporters over the ensuing years. Of the final group of 
Huntly, Athol, Boyd and Marischal there is also a delicate balance. 
Athol, the late Catholic recruit to the Queen's party, was outnumbered 
by his more Protestant colleagues, who, with the exception of Marischal 
<whose allegiance in the civil war has yet to be sat isfactorily traced) 
were all to subsequently distinguish themselves in Mary's service 
during the civil war. The attendance of these groups was to be 
supplemented by the established officers of state, which included 
Maitland as Secretary and other notables as Mary saw fit.36 However, if 
Mary was seeking to secure widespread support by this move she was to 
be disappointed. By May 1567, following her marriage to Bothwell, the 
damage had been done and most of the aforementioned councillors were 
conspicuous by their absence from Carberry in her support. As was long 
ago observed 'this supremacy of dignity in the council' was of short 
duration. 
An equally confident measure was the revocation on 8 May of the 
lieutenancies granted during the Chaseabout raid to Lennox, Athol, 
Bothwell and Lindsay of the Byres, on the grounds that such crisis 
measures were hardly necessary when 'hir hienes is contentit with all 
hir nobilitie and na troubill nor insurrection standing within hir 
realme'.37 Within a month the inaccuracy of this assessment of the 
state of the realm was completely exposed, with Mary left anything but 
contented and her realm anything but quiet. Most commentators have 
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seen Bothwell rather than Mary as the driving force behind these 
measures, which draws at tent ion to Bothwell's own not insignificant 
abilities. His successful seizure of the political initiative and his 
manipulation of the privy council in the post-Darnley era, ably assisted 
by supporters such as David Chalmers of Ormond , are a testament to 
his talents. His ultimate failure should not detract from the soundness 
of his policies in the council, which in a more popular royal consort 
would perhaps have been declared statesmanlike. sa 
This 'dignity of the council' and the impression of business being 
conducted as usual, acted as a smokescreen to the intense, political 
scramble that the Darnley murder provoked for influence over Mary and 
her policy. It is possible that part of the reason Maitland was happy 
along with the rest of his colleagues 'to look through his fingers' was 
because of the greater freedom of action an enervated and less 
triumphant Mary allowed. At any rate, it is clear that Maitland with 
characteristic skill was quick to adjust to the new situation. In common 
with a good many others in the post-Darnley era, Maitland was pursuing 
his own policy. What clearly seems to have been underestimated by many, 
including Maitland, was the strength of Bothwell's own putsch. For in 
the immediate post-Darnley interim Maitland was able to devote his 
attention to his forte, Anglo-Scottish relations, before being diverted 
by the more pressing problem of Bothwell. 3 q 
The Collapse Of The New Amity 
It was a measure of the established strength of Mary's position that 
the immediate impact of the Darnley murder was insufficient to act as a 
brake upon the progressive prosecution of Mary's claim to the English 
succession. Throughout February and March 1567 efforts continued to 
be made on the succession issue through the diplomatic efforts of Sir 
Robert Melville and Maitland himself. ... 0 There was however, a significant 
change of emphasis in the manner in which the negotiations were 
conducted and it was a change in which Maitland's hand can be seen 
very much to the fore. A glimpse into Maitland's handling of the 
succession issue at this time is provided by a letter of his to Cecil 
dated 13 March. This letter, in response to two elusive letters of 
Cecil's dated 25 and 26 February, reveals Cecil's clear disapproval of 
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the 'new amity' and his anxiety to restore it to its former Protestant 
basis.41 It also shows that Cecil had a more than willing ally in 
Maitland in this respect. Cecil had requested Maitland's assistance to 
ensure that Mary 'wold allow off your (England's) estate in relligion'. 
Maitland's enthusiastic response to this appeal is highly instructive in 
several respects. 
Maitland admitted to Cecil with regard to the likelihood of Mary's 
embracement of Anglicanism that: 
it is one off the things in earth I most desyre: I dare be bolde 
anough to uter my fansy in it to her majesty, trusting that she 
will not lyke me the wors for utering my opinion and knowledge in 
that is most proffitable for her every way. And I do not dispayre 
but althogh she will not yea Ide at the firste, yet with progres 
off tyme that poynt shalbe obtayned'.4 2 
This admission is an excellent indication of Maitland's ability, 
lampoo ned in Buchanan's Chameleon J to adapt swiftly to rapidly changing 
circumstances. For he was only able to promote such a policy because of 
Mary's debilitation following the Darnley murder. Quite possibly, 
because at this pOint unlike January 1567, Maitland was once again his 
own man, it reveals his true preference concerning the union of the 
realms - the dominant feature of his career- to which he was always 
com lmitted though not always by the same means. This particular 
instance shows his enthusiast ic embrace of the godly element which 
had been so carefully channelled since Mary's return. It may well have 
been genuine enthusiasm but it was certainly calculated. An amity based 
along such godly lines was also the most likely to appeal to an English 
audience. Maitland was pitching his line accordingly. 
This letter also sheds light on the vexatious question of Maitland's 
religious convictions. Particularly evident, is his preference for a 
state-controlled church which is perhaps the safest statement one can 
make about his religious preferences. There can be little doubt 
Maitland was deeply envious of the Anglican Church. It is evident in his 
frequent clashes with the ministers of the Kirk whilst his 
parliamentary performances in 1560 and December 1567 suggest a 
yearning, if not for the theology of a Henrician Reformation, then 
certainly for the power the English Crown exerted over the second 
estate. 43 
Whether or not Mary approved of her Secretary's strategy and his 
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belief that her interests would be better served by her adoption of an 
Anglican-style settlement and the restitution of a distinctly Protestant 
element to the amity is not certain. Possibly she did concur, and her 
official protection of the reformed church following the parliament of 
April 1567, was the first fruits of this pOlicy.·· If that is the case, 
the new amity shorn of its Protestant overtones can be said to have 
had a remarkably short but highly eventful political life. Yet 
Maitland's aspirations for the development of the amity in this 
direction were to be equally short-lived. The powerful surge of 
Bothwell ensured that more pressing domestic considerations became 
Maitland's chief concern. 
Maitland's A t tit ude To Bothwell's Ascendancy 
Bothwell had seized the initiative adroitly. He had gained an official 
acquittal of any part in the recent murder and also secured by equally 
spurious means the consent of a large majority of the nobility that he 
should marry the Queen.· S He had played his hand well but events were 
to show he had played it too well. In keeping with the complexity of 
the entire year of 1567, it is hard to gauge Maitland's precise attitude 
to the developing ascendancy of Bothwell. He seems to have exercised a 
characteristic, cautious ambivalence before committing himself wholly to 
the destruction of Bothwell. 
Vincenzo Laureo, the Bishop of Mondovi and papal nuncio to Scotland 
in 1566, seems to have gauged Maitland's position and likely course of 
action better than most. His impressive assessment, written in Italy in 
June 1567 but without prior knowledge of the Bothwell marriage, is 
quoted in full below. 
Although the earl of Murray has left Scotland, yet Secretary 
Lethington remains. He is the most crafty of men, a thorough 
Huguenot and a great friend of Murray and as he has great 
influence with the queen, he is capable of doing one of two 
things. He might on the one hand corrupt her which God may avert 
and persuade her to marry the earl of Bothwell who has ever being 
the queen's most trusty and obedient adherent; and this Lethington 
might do in order to reconcile and ally himself with that earl. On 
the other hand he might dissemble the hatred which he bears to 
the said earl,involve him in the queen's disfavour and procure the 
recall of the earl of Murray into Scotland'·6 
It is a remarkably accurate testament and one that raises most of the 
pertinent issues of Maitland's conduct at this time. Laureo clearly 
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discerned the true state of the Bothwell-Maitland relationship. There 
was certainly no love lost between the two men. Despite Mary's public 
reconciliation of the two, the Hepburn-Maitland rivalry ran deep. On a 
local level it was evident in their frequent clashes over Haddington 
Abbey whilst on a more personal level Bothwell had already threatened 
Maitland with his life and was to do so again on several occasions. In 
May 1569 Bothwell claimed that, 'both England and Scotland would be 
better places if both their secretaries were dead' and that had Mary 
allowed him to dispose of Maitland she would not be in her current 
predicament. 47 As Laureo correctly perceived, ulterior motives had a lot 
more to do with Maitland's likely course of action than a genuine 
concern for Bothwell's well-being. 
In his own time-honoured tradition, Maitland had more than one 
string to his bow and made his decisive move as late as possible. 
Laureo, whose main concern was the recovery of Scotland to Catholicism 
and the creation of a climate conducive to that end, was no admirer of 
Maitland and had earlier placed him on his infamous 'hit-list' of August 
1566. 48 Nevertheless he correctly perceived that Maitland had two 
likely courses of action open to him. He could genuinely support the 
marriage as a way of ensuring he did not incur the wrath of Bothwell 
or he could 'dissemble' and feign support for the marriage and dupe 
Bothwell into contributing to Mary's downfall. Maitland was no doubt 
keenly aware of his options and in typical fashion was hedging his bets 
waiting for the right moment before playing his hand. However, to a 
certain extent as regards his attitude towards Bothwell, it would 
appear that Maitland had his hand played for him. 
There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that he was only a very 
reluctant supporter of Mary's third marriage. He was a conspicuous 
absentee from the Ainslie Bond, was subsequently kidnapped by Bothwell 
along with Mary and apparently threatened with his life. His life was 
unquestionably in a good deal more danger than Mary's at this point. 
Bothwell later admit ted it was only through Mary's intervent ion that 
Maitland was spared. 4 9 Even though Maitland was a subsequent witness 
to the marriage contract and was one of those signing the testimony 
that Mary was a free agent, it is hard to believe that he was ever 
more than a luke-warm supporter of the match. s 0 It is true he could 
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have deserted Mary at that point but to nail his colours rashly to the 
mast was not and never was to be Maitland's way. He had nothing to 
gain from joining an as yet unproven confederacy and at any rate 
compromise could yet be reached. 
In a letter written with the knowledge of Mary's imprisonment in 
Loch Leven but not of Moray's acceptance of the regency, Laureo was 
able to embellish his assessment of Moray's and Maitland's conduct. In 
this letter dated 5 August 1567 he states that Moray had: 
absented himself partly from fear of the earl of Bothwell, partly 
in order to be able to maintain his favour with the queen and her 
party whatever might happen. By this absence he has not merely 
been able to play the part of an innocent man averse to the late 
tumults but he has also managed by his pretended services to win 
over both sides in order to mount the throne as he had planned. 
What has helped him most has been the crafty counsel of the 
Secretary Lethington, a man believed to be so astute and 
unprincipled, that in all the late treasons he is thought to have 
thrown the stone (as they say) without seeming to move his hand 
it was impossible humanly speaking to expect good there while he 
enjoyed the Queen's favour. s 1 
This analysis is difficult to dispute. His estimation of the motivation 
behind Moray's sudden determination to see 'the pairtis of France, 
Flanderis, or any uther pairtis beyond sey'S 2 and his expectation of a 
timely return at an opportune moment was incredibly and accurately 
prophetic. There can be no doubt Moray's exit was politically inspired. 
It was a masterstroke and quite possibly the smartest move of his 
career. It also gives the lie to Melville's disparaging but memorable 
description of him as an unskilled tennis player, unable to discern the 
flow of the game and so 'running ever efter the bal1'. S 3 On this 
particular occasion Moray read the game perfectly. Moray's fear of 
Bothwell's ascendancy was not unfounded. As early as 20 March a clear 
indication of his growing influence was given. The Captaincy of 
Edinburgh Castle was transfe~d apparently much to the distress of Mar 
and, 'sair aganes the will of the inhabitantis of Edinburgh becaus the 
said erIe of Mar wes ane gUid man and na oppress our of the saidis 
inhabitant is' to Sir James Cockburn of Skirling. Cockburn was a staunch 
supporter of Mary and had close connections with the Maitland family, 
but he was regarded principally as a henchman of Bothwell's.s 4 Rumours 
too were already beginning to circulate of a marriage between Mary and 
Bothwell, which if true could not but mean a reduct ion in Moray's 
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influence. 5 5 
Moray, with his record of disapproval of any suitor for his sister 
prejudicial to his own interests, had learnt by bitter experience to 
register his discontent more effectively than he had in 1565. Whether 
or not he was aiming at the regency at this point is not certain, but 
his prospects of obtaining high office were certainly enhanced by this 
discreet leave of absence, enabling him, as Laureo candidly put it, 'to 
play the part of an innocent man'. His naming of Mary as the guardian 
of his daughter in his will, shortly before his departure was part of 
this contrived effort.s 6 There can be no quest ion, as Laureo was well 
aware of his departure signalling an incommunicado break with Scotland. 
Although Moray, with his extensive clientage was hardly bereft of the 
means to prosecute his interests in his absence, Maitland was certainly 
one of his principal cornermen. This was clearly evident once the 
regency had been assumed. Throckmorton's confrontation with Moray in 
which he totally defended the conduct of Maitland and the confederates 
in his absence bears this out. 51 
Laureo's belief that Maitland was the architect of Mary's downfall 
'without seeming to move his hand' and that Moray was Maitland's 
sleeping partner in the crisis is convincing. As Laureo bitterly pointed 
out, Maitland was able to play his duplicitous role very well indeed. He 
had the benefit of many years experience of acting in such a way. Yet 
part of the reason why Maitland, on this occasion, was able to play his 
duplicitous role so well was perhaps because he had not embarked upon 
a pre-determined course of action. Even if the odds were stacked 
against him staying in Mary's service once Bothwell had cemented his 
ascendancy through marriage, Maitland had still to decide on his course 
of action. This is what is meant by the argument that Maitland's hand 
was to a certain extent played for him by Bothwell's determination to 
rule. For while Maitland had certainly made provision for such an 
eventuality he had definitely been in close touch with the 
confederate lords - and showed no compunction in resorting to it, it 
was also the case, that if events had not taken such a desperate course 
he would have had little difficulty in continuing to serve Mary.s 8 
There had certainly been no discernible lack of Mary's favour 
towards Maitland prior to her marriage to Bothwell nor after it. The 
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Maitland family fortunes continued in an upward curve. The Parliament 
of 1567 confirmed lands granted to Sir Richard and approved his 
resignation of the office of Keeper of the Privy Seal to his son 
John.s 9 As in 1559, Maitland was one of the last to defect from the 
Crown, waiting for a party of resistance to be clearly formed before 
escaping in perilous fashion. His conduct in 1567 was entirely in 
keeping with the finely tuned judgement that was a hallmark of his 
career. This is not to say Maitland was not a risk taker: power 
politics, as he well knew, always involved an element of chance but 
rather to argue that the Maitland of 1567, chastened by his part in the 
failed coup d'etat of March 1566, was very much the man who had waited 
unt il the last possible moment before joining the Congregat ion in 1559 
and had been a conspicuous absentee from the Chaseabout rebellion of 
1565. 
The sense of deja vu which marks Maitland's conduct in 1567 is also 
evident when the role of Kirkcaldy of Grange is considered. Grange had 
been at the fore-front of the earliest efforts to procure English 
assistance during the Reformation crisis and amongst the first to raise 
the alarm at Lennox's return in 1564. He performed a similar role in 
the vanguard of the opposition against Mary in 1567. 60 It is his 
memorable report of Mary's willingness to go to the end of the world in 
a white petticoat so long as she had Bothwell which provides the 
strongest evidence for the thesis of a headstrong Mary determined on 
marriage and life with Bothwell. 6 1 Unlike 1564 when Maitland rejected 
Grange's warnings, the civil war marks the resumption of an alliance 
that was to be such a striking feature of the conflict, terminated only 
by their deaths in 1573. 
Maitland's Desertion Of Mary 
On 5 June, the Diurnal reports that 'the secretare suspect and his lyff, 
left our souerane ladie and the court and departit to the Callendar'. 62 
Under suspicion for having favoured Bothwell, Maitland found it 
necessary to apologise for his characteristically late defection.63 The 
confederacy had grown rapidly from the bond signed on 1 May, even 
without the support of England, to ensure that by the time of Carberry, 
they possessed an overwhelming majority. Part of the reason why the 
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confederacy arra Y led against Mary and Bothwell was so strong was 
because their professed aims of punishing the murderers of Darnley, 
preserving the person of the infant prince and rescuing Mary from the 
'bondage and captivity' of Bothwell could be as readily endorsed by 
Mary's friends as by her enemies. 6 ~ However, with Newtonian precision 
the confederates' strength was to dissolve just as quickly as it had 
been formed. 
The reason for this was simple; the assembled ranks at Carberry had 
hardly dispersed when the confederates' behaviour towards Mary became 
incompatible with their earlier proclamations. By 17 June Mary was 
subjected, apparently with much rigour; to a strict imprisonment in Loch 
Leven - a provision that was conspicuous by its absence from the pre-
Carberry propaganda. b S Given that so many had genuinely protested at 
Carberry with the sole purpose of removing Bothwell, it was hardly 
surprising that within a week the confederacy began to crumble. The 
crucial figure of Argyll was soon lost to the confederates and he was 
not to be the only deserter.6 6 Mait land was in the vanguard of the 
movement responsible for the imprisonment and deposition of Mary, the 
subsequent coronation of James and the appointment of Moray as Regent 
which succeeded in transforming what was essentially an anti-Bothwell 
protest into an increasingly bitter civil war that was to plague 
Scotland for a further six years. It is to his principal role in the 
first three of those civil war years that attention will now be focused 
upon.b 7 
Maitland's Motives For Deposing Mary 
As ever, it is not easy to detect with certainty Maitland's true 
position as regards these revolutionary developments. It is difficult to 
argue with the image Laureo depicted and many others have followed of 
Maitland as Mary's arch-enemy, cleverly plotting her downfall. The 
hagiographical interpretation of Maitland's son James' Apology and 
Skelton, his Victorian biographer, that Maitland was all along serving 
Mary's best interests is impossible to reconcile with the facts. The 
difficulty, however, is that on the one hand Maitland can be seen very 
much as the nucleus of the radical wing advocating the creation of a 
regency - later confessing that it could not have been done without 
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him - and on the other, even at the same time as he was advocating 
those severe measures, he was looked upon by Throckmorton as the 
moderating voice of reason capable of saving Mary's life. 68 This may 
well have been just another instance of Maitland's notorious ability to 
run diametrically opposed courses simultaneously, but another 
explanation is possible. While rejecting the 'cruel to bekind ' theory of 
Maitland's admirers it does seem that the most satisfactory explanation 
of his conduct can be found somewhere in between the extremities of 
the two positions outlined above. 
It is, for example, impossible to see how Maitland was serving 
Mary's best interests by promoting the measures that culminated in the 
creation of the Moray regency. Even he struggled to explain away the 
essential paradox that lay at the heart of his alleged loyalty to Mary 
and his actions. His defence of his conduct in 1571, when he stood at 
the head of the opposition to the King's party, makes interesting but 
not entirely convincing reading. 6 9 In mitigation, Maitland alleged that 
in an interview with Mary on the night of 16 June he offered her 'gif 
shoe wold abandon my lord Bothuel sho shuld have as thankful obedience 
as ever sho had sen sho come in Scotland'. He lamented that this was to 
no avail, 'Bot noewayis wold schoe consent to leive my Lord Bothuell; 
and swa shoe was put into Lochlevin' .7 0 Nau's account of the same 
interview tends to lay stress on Maitland's inability to look Mary in 
the eye and on her insistence on a full parliamentary inquiry into the 
death of Darnley.7 1 Mary's own explanat ion emphasised her intent ion not 
to bastardise the child she was expecting by divorcing Bothwell. 72 
However, Kirkcaldy's oft quoted 'petticoat' remark of- Mary's refusal to 
abandon Bothwell adds credence to Maitland's allegation. 
If it is not too difficult to accept Maitland's version as at least a 
plausible account of the process that led to Mary's imprisonment then 
greater caution needs to be exercised before accepting his 1571 
testimony regarding the setting up of the King's authority. Part of the 
reason for this is that it contradicts the justification he offered to 
Throckmorton for it in 1567. 73 Perhaps time had blurred Maitland's 
memory but in 1571 he cited the growing support of the Queen's party 
'of the lord Huntlie and many utheris .... swa that thei wer gritter 
pairtie then we' as the cause, while in 1567 it was a somewhat 
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different picture he painted. Then, it was Maitland the moderate against 
a raging multitude of rampant Protestants, backed up by a buoyant 
General Assembly straining at the leash to spill Mary's blood. Which 
version is more reliable? 
The problem with the 1567 version is the distinct pOSSibility that 
Throckmorton was employing the same tactics he had used in 1560 to 
induce Elizabeth into positive action in Scotland. 7 4 There is no doubt 
that he was unhappy, as was Cecil, with the pOlicy he was ordered to 
implement by Elizabeth. It may be that in presenting Maitland's course 
as a middle way, he was ensuring that the confederacy, containing so 
many good friends of England, got what they wanted. Unquestionably, 
there were those ardent Protestants who were urging the death penalty 
for Mary but even in this hour, the image of a militant Kirk triumphant 
does not fully square with the evidence. The June General Assembly of 
1567, prorogued until July was in fact boycotted by the Hamiltons, 
Argyll, Huntly, Caithness, Menteith, Crawford, Rothes, Boyd, Drummond, 
Cathcart, Vester, Fleming, Livingston, Seton, Glamis, Gray, Oliphant, and 
Somerville. 7 5 This poor support adds weight to the 157 i version of the 
regency as a 'fetch' to strengthen the lords against a swelling tide of 
opposit ion rather than as a compromise salvaged against a t ide of 
increasing hostility. It suggests that Knox and his radical colleagues 
were manipulated once again by more secular-minded politicians. Knox's 
characteristic lament of the politicians subsequent conduct, 'How they 
performed their promises God knows',7 b after they had obtained the 
support of the Assembly for the coronation of James, strengthens this 
view. 
The differences in Maitland's two accounts, however, are perhaps not 
as significant as the similarities. In both there is the clear notion 
that the setting up of the King's authority was a temporary expedient 
until the time was ripe for alternative action. Of course, in 1571 when 
Maitland was vehemently opposed to the King's party he was duty bound 
to argue, 
that the setting up of the Kingis authoritie was but ane fetch 
or shift to save us from grit inconvenient is; not that ever we 
meaned the same shuld stand or continow as evir thereafter I 
schew to my lord regent willing him to compone and agrie the 
matter.77 
The compromise inherent in Maitland's 'platt executory', dated 10 August 
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1567 provides further evidence for this view. Maitland envisaged 'ane 
indifferent regiment twa of everie partie and ane neutrall' 
exercising control 'and swa with tyme had the moyen to haif restorit 
the Quene at leist to haif re-establischit hir authoritie, as materis 
sould haif happen it to haif fallen out in foreign cuntries'. 78 The same 
strains can also be found in his argument to Throckmorton that the 
pro-Marian measures advocated by Elizabeth would in fact be disastrous 
to Mary: 'there is no way to do her so much harm as to precipitate 
matters before they be ripe or to put these LOt~ds in a strait'.7 9 Yet 
it is also true that Maitland's speech to Throckmorton from which that 
extract is taken, smacks not so much of an apology but of defiance, not 
only against Elizabeth but also against Mary. It was for this reason 
that Maitland was to later submit a complete retraction for his part in 
set t ing up the King's authority recognising that he did: 'verie evill and 
ungodly for he can never be justlie be king sa long as his mother 
lives'.8o Such rectitude was completely absent from Maitland's conduct 
in 1567 and gives the lie to the saintly character with, his son and 
Skelton have sought to endow his conduct. 
There is more evidence to further dispel such a notion. If Maitland 
was a true Marian he would surely have thrown in his lot with those 
who had already voiced discontent with the confederates. As it was, he 
spent four days with Argyll in Doune Castle in early July trying to 
detach him from the embryonic Queen's party.81 Maitland was at the 
heart of the nascent King's Party and their at tempts to strangle the 
Queen's party at birth which suggests he did not carry out Mary's 
deposition reluctantly. His and the King's party's claim that, 'yea they 
be so far removed from meaning her harm that they wish she were Queen 
of all the world' was perhaps the most outrageous claim of the entire 
civil war.8 2 He viewed Mary as 'a very sick person' and just as 'one 
sick of a vehement burning fever will refuse all things which may do 
him good and require all things which may do him harm therefore the 
appetite of such a person is not to be followed'.83 As such, Mary's 
rest Hut ion, given her continued at tachment to Bothwell, was a non-
starter. 
Once this hagiographical image of Maitland is discarded, it is 
possible to view the path he took in these controversies, prompted by a 
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liberal smat tering of self-interest, as a middle way that did hold out 
the prospect of Mary's rest it ut ion in some form. For there are many 
flaws in the opposite argument of Maitland as Mary's arch-enemy. For 
example, despite Maitland's own efforts to weaken the Queen's party, 
there was much truth in his disparaging remarks of their capacity and 
inclination to intervene effectively on Mary's behalf. This draws 
immediate attention to a question that will be examined later, as to 
how far the Queen's and King's parties can be regarded as being 
primarily concerned with the best interests of Mary and James 
respectively. Maitland's opinion of the Hamilton s at this time is 
particularly instructive in this respect. In August 1567 he warned 
Throckmorton: 'the Hamiltons and such as you practice withall, will take 
your silver and laugh you to scorn when you have done and agree with 
us'. This is exactly what happened the following month. S ~ He argued 
vehememtly with Throckmorton over the foolishness of Elizabeth's 
willingness to support the Queen's Party. He confirmed what 
Throckmorton had heard earlier from Tullibardine that Archbishop 
Hamilton, Gavin Hamilton, commendator of Kilwinning, and Huntly had all 
sent messages to the effect that if the confederate lords would agree 
to execute Mary, then they and all their associates would, 'come and 
conjogne with us within these two days'. S 5 Tullibardine certainly had 
the measure of the Hamiltons' ambitions when he explained their 
enthusiasm for Mary's death, 'For she beinge taken awaye theye accompt 
but the lytle kinge betwixt them and home, which maye dye'.8 II 
Similarly, there is evidence to support the view that Maitland was 
sincere in his attitude regarding Mary's restitution, once she had 
recovered from her feverish attachment to Bothwell and the prospects of 
his ret urn decreased. Claude Nau, by no means an admirer of Mait land, 
relates that Maitland delivered to Mary in Loch Leven, a gold token, 
enamelled with Aesop's fable of the lion enclosed in a net being freed 
by a mouse with the Italian legend engraved upon it, 'A chi basta 
l'animo, non mancano Ie forze'.87 This illustrates Maitland's sympathy 
for Mary and provides incidental proof of the Italian literary 
influences of the court. While Throckmorton's testimony needs to be 
treated cautiously it is possible that his depiction of the four 
possible courses of action open to the confederates in 1567 is 
1567-70 261 
accurate. 88 The first of these was Mary's restoration with certain 
guarantees and conditions for the surety of the confederate lords, the 
punishment of the Darnley murderers, the preservat ion of the Prince, 
and the establishment of the religion and the divorce of Mary and 
Bothwell. Apparently, only Maitland 'amongst all the rest of 
Counsellours which be here' favoured this opt ion, accompanied 'with a 
very slender company' of men outwith the privy council. The second 
measure, apparently approved by Athol and Morton, was that Mary should 
suffer permanent exile from the realm after she had resigned all 
authority to her son and appointed a council to rule in his name. The 
third, supported by a majority of the 'Counsellors and a great many 
others' was that Mary should be tried, and condemned to life 
imprisonment and her son crowned in her stead. The last option differed 
subtly from the third in that instead of imprisonment, Mary should 
suffer death. This option, too, was supported by 'a great number'. 
According to Throckmorton, Maitland was in a clear minority. 
Perhaps the key to understanding Maitland's conduct at this time is 
to be found in his use of the French proverb, i1 perd 1e jeu qui 1aisse 
1a partie, which loosely translates as, he loses the game who leaves 
the side. 8 9 Mait land was arguably true to this all his career. He 
always felt he had more chance of influencing the course of events 
from a position of strength on the inside rather than from the outside. 
On this occasion he was to discover he had over-est imated his own 
influence and under-estimated the powers and ambitions of others. The 
story of Moray's regency is very much Maitland's realisation of this. 
The direct consequence was the gradual and mutual alienation of Moray 
and Maitland and the corresponding rehabilitation of Maitland into 
Mary's service. 
Maitland And England 
Before turning to the Moray regency, one final aspect of the deposition 
saga must be acknowledged. This is Maitland's supreme handling of the 
question of English intervention. Mary's fall provided welcome respite 
for England, which, along with the rest of Protestant Europe, was 
confronted with the alarming prospect of a seemingly inexorable Alva 
marching triumphantly across Europe from Italy to the Netherlands. 
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Despite the obvious benefits to England, Elizabeth voiced her grave 
displeasure with the confederates and demanded Mary's immediate 
restorat ion. 90 Elizabeth was undoubtedly glad to witness the collapse 
of Mary's powerful position which had seemed so threatening at the turn 
of the year, but her imprisonment and the prospect of her deposition 
were just too much for her legitimist sensibilities to countenance. Her 
expressions of support for Mary at this time were perhaps sincere, 
although over the course of many years to come Mary was to rue the 
bitter irony of Elizabeth's consoling words of July 1567 that, 
'prosperity provideth but adversity proveth friends'.9 1 Elizabeth, 
instead of supporting the confederates, reminded them of that most 
troublesome script ural reference for sixteenth-century rebels, Romans 
chapter 13: 1-5, detailing St Paul's insistence on obedience to 
'potestat ibus supereminent ioribus gladium gestant ibus'. 92 This was 
probably motivated not so much by a reverential respect for God's 
divine law but by an acute fear of the dangerous example she would be 
giving to her own potentially rebellious subjects with the conquering 
Alva so near. 
Despite this sympathy for Mary, Elizabeth was not above making 
political capital out of the situation by insisting that the young 
Prince be sent for safe-keeping to England. 9 3 This was arguably the 
only aspect of her Scottish policy that had the complete backing of her 
council. Cecil, Throckmorton, Bedford, Leicester and Bacon all shared 
Elizabeth's desire to have James in England but to a man they 
disapproved of her handling of the Scot t ish crisis. 9 ~ They were not 
unaware of the great opportunity the rebellion presented England to 
settle Anglo-Scottish relations permanently along favourable, gOdly, 
Protestant lines and preferred a far more conciliatory policy towards 
the confederate lords. Cecil complained in August 1567: 'Very sorry I am 
to behold the loss of vii or viii years negotiation with Scotland and 
now to suffer a divorce betwixt this realm and that '. 95 To a large 
extent, he and his COlleagues were powerless in the face of Elizabeth's 
determination to follow her own policy in this matter. Instead they 
were faced with the difficult task of presenting Elizabeth's opposition 
in as palatable a form as possible to the Scots. Maitland treated their 
overtures scornfully. 
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Maitland was clearly suspicious of the intent behind Elizabeth's 
policy. He was convinced that if the King's party was foolish enough to 
follow it through then Elizabeth would in t urn 'leave them in the 
bryers'. 'i 6 As far as Mary's freedom was concerned Maitland told the 
English that there was, 'nothynge in your mouthes but lybertye and 
nothynge less in your hartes'. 'i 7 If Elizabeth was genuine in her concern 
for Mary she should forbear from her aggressive posturings demanding 
Mary's immediate release: nothing, according to Maitland was more likely 
to 'put the Quene my soveraygne in greate jeopardye of her lyffe and 
therefore there is non other waye for the presente to do her good but 
to geve place and to use myldnes'. 'i 8 Maitland could scarcely believe 
Elizabeth's effrontery in requesting to have custody of James without 
offering to recognise him as her successor. The only ground on which 
Maitland was prepared to countenance such a move was with a cast-iron 
parliamentary guarantee of James', 'successyon to the crown of 
Englaunde, for faulte of issue of the Quenes majesties bodye'. To 
have done so without such a guarantee was as safe, 'as thoose which 
commyt the sheepe to be kept by the wolves!', but with the security of 
an Act of Parliament, 'the prynce shalbe as deere to the people of 
Englaunde as to the people of Scotlande and thone wylbe as carefull for 
hys preservacyon as the other. ''i 'i 
As time went by and there was no perceived let up in Elizabeth's 
pressure, Maitland became more forceful in his refusal of her requests. 
He angrily rejected Elizabeth's manifesto which called for Mary's 
liberation, reminding her that she was not the sovereign of Scotland 
and had no authority to command the Scots as 'another Prince's subjects' 
to do anything. If Elizabeth spent as much time and effort procuring 
the safety of the Lords, the Prince, the pursuit of Bothwell and his 
fellow murderers as she had to procure Mary's liberty then the King's 
party might alter their judgement of her intentions: 'Will the Queen 
your mistress arm two or three ships to apprehend Bothwell? Pay a 
thousand soldiers for a time to reduce all the forts of this Realm to 
the King's obedience?'. 1 00 He knew only too well that this rhetorical 
goading of Throckmorton would not be answered by Elizabeth's 
embracement of the action he was advocating. Yet, throughout this 
crisis, Maitland's great concern was not so much that Elizabeth would 
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not assist the confederates but rather that she would actively oppose 
them. He was anxious to ensure that: 
yf you wyll doo us no good, do us no harme and we wyll provyde 
for ourselffes ... Yt were better for us yow wolde lett us alone, 
then neither to do us nor your selffes good, as I feare in the 
ende yt will prove'. 1 0 1 
In his contemptuous dismissal of Elizabeth's ultimate threat of war, 
Maitland made it profoundly clear that the confederates had budgeted 
for England's active opposition. It was in his treatment of this 
possibility that Maitland introduced a third dimension into the 
proceedings, the French factor. In so doing, the central importance of 
the eternal triangular relationship of England, Scotland and France 
throughout the course of the Scottish civil war can be perceived. From 
1567 through to the bitter end of 1573, the tactic of playing England 
against France and vice versa can be seen in operation. In July 1567, 
Maitland was in majestic form positively toying with England. As early 
as 1 July, Maitland made clear to Cecil that his own preference was for 
the preservation of the amity with England. His own commitment to this 
could not be impugned being, 'of a long tyme a procuror of the union of 
this isle in one mynd' and he assured Cecil that, 'the matter of Lethe ... 
is not yet passed the remembrance of some of us'. He promised that he 
would 'never weary' in his devotion to England, 'till you utterly reject 
us which I trust will never happen in my time'. However, Maitland 
reminded Cecil that he himself, 'had no cause to mislike of France for 
they have done me more honour than many of my own country of greater 
degree'. He gently warned Cecil that if England did not play their part 
in the curr 'ent crisis, they would accept the generous offers they had 
already received from France but were holding back from out of a 
preference for English support: 'which yet we must needs do if the 
Quenes Majesty will not condescend to support these nobles'.l 02 
This tactic of proceeding pari passu with England and France, as 
Maitland put it, was simple. 1 03 It was designed to frighten England 
into supporting the confederates out of fear of France. As Elizabeth's 
opposition became clearer so too did the force of Maitland's argument. 
In a significant re-interpretation of the 'matter of Lethe', Maitland 
now argued that the Scots were not indebted to Elizabeth, for: 'we think 
that the quenes majesty by the opinion of her owne counsell and all the 
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worlde tooke as great benefit by that change as the realm of Scotland 
did or any part icular person. 11 04 Far fresher in the memory of the 
Scots was the disappointment of Elizabeth's conduct during the 
Chaseabout raid and in the aftermath of the failed coup of March 1566 
when they, 'founde but coolde favour at the Quenes Majest ie hands'. 1 0 S 
If this was added to Elizabeth's present hostility then it was clear 
that they had no choice but to accept the French offers. It was the 
comfort of the auld alliance that enabled Maitland to so boldly dismiss 
Elizabeth's threat of war: 
Your wars are not unknown to us you will burn our Borders we 
will do the like to yours; and whensoever you invade us we are 
sure France will aid us, for their league standeth fast, and they 
are bound by their league to defend US. 10b 
The missions of Villeroy and de Lignerolles added weight to Maitland's 
threats, demonstrating to Elizabeth that Catherine de Medici was 
perfectly happy to see the auld alliance operate at Mary's expense. 107 
It was galling for Throckmorton and his like- minded colleagues to 
see the French pursue the policy they wished to follow and to watch 
Elizabeth facilitate the re-establishment of French influence in 
Scotland. Throckmorton, fully aware of the futility of Elizabeth's 
policy, was desperate to depart out of Scotland. He bemoaned to Cecil, 
Maitland's ability to 'see thoroughly into your doings and understand 
such things and speeches as I wish had never come into their 
knowledge',1 08 Unless Elizabeth altered her policy it was, as he put it, 
'lost money, lost labour and lost time that is spent here'.109If she did 
not, in Maitland's own words her only accomplishment would be, 'to dryve 
us faster to Frawnce then we have desyre to ronne', I I 0 This, Mait land 
knew, Elizabeth could never want despite her utterances to the contrary. 
Even if she had the inclination to carry out her threats - which must 
be doubted - she was really in no position either financially or 
politically to wage the military campaign that would be required to 
fulfil her objectives. Moray probably hit the mark exactly with his 
later remark that Elizabeth was more pleased with the state of affairs 
in Scotland than she admitted. ll1 The gradual softening of her attitude 
as Moray's regency developed suggests he was right. 
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The Moray Regency 
In August 1567 Maitland was one of Moray's chief supporters. Moray, 
too, was supportive of Maitland. On 21 August they combined to give 
Throckmorton short shrift with Moray's total endorsement of Maitland's 
argument, 'Sir Nicholas truly me thinketh you have heard reason at the 
laird of Lethington's hand'.112 To all intents and purposes, this seems 
the perfect vindication of Laureo's assessment of the Maitland-Moray 
alliance in this crisis. There was certainly no discernible wane in the 
Maitlands' family fortunes during these early days of the Moray 
regency. On the contrary all the evidence shows that their star 
continued to be in the ascendant. 113 Maitland no doubt welcomed Moray's 
early success in coming to terms with the rump of the Queen's party in 
September 1567. Huntly, Argyll, Herries, Kilwinning and Boyd all offered 
their allegiance to the King at that point. 114 Maitland's own testament 
states that within the first month of the regency he began urging on 
Moray the need for compromise with Mary.l1s It was probably this 
recent submission, together with the diminishing threat of Bothwell, 
that was responsible for the timing of his attempts at conciliation. 
Moray, however, did not share Maitland's desire for compromi!5e and it 
was this that, lay at the heart of their increasing disparity. 
This did not of course in the early months of the regency prevent 
Maitland playing a prominent part in the government. Differences of 
opinion, policy and principle had never proved insurmountable hurdles to 
Maitland's Secretariat before and he was not about to develop scruples 
now. In the same way as he had served Mary of Guise and Mary Stewart 
he now served James Stewart. All of them discovered to their cost 
Maitland's penchant for working for the opposition from the inside. As 
such, Maitland gave a vintage performance as Speaker in the parliament 
of December 1567, with which many unsurprisingly have drawn parallels 
to his one seven years earlier in the Reformation parliament. ll6 Once 
again acting in place of the Chancellor, Maitland praised Moray 
voluminously, as the fit instrument chosen to protect the commonwealth 
and religion and recounted the amazing, bloodless triumph of 
Protestantism 'within the space of less than eight or nine years', 
Maitland reminded the parliament that it was: 
a peculiar benefit granted only to the realm of Scot land that the 
true religion has obtained a free course universally through the 
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whole realm and yet not a Scotchman's blood shed! With what nation 
on the earth has God dealt so mercifully? Consider the progress 
of religion from time to time in other countries - Germany, 
Denmark, France, Flanders, or where you please, you shall find the 
lives of many thousands spent before they could purchase the 
least part of that liberty whereunto we have attained as it were 
sleeping upon down coddes. 
If this was a back-handed compliment to the tolerance of Mary's 
personal reign, it was accompanied by the the re-enactment of the 
legislation that Mary had steadfastly refused to ratify, the Acts of 
the Reformation parliament. Maitland's performance in this parliament is 
the epitome of his manipulation of religion for political ends. He had 
earlier at tended the July General Assembly and subscribed the radical 
and extensive demands, including a request for the full patrimony of 
the Catholic Church, which were presented to the Parliament. 1 17 This 
was to be the reward for the Kirk's support of the King's party. Despite 
the ratification of the 1560 legislation, the Kirk's more extreme 
demands were not met. The set ting up of a Parliamentary commission to 
consider various aspects of the Kirk's jurisdiction and to report to the 
next Parliament appears to have successfully fudged the issue. The fact 
that this commission, which included Maitland and Knox, did not report 
to the next Parliament suggests, as Knox himself lamented, that the 
Kirk had once again been manipulated for secular ends. 118 
Maitland's parliamentary performance was not a reliable portent for 
his future relationship with the Kirk nor with Moray. 1568 was to 
r-eveal a ma.jor-- r-1ft between Mor-ay and Maitland. a r-1ft which manifested 
itself in his increasing exclusion from the government. It was a 
development that did not escape the attention of Engish observers. In a 
letter to James Melville, Throckmorton put this down to a personality 
clash. His testimony, which is quoted extensively below is a valuable 
and highly instructive insight to the characters of both men. 
Following the affection I have to the Regent and to Lethington 
particularly and generally to all your kingdom of Scotland 
desiring always happy success in your affairs I am constrained to 
say one small word upon the divisions of some among you which I 
pray you to take in good part. That is to say that in this country 
everyone thinks Lethington is a man of great wisdom and counsel 
very capable and very worthy to manage the affairs of a kingdom 
by which it appears to me that the Regent does himself great 
wrong in suffering the absence of such a man from his company. 
And on the other hand I know that Lethington has such an opinion 
of his own sufficency that he thinks his sole counsel ought to be 
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followed in all things and thinks himself worthy of being seen and 
recognised over all which is the cause of the division. Now it 
seems to me that it would be well done to recognise each 
according to his merits. But also that seeing all the Regent's 
affairs are directly founded on the word of God and that 
according to it he manages and effects all his actions it is not 
only reasonable but expedient and necessary that all and each of 
you obey him and conform to his will, knowing the zeal and 
intention of the man. That is it how appears to me but I remit 
the rest to your better judgement. '11 9 
It is difficult to argue with Throckmorton's description of Maitland's 
character but as an assessment of his drift apart from Moray it is 
somewhat inadequate. Throckmorton seems to forget that Maitland and 
Moray had hitherto worked successfully together for almost ten years. 
It was a strange time for personalities to clash suddenly. It is more 
likely that the problem stemmed from a clash of policies rather than 
personalites. Maitland's more lenient attitude towards Mary was 
beginning to contrast sharply with the firmer pOlicy of Moray, who can 
be increasingly identified with the hard-line Morton at this point. 
Indeed one of the most conspicuous features of the regency is the 
development of a powerful Moray-Morton axis. This should not come as 
too much of a surprise. If Moray never forgot who his father was, he 
was not exactly amnesic as regards his maternal provenance. He had a 
natural and strong affinity with the Douglases, which perhaps explains 
why the days of the Moray regency were halcyon ones for Morton and the 
house of Douglas as a whole. Despite being perhaps a lot more guilty 
than most, Morton had nothing to fear in a trial much less a conviction 
for any part in the Darnley murder at this time - unlike many other, 
arguably less guilty suspects. 120 
Part of the difficulty in discerning the truth of the Maitland-Moray 
split revolves around the myth of the 'Good Regent '. Buchanan's 400 
year-old portrait of Moray, lovingly preserved in our own times by 
Professor Lee is perhaps not the most accurate and realist ic image of 
James Stewart. 1 21 Despite Moray's own ut terances to the contrary there 
is not a surfeit of evidence support ing the not ion of him as the 
reluctant ruler. Such admissions hardly square with his steadfast 
opposition at any attempts to restore Mary.l 22 With Morton at his side, 
it is hardly surprising. They both had too much to lose. 
The drift apart of Maitland and Moray was discernible before Mary's 
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escape from Loch Leven, yet one should not be too surprised to find 
Maitland on Moray's side at Langside. 1 23 It was a decision ent irely in 
keeping with Maitland's character. Mary's ha~te or the Hamiltons' desire 
for military confrontation was out of step with Maitland's strategy and 
although a servant of his is to be found amongst Mary's troops at 
Langside, he himself was anxious to finish on the winning side.! 2 ~ Nau 
and Melville tell of a message, apparently sent by Mary to Maitland, 
which stated her readiness upon his intervention 'to temporise and come 
to some composition' but which he never received. 1 2 S The Hamiltons' 
enthusiastic advance to Langside ensured that the prospects of such a 
'composition' were remote. If hasty confrontation could have been 
avoided, it does seem likely that Maitland would have sought to 
intervene on Mary's behalf to negotiate a settlement. As it was, 
Maitland, already under suspicion from Moray, had too much to lose by a 
hasty adhesion to an uncertain cause. Consequently, in the weeks after 
Langside he was conspicuous in his support of the Moray regime, writing 
to Cecil and Throckmorton to that effect.126 
Despite this conciliatory appearance, confrontation was becoming 
increasingly likely. In July 1568 Sir Francis Knollys reported Mary's 
confidence that Maitland was busy manO\Wvering to her advantage. 1 27 In 
the Parliament of August 1568, prior to the York conference, Maitland 
successfully opposed the proposed blanket forfeitures against the 
Queen's party favoured by Moray.1 2 a From this point onwards, Maitland 
becomes openly referred to as the 'necessary evil' by Moray and it was 
on these grounds that Maitland was reluctantly included in his party 
that travelled to York, then Westminster and finally to Hampton Court 
for the shambles of a trial of Mary Stewart. 129 
Mary's Trial And The Norfolk Marriage Proposal 
If Maitland's Chicanery in England was anything to go by, Moray's fear 
as to the damage he could have caused in Scotland in his absence was 
justified. 130 The whole episode is perhaps the most difficult to discern 
of all the intrigues of Maitland's political career. The confusion is 
compounded by the Casket letters and the Norfolk marriage and it is 
doubt ful whether a detailed analysiS here of the events surrounding 
Mary's trial from October 1568 to January 1569 can add construct ively 
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to a better understanding of the controversy. These months however 
exposed the divergent pOlicies of Moray and Maitland. In theory the 
Regent's representative, Maitland clearly acted in closer concert with 
the Queen's commissioners than the King's, culminating in his masterplan 
of the Norfolk marriage. 13l It was a scheme that satisfied the 
conditions Maitland believed necessary for Mary's restitution and his 
own desire for the ultimate union of the realms. His complex strategy 
was not to come to fruition at this time and the inconclusive trial 
closed without enhancing the personal prospects of Mary. While many 
have argued that they were not diminished either, the trial had 
undoubtedly been more of a success for Moray. He was able to return to 
Scotland tacit ly recognised as Regent by Elizabeth and with a subsidy 
of £5000 to keep him company.132 
It was perhaps the continued uncertainty of the situation, 
particularly as regards Elizabeth's intentions towards Mary, compounded 
by England's ever precarious international status, that explains why the 
Maitland-Moray rift did not become final until July 1569. Until then, 
Maitland continued on his not unfamiliar footing of scheming from 
within but with a low profile. A letter of 22 March 1569 shows he had 
scarcely been in the Regent's company since their ret urn north of the 
border. 1 33 However, Maitland still gave Cecil the impression of 
support ing Moray, expressing opt imism tempered with well- founded 
caution after the rapprochement with the Queen's party of 13 March. 1 34 
Maitland, too, must have been encouraged by the continuance of good 
relations between Norfolk and Moray which boded well for Maitland's 
hopes of the former's marriage with Mary.1 3 5 It was this issue which 
was to make their breach final. 
Support for the proposal in England had grown to a remarkable 
extent. The Diurnal reports that in May 1569, Lord Boyd, Mary's 
commissioner, arrived: 
fra the quene and counsale of Ingland with writingis and ane 
commissioun to desyre my lord regent and his counsale that he 
mycht actioun tweching devorce betuix James erle Bothuill and 
the quenis majestie and to hauve thair consentis that the quenis 
grace mycht be maryijit upon the erie of Northfolk and that hir 
majestie micht be restorit to hir croun and realme'.l 36 
The Diurnal's accuracy must be questioned here. While Boyd 
unquestionably had the support of many English privy councillors, it is 
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almost inconceivable that Elizabeth ever gave official backing to the 
Norfolk marriage. It also needs to be acknowledged that while Boyd's 
commission was debated at a convention in Perth in July, no public vote 
or debate was heard on the Norfolk marriage, although it was reasonably 
clear to all that this would be the consequence of granting Mary's 
divorce. It was this convention that sealed the split between Maitland 
and the Regent. 137 
The convention voted by forty votes to nine against Mary's divorce, 
a conclusive proof of the changed agenda from Carberry when the 
separation of Mary from Bothwell was the protesters l principal aim. 
Maitland, his brother John and Tullibardine, all officials of the Moray 
regime were amongst the nine and Mait land facet iously congratulated 
the assembly on their concern for Mary's domest ic happiness. 1 38 It has 
been argued that the remarkable division the vote showed in Moray's 
government was an attractive feature illustrating a preference for 
debate rather than violence. 139 The days of reasoned debate were, 
however, numbered and Moray was to act ruthlessly to heal the alarming 
divisions in his administration. Maitland was his principal target. 
The Final Collapse Of The Moray-Maitland Alliance 
Maitland could now be clearly numbered amongst the ranks of the 
Queen's men, as his correspondence and actions from this point show. 
Following the disappointment of the convention, Maitland passed to 
Dunkeld, where, while supposedly hunting with Athol, Crawford, Ruthven, 
Seton and Ogilvy he was rumoured to be hatching a plot to accomplish 
Mary's restoration and 'the wraiking of James erIe of Morton and his 
assistaris'.l 40 If the rumours were true he was to have no time to 
implement them. Moray tricked Maitland into attending a convention at 
Stirling on 2 September on the grounds of discussing Dunfermline's 
proposed mission to Elizabeth to explain the recent proceedings at 
Perth.141 On his arrival he was placed under arrest for his part in the 
Darnley murder. There was no doubt at the time that this was a pre-
emptive strike 'lang of befoir consaivit be my lord regent, the erIe of 
Mortoun and thair assistaris' out of fear of the alleged Dunkeld 
conspiracy 'quilk wald have bene thair distruct ioune in cace the same 
wer performed'.! 42 Melville states that the death of Maitland was 
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Moray's aim. 1 43 Morton and Moray both knew that Maitland was now too 
dangerous an enemy to be left to his own devices. 
Maitland's own detailed account of this episode makes interesting 
reading. 1 44 It can be found in a long let ter to Norfolk, dated 16 
September 1569. That Mait land should have communicated at such length 
with Norfolk shows how deeply he was involved with the intrigue to 
secure Norfolk's marriage with Mary and her own restitution. Maitland 
told how he had known from April 1569 that 'Morton, Mar, Glencairn, and 
Sempill had made a ligue and that they would procure my lord 
regentis consent to my ondoing eyther by one meane or another'. He 
alleged that they had sought his overthrow at the Perth convention but 
had been disappointed. In graphic terms, Maitland told of his assurance 
from Moray the night before he placed him under strict arrest, 'that I 
shold never be in danger whear he wer', In characteristic style Maitland 
lamented, 'I am assured a christen man amongst the t urkes wald not have 
bene so crewlly used' but he rejoiced to say that, although 'never manis 
lyfe I think wes in greater hasard then myne hes bene', he had been 
'miraculously preserved', As a result he was now in a stronger position 
than ever before to intervene effectively on Mary's behalf. 'Therefore I 
pray your grace advertise me with spede what resolution yow there do 
take for the quene that I may use soch meanes as I have here to serve 
the propos'l 45. 
Maitland's Resurgence 
Maitland's escape was indeed nothing short of miraculous. On 9 
September 1569, Kirkcaldy of Grange successfully duped Alexander Hume 
into allowing Maitland's removal from Moray's appointed custody in David 
Forrester's house to the sanct uary of Edinburgh Cast le. 1 46 The react ion 
of the King's party does not require much imagination but Maitland 
probably judged it accurately when he said, 'thay ar desperate and do 
sore repent themselff that I do lyve. Sure I am they slepe onsoundly 
and some off them shall have caus to do',l. 7 The Cast Ie was fast 
becoming a safe haven for Marian supporters and the prospect of 
Maitland's collusion with Kirkcaldy's other guests of a Marian 
persuasion, ChAtelherault and Herries, was not an attractive one for 
Moray.l 48 The consort of such company probably contributed to 
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Maitland's success in his next and final clash with the Regent, his Day 
of Law on 21 November. 1 4 9 Maitland had successfully mobilised such a 
force of Hamiltons together with supporters of Lord Hume, Athol and 
Huntly that Moray was angrily forced to prorogue the trial. It was the 
perfect vindication of Maitland's belief that, 'at home in my countrey I 
thocht myselff able ynough with the assistance of my frendis to resist 
all the forces they wer able to mak'.1 so The impressive array of 
Maitland's legal counsel is also worth noting. He was represented by his 
brother John, his cousin Robert, a commissary of Edinburgh and Dean of 
Aberdeen, plus the distinguished Edinburgh Protestant advocate, Clement 
Little. 1 S 1 Far from signalling the end of Maitland as a political force, 
his Day of Law signalled the major turning-pOint in his own and the 
fortunes of the Queen's party in Scotland. The Regent's authority had 
been publicly undermined by a popular show of support for Maitland and 
his pro-Marian policy. There could not have been a clearer warning to 
Moray and Morton. 
The Northern Rebellion 
It was at this point that a further element was thrown into the 
Scottish equation by the Northern Rebellion in England. Inevitably this 
involved the Scots. This rebellion can be interpreted as a means of 
salvation for Moray as it forced Elizabeth to adopt a far more 
favourable policy towards him but in truth it was very much a double-
edged sword for Moray.1 52 It placed him an invidious position. He 
desperately needed Elizabeth's support but could only get that if he 
proved his worth by successfully prosecuting her rebels, thereby 
increasing the hostility with which he was regarded in Scotland. His 
seizure of the earl of Northumberland was the perfect illustration of 
his dilemma. If he had not arrested Northumberland he would have been 
d d b Eli b th t because he dl'd arrest amne y za e ye, the earl, he was 
condemned by a large majority of his own countrymen for breaking the 
unwritten law of giving succour to political refugees. 1 53 In contrast, 
Maitland was able to capitalise on the Regent's dilemma. He was able to 
fuel the popular discontent at the seizure of Northumberland but at the 
same time, by playing as he had done so often in the past. a timely, 
godly card, he avoided the unnecessary enmity of the Kirk. Maitland 
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wisely distanced himself from the Catholic aspect of the rebellion and 
called for a universal bond amongst the Scottish nobility against the 
papists of England and Scotland. 1s • 
The Regent was flummoxed. His instructions for Elphinstone on his 
mission to the English court in January 1570 are panic-ridden. 1ss It is 
hard not to feel sympathy for ploray fight ing for his political life and 
so dependent on the interminably difficult Elizabeth. In that last month 
of his life Moray was faced with arguably the biggest task of his 
political career. Whether or not he would have triumphed against the 
growing momentum of the Queen's party with Maitland increasingly at 
the helm must remain unknown. What is certain is that his assassination 
increased the prospects of victory for the Queen's party to their 
highest point since the conflict began. This was certainly the opinion 
of the anonymous historian of the Historie and Life of King James The 
Sext. 1 S 6 Maitland ensured that he and they benefited to the full from 
the assassination of 23 January 1570. 157 
Moray's death marked the end of a dist inct phase not only of the 
civil war but of Maitland's career too. The two men who had shared many 
triumphs over the years - most recently the creation of Moray as 
Regent - parted as bitter enemies. Maitland was not hypocritical in 
this respect and in the aftermath of lYloray's death he refused to 
pretend that they were anything other than adversaries. The beginning 
of 1570 marks the end of the most tortuous phase of Maitland's career. 
The sheer complexity of his allegiance." illustrated by the fact 
that he fulfils Professor Donaldson's criteria for rump membership of 
both the Queen's and the King's parties. He was present at the Court of 
Session on 12 May to declare that in marrying Bothwell she was a free 
agent; was a witness to the marriage contract of 14 May and although 
it is not clear whether he was actually present at the marriage on 15 
May he was one of the privy councillors who attended the meetings from 
17 to 22 May. His equally impressive King's party credentials are 
revealed by the fact that he witnessed the coronation of James on 25 
July and the acceptance by Moray of the regency on 22 August. Maitland 
is the only man to appear on all these lists. From 1570, however, his 
allegiance was to be firmly with the Queen's party.1 S 3 He had passed 
the nadir of his relations with Mary and was to steadily rise once more 
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in her credit and affection over the next three years. Conversely, his 
relations with that other sovereign and realm with whom he was so 
deeply involved were to suffer an equal and opposite reaction. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE CIVIL WAR 
1570-1573 
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The Secretar is the saule, and without whom and whose counsall, they 
can do no moir than the wheillis can do without the extrie. 1 
The period 1570-73 marks the final phase of Maitland's life, the end of 
the Scottish civil war and the effective collapse of Mary's cause in 
Scotland. His destiny had come to be inextricably bound up with the 
outcome of those two concomitant issues and it is his conduct during 
those years or rather the interpretation of his conduct by the 
propagandists of the King's party, that has to a large extent earned 
him his unenviable historical reputation. The machiavellian, chameleon 
epithets and accusations of atheism share a common post-1570 
provenance. 2 Despite the fact that many of the best contemporary 
accounts of the civil war stem from the pens of his bitter enemies, 
Maitland, perceived to a large extent as the opening quotation suggests 
as the 'saule' of the Queen's party provides an excellent focus for an 
effective understanding of the complexities of this phase of the 
Scottish civil war. As the struggle developed and the outcome hinged 
upon the fate of Edinburgh Castle; Maitland, together with Kirkcaldy of 
Grange occupied the centre stage, of what paradoxically for a civil war 
was quintessentially an international crisis. This wider European angle, 
a recurrent theme of Maitland's career must not be discounted. As so 
often in the years 1558 to 1573, Scotland and Maitland's destiny 
depended directly on the intervention of foreign powers. This, along 
with many other pertinent aspects of this post-Moray phase of the war 
that Maitland's conduct highlights, will be discussed in this chapter. 
Not the least of these is the fundamental question of how far the 
Queen's party can be regarded as essentially just that: a party serving 
the interests of Mary Stewart rather than as a vehicle, manipulated by 
many as the most effective means of registering opposition to the 
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King's party, seeking to supplant them with an alternative other than 
Mary. 
The Effects Of Moray's Assassination 
The assassination of Moray was undoubtedly one of the most significant 
turning points of the war, one which left Elizabeth temporarily 
hamstrung and facilitated a major realignment of forces in Scot land. In 
her typically infuriating and childish manner Elizabeth seemed to 
realise what a splendid servant she had in Moray and the great means 
he provided to solve her Scottish problem only when his services were 
no longer available for hire. 3 However, not everybody either in Scotland 
or abroad shared Elizabeth's sorrow at the passing of the 'Good Regent'. 
Mourners from the Queen's party at Moray's funeral were conspicuous by 
their absence. Many had good cause to rejoice at his death. Mait land 
had more than most. Whilst it is not known whether he joined 
Westmorland in throwing his hat in the fire for joy on receipt of the 
news of Moray's death, for Mait land the irony of Moray's demise could 
not have been sweeter.· He had already successfully out-witted Moray's 
efforts to diminish his political influence and on the very day of his 
funeral, 14 February 1570, he completed in perfectly stage managed 
style his political re-habilitation. Maitland, ever the political 
opportunist.) insisted on a fully public trial 'for his bet ter purgacion 
by the assent of the whole nobilitye' on the charge of complicity in 
the Darnley murder. Public trial and acquittal was followed by a 
successful return to the privy council. Maitland was back.s 
For the Queen's party as a whole, the death of Moray, manufactured 
as it was by a Hamilton assassin~ was a cause for triumphant 
celebrat ion. b Here at once is an illustrat ion of the complex dichotomy 
inherent in the allegiance of many members of the Queen's party, and 
particularly in this case of the Hamiltons' support. Even though the 
Hamiltons may have been seeking primarily to fulfil their own dynastic 
aspirations during the civil war, there was more than a small amount of 
common ground in the obstacles standing in the way of that goal and 
their ostensible desire to restore Mary to her throne. The defeat of 
the King's party was essential to both. That Mary and Chatelherault did 
not recognise this shared interest is incontestable. 7 Both seemed to 
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realise their mutual dependence upon each other and this was reflected 
in Mary's choice and Chatelherault's acceptance of her Lieutenancy. 8 
Their common desire to see the King's party defeated ensured an 
intriguing and valuable alliance. The alternative foreign policy actively 
pursued by Chatelherault through the industrious offices of the 
distinguished exile David Chalmers, adds weight to the suspicion that 
Chatelherault's ultimate object was not a complete Marian restitution 
but a government headed by himself in Mary's name. 9 This is not to say 
that the Duke was unsupportive of the mainstream, foreign policy 
carried out by the Queen's party but rather to show that in time-
honoured tradition, he was ensuring the Hamiltons own interests were 
given every chance to prosper through their association with and 
support of the Queen's party. 
The immediate post-Moray period is regarded as the apogee of the 
Queen's party's prospects for success. Their domestic strength at this 
time was allied to good prospects of attracting effective foreign 
assistance. 1o Yet while it is undeniable that the Queen's party enjoyed 
a major renaissance during this period, the situation may more 
accurately be regarded as the nadir of the King's part y's fortunes 
rather than the zenith of the Queen's. The balance of power between the 
two parties was a very fine and delicate one: it was only when the 
King's party was weak that the Queen's was strong and at this time it 
was very weak indeed. With the King's party leaderless, a constitutional 
crisis beckoning over their right even to appoint another regent, a 
distinct lack of interested and suitable candidates in the face of the 
highly uncertain prospect of effective English aid, it was hardly 
surprising that the initiative and momentum swung to their opponents. 11 
The question of English intervention was perhaps the most crucial of 
all these factors. The determining role England played in the civil war 
goes some way towards explaining the vicissitudes in the fortunes of 
the King's and Queen's parties. If it was for no other reason than 
geographical proximity, which traditionally guaranteed a certain amount 
of English interference in Scot t ish affairs, England would have been a 
more than interested observer in this crisis. However, their role was 
not to be restricted to any spectatorial capacity. From May 1568 such a 
stance was impossible with England's fortuitous hold over the raison 
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d'etre of the civil war, Mary herself. This basic fact guaranteed 
Elizabeth's position as arbiter of the crisis, ensuring the two parties 
shared a mutual dependence upon her. Maitland recognised this reliance 
but acknowledged that it tended 'albeit to contrary endes'.12 The battle 
was for Elizabeth's support and Maitland was faced with the dilemma of 
whether English co-operation could best be acheived by confrontational 
or conciliatory tactics. It was Maitland's conviction that the 
consistent, although at times guarded English preference for the King's 
party forced the Queen's party to adopt the former alternative with all 
its attendant implications of overseas intervention. 13 
Even if the Queen's party overcame the handicap of English support 
for the King's party and forced them into submission, they would have 
still required English co-operation to fulfil their ostensible aim of 
restoring Mary to her throne. Elizabeth was nothing if not a realist 
and if the King's party had been defeated, her co-operation would no 
doubt have been forthcoming. She could not have afforded to oppose a 
united and antagonistic Scotland. However, that Mary's restitution lay 
ult imately outwith the Scots' own hands is illustrat ive of the scope 
available in the Queen's party for those opposed to the King's faction 
but not necessarily in favour of Mary's restitution. What is clear above 
all else from this is the decisive importance of the direction of 
English policy to the outcome of the civil war. In the immediate 
aftermath of Moray's assassination, English hesitancy ensured that the 
tide had turned very much against the King's party. It was Maitland, 
who, to a large extent ensured that the Queen's party took full 
advantage of this.14 
In the guise of an honest broker, Maitland sought or pretended 
mediation between the two factions yet it quickly became obvious that 
his sympathies lay with the Queen's men. Despite working alongside 
Morton and rumours that he too had fallen under the Maitland spell, the 
seeds of the bitter enmity that was to so mark Morton's later treatment 
of the Maitland family had already taken root.' S Mary seems to have 
accurately perceived the likelihood of a sincere rapprochement between 
the two. Whilst welcoming reports of their reconciliation which she 
understood to have been perfomed with her best interests at heart, she 
asked Maitland, 'Gif it be nocht on his pairt, pray yow warn me in tyme 
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that I be nocht dissavid',l b In this respect Mary read the situation 
more accurately than Randolph, who hoped to~ effect a complete 
reconciliation between the two men as a forerunner to the better 
establishment of the King's party's authority, Randolph felt if he could 
effect such an agreement then, 'I doubt the less my success in the 
case',17 However, that their respect ive Edinburgh residences provided 
the meeting points for the Queen's and King's lords during the time of 
the March convention of 1570 was a much better indication of the 
future course of the Maitland-Morton relationship. It was Maitland's 
house in the High Street that won for the Queen's men the derogatory 
epithet of 'the lords of the meill mercat',18 Maitland and Morton were 
assuming their positions as the natural leaders of the two rival 
parties. 
The uncertain political legacy of the Moray regency provided the 
perfect ambience for Maitland to weave his own special brand of 
political mischief. Maitland was in his element and it was his success 
in mobilising a formidable caucus of support for Mary that provoked the 
series of bit ter propaganda at tacks against him. The King's part y had 
every reason to fear Maitland's influence as events were swiftly to 
show. An excellent indication of the change in the domestic balance of 
power and the oppositon now arrayed against the King's party can be 
found in a letter almost certainly penned by Maitland on behalf of the 
Queen's party to Elizabeth dated late March 1570. 19 It was signed by 
ten earls and fourteen lords as well as by Secretary Maitland and the 
former Clerk-Register, Sir James Balfour. 
There are certain obvious similarit ies bet ween Mait land and Balfour 
and they must have presented a fearsome combination. Balfour 'the most 
corrupt man of his age' is not far behind Maitland in terms of the 
unsavoury nature of his historical reputation. 20 Balfour, who 'served, 
deserted and profited by all part ies' shared a long association with 
Maitland. Both men had gained entrance to the College of Justice at a 
similar date and Balfour seems to have worked closely with Maitland's 
father in producing his well known Practicks. Both had fallen foul of 
Knox after a former friendship, in the case of Balfour an obviously 
intimate one as a fellow galley slave alongside the reformer. Despite 
having been on opposing sides during the coup of 1566, throughout the 
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civil war Maitland and Balfour seem to have worked very closely 
together. They allegedly burnt the incriminating evidence of the Darnley 
murder bond and were arrested at the same time by Moray but Balfour, 
unlike, Maitland was able to bribe his way out of trouble. 21 Following 
Moray's death and up until 1572 Balfour played the part of a Queen's 
man well enough. working in close partnership with Maitland and 
Kirkcaldy before returning to the King's party once more. Having 
benefited from his devious support. the Cast ilians immediately suffered 
the effects of his defection. Balfour showed no compunct ion in 
betraying information that led to the seizure of Kirkcaldy's brother in 
Blackness with the much-needed French aid, whilst Morton also availed 
himself of Balfour's professional expertise in framing the terms of the 
Pacification of Perth.22 Balfour's conduct provides evidence for those 
who take the view that allegiance in the civil war had very little to 
do with a conflict of deeply held constitutional principles. This, 
however, is to digress. 
The Growing Strength Of The Queen's Party 
The convention in Edinburgh arranged for March in the light of the 
Regent's death illustrated the progress made by the Queen's party at 
this time. This assembly was boycotted by Argyll. Boyd and the 
Hamiltons, who instead convened menacingly at Linlithgow, whilst the 
presence at the Edinburgh convention of dissenting earls such as Athol. 
Huntly and Crawford along with Lords Seton and Home together with the 
master of Forbes, Tullibardine, Lochinvar and Kirkcaldy of Grange aided 
and abetted by Maitland, ensured the frustration of the King's party's 
plans to appoint a new regent. 23 The convention was dissolved having 
achieved nothing except the confirmation of the ascendancy of the 
Queen's party under Maitland's astute guidance. This was further 
emphasised by their subsequent convention at Linlithgow. It was this 
convention which met on 9 April 1570 that represents the most 
impressive array of support both domestic and foreign ever gathered for 
the Queen's party. Huntly, Athol. Argyll. Crawford, Cassillis, Fleming. 
Home, Herries, Ogilvy, Boyd, Seton, Yester, Somerville, Oliphant. Balfour 
and of course Mait land at tended the convent ion along with the French 
ambassador, Verac, as well as the fugitive earl of Westmorland and 
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Leonard Dacres. 24 
Perhaps even more disconcerting for the King's party at this time 
was the alarming behaviour of Kirkcaldy of Grange, in the light of his 
Captaincy of the Castle and Provostship of the burgh. At almost every 
turn Kirkcaldy was an ever-increasing disappointment to his former 
allies. There was no doubt who was held responsible for this corruption 
of 'the some tyme, stout, true, laird of grange'. It was put firmly at 
the feet of 'that fathir of all traytouris, the secretare'.2 S It is 
extremely doubt ful that Mait land was the only reason for Kirkcaldy's 
support for the Queen but their personal friendship and Kirkcaldy's firm 
belief in Maitland's innocence of the charges laid against him by the 
King's party were no small factors in determining his eventual 
allegiance. Kirkcaldy's reputation is the very antithesis of Maitland's 
and Balfour's but it is difficult to see why. Like Maitland he had 
betrayed Mary of Guise; he had even joined the Chaseabout raid and 
despite leading the campaign at Carberry and fighting against the Queen 
at Langside he is numbered firmly amongst the ranks of genuine 
Marians. 26 Maitland's role in securing Grange's support for the Queen's 
party can, however, be quite fairly regarded as his single most 
effective contribution to the cause of Mary. Undoubtedly it lengthened 
the life of the civil war and the prospects of Mary's restitution far 
beyond what could otherwise have been achieved. 
Kirkcaldy's exceptional international reputation was a valuable asset 
in the attempt to secure French assistance as letters to him from 
Charles IX and the Cardinal of Lorraine dated May 1570 show. 27 It was 
probably due to Kirkcaldy's high credit with the French that his brother 
James was chosen as the envoy of the Queen's party to try and procure 
financial and military aid from that quarter. 28 His strategiC influence 
over Edinburgh was, however, his greatest contribution to the Queen's 
party. Randolph bitterly admitted that, 'he hath in his hands that which 
maye do moste nexte to the kynges person'.29 Randolph was contemptuous 
of the united front Maitland and Grange presented, lamenting the 
decline of his relationship with his former 'brother William' and that 
Maitland even seemed to be composing Kirkcaldy's correspondence for 
him.30 Randolph was critically aware that Moray's assassination had 
produced a sequel which looked set fair for the Queen's party and 
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Maitland's confident mood can be deduced from a variety of sources. 
In keeping with his consistent desire for the union of the isle 
Maitland advocated. as the most preferential solution to the conflict, 
an English sponsored restitution of Mary.31 It was with this in mind 
that Maitland sought to rejuvenate his relationship with Cecil along 
the lines of a 1560 scenario, with Maitland carefully channelling 
English intervention towards a common Anglo-Scottish goal. Maitland 
even went back to the reign of Henry VIII in his attempt to show Cecil 
his own and his family's devotion to England, 
the general obligacioun qUhilk I ow unto her hyghnes and the haill 
realme off England for the favour and support my father, I and 
other our frendis receaved the tyme of our troubles as well at 
the handis of her father as her brother King Edward. 32 
Maitland was to discover to his cost that the realities of 1570 were 
far removed from the halcyon days of a decade earlier. There was now a 
massive gulf between the ground Maitland and Cecil occupied at this 
juncture compared to that they had once shared. Cecil, now one of the 
chief anti-Marian hawks in the English council, repeatedly ignored 
Maitland's overtures for a resumption of their old partnership as a 
forerunner to a new harmonious phase of Anglo-Scottish relations based 
upon the restitution of Mary. 3 3 In another parallel with earlier days, 
Maitland found a more receptive ear in the earl of Leicester, who 
undoubtedly had a more favourable attitude towards Mary than the older 
Cecil 'and his brothers in Christ'.3' It was probably Cecil's fear that 
direct communication with Maitland would have been to the Scotsman's 
advantage rather than his own that explained his favouring of an 
indirect route through the offices of Randolph to win Mait land over to 
his former anti-Marian view. It was as usual, well-founded caution on 
Cecil's part. 3S 
Randolph, arguably the most experienced English agent in Scottish 
affairs provides the best insight not only into Maitland's conduct and 
movements at this time but also into the entire post-Moray scenario 
from an English perspective. He was critically aware of Maitland's hold 
over so many of the major figures in the crisis. Hume, Randolph 
observed, was 'wholly Lethington's' and would 'follow no other course 
than that which he will tayke who I perceave doth verrie muche with a 
greate number of those that I shall have moste to do with all'.3 6 This 
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opinion of Maitland's influence was shared by all the English officials 
involved in the civil war. Sir William Drury, the English marshal of 
Berwick, told Cecil 'what favour you woold have Huntly, Atholl or Hume 
to do Ledyngton muste be the woorker off yt. Iff he woold that Huntly 
or Hume shoold have been at thys convent yon they had not bene 
absente'.37 The earl of Sussex also concurred with this view of 
Maitland's influence over the Queen's party, feeling that they were 
completely dependent upon him: 'If he maye be wone from that side as 
they were nothing before he was ther instrument so will they be 
nothing againe when he is taken from them'.38 
Randolph spent much of early 1570 attempting to woo Maitland back 
to his former allegiance. His correspondence relating to those efforts 
sheds valuable light on the intriguing relationship the two diplomats 
shared from the early days of the Reformation crisis. 39 In classic 
Randolph style, he combined his keen political perception with the 
deliciously, spiteful, barbed and entertaining allusions that garnish his 
correspondence. He assured Maitland of the great esteem he was still 
held in amidst the highest echelons of the English court and reported 
to Cecil that despite his wret ched physical condit ion it was 'only he 
that can do beste in all good directions betwixt the two countries' and 
effect a satisfactory and speedy solution to the crisis.40 However, 
Randolph's regular, colourful bulletins of Maitland's declining health, 
which was such a restrictive feature of his final years, betrayed a 
jealousy he seems to have felt towards Maitland for a number of years 
as much as any sincere concern. Quite possibly this was motivated by a 
sexual envy over Maitland's successful pursuit of Mary Fleming which 
contrasted with Randolph's unsuccessful quest for Mary Beaton. 4 1 
Randolph doubted Maitland's capacity to survive his illness and seemed 
to delight in ascribing his disability as a side-effect of his marital 
bliss. 
I doute nothing nowe so much of hym as I do off the lengthe of 
hys lyf he hathe onlye hys harte hole and stomake good an honest 
mynde somewhat more gyven to pollicie than to Mr Knox's 
preaching, his leggs ar cleane gone, his boddie so weake that it 
sustayneth not it selfe, his inwarde parts so feeble that to 
endure to neese he cannot for annoyinge the whole boddie. To this 
the blessed joy of a young wife hath brought him unto that which 
the begettinge of a couple of boyes hath spylte a good boddie and 
lyke to overcome no less a good servant to this commonwealthe. 42 
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This description is interesting in a number of respects. The axiomatic 
observation of Maitland's prediliction for politicking rather than for 
Knox's sermons is amusing, and the details of his physical condition 
important, but most significant is the perceived importance of Maitland 
in February 1570 and Randolph's optimism of winning him to the English 
cause. Randolph was of course to be disappointed, a fact which was 
reflected in his future bitter references to Maitland. Randolph's 
subsequent remarks as to Maitland's services to the commonweal were 
firmly rooted in the negative rather than positive respect. Within three 
months Randolph's opinion had altered dramatically, 'Of Liddington I 
thynke still as I dyd and he hath heard inoughe from me thereof ... I 
thynke hym as unhoneste in mynde towardes us as he is weake in boddie 
in sight of the worlde'. 43 
Maitland's desire to procure an English sponsored restitution of 
Mary was his preferred solution to the crisis but not his only one. He 
made this abundantly clear to Leicester, in a letter dated 29 March 
1570, which enunciated the 'platt of this country'. Maitland explained 
the political realignment that had taken place in post-Moray Scotland, 
emphasising the supremacy of the Queen's party over the King's not only 
in terms of numbers but also, in what was a recurring argument of 
Maitland's, in terms of quality and degree as well. He acknowledged that 
the King's party had attracted the support of 'a good number of the 
nobility, gentlemen and principal burghs of the realm' and most 
crucially of all 'as Mr Randolph beareth us in hand the Queen's majesty 
your soveraignes allowance and protection'. In contrast to this the 
Queen's party was composed of the 'principal of the nobility and good 
members of the inferiour sort throughout the whole realm' and as the 
perfect counter to Elizabeth's support for their opponents 'looke 
assuredly thyt all kings do allow theyr quarrel and will ayde them 
accordingly'.44 
Maitland took great pleasure in informing Leicester that the 
strength of the two parties had been significantly altered in the light 
of the Regent's death by a fundamental difference of opinion over the 
'regiment of the realm'. He delighted in relat ing to Leicester the great 
desertion from the ranks of the King's party, due, according to 
Maitland, to their preposterous aspirations to control the government 
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of the realm: 
It was neither fitt nor tollerable that three or four of the 
meaner sort shall presume to challenge to themselves a rule over 
the whole realm - the next of blood, the first in rank, the 
greatest both for the ancienty of their houses, degree and forces 
being neglected. 4s 
This is perhaps the clearest example of Maitland - sometimes portrayed 
as the emblem of a new rising class of lesser lords and lairds -
emphasising the traditional values of noble blood and lineage; an 
emphasis which has been said to prove a damaging aristocratic bias in 
him. This may be so but it is more likely to have been Maitland making 
the most of a strong, bargaining counter in what was, despite 
Ki1ligrew's over-used and over-valued sociological comment on Scottish 
society, an essentially conservative society.4 6 It was also probably a 
line of argument designed to appeal specifically to the ultra-
conservative Elizabeth. 
Maitland went on to warn Leicester that the proposed English 
invasion under the earl of Sussex - rumours of which were already rife 
in Scotland - would achieve nothing except force the Queen's party to 
respond positively to offers already received from 'the King of France 
to that part of this nobility that favoures the Queen'. Maitland 
insisted that he abhorred the prospect of 'the forces of strangers sett 
foote within this realm' but was realistically aware of what necessity 
might dictate. 47 The sincerity of Maitland's threat can be seen in the 
detailed instructions the Queen's party sent to Archbishop Beaton for 
French aid. This request was composed just days after Maitland's letter 
to Leicester while they were convened together at Linlithgow. 48 These 
instructions are amusingly specific in their insistence that any French 
force should be headed by Henry II's son by Lady Fleming <Maitland's 
wife's mother), Henry de Valois, 'Le batard d'Angouleme', whose Scottish 
provenance would offset the popular revulsion against French 
intervention: 'For it is ane populair favour in him that he was born of 
a Scotis woman within the cuntre and resavit thairin nuriture a greit 
pairt of his age' and perhaps more basically 'becaws he speikis Scottis 
or at leist will easily lern'. The more serious and 'vehement fear' of a 
return to French domination was the chief motive behind the Queen's 
party's insistence that Charles IX 'chuise syk a chief of his army as 
wilbe lykit of in this cuntrey'. The emphasis the instructions placed on 
/570-/573 291 
the dangers of French intervention being misinterpreted as an attack on 
the religion and liberties of the realm 'calling to remembrance diverss 
insolences done befoir in the eis of this peiple' illustrates the 
sensitivity of the Queen's party to the charges frequently laid against 
them by the King's party propagandists.~ 9 
Maitland concluded his argument by insisting that if Elizabeth truly 
sought the friendship of Scotland rather than of a minority faction 
then she must proceed by peaceful mediation and not by military 
aggression. As usual he was able to support his argument with an 
apposite analogy, comparing the Queen's party's situation to that of: 
men in the middle of the sea were in a shipp which soddenly 
should be sett on fire, the feare of burning wold make them so 
leape into the sea and soone after the feare of the water wold 
dryve them to releave again to the fyred ship, so for avoyding of 
a present evil men will many times be enforced to have recourse 
to an other as lesse dangerous. 50 
Maitland's drift was clear and by the end of March 1570, the beginning 
of the final phase of the civil war with the constant spectre of 
foreign intervention was well underway. 
It was under the threat of English military intervention that the 
Queen's party met at Linlithgow on April 9 1570, yet this does not seem 
to have dampened the ardour of the convent ion. 51 As noted in their 
instructions to Beaton the threat of invasion was addressed confidently 
by the Queen's party. It is also apparent in their bold proclamation to 
the people of Scotland and in the instructions given to Maitland's 
brother-in-law, Heriot of Trabroun, to treat with Sussex.52 The 
proclamation amounted to a basic manifesto of their cause. The just 
deposition of Bothwell was recalled and the Queen's party depicted as 
the true defenders of the commonweal and religion. The damaging 
consequences of foreign intervention were placed firmly at the door of 
the King's party. The 'overthrow and undoing and utter wraike not only 
of the cuntrey bot of the religione and all' was due directly to the 
King's party's 'obstinate rejecting of equitable and ressonabill 
conditiones' and not the 'godly and honest' Queen's party who 'have 
socht measoure, peace, and unit ie'. The instruct ions for Heriot of 
Traboun bore the same, confident stamp, warning Sussex not to proceed 
any further without being prepared to face the consequences. 
Similarly, the letter of John Gordon to Elizabeth explicitly 
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threatened that English armed intervention might force the Queen's 
party to accept Charles IX's offers of assistance 'not only for the 
goodwill he bears to the Queen of Scotland but also for the ancient 
alliance betwixt France and Scotland,.s3 This further reference to the 
auld alliance shows that although the Queen's party had to be very 
careful on the domestic front as to how they handled the matter of 
French intervention, the threat of the active resumption of the auld 
alliance was still a potent weapon in their attempts to induce 
Elizabeth's support for their cause. The civil war serves as another 
reminder that the diplomatic revolution of 1560, had far from 
completely supplanted the tradit ional antagonisms inherent in the 
triangular relationship between England, Scotland and France. It was 
arguably Elizabeth's recognition of this and her fear of driving 
Scotland firmly back into the arms of France that was the chief reason 
behind her hesitant policy in Scotland. 
The bullish mood of the Linlithgow convention was further 
emphasised by their subsequent occupation of the burgh of Edinburgh, 
achieved chiefly through the compliant offices of Kirkcaldy of Grange. S4 
This was followed by the release from the Castle of Herries and 
Chatelherault which restored the Marian Lieutenancy of Argyll, Huntly 
and ChAtelherault over the realm.55 This triumvirate represented a 
formidable territorial range of opposition to the King's party, sweeping 
across northern, central and western Scotland. However, the optimism of 
Linlithgow was an inaccurate portent for the future fortunes of the 
Queen's party. Elizabeth and Sussex ignored the Queen's party's 
overtures. Despite Kirkcaldy's cautionary advice to Randolph not to 
underestimate the strength of this 'contrair faction .... for they are 
xxxii erles and lords in parlement quharof xxiiii hes subscryvet the 
writing sent with Mr John Gordon to the Quene your mistress', Sussex 
was able to inflict lasting and severe damage on the Queen's party.s 6 
The English Invasion 
The military intervention of Sussex was yet another turning point in 
the civil war and one that could so easily have proved instantly 
decisive. Sussex's initial military campaign consisted of a three-
pronged at tack on the east, middle and western borders, followed up by 
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a joint military venture with the King's party's forces directed 
principally against the Hamiltons. s 7 The wanton barbarous destruction 
of this campaign has not achieved the notoriety that it deserved. 
Apparently, 'Ninety strong castles, towers, and dwelling houses with 
three hundred towns and villages were utterly destroyed' with perhaps 
the most significant strikes of the campaign being the successful 
seizures of Hume and Fast Cast Ie along with those of Buccleuch and 
Ferniehurst. s8 Maitland laconically congratulated Sussex that his troops 
had in a manner: 
not unknown to our forefathers reasonably well acquit themselves 
of the duty of olde enemies and have burnt and spoilt as much 
ground within Scotland as any army of England did in a year in 
Scotland these hundred years by past. 59 
More significant than the wholesale destruction wrought by the English 
task force was Sussex's successful dispersal of the Queen's party's 
forces. The Queen's lords had been forced to abandon Edinburgh. whilst 
the severe damage inflicted on the Hamiltons and their lands appears to 
have had a lasting effect on ChAtelherault's capacity to intervene 
decisively on behalf of the Queen's party's forces. 6o The Queen's party 
still held several key strategic advantages over the King's party: in 
the west, Dumbarton Castle was of crucial importance, Edinburgh Castle 
in Kirkcaldy's trusty hands was st ill beyond the grasp of the King's 
party and Huntly was pre-eminent in the north-east, but it was never 
again the case as it had been in the pre-Sussex days of April 1570 
that 'the son's party daily decays, the mother's party daily 
increases', 6 1 
Despite the major damage Sussex inflicted upon the Queen's party, 
his intervent ion did not sat isfy the King's men. Ironically • it 
heightened their fears as to Elizabeth's real intentions in Scotland. 
Kirkcaldy arguably hit the nail on the head with his shrewd observation 
to Randolph that 'we thynk yt very strange yt ye never mak mention of 
our kyng in all your writynges and proclamations qlk makes us suspect 
that your mistress wi! never tak the maintenance of hym upon her',62 
The King's party's anxiety reached fever pitch when Elizabeth rejected 
Sussex's request to advance his military conquest. She firmly refused 
Sussex's gung ho offer of taking the castles of Edinburgh and Dumbarton 
within twenty days and bringing the whole of Scotland to her obedience 
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in another twenty if she would but allow him to continue with his force 
of 4000 men. 6 3 Instead, Elizabeth was content to withdraw the troops, 
sanction the appointment of Lennox as regent and to promote a 
negotiated settlement to the crisis. 64 It was the King's party's 
uncertainty as to what Elizabeth actually intended to achieve in 
Scotland that Maitland exploited so effectively in his recruiting drives 
for the Queen's party. He repeatedly claimed to know Elizabeth's mind 
and her firm intention to restore Mary to her throne. No matter how 
much Randolph and Sussex objected to Maitland's claims they both knew 
their mistress too well to dismiss out of hand his speculative 
assertions. 6 S 
However, while the military intervention was not as decisive as 
Sussex and the King's party wished, there was st ill much for them to 
cheer. Despite the public pretext of the invasion as the pursuit and 
punishment of English rebels following the abortive Northern rebellion 
and those Scots who had succoured and supported them, it was clear to 
all concerned that this was just a pretext. Even Elizabeth privately 
admitted that the military intervention was designed to aid the ailing 
fortunes of the King's party and this it most certainly did. 6 II 
Maitland denied that the Queen's party had favoured the English 
rebels but it was a useless and quite transparent lie. Maitland's and 
the Queen's party's handling of the English rebels arguably represents 
their most damaging miscalculat ion. By being so openly associated with 
the rebels, they provided Elizabeth with the perfect justification for 
intervention and a classic opportunity of killing two birds with one 
stone. Just as the northern rebellion had been a two-edged sword for 
Moray so it proved for the Queen's party. They were fortunate in the 
extreme that Elizabeth failed to take better advantage of the offer. 
The gamble of identifying so closely with the English rebels, possibly 
in a deliberate attempt to incite an English invasion and thereby 
procure the intervention of France or Spain was one that badly misfired 
and cost the Queen's men dear. By the time they had finally 
disassociated themselves with the English rebels, severe damage had 
been done with little in the way of foreign aid to compensate for it. II 7 
Mait land, with the benefit of a year's hindsight in August 1571 was 
to view the effects of Sussex's intervention as the most significant 
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turning point in the retrogressive fortunes of the Queen's party. In a 
fascinating letter to Archbishop Beaton dated 28 August 1571, which 
will later be examined in greater detail, Maitland admitted in reference 
to the pre-invasion situation: 
in quhat termis we then stud and quhat nombre of nobilmen maid 
sum countenance and demonstration that they wald then set furth 
the Quenis cause, quhilk company was dispersit by the incoming of 
Englismen in May bygane a yeir; sen quilk tym, for na labour is 
culd be maid that nombre culd never to this hour be assemblit 
again in a place. 6 8 
This pessimistic appraisal was not his immediate response to the 
situation. 
In the immediate aftermath, Maitland, cheered by the swift 
withdrawal of the English troops, seems to have felt confident of 
holding the Queen's party together and capitalising on Elizabeth's 
reluctance in the face of an exceedingly delicate international 
situation - to act openly against Mary by offering the King's party 
conclusive support. Even though he had been forced to flee from 
Edinburgh on 29 May 1570 to his safe haven of Blair Athol, active 
moves were still being made to enlist overseas aid and Maitland seems 
to have been encouraged by the numbers who st ill alleged support for 
Mary.69 By the time of his letter to Beaton in 1571 he had, however, 
realised that despite the many who: 
in privat conference with their friendis wad lament her caus and 
be word is profess that thai wish weil to hir majestie and semis 
to mislyk the present government ... we fynd very few quha puts 
thair hand to the pleuch. 70 
In 1570, Maitland was still blissfully unaware that 'feu will mel in the 
caus or dip ernestly ather to defend hir friendis or invaid hir enemies' 
and there were no signs of the deep depression he fell under in the 
following year. 7 1 Indeed in 1570, it was Randolph and Sussex who were 
disillusioned at Elizabeth's half-hearted support of the King's party 
which seemed to vindicate Maitland's claim that as regards Scotland, 
Elizabeth 'was inconstant, unresolved and fearfull'.7 2 Sussex and 
Randolph both asked to be relieved of their duties. Not many people in 
history have requested a posting to the Russian front but such was 
Randolph's frustration at Elizabeth's lack of decisiveness that he 
wished he was back in MoSCOW. 73 
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Elizabeth's Scot tish POlicy 
Hindsight is, of course, the perfect vantage point but the temptation is 
difficult to resist that had Elizabeth rammed home her advantage at 
this point then the cause of Mary in Scotland would have been over. 
This was certainly Sussex's opinion but as with the rest of Elizabeth's 
policy in the civil war, which, in the main was shrouded by finesse, the 
reasons for her rejection of Sussex's offer cannot be discerned with 
any certainty. Yet however difficult, it is necessary to try to pin down 
what Elizabeth's Scottish policy was and attempt an explanation of the 
dilatoriness that characterised it. Whilst financial considerations can 
never be discounted in any discussion of Elizabethan policy - and it 
does seem likely that Elizabeth's penchant for a settlement on the 
cheap played no small part in determining her Scottish policy - there 
are more compelling motives that need to be taken into account. 
Elizabeth's hesitant approach to the Scot t ish civil war does lit tIe 
to quell the accusations voiced in the unreliable memoirs of Sir James 
Melville of Halhill. Melville believed that Elizabeth was not interested 
in effecting a permanent solution but was content to ensure her own 
safety through the creation, chiefly via the capable hands of Randolph, 
of further debilitat ing dissension in Scot land. 74 There may well be 
some truth in the accusation but if so it was a policy that Randolph 
even if he did comply with, did not approve of. It has already been 
noted that Randolph and Sussex did not share Elizabeth's taste for 
prevarication in Scotland. However, such is the lack of a consistently 
clear policy and the often stark incompatability between Elizabeth's 
public proclamat ions and her act ions that Melville's accusat ions are 
certainly tenable. Despite the chicanery with which Elizabeth sought to 
conceal her intentions in Scotland, it seems that her concerns were 
essentially those of her Tudor predecessorsj the security of her 
northern border through the establishment of a pro-English government 
in Scotland free from host He foreign influences. In 1570 Elizabeth 
clearly felt that the best way of achieving this was not through the 
iron fist of Sussex but through more subtle means. 
In the summer of 1570 Elizabeth seems to have been very much aware 
of the danger of people in glass houses throwing stones. The threat of 
incurring the wrath of France and Spain allied to her own intrinsic 
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conservatism seems to have proved decisive in her refusal of Sussex's 
request. 7 S She no longer had the pretext of the pursuit of her rebels 
who had by now fled abroad and despite the fact that both France and 
Spain had opposed the papal bull of deposition against her in May 1570, 
she probably suspected that both would be quite prepared to take 
advantage of a possible papal subsidy for intervention in Scotland 
against her. Elizabeth was content to support the King's party and, as 
Melville argued, actively encourage division in Scotland but not to the 
extent of provoking hazardous foreign intervention which could only be 
detrimental to England. There was no guarantee that Sussex's proposed 
campaign would not incur the wrath of France and Spain and in any case 
why take the risk when diplomacy offered an equally attractive 
alternative? Elizabeth's chief concern was the security of her own 
realm not the well being of the King's party. It was only when the 
former depended on the latter that Elizabeth acted decisively. In the 
mean-time she had other strings to her bow. 
Her favourable response to French pressure for a negotiated 
settlement was good policy as far as Anglo-French relations were 
concerned whilst in Scotland she stood to lose nothing. 7 6 The King's 
party could protest but they were powerless to change her mind. She 
was probably confident enough in her own security to be careless of 
the fact that her conciliatory approach gave Maitland the opportunity 
to resuscitate the spirits of the Queen's party. That this could lead to 
more civil unrest in Scot land does not seem to have been of great 
moment to Elizabeth. It never was so long as it did not threaten her 
position as arbiter of the crisis. Perhaps then, Melville was more 
accurate than usual in his depiction of Elizabeth's Scottish policy. 
Maitland's year-long absence from the capital provides another 
distinct phase of his conduct during the war. The sincerity of his later 
admission to Elizabeth of his decision: 
to retire myself to some place where I myt live in quiet and so 
past to A thole with the ferme intent ion (as God shall juge me) to 
have lived in quiet takinge onely caire how by what meanes I myt 
recover my healthe without any further medling in the public 
affaires and to let the worlde go as it wolde judging the disease 
of my countrey ayther incurable or that the due season was not 
yet procured when it myt proffitably receave medicine which tyme 
muste breade or at least that I was no fite phisition to take the 
cure on hand 
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is to be doubted. 7 7 Maitland's modesty in doubting his capacity to 
effect a solution was uncharacteristic and there does not any time 
appear to have been any discernible let up in his own diplomatic 
activity. While Maitland may have genuinely intended to retire from 
public life there is little chance that he would have been able to 
enjoy the life of a recluse. An unmonitored Maitland was too dangerous 
a prospect for the King's party and England to countenance. As it was, 
much to Lennox's consternation, the pursuit of Maitland by Anglo-French 
diplomacy as the likeliest means of producing a peaceful resolution of 
the crisis proved to be the dominant feature of his regency.78 
Lennox's appointment had finally taken place with Elizabeth's 
blessing in July 1570. At last he had achieved the position he had 
craved for decades earlier but the selection of this angry, old man was 
always more likely to antagonise than conciliate and so it proved. 
Reconciliation was not a priority for Lennox who was perpetually 
fearful of an English sell-out through a negotiated settlement. He 
favoured a more aggressive policy of conquest and had notable 
successes. Dumbarton Cast Ie was capt ured in April 1571 whilst the 
capture of Brechin in August 1570 has been described as the most 
decisive campaign of the civil war in the east of Scotland. 7 9 Whilst 
Elizabeth was happy to congratulate Lennox on these successes, further 
progress was seriously impeded by a lack of substantial English support 
which compounded the already severe dearth of resources avilable to 
him. Reluctantly, Lennox was forced to comply with Elizabeth's wishes 
for a diplomatic solution but all the while doing his utmost to 
obstruct meaningful negotiations. A truce was finally agreed upon but 
was marked by constant breakages, many on Lennox's part. 80 Much of 
Lennox's aggression was channelled directly against the Maitland family 
with their estates suffering grieviously during his regency. This was a 
source of acute embarrassment to Sussex and Elizabeth in their 
attempts to appear impartial in their pursuit of peace even if their 
allegiance did lie with Lennox. 8 1 
Propaganda In The Civil War 
Passing reference has already been made to the impact of party 
propaganda during this struggle. The part propaganda played in this 
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phase of the civil war is one of the most outstanding features of this 
internecine dispute. A decade earlier, propaganda played a conspicuous 
role in the Reformation crisis. Professor Donaldson has recognised the 
'novel appeal to public opinion' made by both sides during that 
dispute. 82 The propaganda of the civil war was a development of that 
novel appeal, which, if it differed little in its conservative emphasis 
on the commonweal and the defence of the realm contrasted sharply in 
its bitterness, intensity and volume. It was a development in which the 
Maitland family figured prominently as both victims and perpetrators 
and also as protesters. 
Maitland's father Sir Richard, who seems to have remained a 
remarkably passive observer during the war despite the often vindictive 
treatment of his family at the hands of successive regents, was 
particularly critical of what he regarded as a highly unsavoury 
development. Sir Richard, attacked in his poem, Of the Malyce of 
Poyet is 8 3 those: 
Poyetis and makaris yat ar now 
off grit despite and malice ar so fow 
who sought the defamation 
of mony gude honest men insetting 
forth yair bukeis and yair rymes. 
Sir Richard warned of the personal, retributive dangers awaiting such 
authors from their victims, who could well confront them saying, 
think on ye maid of me ane ballat 
now for your reward I shall break your pallat 
but it was the wider, harmful effect such offensive literature had on 
the community as a whole that really concerned him: 
Dispytfull poyettis sould not tholit be 
in commoun weillis or god lie cumpane 
As on many other occasions, his three sons, William, John and Thomas 
chose not to follow their father's advice. 
While William was the butt of much of the King's party propaganda it 
was his younger brother Thomas who provided one of the most brilliant, 
amusing and satirical attacks on behalf of the Queen's party. His 
masterly pasquinade ridiculed the leading protagonists of the King's 
party including Moray, his faithful secretary John Wood, John Knox, 
James McGill, Lindsay of the Byres, Wishart of Pittarow and James 
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Haliburton the tutor of Pitcur and their nefarious aspirations. 8 4 It 
certainly hit several raw nerves and was bitterly and angrily denounced 
by Knox in the pUlpit. It was perhaps in revenge for this successful 
swipe that Buchanan used the character of Thomas Maitland in his 
renowned anti-Marian treatise De Jure Regni, which, although not printed 
until 1579 clearly seems to have enjoyed a wide circulation in 
manuscript form. Thomas himself felt the need to reassure Mary in 
December 1570 that he had nothing to do with Buchanan's latest 
offering.8 S 
Maitland's other brother John, the future Secretary and Chancellor of 
the realm also seems to have inherited his father's literary bent and 
took an active part in the propaganda warfare. Ane schort inveccyde 
maid againis the delyverance of the erIe of Northumberland is one of 
three poems attributed to him at this time. 86 His authorship of this 
poem is, however, not certain and quite possibly it was not known at 
the time. It is to be doubted that Morton, the principal target of the 
poem, and a man not known for his clemency would have shown John the 
mercy that he did in 1573 had he known him to be the author. The poem 
depicted Morton as the Scottish Judas who along with his kinsman 
Lochleven and the other stalwarts of the King's party, Colville of 
Cleish, Pitcairn, Lindsay, Mar, McGill and the bishop of Orkney were 
responsible for the treacherous deed. It was Morton, however, displaying 
the traditional Douglas avarice who was chiefly responsible. 
Fals miscreant Mortoun, feb ill and unkind, 
Thy wretchit hairt could never schame eschew 
Thou never was upricht, trust ie, nor trew 
To friend, to fo, nor to na other man, 
On sic vyild treasoun vengeance man ensew 
On the and all thy fals degenerat clan. 
The coup de grace of this diatribe against Morton was his assertion 
that: 
Had Christ himself been in the Percy's room 
I wight ye would have playit Judas' part 
gif Caiaphas had offert you the sum. 87 
This bitter, exaggerated and personal invective is typical of the 
propaganda of the period: along with the heavy strains of self-
righteous indignation and appeals concerning the defence of the realm, 
appeals to the commonweal and religion can be found in abundance 
throughout the works of both parties. A string of Sempill's ballads, all 
/510-/513 301 
printed by the industrious Robert Leprevik such as Maddies Lamentatioun 
and Proclamation.The Poysonit Schot, and The Admoniton to the Lords (all 
pro-King's party) bear this out, as do equally subjective pro-Marian 
offerings such as Tom Truth's defence of Mary.88 Interestingly this 
lat ter piece published in 1568 cast igated Mait land as a traitor to Mary 
and a 'false Machiavellian', themes that the King's party propagandists 
were to expound upon extensively from 1570. 
George Buchanan was of course at the very heart of the anti-Marian 
propaganda machine. The tract De Jure Regni, his Detectio and Actio 
were all valuable weapons in the campaign to detract domestic and 
foreign support for Mary through the constant sullying of her 
reputat ion. Cecil, (created Lord Burghley in 1571) recognised this and 
in 1572 felt, 'that it were not here amiss to have divers of Buchanan's 
little Latin books to present if needs were to the King of France and 
likewise to some noblemen of the Council'. 8 ~ Buchanan's acknowledged 
role as the Regent Moray's defence lawyer, so clearly evident in the 
post-assassination hagiography that he did so much to foster was 
perfectly complemented by his plaintiff stalking of Maitland, seen at 
its most bitter in his Chameleon. Yet Buchanan was not alone; The 
Crukit Leads The Blind and The Bird in the Cage were all aimed 
principally at Maitland as the 'very soul of the Queen's party'.9 0 King's 
part y propaganda that made no passing, scathing ment ion of Mait land 
was scarce. 
All these works confirm Maitland's gUiding influence over the 
Queen's party and in part icular his hold over Athol, Hume, Grange, Seton, 
Chatelherault, and Huntly as well as offering a begrudging tribute to 
his powers of political guile. The 'scurvy scholar of Machiavelli's lair' 
was a man to be feared whose reputation went before him: 
The Quene his doingis sair did rew 
and richt sa did hir Mother: 
The counsall kennis if he was trew 
To him that was hir brother. 91 
Yet there was more than a hint of envious resentment in the admission 
of Maitland's ability to perform apparent impossibilities which the 
King's party had so recently benefit ed from: 
They say he can both quhissil and cloik 
And his mouth full of meil192 
The Chameleon in particular provides several useful snippets of 
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otherwise abtruse information. Buchanan gave specific details of 
Maitland's kinship connection to the Hamiltons by disclosing that John 
Hamilton of Cochnoch was Maitland's cousin. This is a connection which 
should not be underestimated and is testament to the extensive kinship 
network Maitland was able to exploit to his advantage during the war. 
Buchanan also helps to piece together the movements of Maitland and 
the Queen's party following their dispersal after Sussex's intervention 
in mid-1570. The meet ings at Dunkeld and Strathbogy are well enough 
known but the same is not so true of the meeting at Breadalbane, where 
as in other gatherings Maitland was busy 'plotting directionis to put 
ye king out of his estait, his realme and at lenth out of yis erdlie 
lyff'.93There is little need to go into the details of Buchanan's 
familiar vitriolic Charges against Mait land here. However, perhaps an 
extra twist in Buchanan's bitterness towards Maitland which was 
strictly a post-1567 phenomenon and in sharp contrast to his earlier 
warm regard for the Secretary can be. Quite possibly Buchanan, through 
his mother Agnes Heriot was loosely related to Maitland through the 
marriage of Maitland's sister to James Heriot of Trab:[Jun, himself a 
loyal Queen's man. 9 4 
All of the party pamphlets, tracts and diatribes that have been 
hitherto referred are well known and readily available in print. Not so 
well known but nonetheless pertinent is a manuscript housed in the 
State Paper collection in the P.R.O.; it is a nine-page, anonymous 
dialogue of 'twa wyfeis' in an Edinburgh tavern endorsed by Cecil as '30 
April 1570; a Scottish dyalog betwixt 2 Scott. women of ye state of 
Scotland'.95 This document, bearing much fascinating information on this 
phase of the war, has been so ignored by historians that even the 
editor of the State Papers failed to recognise in his brief calendar 
entry that Maitland was one of its principal targets. The dialogue is 
abundant in its criticism of the Queen's party, attacking in particular 
Maitland, Athol, Chatelherault, Lesley, Herries, Hume, Huntly, Boyd, 
Borthwick, Yester and Somerville whilst toasting the immortal memory of 
Moray, who was turning in his grave due to the lamentable state of the 
realm. Quite apart from being a fairly typical, anti-Queen's party 
diatribe, this document is arguably the most detailed contemporary 
exposition of the popular Scottish interpretation of the political 
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principles of Machiavelli, who seems to have held a seemingly obsessive 
fixation for the civil war propagandists. 
It is clear from this document that the popular Scottish 
interpretation of Machiavelli was no different from the popular 
interpretation (many would argue misinterpretation) and reputation the 
Italian earned elsewhere. Copies of ~Prince and the Discourses were 
almost certainly circulat ing in Scot land long before 1594, which is the 
date of the library inventory of Bishop Adam Bothwell who possessed 
French translat ions of three Machiavellian texts. 9 6 As early as 1553 
the first French translat ion of the Prince was dedicated to the then 
Governor of Scotland, and second person of the realm, Chatelherault, by 
the learned companion of Ronsard, Gaspar d'Auvergne. 9 7 It has been 
argued that it can hardly be doubted that the Prince 'either in 
translation or the original was widely known in cultured and court 
circles in Scotland throughout the second half of the sixteenth 
century'.98 Thomas Maitland's earlier referred to feu d'esprit provides 
further evidence to support such an argument. Thomas poked fun at the 
King's party's obsessive tarring of the Queen's party as Machiavellian 
diSCiples but the remark he put in the clerk, Blair's mouth that 
'Matchiavel is an evile booke and I would he had beene burnt seven 
yeeres since', suggests that Machiavelli was circulating in printed form 
in Scotland long before 1600 when William Fowler made use of 
d'Auvergne's text for his own Scots translation. 9 9 
However, perhaps what this document provides in terms of the debate 
concerning the. influence of Machiavelli in Scottish politiCS, is further 
evidence to support the view that there were two conflicting traditions 
of Machiavellian interpretation in Scotland: one, relatively informed 
through acquaintance with d'Auvergne's text or copies of it and the 
other, a cruder, more popular interpretation promulgated by the 
propagandists. 1 00 This popular Scottish interpretation of Machiavelli 
was hardly sophist icated and certainly not based on the close scrut iny 
of any part icular Machiavellian text. It must be acknowledged, however, 
that there was enough material in either the Prince or the Discourses 
to shock sixteenth-century sensibilities and to support the notorious 
reputation Machiavelli earned. 
The popular opprotdum heaped upon Machiavelli's work is not the 
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least of the many ironies of the age. Machiavelli had merely put into 
print what politicians across Europe had been practising long enough. 
However, in the best traditions of 1066 And All That, it was clearly a 
very bad thing to embrace in theory the unsavoury realities of the 
practice of political power. Consequently, self-righteous indignation and 
a certain amount of hysteria surrounded any imputation of Machiavellian 
influence and by the time of the civil war, Machiavelli was a by-word 
for atheism, tyranny, treachery and deceit. This document is the perfect 
embodiment of that, delineating in great detail the alleged political 
principles of Machiavelli and castigating the entire Queen's party as 
disciples of the Italian knave. 
The dialogue is of especial significance for Maitland. It depicts him 
as the Machiavellian 'scole master', the brains behind the 'glaikit 
cumpane' of the 'lords of the meill mercat " indoctrinating the Queen's 
party with the wisdom of 'Michaivell Wylie'. Incidentally, the 
Machiavellian allusions in this document provide a restatement of Knox's 
accusation of Maitland as an atheist and his much vaunted gibe of 
religion as but a bogle. lo1 
Speculat ion as to the authorship of the dialogue is interest ing but 
inconclusive. It certainly bears the stamp of two of the chief King's 
party propagandists, Bannatyne and Buchanan. Interestingly, many of its 
terms of reference are not unfamiliar to the author of the Historie of 
James the Sext. References to the Queen's party as the 'lords of the 
meill mercat' can be found in the pages of that work, as can a 
description of Maitland as 'sufficientlie studiet in the preceptis of 
Nicolas Machiavel',1 02 The analogy of Maitland as the 'scole master' and 
his house as the 'scole' is one that Buchanan used, whilst the 
derogatory references to John Major are also reminiscent of Buchanan's 
later contempt for his former master,l 03 Similarly the references to 
Maitland's 'heid of wit' are familiar enough to readers of Bannatyne as 
one of his favoured epithets for his arch-enemy.1 04 Yet, whatever the 
actual provenance of the dialogue it provides a striking illustration of 
many of the major themes of the propaganda of the civil war. 
The dialogue is preceded by a prologue which explains that it is 
modelled on the example of John Major's logic classes with the speakers 
termed respectively horse and mare. The 'taill' begins with the 'twa 
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wyf1es' expressing the seemingly perpetual view that things had never 
been worse, goods never more expensive and the weather positively 
apocalypt ic, 'as if Domesday be neir' before launching into its severe 
diatribe on the 'lords on the meill mercat '. It was they 'who herd 
everie day and convene as bairnis to ye scole up in ye secretar1s house 
to Ie arne wisdome, for yai say he hes ane heid of wit '. Maitland, it 
transpires, is imbuing the 'glaikit cumpane' with the principles of 
Machiavelli which he himself allegedly had learned from John Major at 
St Andrews University. The accuracy of this particular allegation must 
be challenged. It is exceedingly unlikely that Major would have sought 
to imbue his students with the devious precepts of Machiavelli although 
it is possible that Maitland as a student at St Leonard's in 1540 may 
have encountered the East Lothian scholar who taught at St Salvators 
from 1536 to 1553. 105 At any rate as far as the 'wyfies' were 
concerned Maitland was responsible for the corruption of the Scots 
lords by teaching them the erroneous precepts of Machiavelli. An 
extract of which is given below. 
A: Quhat new lerning teiches that buke of yairis? 
B: Now mony new thingis as schowis ye grit folie of our forbearis 
and first quhow ane king should be brocht up .... The first preceptis 
that he be of na religion for yai say that religion is to men as 
ane bogill to bairnis and kepis yaime fra mony plesouris and makes 
yame towart in fearing of punicion in ane vyir warld for thingis 
done in this warld. Nixt that ane man suld cast him alwayes to win 
geir and care not on quhat faschoning for ane pourr man is bot ane 
schadow of ane man and silver is ane manis saull, lyfe and 
paradyse ye qlk yai move be ye buke of pocalppis yat sayis that 
paradys is all beildet of gold and precious stanes. The third 
principall poynt is yat ye best net in ye warld to tak fuiUs is 
ane fair promise, ane subscription and ane fals aith. 
As an accurate appraisal of the political principles of Machiavelli it 
leaves a great deal to be desired but that is hardly the point. It 
seized on the popular perception of Machiavelli to slur the entire 
cause of the Queen's party as a Machiavellian ruse. The Queen's men 
were motivated by completely selfish desires. The cause of Marian 
restitution was nothing but lane cloik to uther crymes ... The quenis 
auctority is pretendit be al and menit be nane', This last gibe hits at 
the heart of the fundamental debate earlier acknowledged as to the 
true rationale behind the Queen's party. The 'wyfeis' were sure that 
Mary's restoration was not really intended and pOinted to the basic 
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implausibility of such an aim, 'For how can yai put hir in auctority yat 
can not put hir in hir own chalmer', before proceeding to launch an 
acerbic at tack on the Machiavellian mot ives of specific members of the 
Queen's part y. 
The Hamiltons were prime targets and Chatelherault's motives in 
particular were challenged with the constitutionally correct statement, 
'for he that be ane King most first be Duke'. The view was put forward 
by one of the women that the Duke 'and his bairnis ar bot ane nest of 
fuilles' but her drinking partner was quick to point out 'howbeit he 
seme to yow he hes mony poyntis of Machiavellis wisdome .... he cares 
not for religioun, for na ayth nor princis ... he estemis silver uver al 
thingis'. The wyfeis uncomplimentary characterisat ion of ChAtelherault 
was not without some justification as any student of this period can 
vouch. The Machiavellian comparison was particularly apposite given the 
fact noted earlier that the first French translation of the Prince was 
dedicated to him. Similarly, the sincerity of Chatelherault's attachment 
to Mary has already been questioned in the light of his instructions to 
David Chalmers to ensure foreign support for his own appointment as 
regent in the event of Mary not being restored. 
Other members of the Queen's party did not escape the 'wyfeis' 
opprobrium. Argyll and his close associate Boyd were lampooned as lye 
gook and hir titling'. Argyll was lane scoler of Machiavellis' whilst 
Boyd had past twa universities' in Machiavellian deceit. The military 
power of Argyll was alluded to with his redshanks being equated to lane 
of the plagues of Egypt '. Cassillis, Argyll's cousin was dismissed as an 
inconstant waverer which seems a more than fair assessment but 
curiously Cassillis was alleged to be guided by the obscure Andrew 
Gray, 'his heid of wit '. Hume was described as Maitland's slave whilst 
the Machiavellian abilities of Maitland's younger brother (either Thomas 
or John) were criticised. Herries, it was alleged was so conversant with 
the principles of Machiavelli that if Maitland died he would be the 
perfect replacement as 'scolemaster'. Borthwick and Yester were 
described as 'lustie young men' who regrettably ear gydit by yair sheip'. 
Somerville was 'abill to infect ane army' and the consequences of his 
consorting with the Hamiltons was greatly feared. Oliphant, along with 
Eglinton and Marischal, were allegedly being bought with French money. 
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Crawford was acknowledged as a member of the Queen's party although 
again quite accurately it was said that 'few of the Lindsays followis 
him '.1 0 6 Athol was beaut i fully described as, 'nither heit nor cauld, he 
fisches on the brayis and out of dangear.... firme to na partye and 
reddye to bayth'. 
The dialogue also offered certain qualifications on the powers of 
'the King of the north' - Huntly. Although his ability to 'bring him 
alane mair than al ye contrary pairte may be' was admitted, the 'wyfeis' 
believed that in the same way as his father's influence had been 
limited by the traditional 'northland habit ... which is ginourly trew 
yat yai cum lait, bringis few, and bydis schort tyme' so too would his. 
Unfort unately for the King's part y, Hunt ly with his rival administrat ion 
in the north posed a far more potent threat than the 'wyfeis' predicted, 
as Lennox in particular was only too well aware. 1 07 
The dialogue closed with the expression of the wyfeis firm belief 
that justice would prevail with the King's men triumphing over their 
evil enemies. The chief reason for this expectation was the 
straightforward raison d'etre of the King's men in contrast to the 
Queen's party which was riddled with particularism despite the pretence 
of devotion to Mary. lYe maintaining of ye Kingis auctority and to do 
justice ane thing favorit by ye haill body of Scotland be yame that are 
nolder giltie of ye King nor regent's slauctor' was in stark contrast to 
their motley, machiavellian opponents, 'sum murthiraris of ye King, sum 
muthiraris of ye regent and sum of bayth' who harboured, lye quene of 
Inglandis rebellis the said being enemies to God and to ye king of 
Scotland'. With the comforting thought of the impending defeat of the 
Queen's men the 'wyfeis' returned to their drink. 
Whilst the specious nature of many of the 'wyfeis' partisan 
allegat ions must be acknowleged, not least their insistence in the 
altruistic purity of the King's party, the Dialogue nevertheless 
illustrates several of the major characteristics of the civil war 
propaganda. Its factual inaccuracies are particularly symptomatic of the 
extremely subjective literary output of both parties. Its consistent 
at tempt to ident ify the Queen's party as contempt uous of religion, as 
enemies to both God and Scotland is in keeping with the great efforts 
of both sides to portray themselves as the true upholders of the 
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religion and the defenders of the commonweal. This is despite the fact 
that the most cursory of glances through the ranks of both parties -
at any time during the civil war shows conclusively how 
unsatisfactory the notion of the conflict as a sectarian dispute is. 
Religion And Kinship In The Civil War 
Religious affiliation exercised very little influence as a determining 
factor of party allegiance during the civil war. This fundamental fact 
was even accepted by several leading English and Scottish divines. 
Edmund Grindal, Archbishop of York and future Archbishop of Canterbury 
seems to have grasped it better than most: 'For each party even when 
the dispute was at the highest, professed as they still do, the doctrine 
of the gospel'.1 08 Superintendent Spottiswoode lamented the fact that 
the Queen's party enjoyed the support of 'such as were esteemed the 
principal within the flock'.1 09 Argyll was certainly one of those. Few 
had a more distinguished Protestant pedigree than him yet for the vast 
majority of the civil war he was opposed to the authority of the King. 
Conversely the consistent support of the Catholic, Sempill for the 
King's party along with the allegiance of Athol until 1570 shows that 
the King's party was never, despite pretences to the contrary, the 
exclusive preserve of the elect.i1o 
There were those, of course, who preferred to take a more 
Simplistic, confessional view of the proceedings. Bishop John Jewel of 
Salisbury believed the King's party to 'cherish the pure religion and 
the gospel and depend on us, the other are enemies to godliness and 
friends to popery and are inclined towards the French'.11! Following the 
St Bartho~.mew's Massacre, however, it became more common for the civil 
war to be viewed in sectarian terms. The testimony of Bishop Parkhurst 
supports this view. In August 1571 he informed Henry Bullinger that 
'the true religion is flourishing in Scotland. But the nobles are 
sometimes quarelling with each other not on account of religion to 
which all part ies are favourable but for the custody of the King'. 
However, in a letter of 1573 to the the ZUrich-based reformer he 
preferred to relate the triumph of 'the godly Scots' over 'the 
papists'. 1 1 2 He was not alone in seeing the fall of Edinburgh Cast Ie in 
terms of an international Protestant triumph. In a letter to Leicester 
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of May 1573, the earl of Huntingdon saw the loss of the Huguenot 
stronghold of La Rochelle being compensated by the victory in 
Edinburgh. 1 1 3 
The King's party clearly felt there were advantages in terms of 
obtaining much needed domestic and English support in identifying the 
restoration of Mary with the restitution of Catholicism. They spent a 
good deal of time portraying themselves as the Protestant party with 
the consequence that the Queen's party devoted an equal amount of 
their literature to the refutation of 'malicious calumnies', that they 
intended 'the subversioune and alteratioune of the stait of trew 
religioune and danger to the professor is thairof'. On the contrary, it 
was they who were the protectors of the 'commoun weill and libert ie of 
thair native cuntrie' who not only 'hes professit and does profess the 
same trew religioune' but 'war of the first and chiefest instrumentis 
of the promot ioune, cont inowance and establishing thairof'.1 1 4 
It would, however, be equally facile not to recognise that there 
were those whose allegiance could be said to have been dictated by 
their religion and to ignore the more complex role religion played in 
the civil war as a whole. It is undeniable that Mary and the Queen's 
party provided a focus, however misplaced, for Catholic aspirations. 
Similarly it would not be unrealistic to argue that the Queen's party 
and Maitland in particular were happy to exploit these aspirations for 
the restitution of Catholicism in the hope of obtaining assistance for 
the separate and purely secular restoration of Mary. The Bishop of Ross 
confirmed as much when he admitted to Maitland, 'We wil not refuis the 
aid nouther of Papist, Jow nor Gentil'.11S Maitland certainly cultivated 
some very dangerous Catholic connections which did little to enhance 
his own or the Queen's party's reputation in the eyes of the English 
government. For Maitland, however, it was probably just a case of 
business as usual. He had shown himself throughout Mary's reign to be 
more than capable of doing business with Catholics in both domestic and 
foreign affairs. Yet, even Maitland seems to have surpassed himself in 
the amount of dealings he was prepared to conduct with those who ten 
years earlier he had fought against as the troops of the anti-Christ. 
Amongst the most notable of Maitland's Catholic contacts was 
Nicholas Sanders.1 1 6 The Elizabethan exile, controversialist and 
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historian, who was regius professor of theology at Louvain corresponded 
with Mait land and sent him a copy of his magnum opus, De Visibil'l.s 
Ecclesia Monarchia t promising him every assistance in the quest for the 
twin restitution of Mary and Catholicism. Perhaps even more remarkable 
were Maitland's efforts to obtain papal assistance via Archbishop 
Beaton to ensure the Abbacy of Kilwinning for his 'kinnisman James 
Hamilton of Nelisland' nephew of the recently deceased Gavin 
Hamilton. 117 It is amusing to contrast Maitland's respectful reference 
to the papal provision made for his kinsman in 'anno millesimo 
quingentisimo qUinquagesimo primo, pridie Nonas Septdmb ris 
Pontificat'..ls Julii tertii secundo' to ensure that the benefice 'may be 
saved from that tratour Glencairn' to his conSistently disrespectful 
allusions to the papacy throughout the last decade. 
Maitland's Protestantism had seldom been that of the more radical 
ministers and in this final phase of his life his declining relations 
with the Kirk plunged to new depths. His stormy relationship with Knox 
continued to the end. Maitland's last recorded insult of the 
conveniently nomadic minister of Edinburgh was to describe him 'as but 
a drytting prophet'.11 a He bitterly attacked Knox's denunciation of him 
as an ath~! st and the allegat ion that he had dismissed heaven and hell 
as 'thingis devysed to fray bairnis'. Maitland was even brass-necked 
enough to demand that Knox should feel the discipline of his own kirk 
session for his slanderous and false accusations. 119 Similarly, his 
well-documented clash with the mediatory overtures of the 
commissioners from the General Assembly, probably John Winram and John 
Craig, in June 1571, illustrates his complete estrangement from the 
clerical guardians of the reformed faith.1 20 He seemed to take great 
delight in reminding the reformers when they charged him with being 
disrespect fully disobedient to the established power and authority of 
the King that he remembered hearing not so long ago: 
Mr Willockis, Mr John Rowand the rest of you, preiche concerning 
the papistrie, that albeit the same was established be long 
continowance and the authoritie of princes, yit sould the samen 
be rejected without order ... and not to tarie till the lyke order 
sould be usit in setting doun of it as was usit in the 
establishing of it. 
For Maitland the parallel with the present situation was exact and he 
put a new slant on the notion of tarrying for the magistrate when he 
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said, 'Evin so I say of the Kingis authority that we neid not tarie till 
the same be set down be the self same order that it was erectit for 
that perchance mycht be too long'.i 21 
Perhaps though it is the wider international dimension of the civil 
war that provides the sharpest insight into the influence of religiOUS 
factors over the outcome of the struggle. The long drawn-out 
negotiations of the Queen's party with the major Catholic powers, 
particularly with the greatly feared Alva, lying so perilously close in 
the Netherlands, posed the potent prospect of the Counter-Reformatory 
dream ticket of a Marian and Catholic rest ora t ion. 1 2 2 However, it is 
clear that the association of the Queen's party with the major Catholic 
powers did their cause more harm than good in the long-term. It is true 
that the threat of assistance from the Catholic powers acted as a brake 
upon open and decisive Elizabethan intervention in Scotland, for 
Elizabeth admitted as much. 123 Yet far more significant than this 
short-term advantage was the adverse effect in terms of stiffening 
Elizabeth's resolve to act decisively against Mary that the Queen's 
party's association with the major Catholic powers produced. The Spanish 
provenance of the Ridolfi plot had the damaging effect of drawing 
France and England closer together and facilitated the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Blois in April 1572. Despite the fact that no involvement 
of Mary and her Scottish supporters could be discerned in the carnage 
of St Barthob.mew's, such was the backlash that this awesome 
manifestation of a militant, French, anti-Protestant policy produced, 
that the traditional perception of Mary as a French Catholic and the 
Queen's party as the Scottish arm of the auld alliance ensured that 
they were recognised as guilty partners in the crime. 124 
As an interesting aside it is perhaps worth noting that whilst the 
association of the Queen's party with the Catholic powers of Europe did 
little to advance their cause, the benefits to Protestantism of the 
Kirk's establishment support of the King's party must also be 
questioned. The defeat of the Queen's party did, it is true, effectively 
end the already remote prospect of a restoration of Catholicism. 
However, whether the interests of the Kirk were actually served any 
bet ter by the avowedly Protestant Morton than they had been by their 
Catholic Queen is open to question. It is intriguing to speculate as to 
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whether, if the Queen's party had succeeded in their ostensible aim of 
restoring Mary how the fortunes of the Kirk might have fared. Is it too 
outrageous to suggest that perhaps the Kirk suffered more under Morton 
than it would have done under Mary? 
Before returning to the events of the Lennox regency one final 
aspect of Maitland's role in the civil war ought to be analysed. This is 
the perception of Maitland by the King's party as the guiding force 
behind the Queen's party. This view, shared by the propagandists and 
political observers alike was not an ill-founded one. Generally, 
Maitland's pre-eminent position has been put down to his unparalleled 
diplomatic, political abilities and his experience in keeping disparate 
forces together. 1 2 S Another, equally important feature that probably 
helped Maitland to exert some sort of effective control over the party 
has, however, tended to be ignored. This is the extensive and 
influential network of support based upon a combination of kindred and 
personal ties, which he had built up over the years and into which a 
good many of the leading members of the Queen's party were drawn. 
Maitland's links of kin with several leading figures of the Queen's 
party is striking. His marriage to Mary Fleming was invaluable in this 
respect, adding Athol and Fleming to his list of influential brothers-
in-law and opening up an important Hamilton connect ion to add to the 
useful connections his own Maitland family could claim. 1 2 II His 
relationship with Athol seems to have been particularly close and was 
picked upon by the propagandists who referred to him as Athol's 'head 
of wit' and guide. Mary Fleming gave birth to Mait land's daughter in 
Athol's house in July 1570 and it seems certain that Maitland was 
decisive in winning Athol over to the Queen's side. 1 2 7 There is also 
evidence to suggest that Maitland was able to intervene successfully in 
the complex Argyll-Athol feud involving Campbell of Glenorchy, that had 
earlier seen the two earls supporting opposite parties in the civil war. 
Maitland, through his close friendship with both Campbell of Glenorchy 
and the earl of Atholl was instrumental in the creation of a united 
Campbell-Stewart front; consisting of Argyll and the Glenorchy kindred 
and Atholl, William Stewart of Grandtully, Menzies of Weem and Murray 
of Tullibardine. 1 2 & The Fleming marriage was helpful in other respects 
too. While not related to the Flemings, Adam Gordon of Auchindoun, 
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Huntly's younger brother, arguably the most effective of all the 
military assets of the Queen's party after Kirkcaldy. apparently owed 
his life in the aftermath of Corrichie in 1562 to the intervent ion of 
Mary Fleming, a useful favour for Maitland to be able to call in.1 29 
Similarly, the close relationship the Flemings had enjoyed with the 
Livingstons was not a disadvantage for Maitland when LiVingston was so 
actively involved as Mary's envoy in these years. 130 
The contribution of Maitland's more immediate family should not be 
underestimated. It clearly was not by the King's party who ensured 
their extensive forfeitures. It was the sins of his children, John and 
Thomas - who both actively followed the lead of their elder brother -
rather than his own contribution that was responsible for the severe 
treatment Sir Richard suffered at the hands of the victorious King's 
party. As Sir Richard later bitterly complained to Elizabeth 
(unsuccessfully as it turned out), such logic whereby 'for the sonnes 
offence the father deserveth punishment' was 'agreeable to na law of 
god nor man'.l 3 1 George, fifth Lord Seton was probably the most famous 
Marian of Maitland's relations but he was also able to enlist the 
useful support of his sisters' husbands in the Queen's party. 
Conspicuous amongst these were Heriot of Trabi""un and John Cockburn of 
Clerkington, the latter of whom seems to have assisted Thomas 
Maitland's efforts to procure overseas aid for the cause. 1 32 It was 
also alleged by Lord Hunsdon in a let ter to Burghley that Murray of 
Tullibardine had married one of Maitland's sisters, although 
corroborative evidence for this statement has proved elusive as has 
Hunsdon's claim that Tullibardine was Mar's brother. 1 33 If it is true 
however it provided another valuable connection and helps explain 
Tullibardine's strenuous mediatory efforts to bring the two parties 
together. 1 3 ~ Also conspiCUOUS in his support of the Queen's party at 
least until 1572 was another of Maitland's kinsmen Hugh, Lord 
Somerville, whilst the support of Robert Maitland, a cousin and 
influential long·-ter-m ally of Maitland, being a Senator of the College 
of Justice and the dean of Aberdeen was also a positive advantage. His 
physical efforts in helping to convey Maitland to the castle in 1571 
are amusingly recorded in Bannatyne. 1 3 S Maitland was also assisted by 
the cadet Auchengassil branch of the Maitland family with John of that 
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ilk suffering forfeiture and not having the terms of the pacification 
of Perth extended to him until 1578. 136 
There is evidence however to suggest that the support of the wider 
Maitland kinship network for Mary was not unanimous. The laird of 
Carmichael, who was described by Morton as Maitland's cousin seems to 
have been able to maintain credit with both part ies. The behaviour of 
Maitland's grandparents the Cranstouns of Corsby is another case in 
point. The Cranstoun s· allegiance was, however, disputed by the Regent 
Mar. The debate surrounds Maitland's complaint on behalf of 'the 
goodman of Corsby' very probably Maitland's grandfather, seventy six 
years old and blind with age, who, despite having 'served and obeyi t 
continually theyr usurped authority' had seen his lands ravaged by that 
rapacious reaper of Maitland territory - Alexander Hume of Manderston. 
Mar, however, refuted Maitland's claims angrily renouncing them to 
Hunsdon, the English official stating 'had the Cranstons all being as 
true servants to the King as they were Lethington's near kinsmen and 
earnest fautoris little mention of that matter had been in the 
answer'.1 37 Yet, taken overall, Maitland's family in this post-1570 
period appear to have been outstanding supporters of the Marian cause. 
Equally significant was the firm hold Maitland was able to exercise 
over several highly influential friends. Kirkcaldy is the obvious 
example here. Quite apart from his captaincy of the Castle and 
Provostship of the burgh, Kirkcaldy was also able to bring with him the 
valuable assistance of his two brothers, James and Thomas. Their 
friendship which can be traced back to the embryonic days of the 
Congregat ion was one of the few to last the difficult course of the 
years 1559 to 1573. 13 a Of similar long standing was Maitland's 
friendship with Sir Robert Melville, first Lord of Monimail. This 
perhaps explains the more generous treatment (by contemporary 
standards) afforded to Maitland in his brother'S unreliable memoirs. 
Maitland was able to benefit from the unstinting support of the 'loyal 
Melvilles'; Captain David, Sir Andrew and Walter were all devoted 
Marians. Robert and Andrew remained in the Cast Ie unt 11 the bitter 
end. 139 The support of Alexander, fifth Lord Hume for the Queen's party 
was similarly no doubt bolstered by the great personal friendship he 
had with Maitland. In warning Sussex that he would face his own wrath 
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if any harm came to Hume, Maitland described Hume as 'a Scotishman and 
so my countryman whom for the nation I must favour besides that he is 
particularly one of the dearest friends I have ... '.140 Maitland's 
influence and that of the aforementioned Robert Maitland may also have 
been responsible for the influential Edinburgh lawyer and burgh official 
Clement Little being prepared to 'trim his sails' during the Queen's 
party's occupation of the capital until late June 1571 when he finally 
left for Leith. 1 41 Mait land was also able to exploit his friendship with 
Scots overseas. Throughout the personal reign of Mary he appears to 
have maintained an active correspondence with Archbishop Beaton which 
he particularly capitalised on in this period. 1 42 Similarly, the Scot t ish 
Conservator of the staple at Veere, George Hackett, a vital link and 
focus for several efforts to obtain Spanish assistance for Mary .and a 
committed Marian, was an old class-mate of Maitland's from St Andrews 
in 1540. 143 
It is not difficult to understand why Maitland was perceived by the 
King's party as the 'very soul' of the Queen's party. They probably 
realised that if anyone could hold the Queen's party together as an 
effective and cohesive unit, Maitland could. They knew only too well at 
first hand his immense political and diplomat ic skills which had been 
used to their benefit in the earlier phase of the war. They were also 
probably a lot more aware than subsequent historians have been, of 
Maitland's vast personal influence over so many significant and 
powerful figures in the war, a brief indication of which h~s been given 
above. Bannatyne caustically but percipiently noted Maitland's ability to 
'lay a plaster over the wound of variance' that lay at the heart of the 
Queen's party.l 44 It was this that also lay at the heart of the King's 
party fear of him and why he was so often the target of so much of 
their propaganda. 
Maitland's Justification Of His Conduct 
Attention ought now to be re-focused upon the brief but eventful 
fourteen-month Lennox regency. It was during this turbulent period that 
Mait land provided what has right ly been regarded as his apology and 
justification of his conduct during the civil war. This can be gleaned 
from two separate sources. The first is Maitland's lengthy 
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correspondence with the earl of Sussex which began just prior to 
Lennox's appointment in the Summer of 1570 and the second, the stormy 
conference earlier referred to, of May 1571 between Maitland and 
Balfour on the one part and the representatives from the General 
Assembly, John Craig and John Winram on the other.1 4 S Taken together, 
the two provide Maitland's admitted rationale for his part in the 
deposition of Mary, his subsequent fall-out with Moray and his ultimate 
return to the allegiance of his Queen. 
The correspondence with Sussex occasioned Elizabeth's famous, 'Flower 
of the wits of Scotland' remark as a tribute to Sussex's ability to cope 
with the notoriously brilliant Maitland. 1 46 Maitland displayed the full 
range of his legal, philosophical, spiritual and political erudition in 
his defence against Sussex's accusations and he had good cause to do 
so. Sussex accused him on very good grounds of inconstancy and 
hypocrisy, forcefully reminding him of his major part in Mary's 
downfall, his earlier championing of the King's authority and urged him 
to return to his former allegiance. Craig and Winram placed exactly the 
same Charges against him and it is their confrontation which will be 
dealt with first. 
Maitland stole the thunder of the clergymen's accusations by openly 
admitting his part in the downfall of Mary. He seemed to take 
particular pleasure in avowing that her deposition and the coronation 
of James could not have been done without him or his expertise: lYe and 
farther without me they had nather the knowledge, wisdome, nor moyen 
to performe the same'. As noted in the previous chapter, this 
confrontation was the occasion of Maitland's admission of James' 
coronation as a temporary 'fetch' and his complete retraction for his 
earlier behaviour: 'for my owin part plainlie I confess I did verie evill 
and ungodly in the upsetting of the kingis authoritie for he can never 
justlie be king sa long as his mother lives'. 1 47 Maitland then launched 
a bitter attack on the King's party and there were many in the Queen's 
party who were only too happy to go along with his carefully selective 
analysis of the progressive phases of the civil war. The convenient 
distinctions he drew between the justifiable opposition at Carberry and 
his dismissal of the subsequent deposit ion and coronat ion as 'but ane 
fetch' and the now indefensible opposition the King's party were 
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maintaining were attractive to many. At any rate Maitland was convinced 
that he spoke for the majority, 'That which I speik the whole noble men 
in this town and utheris here present will affirm the same', He was 
probably right. 148 
Maitland resorted to a more sophisticated defence of his conduct to 
Sussex, although his basic interpretation of the pattern of the civil 
war remained the same. The arguments he used in this lengthy 
correspondence shed a great deal of light on Maitland's career as a 
whole. Through a series of detailed arguments, Maitland showed the 
depth of his learning. Drawing upon the examples amongst many others 
of Plato, Cicero, Zeno, Aristotle, the jurists, scripture and particularly 
St Paul, he made it clear that the very inconstancy he was charged with 
- and is largely remembered for - was to him an essential political 
virtue. 
Maitland's tussle with Sussex raises once again the spectre of 
Machiavelli. It does seem more than likely that Maitland was conversant 
with the works of Machiavelli. His basic political premise bears a 
striking resemblance to the Italian's insistence found in chapter 25 of 
the Prince and also in the Discourses o~ the need for the adapatation 
of policy to particular circumstances and environment. Maitland was no 
stranger to Italian cultural influences and in this respect - as noted 
in chapter one - a parallel can be drawn between him and one of his 
predecessors in the office of Secretary, Sir Thomas Erskine, a student 
at Pavia. 1 49 It was in all probability Machiavelli to whom Maitland 
was referring when he told Sussex: 
I remember I have redde in a good author one that in his time was 
no prentice in the politique science beinge from his youth brought 
up in that trade, it was never praised in those that were 
excellent in the government of the commonwelthe to remaine always 
perpetuallie in one opinion but as in sailinge it is a chief point 
of the master's arte in ruling his shippe to applie his course as 
the stormie blastes of winde and wether shall dryve him so in the 
politique actions of all states tyme must beare a great swinge to 
teache men how farre they may follow the trade they have begonne 
or where they shall change to direct their course an other 
waie. 150 
Maitland's entire career is illustrative of his firm grasp of this 
precept. As contemporaries were wont to observe, Maitland always had 
more than one string to his bow. 
The tortuous nature of much of Maitland's detailed arguments, 
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part icularly those concerning the nicet ies of 'bonum and malum' is 
illustrative of the bitter determination of both sides to prove that 
they had right on their side. It also emphasises the sheer complexity 
of the civil war and the volat ile nat ure of the allegiances of those 
involved. In their intense and very clever debate, Maitland and Sussex 
had to contend with the major volte-face both England and Maitland had 
performed in respect of their allegiance and attitude to the Marian 
question. Maitland was not slow to argue that if he was guilty of 
inconstancy so too was Elizabeth. Sussex rightly insisted that Maitland 
had been amongst those who had earlier demanded harsher action against 
Mary by Elizabeth yet equally, Maitland was right to insist that 
Elizabeth's attitude on the same issue had hardly remained constant. 
Unlike Elizabeth - who denied any change - Maitland was able to point 
to the greatly changed circumstances to justify his change of heart. He 
did not agree with Elizabeth's and Sussex's conviction 'that the persons 
be still the same, the causes the same and the matter the same'. 
According to Maitland: 
tyme hath changed many thinges. The affections of men are changed 
in both the realmes and the persons are altered, there be more 
persons than the two queens to be considered, the person of the 
late regent was a circumstance of no small moment which with the 
Regiment itself was extinguished and that state which then was 
utterly confounded. 
Maitland felt these serious changes necessitated all parties 'to have 
recourse to a new remedie which I thinke the beste you knowe'. 
Maitland's civil war was largely spent attempting to win Elizabeth and 
her government round to accepting his 'remedie',1 S 1 
Maitland's consistent exploitation of the language of the commonweal 
throughout his career to justify his actions is evident again on this 
occasion, 'The chief thing we ought moste to respect is our countrey 
the common parent of us all and the quiett thereof. To that end we 
muste directe all our actions', Maitland was convinced his conduct had 
been consistent with this fundamental principle. He insisted that he had 
always favoured a negotiated settlement to the crisis and claimed that 
there were many 'bothe Englishe and Scotishe ... yea even of those which 
be nerest about the Quene your mystress and I truste hir self wer also 
privy' to his consistent attempts 'within a monthe or thereabouts after 
the last regent accepted the office' to reach an accord with Mary. Much 
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less credible were Maitland's denials of any knowledge of the 'secret 
practices and open actions' of Mary's supporters in England and 
Scotland. Evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. 1 52 
Maitland's dismissal of Seton's mission to Flanders as an attempt to 
prevent Spanish intervent ion and of his brother Thomas accompanying 
Seton on the same journey, merely to keep his cousin company and to 
see a bit of the world at the same time is suspicious to say the 
least. 1 53 The English government had evidence that one of Lethington's 
servants, Thomas Cowy, had been industrious in recruiting the 
assistance of France and Spain. Cowy, cannot have been the most 
inconspicious looking of spies. He was described by Randolph as, 'a very 
young man and his head almost all white, a slender body, evil face and 
little beard'.1 54 Maitland was unquestionably involved in the attempts 
to enlist foreign aid for the Queen's party, both in what can be 
regarded as the mainstream strategy with their strongly Marian 
emphasis and also with the alternative efforts such as those conducted 
by Chatelherault via David Chalmers. It is hard to imagine Maitland, 
with his close association with the Hamiltons being unaware of this 
alternative policy. The personal animosity between Maitland and so many 
members of the King's party must have been a strong factor encouraging 
him to support any initiative which would lead to the defeat of the 
King's party. 
The depth of the differences in opinion between Maitland and Sussex 
as to the justice of their respective causes is indicative of the 
increasing bitterness between the King's and Queen's parties and their 
failure to come to peaceful terms with each other. Attitudes were 
becoming more and more entrenched as personal animosity, fuelled by 
forfeitures and the spoils of numerous military encounters combined to 
decrease the liklihood of a negotiated settlement. Taken as a whole, the 
Lennox regency - despite the external efforts to bring the two sides 
together - did very lit t Ie to advance the prospect of a negot iated 
peace. 
The Lennox Regency 
Although the Lennox regency witnessed a steady decline in the Queen's 
party's fortunes, the prospects of a solution either by conquest or 
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diplomacy were as remote as ever. The Queen's party had undoubtedly 
been reduced to dire straits. The defection of Argyll and Boyd added 
further strength to the main core of the King's party, made up of 
Lennox, Morton, Mar, Glencairn, Buchan, Glamis, Lyndsay, Ruthven, Methven, 
Cathcart, Ochiltree and Sempil1. 1ss In August 1571 Maitland sadly 
reported that Eglinton and Cassillis, Crawford, Montrose, Menteith, the 
Master Marischal, the Master of Errol, Yester, Borthwick and Drummond 
could all be counted as King's men. 1 5 b This together with the loss of 
Dumbarton, Morton's seizure of Brechin and the execution of Archbishop 
Hamilton severely weakened the Queen's party's aspirations. It was 
probably only the definite attachment of Kirkcaldy of Grange following 
his 'outrage' of December 1570, which secured the Queen's party's hold 
on the town and Castle of Edinburgh, together with the continued 
effectiveness of Hunt ly's rival administrat ion in the north that 
prevented the death knell ringing even louder for the Queen's men 
during Lennox's regency.1S1 
In an attempt to restore some semblance of cohesive unity to the 
Queen's party, Maitland had been forced to return to Edinburgh in April 
1571 to effect an assembly of their supporters. According to Maitland's 
correspondence the 'hail bourdin' had fallen on Huntly and himself and 
despite being: 
so diseasit in my persone that I was nat her abil to ryde nor gang. 
Yit knawing that if I refusit it wald serve for a stay to the rest 
I set al danger asyd and quhair I mycht not be careit be land, I 
come by sey and almost baith at ane tyme Huntly and I about the 
second of April last. 1 S 8 
Maitland's journey enabled the Queen's men to reduce their opponents to 
the indignity of the 'Creeping parliament' in the Canongate while they 
were able to hold their own parliament in the more traditional 
Tolbooth, together with the requisite regalia. However, the respective 
procedural dignity of the two parliaments, whilst accurately reflecting 
the relative strengths of the two parties in Edinburgh, did not provide 
the same accuracy of support the part ies enjoyed on a nat ional scale. 
The 'Creeping parliament' has been described as 'no more than a symbolic 
show of defiance' yet the same was no less true of the rival assembly 
whose effectiveness was even emptier. 1 5 9 This is illustrated by the 
inability of the Queen's party to enforce their tit-for-tat forfeitures 
and legislation and the almost immediate departure of Argyll and Boyd 
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from their ranks. 
The Queen's party's plight during the Lennox regency, bereft of 
substantial foreign aid, was as Maitland knew only too well -
desperate. Maitland rightly perceived their possession of Edinburgh was 
crucial, as the war 'is brocht from all the rest of the realme to thir 
twa tounis' Leith and Edinburgh. 1 60 Despite the boasts of the King's 
party that they would take the town and the castle, Maitland was happy 
to report that the same was 'sa weil fort ifeit and provydit that thai 
are constrainit to put water in thair wyn'.l t. 1 However, as noted 
earlier, the town and castle of Edinburgh was one of the few trump 
cards left remaining to the Queen's men. Elizabeth's continued 
reluctance, despite her clear favouring of the King's party, to furnish 
them with the telling military power was perhaps the next major factor 
prolonging the life of the Queen's party. 
Maitland's letters to Mary and Archbishop Beaton illustrate his 
acute understanding of their declining fort unes. Mait land recounted the 
meagre assistance they had received from France: 'twa thousand crown is 
and ane thousand pistollis' did little to alleviate their urgent 
financial need. 162 Their credit with the merchants was almost exhausted 
and mutiny beckoned if they did not receive substantial aid from France 
immediately. The recent defections of Argyll, Cassilis, Boyd and Eglinton 
had further damaged their credit with the merchants and allied to their 
critical financial situation was the equally alarming fact that they 
were badly outnumbered in military terms. Apart from their mercenaries 
and inhabitants of Edinburgh, Maitland admitted that they did not have 
one hundred men ready to fight.163 This illustrates not only the 
importance of the burgesses of Edinburgh and helps explain the 
strenuous efforts made by both sides to obtain their support but also 
the Queen's party's urgent necessity of a regular money supply, vital 
for the retention of their mercenary force. 164 
The King's party were not immune from financial worries either. 
Indeed the final phase of the war from 1571 to 1573 which came to be 
termed the wars between Leith and Edinburgh, took place against the 
backcloth of a severe economic crisis. The civil war, if not the root 
cause of this, certainly exacerbated it to a crit ical extent. So severe 
were the cumulative economic effects which the military struggle 
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wrought on the Edinburgh community, particularly in terms of chronic 
inflation and food shortages, that the wars between Leith and Edinburgh 
have been said to have declined into a, 
rather than the minds and hearts of 
'struggle for the stomachs 
the remaining Edinburgh 
inhabitants'. 1 b S Similarly, Sir William Drury's comment during this phase 
of the war, that 'money is the man in Scotland' correctly emphasised the 
fundamental influence financial considerations exercised over this 
ultimate chapter of the civil war. 10b 
It is against this backcloth of a growing economic and political 
crisis, part icularly from the perspect ive of the Queen's party, that the 
events of the night of 4 September 1571 in Stirling ought to be judged. 
This botched coup is one of the most significant episodes in the civil 
war. Although its failure had terminal implications for the cause of the 
Queen's party, that it came within an ace of success illustrates not 
only the fragility of the King's party's authority but also the utter 
precariousness of Elizabeth's Scottish policy. At first it appeared that 
the stratagem had gone completely according to plan. Maitland's aim of 
capturing Morton, Lennox, Argyll, Glencairn, Cassillis, Eglinton, 
Montrose, Menteith and Ruthven - 'the haill nobilmen of yat syde' bar 
Mar and Angus who were safely ensconced in the Castle - and conveying 
them to the surety of Edinburgh Castle seemed within their grasp. The 
Queen's party, however, managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of 
Victory. The greed of the borderers for petty spoils ensured that 'the 
whole fruit of the journey was lost' in the farcical chaos that they 
provoked. Buccleuch's 'untymous kindness' in releasing Morton led to the 
m~lee which saw the slaughter of Lennox and the escape of the other 
lords. Instead of regaining the init iat ive, Mait land was forced to 
admit that the strike had done the King's party more good than harm by 
ridding them of their greatest liabilty, Lennox. If Maitland was guilty 
of overstating the point, there was still much truth in his 
assessment.1 6 7 
Maitland had never hidden his contempt for Lennox since his 
appointment as regent. Hypocrit ically, in view of his own earlier 
attachment to the English cause, Maitland denounced him, as 'an 
Englishman sworn'. He ridiculed Lennox as an incompetent, not to be held 
responsible for the lamentable state of the realm 'for he is too simple 
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to bear the burden of their faults'.l 68 It had become increasingly 
apparent that Lennox did not enjoy the full support of the King's party, 
particularly that of Morton, the real power behind the throne, and was 
hindering their prospects. Mait land even claimed that it was the King's 
men who were responsible for the death of Lennox, alleging that before 
the St irling fiasco they had plot ted his downfall as 'is notoriously 
known in Scotland and England'. 1 69 It was certainly true, regardless of 
who fired the shot that killed Lennox, as Maitland acknowledged, that 
the King's men stood to gain considerably more from his removal than 
their adversaries. The speedy appointment of Mar as Lennox's successor 
within twenty-four hours of his death was felt by Maitland to be 
further proof of the scant regard Lennox was held in by his supposed 
supporters. 1 70 
The Mar Regency 
The appointment of Mar did not signal any upturn in the Queen's party's 
fortunes. His thirteen-month regency witnessed their further decline 
amidst a series of disastrous internat ional blows to their cause. The 
discovery of the Ridolfi Plot, and even more decisively the effects of 
the St Barthll/llmew's Massacre, served to harden Elizabeth's attitude to 
the Marian question. By early 1572 Elizabeth had publicly anounced her 
firm opposition to Mary. By the autumn of that year the extremity of 
that opposition had deepened so radically that she was prepared to 
deliver Mary up to the King's part y for almost certain death. 1 71 This 
'great matter' as it came to be known is a timely reminder of the great 
delicacy of the Marian quest ion. For whilst both Elizabeth and the 
King's men would have been quite happy to reap the benefits of Mary's 
execution, neither were prepared to perform the dirty deed and to be 
held publicly reponsible for it. 
It is not being over-dramatic to state that the Barth.:.wmew's 
Massacre sounded the death-knell loud and clear for the Queen's party. 
The Catholic orgy of violence against the Huguenots practically negated 
the effects of the recent Anglo-French reconciliation of Blois but this 
was of little import in relation to the overwhelming damage it 
inflicted upon their cause, given France's inability to implement a 
similarly militant policy in Scotland. It is somewhat ironic that the 
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Queen's party's continuous attempts to gain overseas aid reaped them 
such a destructive harvest. The aid they received was far out-weighed 
by the damage such dangerous Catholic connections wrought to their 
cause. Maitland unsuccessfully tried to distance himself and the Queen's 
party from the Barth.:,l'.lmew's Massacre but to no avail. 1 72 He knew only 
too well that it was the spur that would finally procure decisive 
English intervent ion. A let ter from Francis Walsingham to Mar, dated 7 
October 1572, perfectly illustrates the post-Barth(,lo.mew paranoia that 
was so detrimental to the Queen's party.173 Walsingham voiced the 
widespread view that the massacre was the first fruits of Trent and 
Bayonne. Scotland was the next and obvious target for the forces of 
international popery. Scotland's danger was now once again England's 
danger and in admitting as much Walsingham spelt out the bottom line 
that dictated Elizabeth's policy throughout the civil war. For it was 
only when the security of England was threatened that she fully 
addressed herself to the quest for a final settlement. The threat to 
England of a potentially papist and militant Scotland was just enough 
to jolt Elizabeth decisively, albeit slowly, into action. 
Just a month prior to the French massacre, the Queen's party had 
agreed to a two-month abstinence which ultimately lasted from 1 August 
1572 to 1 January 1573. 174 Opinion on the wisdom of this has varied. 
Maitland certainly regretted the consequences of it, which saw the 
King's party regain control of the burgh but Killigrew also saw the 
King's men as the losers of the truce. He was still fearful of the 
arrival of Alva and the military power of a revictualled Castle. 1 75 
Maitland, too, continued to emphasise to Mary the strategic importance 
of the Cast Ie, which was lay able to cast the ballance'. Maitland 
believed that 'For sa lang as the castel is preservid the cause will not 
perish' and that if the French had done their part, victory would 
already have been assured. 176 However, as Maitland seems to have 
realised all along, the solution did not lie in the Scots' own hands. 
Both Maitland and Mary seem to have conSistently felt that their best 
chance of gaining satisfaction lay in the enlistment of Elizabeth's 
support for their cause. Even at this late stage he urged Mary to try 
and effect a reconciliation with Elizabeth. 1 77 It is difficult at this 
juncture to see how such a rapprochement could have been effected. 
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Mait land, throughout. the abst inenceJ tried to procure such a 
reconciliation. He sought to do this by resuscitating his friendship 
with Burghley, reminding him yet again of their old father-and-son 
relationship and his willingness to follow his guidance once more. 
Maitland even sought to justify the disintegration of his friendship 
with Lord James. 1 78 Despite the resumpt ion of a mutual correspondence, 
it was a striking feat ure of Mait land's conduct during these and even 
darker days that he refused to follow Cecil's path and its desertion of 
Mary's cause. It is remarkable that Maitland, the great changeling of 
Scottish politics, remained steadfast to the end in his support for 
Mary and the Queen's part y. 
Maitland and Mary 
Whilst not wishing to stray into the moralistic and apologetic pitfalls 
that seem to plague any discussion pertaining to Mary, Maitland's 
personal relationship with his Queen must be examined if an accurate 
appraisal is to be made of his conduct in this final phase of the war. 
The question of how far Maitland was essentially Mary's man rather than 
an anti-King's party man is in any case a question of fundamental 
importance to this thesis. In addressing this issue it would be 
erroneous to ignore the fact that Maitland's behaviour did not conform 
to the pattern his opponents so vigo rously accused him of. It was 
certainly not for the lack of an opportunity to do otherwise that 
Maitland remained true to the cause of Mary. Both he and Kirkcaldy, 
could, almost at any point up until the final siege of May, have 
abandoned their resistance and secured their own personal safety. 
Repeated offers were made to Mait land to renounce Mary and enjoy a 
safe living in England yet repeatedly Maitland rejected those 
overtures. 179 Why? 
Quite possibly and with good cause, Maitland was perhaps suspicious 
of the sincerity of such offers. Alternat ively it has been suggested 
that the key to Maitland's steadfast resistance lay in his insatiable 
love of power and his bitter hatred of his opponents in the King's 
party.1 80 More than once it was claimed that Maitland acted out of 
spite for the King's men rather than for devotion to Mary. A slightly 
different almost altruistic slant, albeit consistent with Maitland's 
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deep-rooted opposition to the King's party, was suggested by Randolph. 
He believed, Maitland's Icourse is to bring home his mistress' but felt 
that it stemmed from his contempt for the King's party rather than Ito 
profyt himself'.181 Perhaps Randolph's perception was correct although 
it is hard to imagine Maitland being altogether unconcerned about 
himself. The rationale behind Maitland's conduct becomes even harder to 
detect if the view of Claude Nau - that Mary held him responsible 
above all others for her downfall and never forgave him - is taken into 
account. 1 82 However, if Mary was so bitterly opposed to Maitland why 
should he so resolutely refuse to come to terms with the King's party? 
Fortunately the evidence permits another interpretation. 
As noted earlier, Maitland admitted he had done Ivery ungodly' but 
was ready to accept Mary's judgement in the matter, 11 doubte not I 
shall be able to justifie my selfe in the pointe the quene hir selfe 
being judge whom the matter moste towcheth whose judgement in that 
behalf I shall not refuse '.1 83 The Maitland-Mary correspondence after 
1570 suggests that Maitland had been forgiven for his former crimes 
and the establishment of their genuine working relationship tends to 
support this view. Of course, one would not expect to find in this 
correspondence an open admission that he was manipulating Mary and 
that he was not really interested in her restitution. However, the tenor 
of their communication, allied to Maitland's consistent rejection of 
terms that would have secured his own safety, suggests that, perhaps as 
much as anyone in this phase of the war, he was a Marian rather than 
an opponent of the King's party. A clearer picture would probably 
emerge but for the number of letters between them that do not seem to 
have survived. Both constantly referred to letters which the other had 
not received, an indication of the great difficulties of communication 
the Queen's party suffered throughout the war, with many vital letters 
falling into their enemies ' hands. However, enough correspondence 
survives to be able to deduce the healthy state of the Mary-Maitland 
relationship.184 
In July 1570, Mary wrote in very friendly terms to Maitland, 
acknowledging 'the gritt skaith and dampnage by the hazard of your 
awne lyff that ye your father brother and friendis sufferis for your 
constancy in my cawses quhilk, God willing I hope to recompense nocht 
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withstanding all thir threatningis'.1 & S In March 1570, Mary had already 
paid tribute to Maitland's 'gritt trawell and pains ye haif for the 
avancement and weillfair of my effaris' and voiced her trust in him 
'referring all that may be neidfull to the weilfair of me effairis in 
thir partis to your wisdome'.1 86 Mary's friendly reference to Mary 
Fleming is also testament to the restoration of a more than business-
like relationship.187 A letter of Mary dated December 1571 to Maitland 
and Grange shows her realisation of their importanance to her cause, 'If 
you shall hold hard to them on the one side as I shall do on the other 
we shall yet wirk them a pirne that studyes to circumvene US'.1 a 8 While 
Maitland's support was anything but straightforward it is difficult to 
prove that he and Kirkcaldy did not hold firm. 
Although Maitland ultimately met with failure, his support of Mary 
was strongly tempered with realism. In August 1570, in a let ter to the 
Bishop of Ross, he voiced his desire to see Mary restored to her 
kingdom but offered prophetic words of caution to involvement with 
ambitious and dangerous escape plans: 
for albeit I wald be content to be banist Scotland all the dayes 
of my life to have the queen of scots obteynand liberty without 
the queen of England's consent for the great uncourtesy that scho 
hes usit unto hir rather than have it with hir consent ... because I 
would she might be even ... Yet I dare not advise her majesty to 
press it unless she be well assured that there is no kind of 
danger. 1 89 
In so doing Maitland predicted almost exactly the English handling of 
the Ridolfi affair, allowing it to run until they could 'trap her in a 
snare and so to execute against hir person their wicked intention'.1 90 
Regrettably for Maitland this letter was one of the many to fall into 
English hands. 
It is difficult, however, to detect that same sensible, cautious 
concern for Mary's best interests in Maitland's and Kirkcaldy's offer of 
April 1572 to Sir William Drury.1 9 1 This offer provides ammunition for 
those who prefer to see Maitland's resistance as intrinsically selfishly 
motivated. He and Kirkcaldy still refused to compromise on the 
fundamental issue of the establishment of Mary's authority as the basis 
for a reconciliation between the two Queens but were prepared to 
accept, in the meantime, the creation of a council equitably made up of 
King's and Queen's men and the detention of Mary at Elizabeth's 
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pleasure. The offer came to nothing but understandably Maitland and 
Kirkcaldy were anxious that their offer should be made known only to 
Cecil. It seems that Chatelherault and Seton were strongly opposed to 
any such deal. 1 92 However, if this was such a sell-out the obvious 
question is why was the opportunity not seized upon by an English 
government keen to obtain a settlement on the cheap? Perhaps they 
doubted Maitland's sincerity and were reluctant to grant him more time 
to gain himself and the Queen's party a stronger, bargaining counter, 
leading ultimately to the King's party's detriment and Mary's advantage. 
It is perhaps foolish given Maitland's own admitted rationale behind 
his poltical conduct to expect to find him following a straightforward 
course in this complex struggle. There is a good deal to be said for 
treating all Maitland's diplomatic offers with a sackful of salt. He had 
known all along the insincerity of the public avowals of Elizabeth and 
her ministers concerning their desire for an equitable settlement in 
Scotland. As early as August 1570 he was certain that Elizabeth 
'intends never with her goodwill to part with her and therefore to 
satisfy other princes, proponis the harder conditions which she thinks 
will be refused '.1 93 He advised both Mary and Lesley to play the 
English at their own game and agree to anything - regardless of the 
stringent conditions that might ensure Mary's return. Any 
disadvantages could be redressed once Mary was home. It is perhaps in 
this devious context that Maitland's offers to the English ought to be 
viewed. Like the English diplomats, what Maitland offered often bore no 
resemblance to what he was seeking to achieve. 
It is Maitland's self-interest that is at the crux of the debate as 
to how far he can be regarded as a Marian rather than as an opponent 
of the King's party. Maitland was clearly no altruist yet at the same 
time he was not supporting Mary for the good of his health. If that had 
been his motive he would surely have accepted Killigrew's invitations to 
retire to the comfort of an English spa. 194 As the cause of the Queen's 
party became more and more desperate, Maitland's own interest would 
surely have been better served by his desertion. He was too consummate 
a politician not to have been able to achieve a reconciliation 
guaranteeing his own personal security if he had so wished. This he 
refused to do. It would be wrong. however. to portray Maitland as 
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acting from a single and pure motive. There were few in either party 
who can have said to have acted in such a way. The recognition that 
Maitland's bitter contempt for the King's party stiffened his steadfast 
support of the Marian cause allows a more complete picture to emerge 
of his allegiance in this phase of the war. While he did not share the 
same principles as his kinsman Seton, who, seems to have acted 
consistently out of loyalty to Mary and Catholicism, ultimately, albeit 
paradoxically, there were few who could say they had sacrificed more 
for Mary than Maitland. Although Maitland had not always lived 
accordingly, the inescapable fact is that he died in Mary's service. 
Whatever the precise nature of Maitland's motives - and they cannot 
be established with total certainty - he was definitely not oblivious 
of the damage the war was doing to Scotland. In one of the most 
perceptive contemporary observations, albeit somewhat partial in 
apportioning the blame, Maitland warned of the inheritance James could 
look forward to if a satisfactory solution was not found. The abuse of 
the realm by the King's party 'without all contradiction or challenge to 
the contrary' would, according to Maitland ensure that James: 
shall fynde no kingdom at all apt for rewll bot in place thereof a 
confused chaos and a contrey deveyded in two or three hundred 
kyngdoms For if this state continue then shall in a short space of 
tyme start up two or three hundreth resembling Schane Q'Neile 
where of everyone wilbe a kyng in his owne boundes or in x myles 
compass. 1 95 
Maitland, here, depicted the total collapse of the often fragile balance 
of what has been termed the laissez faire kingship of the Stewarts. 1 9 b 
This was hardly surprising. If the scope for good lordship - 'the vital 
lubricant in magnatial politics' - was more limited in a regency;1 97 it 
was non-existent in a civil war, which, almost by definition represented 
the diSintegration of government by consent. The prediction that 
Scotland was heading the same way as Ireland was perhaps exaggerated, 
but it was a powerful indictment of the suspect motives of many within 
the King's party, motives that were at least as dubious as those they 
accused the Queen's party of possessing. 
The sheer hopelessness of the task facing the Castilians on the 
resumption of hostilities on 1 January 1573, with the King's party 
buoyed up with English aid, whilst they remained ever hopeful but 
bereft of foreign aid must have played a great part in the decision of 
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many to surrender. The touching appeal Maitland and Grange made to 
Huntly in February 1573 was symptomatic of the fact that they knew 
their candle was out. 1 98 They begged him to stay, using their old 
bargaining counters of the prospect of French aid, of Elizabeth's 
hesitant reluctance to undertake military action and the prospect of 
better times ahead. Unsuccessfully they urged him not to be too swayed 
by the capture at Blackness of James Kirkcaldy, who had recently 
returned, complete with desperately needed French money. The most 
extraordinary aspect of their appeal was that their argument was still 
tenable. The proof of this is that, even following the Pacification of 
Perth in February 1573, it was a further three months before the Castle 
was forced into surrender. Indeed, given Elizabeth's remarkably dilatory 
execution of her Scottish pOlicy, if substantial French aid had arrived 
then the struggle could have gone on inexorably.199 
The Morton Regency 
The accession of Morton in place of the less dynamic Mar undoubtedly 
speeded up the end of the war. More ruthlessly determined, Morton was 
quite prepared to resort to sixteenth-century chemical warfare tactics 
in his pursuit of victory. Recent arc~ological findings have supported 
the effectiveness of the poisoning of the Castle's water supplies. The 
sabotaging of St Margaret's Well with 'white arsenic and new limestones 
and filled up with dead carrions' was perhaps not the only instance of 
these underhand tactics by the King's party.2 0 0 There was certainly no 
love lost between Maitland and Morton and his appointment cannot have 
filled Maitland with optimism. However, shortly after his appointment as 
regent, Morton was struck by an illness that was expected ,to prove 
fatal. Maitland, too, was in ever declining health and the two bed-
ridden invalids conspired to provide one last amusing episode that is 
nonetheless instructive in the detail it sheds on the bitterness 
between the former allies. 20 1 
On hearing of Morton's illness Maitland attempted to throw an olive 
branch in his usual lofty style with the alleged, godly, intent of 
clearing both their consciences before their eternal judgement, 'sen God 
hes visiet bai th him and me with corporal! diseases and lit Ie liklihoud 
that evir we sall meit face to face'. Unsurprisingly it failed to effect 
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a reconciliation. In his letter, Maitland did not acknowledge Morton as 
regent but asked him to remember their old friendship and the favours 
he had done Morton, not the least of which was his role in securing for 
Morton the Chancellorship in 1562, even though Lord James was 
determined to obtain the same office for Marischal, his father-in-law. 
So much had Maitland done for the house of Angus and Morton that he 
alleged Morton had previously acknowledged his indebtedness saying, 
'thair sould a memorial of my kyndnes remaine in thair chart our 
kistis'.202 It was vintage Maitland and retorted to in some style by an 
angry and unrepentant Morton. He owed Maitland nothing and stated that 
Maitland had gained as much from their friendship as vice versa. As for 
a Douglas family memorial paying tribute to the services Maitland had 
rendered, 'Giff the memorie baith of his kyndnes and unkyndlie 
behavioure sould be placi t in our chartoure kist is, I thinke the last 
sould exceid the first '. 203 After this incident their relationship 
descended further into the bitterness from which Maitland's timely 
death provided his only escape. Maitland's public accusations that 
Morton's government shared the common errors of all 'unlawfull 
regementis' and that he had 'by hooke and by crooke ... intrusted 
himself in ane usurped auctoretye' were unlikely to endear him to the 
Regent but their days of friendship were in any case long since 
over.2 0 4 
The Pacification of Perth and the arrival of an English army on 25 
April signalled the end for Maitland and the Queen's party.2 0 5 Their 
only hope was foreign intervention. It was not forthcoming and, despite 
a determined, month-long resistance, anxiously await ing assistance, on 
29 May, hungry, parched and hopelessly outnumbered, an unconditional 
surrender was made. 2 0 6 The Scottish civil war had been won and lost 
and Maitland's political life was over. Within two weeks he himself was 
dead. 207 
In conclusion, the tortuous course of the civil war from 1570 to 
1573 had seen Mary's cause become Maitland's cause. That in itself was 
just one of the many contrasts between this final phase of his life and 
the outset of his political career during the Wars of the Congregation. 
The wheel had travelled full circle for Maitland. In place of his 
earlier anglophilia was a more traditional Scottish contempt for their 
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English neighbours. Maitland confessed, 'it breaks my hart to see us at 
this point that Englishmen may give us sik law as they will' and that 
the happiest news he could hear apart from the achievement of Mary's 
restitution, would be to discover Elizabeth 'had ben gane ad patres'.2 0 8 
This, together with Maitland's affectionate and respectful references to 
the auld alliance with France were a far cry from the days when 
Maitland actively pursued the perpetual, godly, union of England and 
Scotland under Elizabeth's rule free from French tyranny. The war had 
also witnessed the collapse of Maitland's 'father and son' relationship 
with Cecil. This was sadly confirmed by Cecil's own son Thomas, who 
witnessed the fall of the Cast Ie but refused to intercede with his 
father on Maitland's behalf. 2 0 9 Maitland made one last appeal to Cecil 
on behalf of the Cast ilians for Clemency on 29 May, recognising that 
'we dout not your lordShip is sore offended with us and perhaps not 
without caus'.21 0 It was a typical Maitland understatement. It was 
certainly his last. As this chapter has strived to show, Maitland, 
through his own conduct and extensive influence had given the English 
every good reason to be 'sore offended'. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study of Maitland's career from 1558-73 has revealed a picture 
considerably different and far more complex than any previous account 
of his life. This conclusion will briefly summarise the main findings of 
this thesis and discuss their implications for an assessment of 
Maitland's career and the period as a whole. 
Importance Of The Secretariat 
The most striking difference between this work and any other attempted 
on Maitland has been the attention it has paid to the seat of 
Maitland's power, the Secretariat. The development of the office has 
been traced from its fourteenth cent ury origins to its posit ion as the 
keystone of government in the 1560s. The full range of Mait land's vast 
responsibilities, relating to legal, administrative, financial, 
ecclesiatical and mercantile affairs has been acknowledged. These, 
together with his control of foreign poliCY and influence in parliament, 
the privy council, the Court of Session and the royal court itself, 
corroborate the view of the sixteenth-century as the age of the 
council, the Secretary and the court. 
Cultural Background 
The important contribution of the renaissance environment in which 
Maitland was raised by his father, the poet, judge, privy councillor, 
knight and family historian Sir Richard, to Mait land's ability to operate 
so successfully in the twin spheres of the court and the council has 
been explained. For the first time too, details of Maitland's university 
education have been stated with certainty, with his attendance at 
St.Leonards College at St. Andrews in 1540 and at the Collegia Caluicio 
at Paris in 1542 confirmed by documentary evidence. 1 In a sense this 
represents an almost conventional Protestant education, with ideas 
imbibed at the 'well of St. Leonards' supplemented by time in France. 
Yet this thesis has shown that Mait land was seldom - least of all in 
his religious convictions conventional. As far as religion was 
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concerned this was perhaps due to the Erasmian influences of his 
father. Sir Richard was described as 'civil albeit unpersuaded in 
religion' and was capable of extending hospitality to George Wishart 
shortly before his execution in 1546, but also of assisting Cardinal 
Beaton's escape from captivity in 1543. 2 It was perhaps this same even-
handedness that explains why Maitland, unlike so many of his 
contemporaries, took no part in the murder of the Cardinal in 1547. 
Maitland's Standing In Scottish Society 
Closely related to the influence of Maitland's family background, has 
been the clari ficat ion of Mait land's standing in Scot t ish society, and 
the discussion of the question of how the son of a laird came to hold 
such a position of power? In this respect it has been shown that 
Maitland's career adds weight to the notion of the rise of the lairds 
and of the 'middling sort' generally, a development that was to be such 
a major feature of seventeenth century Scottish society. The 'new-man' 
label can, however, only be at tached caut iously to Mait land. For while 
the elevation of the next generation of Maitlands to the peerage is in 
certain respects the epitome of the creat ion of a noblesse de robe, the 
Maitland family origins belong to the Anglo-Norman era of Scottish 
history. A similar qualificat ion against accept ing too enthusiast ically 
the rise of the lairds at this time is the fact that Maitland's 
influence was due solely to his position as Secretary. It was the office 
that made Maitland and not vice versa. While it was significant that a 
laird could exercise such power at all, individual lairds could not hope 
to make such an impact. In this sense the manner of Maitland's rise to 
power was an accurate portent for the later rise of so many more 
lairds which was achieved largely through the growing institutional 
power of the legal profession. 
Mai t land And Religion 
Inevitably in a career that encompassed, and was to a large part 
responsible for, the achievement of the victory of the Congregation and 
the establishment of the Scot t ish Reformat ion, this thesis has had much 
to say on the contentious issue of religion. Just as many recent 
studies on local manifestations of the Scottish Reformation have 
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contradicted John Knox's view that 'in religion thair is na middis', 
Maitland's career shows that the same was no less true on a national 
scale. This thesis has not undermined the role of religion in these 
years but rather shown how through all the major issues and not least 
in the Reformation crisis it was carefully channdled and managed. 
Maitland's vintage perormances in the Reformation parliament of 1560 
and the parliament of 1567 exemplify this and expose the inaccuracy of 
the view of the sixteenth-century as an age of religious 
fundamentalism. In this sense it is right to regard Mait land as a 
politique because he always sought to correlate the religious 
temperture to the wider political temperature. It has been noted that 
the most extreme Protestantism of his career coincided with the time 
when his political credit with Mary was at its lowest, even causing 
Maitland to abandon his consistent regard for a degree of liberty of 
conscience. 
Despite Knox's condemnation of Maitland as an atheist, and his claim 
that Maitland regarded hell as nothing more than an invention 'designed 
to fray bairns'3, this thesis has shown that Maitland's Protestantism 
while not of the same stamp as Knox's was no less well informed or 
sincere. Maitland's Protestantism was never in doubt. He was regarded 
by papal representatives as a 'thorough Huguenot' while even during the 
Spanish marriage negotiations which were so offensive to Knox, Alavro 
de La Quadra, the Spanish Ambasssador and bishop of Aquila, was well 
aware that Maitland 'was no more desirous of the restitution of 
Catholicism than Cecil'. While Maitland seemed to hunger for the powers 
the English government exercised over their second estate and sought 
the powers James VI was later to exert over the General Assembly, 
Maitland was happy to work within the framework of the kirk. In 
November 1572, Knox only escaped an embarrassing confrontation in his 
own kirk session, for his slanderous remarks on Maitland's religious 
convictions, by his death. Perhaps Maitland's major contribution to an 
understanding of the difficult birth of State Protestant ism in Scot land 
is his delineation of the heterogeneous composition of the religious 
body in Scot land, noted in chapter three. Maitland's simple recognit ion 
that as far as commitment to the new faith was concerned 'we be not 
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all alike', adds to the more complex r'ealism that has been such an 
impressive mark of so much recent Reformation research. 
Maitland's Unionism 
Whilst the popular image of Maitland as an Anglophile has been 
rejected, this thesis has also recognised that Maitland's major goal was 
the achievement of the union of the realms in perpetual amity. He was 
in no doubt of the enormity of this task. 'In music you see most 
different tunes will by art be reduced to a perfect harmony. I am sorry 
there are so few do plye there coming to accord the harmony of this 
isle'4. Although in 1560 in the Arran marriage proposal Maitland was 
responsible for the most radical and Anglophile unionism ever voiced by 
a pre-Union Scottish official, it is only in that early phase of his 
career that he can be termed an Anglophile. Such an image contrasts 
sharply with the later phase of his career when his regard for England 
was such that it 'breaks my hart to see us at this point that 
Englishmen may give us sik law as they will'. The complete volte-face 
Maitland had performed since 1560,when he had played such a crucial 
role in the achievement of the diplomatic revolution which saw the auld 
alliance exchanged for the new amity was shown by his confrontation 
with the represent at ives for the General Assembly in 1571. It was now 
Maitland's belief that Lennox as a foreigner an 'Englishman sworn' could 
never be 'lauchfull Regent to this realme' unlike the earlier regency of 
the French-born Duke of Albany which was legitimised according to 
Mait land because 'we ar joynd in leig and amity with France, but 
England hes bene over ould enemies's. 
Maitland was always a unionist but only briefly an Anglophile. It 
has been shown that from early January 1561, once Maitland realised 
Mary was returning, the amity was renegotiated along lines which held a 
consistent regard for Mary's honour and surety. It is very hard to 
argue with Maitland's profession that he had consecrated himself to the 
union of the realms. What has been debated in this thesis are the 
differing means he sought to achieve that goal. What has been offered is 
more than a critique of Maitland's attachment to the amity, it is a 
reappraisal. 
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The Context For Viewing Maitland's Career 
It is this more rounded and informed picture of Maitland - of his 
power, of the cultural influences at work on him, of his early years, of 
his sophisticated attitude towards the religious question and union -
that provides the basis of this thesis' interpretation of Maitland's 
career. In the eight chapters that cover his deep involvement with the 
major issues of 1558-73, it has not been necessary to succumb to the 
temptation that has plagued so many historical biographers of 
tortuously twisting events so as to emphasise the central importance of 
their chosen subject. It is difficult to see how any serious account of 
the years 1558-73 in Scotland's history could avoid recognition of 
Mait land and his at times magisterial influence over the course of 
events. Nor has it been necessary to indulge in the apologetics that 
mar too many essentially, biographical works. It has not been the 
intention in the best traditions of 1066 And All That to show Maitland 
as either a 'very good thing' or 'a bad thing', but rather to assess 
objectively his impact and his role in these remarkable years. 
Propaganda 
An examination of the development of sixteenth-century propaganda 
plays a major role in this thesis. The importance of the growing 
appeals to public opinion are dealt with in detail in chapter eight. The 
propaganda at tacks on Mait land, responSible to a large part for his 
unsavoury historical reputation have been refuted, not out of a desire 
so evident in earlier biographies to endow his character in some sort 
of saintly. innocent glow but for the sake of an historical approach, 
based on hard fact and evidence rather than prejudice. There is in fact 
a good deal of useful information to be gleaned from the hugely biased 
propaganda. The frequency of the attacks on Maitland attests to his 
importance and shows how much his many talents, including his ability 
to 'lay a plaster over the wound of variance' was feared. 
Maitland's Inconstancy 
The most spectacluar charges laid against Maitland can be found in 
George Buchanan's Chameleon, which brilliantly lampoons Maitland's many 
changes of allegiance. This thesis has charted those changes in detail 
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his betrayal of Mary of Guise, his radical unionism in the 
Reformation crisis and the Arran marriage proposal, his volte-face of 
January 1561 when he realised the impending return of Mary, his 
complete support of her until 1565 and the Darnley marriage, his major 
role in the at tempted coup of 1566, his rehabilitation but sUbsequent 
leading role in her deposition and then finally his role as the leader 
of the Queens Party. Yet this thesis has also recognised Maitland's own 
admission that he regarded his his ability to adapt as an essential 
or 
political virtue. Chapter eight has shown this in detail but several 
points are worth noting here. Maitland was right to regard this ability 
to change as a political necessity. The years of his political influence 
were years of almost constant fluXi as Cecil admitted, nothing in 
Scotland stood sti11 and those who did were destined to sink in the 
quagmire that was Scottish politics. Maitland was not the only one in 
Scotland not to stand still and it is interesting to note that the 
crafty Buchanan, Maitland's most bitter critic was hardly a model of 
consistency. Even Cecil, the revered elder statesman of Elizabethan 
history, whom Maitland adopted as his role-model and who is never 
portrayed as a chameleon, could teach Maitland a thing or two about 
trimming his sails. It says little for Cecil's constancy that he was 
able to serve without too many qualms, the somewhat diverse regimes of 
Somerset, Northumberland, Mary and Elizabeth.6 It is perhaps a reminder 
that history is very often the history of the winner that it is Cecil 
who is regarded as the statesman and Maitland the chameleon. 
Maitland's Political Rationale 
For all Maitland's admission that he regarded change as essential and 
that he considered it absurd to be regarded as 'inconstancie', 'if two 
or thre yeres ago I had thought a matter convenient to be done which 
now I think altogether unfit '7, it was his opinion that there was an 
underlying consistency to his actions. According to Maitland, 
underpinning his many vicissitudes was a zeal for the commonwealth. In 
1570 Maitland professed that, 'The chief thing we ought moste to 
respect is our countrey, the common parent of us all and the quiet te 
there off. To that ende we must direct all our actions's. It was 
Mai t land's firm convict ion that his act ions had been in keeping with 
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this dictum. Maitland's consistent use of the language of the 
commonweal to just ify his act ions has been acknowledged throughout 
this thesis, but as was shown in chapter six, in the discussion of the 
attempted coup of 1566, the broad and respectable resort to the 
language of the commonweal provided a very large and convenient 
umbrella to shelter some far less respectable motives. It is 
unquestionable that Maitland throughout his career was motivated to a 
cetain extent by selfish concerns, and his strong self-presevatory 
instincts have been acknowledged in his late defection from Mary of 
Guise to the Congregation, his refusal to join the Chaseabout· rebellion 
and in his late decision to join the confederacy arraigned against Mary 
and Bothwell. Yet while Maitland was capable of exploiting the langv.)ge 
of the commonweal, it is the content ion of this thesis that Maitland's 
actions were in the main guided by this concern. 
This thesis has not been able to shed any preCision on the question 
of Mait land's date of birth or in the manner of his death, which st ill 
remains one of the many unsolved mysteries of this period. It is hoped, 
however, that as a result of this study, the impact of his career from 
1558-1573 is clearer than ever before and that a useful contribution 
has been made to the further erosion of the plague of Mariolatry that 
has for too long impeded serious historical analysis of this period of 
Scottish history. 
NOTES 
1 J.M. Anderson <ed.), Early Records of the University of St. 
Andrews.245, and W.A. McNeill, 'Scottish entries in the Acta Rectoria 
Universitatis Parisiensis', SHR. 43, (1964), 66-83. 
2 Knox, History, i, 43. ' 
3 Bannatyne, Memorials. 281. 
4 SP 52.18.61. 
5 Bannatyne, Memorials, 132. 
6 Read, Cecil, chapters 1-5, passim. 
7 SP 52.19.5. 
8 SP.52.19.5. 
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